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Preface
My first experience with arbitration was as an articled clerk in a construction dispute in Perth, 
Western Australia, in 2004. The arbitrator was a very fair man, and the proceedings were 
conducted efficiently and without incident. To me, the only appearance was one of complete 
impartiality and fairness. This prompted me to ask myself what if the arbitrator was not 
impartial, and what would I need to show the court if I wanted to challenge him? When I 
looked at the statutes and case law, I found that the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test would be 
decisive of such an application, but that different tests had been used in other countries, 
namely England. As my curiosity grew, I found that bias challenges were in fact quite 
common in arbitration, particularly international commercial arbitration. When I asked why, I 
saw that many of the countries in which international arbitrations are held use the ‘reasonable 
apprehension’ test which, it seemed to me, set the bar fairly low. This then led me to ask 
myself whether the ‘reasonable apprehension’ makes it too easy to challenge an arbitrator. 
My conclusion in this thesis is that it does, and that a higher threshold for the appearance of 
bias should be used for international commercial arbitration. 
What follows is an indictment of the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test for apparent bias in so far 
as it applies to international arbitrators in certain states. This thesis is not an argument against 
use of the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test in public law contexts, where the presumption of 
innocence and the policy imperative of public confidence undeniably justify its use. This 
thesis is about international commercial arbitration. It is intended to be a mixed theoretical 
and practical response to the procedural problem of tactical bias challenges in international 
commercial arbitration. I hope that it goes some way to achieving these objectives. 
This thesis is dedicated to my wonderful parents Kevin and Sally, whose love and support has 
made everything possible. 
I would like to thank my supervisor and dear friend, Professor Gabriël Moens, Dean of Law 
at Murdoch University, for introducing me to international commercial arbitration and 
guiding me in my studies. I would also like to thank Professor Phil Evans for leading me to 
academia by offering me my first teaching job, without which offer I am sure I would never xxxix
have undertaken a PhD. Finally, I am grateful to Professor Peter Gillies (Macquarie 
University), Professor Doug Jones AM, The Hon. Neil Brown QC, A. A. de Fina OAM and 
Professor Derek Roebuck for their advice and encouragement over the last four years.
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CHAPTER 1
Bias in International Commercial Arbitration
Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and 
to decide impartially
- Socrates
1. Introduction
This thesis is concerned with procedural fairness in International Commercial Arbitration 
(ICA). Although ICA can be characterised as a ‘non-national’ process, it will earth itself in 
national legal systems at various stages. After all, national law is what makes arbitration 
binding. Today, all national laws require that some degree of procedural fairness be observed 
when the rights and liabilities of citizens are determined. In Civil Law states this requirement 
will usually be positively expressed in the form of an article of the municipal code of civil 
procedure that makes equal treatment of the parties a precondition for a valid decision or 
states the grounds on which a judge will be disqualified. In Common Law jurisdictions, 
where the expression ‘procedural fairness’ is often used interchangeably with the more 
emotive label ‘natural justice’
1, the requirement is often expressed in the negative as a 
binding rule of precedent that a denial of natural justice shall entitle the affected party to 
challenge the decision maker or apply for judicial review of their determination. Americans 
call it ‘due process’, and to some extent this expression has caught on in ICA. 
Modern principles of procedural fairness are derived from two maxims of law. The first is 
that no man shall be condemned unheard
2. The second is that every man has a right to an 
impartial (and independent) adjudicator, a corollary of which is that no man may be a judge 
   
1 The writer prefers the term ‘procedural fairness’ because it refers only to procedure, and does not extend to the 
set of ‘fundamental’ or ‘natural rights’ sometimes associated with the expression ‘natural justice’.   
2 The maxim audi alteram partem2
in his own cause: nemo debet esse judex in propria causa
3. Observation of the first maxim 
includes the recognition of the right to be heard, present evidence, make submissions, and 
confront one’s accusers. Abiding by the second will mean that only a person who has no 
significant interest in the cause and no preference with respect to the parties involved may sit 
in determination of it. It is with the operation of the second maxim in international 
commercial disputes that this thesis is principally concerned. 
2. International Commercial Arbitration (ICA)
Arbitration is at present the best means of peacefully establishing and preserving the rule of 
law in the world marketplace. There is no omni-jurisdictional world commercial court and no 
international bailiff to enforce state court judgments abroad. Most states have very few civil 
judgments enforcement agreements with other states; the United States, the world’s largest 
economy, is not party to one. As a result, ICA is essential to the proper functioning of global 
markets. In 1999, Klaus Peter Berger estimated that 90% of all cross-border trade contracts 
contained  clauses stipulating that, in the event of a dispute, the parties will submit to 
arbitration
4. The figure would certainly be higher today; indeed we may even be at the stage 
where it can safely be said that ‘nearly all international contracts have arbitration clauses’. 
Arbitration is a flexible process for the final determination of private rights in international 
contexts; when parties submit to arbitration they agree to appoint a third party (or third 
parties, in the case of multi-member tribunals common in high value disputes) to act quasi-
judicially and finally decide their rights, duties and obligations in the dispute. Unlike the 
orders of national courts, arbitral awards are portable – there is no international enforcement 
instrument for court judgments comparable to the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). The New York Convention allows 
parties to transact across borders safe in the knowledge that, if a dispute arises, they will not 
have to press their substantive rights in the other party’s national courts in order to get a final 
result. The prospect of trial in foreign courts is alarming for a number of reasons: the 
substantive and procedural laws that apply may be different or poorly developed and the 
processes of the court may be inefficient or costly. There are also the risks of parallel 
   
3 The short form of this maxim is ‘nemo judex in sua causa’, or simply nemo judex. The writer will use the latter 
throughout this thesis.
4 Berger, K.P., The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer, 1999), p.703
proceedings in different countries and the operation of exotic conflict of laws rules 
determining jurisdiction. 
From the international businessman’s perspective the most significant risk is that judges in 
other states may be biased against foreign parties. As Humphrey O’Sullivan said in 1831 
‘there is little use in going to law with the devil while the court is held in hell’
5. Private 
international actors go to arbitration to avoid adjudicatory risks, especially the risk of bias. It 
follows that safeguarding procedural fairness is a key concern in arbitral processes. The New 
York Convention recognises this by providing certain exceptions to the enforcement and 
recognition of foreign arbitral awards, one of which is that that the enforcement of the award 
would be contrary to ‘public policy’. 
It will be observed in this thesis that public policy has procedural and substantive facets; the 
New York Convention public policy exception therefore covers situations where one party 
has been denied procedural fairness by the tribunal in that one or more of its members were 
biased or had a conflict of interest when they sat. For Lew, Mistelis and Kroll, the ‘Magna 
Carta’ of ICA has two main rules: 
(1) Due process and fair hearing; and 
(2) The independence and impartiality of arbitrators
6
Whilst it is right and proper to safeguard procedural fairness, experience has shown that wily 
defendants are willing to abuse it and cry bias as a way of delaying proceedings and escaping 
enforcement. Practitioners confirm this. Writing in 2004, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter 
described ‘the ever-increasing recourse to arbitrator challenges as a means of delaying 
arbitrations or depriving a party of the arbitrator of its choice’
7. In 2006, Vice President of the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) William Park identified ‘spurious attacks 
on arbitrators’ independence’ as one of the four ‘problematic elements of arbitral procedure’
8. 
Driven by user-concern, the same year the LCIA resolved to start publishing its decisions on 
challenges. On the Continent, Finnish lawyer Matti Kukela has observed that ‘the problem 
   
5 Diary of Humphrey O’Sullivan, 6 January 1831, in Park, below note 8, p. 423
6 Lew, J.D.M., Mistelis, L.A., Kroll, S.M., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer 2003), 
p.95
7 Redfern, A., Hunter., M., Blackaby, N., Partasides, P., Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (Thompson 2004), p.294
8 Park, W, Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice (Oxford 2006), p.4504
[of conflicts of interest] seems to be increasing
9. Similarly, in their 2008 European review 
English lawyers David Foster and David Edwards note
the frequency of challenges in European arbitration seems to be increasing. Parties (or 
their legal advisors) have become highly adept at identifying a perceived flaw in the 
arbitral process or an extraneous factor affecting the partialityof an arbitrator, and are 
increasingly willing to make a formal objection when the opportunity arises
10
Using anecdotal and empirical evidence – mostly in the form of case law but also some 
institutional statistics - this thesis will show that the rate at which bias challenges are being 
made is increasing, such that bias challenges are now a key means of ‘playing dirty’ in ICA. 
Mantilla-Serrano reports that ‘challenging the arbitrator on frivolous grounds’ is one solution 
to ‘clients’ pressing demands for immediate corrective action in the face of arbitrators’ 
procedural decisions against which there is no recourse’
11. Margaret Moses has pointed the 
finger at Common Law practitioners, writing ‘as international arbitration becomes 
increasingly adversarial, there are more possibilities that a challenge to an arbitrator is simply 
a tactic to delay the proceedings’
12.  Whilst the record shows that some challenges are
justified, Professor Moses is right: the objective of a challenge is more often to cause delay, 
disrupt the Claimant’s case, and pressure the arbitrator into recusing himself. There are ways 
a challenge can be set up. One of the dirtiest tricks is to telephone the arbitrator and record 
the conversation, in the hope that the ex parte communication will yield some impropriety 
which will be admissible as evidence in a challenge to the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence. The cases surveyed in this thesis will reveal other ways of setting up 
challenges to arbitrators, not as a ‘how to’, but rather to warn users of arbitration (including 
arbitrators). 
The writer sees an emerging ‘Black Art’ of bias challenge in ICA, and the way arbitration 
should respond is the central theme of this thesis. This thesis will make the point that ‘dirty’ 
challenge tactics are made viable by the prevalence of a judicially derived test for apparent 
bias which focuses on appearances, rather than facts. The writer will also argue that the 
   
9 Kurkela, Matti S., Due Process in International Commercial Arbitration (Oceana 2005), p.159
10 Foster, D, and Edwards, D., ‘Challenges to Arbitrators’, The European and Middle Eastern Arbitration 
Review 2008, pp.2-3, available at www.globalarbitrationreview.com
11 Mantilla-Serrano, F, ‘Towards a Transnational Procedural Public Policy’, in Schlaepfer, A, Pinsolle, P, Degos 
(eds), Towards a Uniform International Arbitration Law? (Juris 2005), p.194-5
12 Moses, M. L., The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge 2008), p.1415
Black Art of bias challenge is further aided by the ‘lack of clear guidance on the standards to 
apply in making disclosure’
13, and the very personality of the decision maker bias challenges
target. Arbitrators are not public officials in Hobbesian social contract with a sovereign state 
like judges are, but rather ‘commercial men’ with private interests and lives; professional 
friends and personal foes. That they are something of a cartel is proven by the fact that the 
international arbitration community is regularly described as a ‘mafia’
14, by both insiders and 
outsiders. According to one leading arbitrator 
It’s a mafia because people appoint one another. You always appoint your friends –
people you know. It’s a mafia because policy-making is done at these [ICC and 
ICCA] gatherings
15
There is real strength to this description: the group is small, oligarchic, largely self-regulating 
and geared around the exchange of favours. It has been put that ‘because arbitrators get paid 
only when selected to serve, arbitrators have an incentive to favour parties more likely to 
select them in future’
16. Studies of consumer and employment arbitration in the United States 
have called this ‘Repeat Player Bias’
17. The pool of arbitrators in regular service in 
international disputes is made up mostly of barristers, partners of large international law firms 
and senior law professors. These actors demonstrate a high degree of role reversability: he (or 
she) who sits as arbitrator in one matter is just as likely to stand as counsel in the next; he 
who is doing the challenging today may himself be challenged tomorrow. This is not theory –
it is reality. We need only look at the Telekom Malaysia matter of 2005 to see how 
complicated things can get: two out of three arbitrators (including the challenged arbitrator, 
Professor  Emmanuel Gaillard) were members of the nineteen-member International Bar 
Association Working Party that drafted the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration in 2004; so was counsel for the challenger (Arthur Mariott QC)
18. 
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14 Dezalay, Y, Garth, B.G., Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a 
Trans-national Legal Order (University of Chicago, 1996), p.50
15 Ibid 
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17 Ibid 
18 Telkom Malaysia v Republic of Ghana, decision of the District Court of The Hague, 18 October 2004 
(Challenge No. 13/2004; Petition No. HA/RK/2004.667). The Telekom Malaysia matter is discussed in Chapter 
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This equation has positive and negative integers. Writing in 1996, Dezalay and Garth 
observed: 
Because of a mixing of roles, the same individuals who belong to the networks around 
the central institutions of arbitration [ICC, LCIA et al] are found in the roles of 
lawyers, co-arbitrators, or chairs of the arbitral tribunal. The principal players 
therefore acquire a great familiarity with each other, and they develop also, we 
suspect, a certain connivance with respect to the role held by the adversary of the 
moment. The extraordinary flexibility of this rotation of roles contributes greatly to 
the smooth running of these mechanisms of arbitration
19  
The situation is ‘Catch 22’: whilst the international arbitration system works well because its 
actors know each other, the perceived validity of their deliberations is jeopardised by this 
very fact. Institutions have reacted sharply to this - maintaining the integrity and reputation of 
international arbitration was a driving concern behind the IBA Guidelines
20. But it was the 
clients who noticed first: a party to a large international arbitration may well be alarmed to 
enter the room and find that everybody (including their own lawyers) knows one another 
except them. The people they see might be current or former partners of the same law firm, 
members of the same chambers, panelists at the same arbitral institution; sworn enemies or 
dear friends. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to see that by far the most common ground for 
bias challenge is professional relationship between the arbitrator and a party or their 
counsel
21. Allegations of pecuniary interest bias are catching up. The increased uptake and 
use of arbitration as a dispute resolution method has corresponded with an unprecedented 
increase in the economic and social interdependency of states and private individuals. The 
drafters of the IBA Guidelines noted:
The growth of international business and the manner in which it is conducted, 
including interlocking corporate relationships and larger international law firms, have 
caused more disclosures [of conflicts of interest] and have created more difficult 
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20 See paragraph 4 of the Introduction to the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration 
(2004), where the Working Party stressed ‘The Working Group has attempted to balance the various  interests of 
parties, representatives, arbitrators and arbitral institutions, all of whom have a responsibility for ensuring the 
integrity, reputation and efficiency of international commercial arbitration’ 
21 Bond, S.R., ‘The International Arbitrator: From the Perspective of the ICC Court of Arbitration’ (1991) 12 
NW J Int L & Bus 1, p.207
conflict of interest issues to determine. Reluctant parties have more opportunities to 
use challenges to arbitrators to delay arbitrations or deny the opposing party the 
arbitrator of its choice
22
In a similar vein to the IBA Working Party, Ahmed El-Kosheri and Karim Youssef wrote 
recently:
In the world of globalised business and legal services in which international 
commercial arbitration operates, many, if not most, players are in some way 
acquainted with each other
23
Whilst there is nothing new about international trade, the volume and scale of current 
international capital exchange has no precedent in history. The world market we participate in 
today must be seen as a new construct
24. We can now transact at distances and speeds that 
were unthinkable a century ago. The efficiency of modern cross-border transactions is 
correlated to arbitration; market efficiency has increased as the law and practice of 
international arbitration has developed to guarantee investors the ability to avoid foreign 
courts. William Park has said: 
no econometric model should be required for the proposition that merchants and 
investors will be less likely to enter into business transactions if they fear that 
potential disputes will be settled by biased judges of the other side’s home courts
25
The fear of bias lies at the very heart of ICA, so much so that it might not be too much to say 
that the prevention of partiality is its raison d’etre. 
   
22 The IBA Guidelines are discussed in Chapter 6. 
23 El-Kosheri, M.,  Youssef, K., ‘The Independence of International Arbitrators: An Arbitrator’s Perspective’, 
ICC Bulletin 2007 (Special Supplement), p.48
24 We can place the turning point – what economic historian Fernand Braudel called the evenement – in the 
closing stages of the Second World War. In July 1944 the victors-to-be met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 
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International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and GATT as the parent instrument of 
the various bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (notably the Marrakech Agreement which established 
the World Trade Organisation) which frame investor-state arbitration today.
25 Above note 8, p. 5138
3. Variation in National Court Approaches to Arbitrator Bias
Actual bias will always be actionable; an award made by an arbitrator who was actually 
biased against a party will be null and void in every jurisdiction that has an arbitration law. 
The writer has found no exceptions. In Chapter 6 the writer will show that this rule is so 
widely accepted that is part of the lex mercatoria. It is so well settled as to be 
uncontroversial, and for this reason the writer will not dwell on it. Rather, this thesis is more 
concerned with apparent bias (or what the Europeans call ‘objective bias’
26), in relation to 
which the writer will expose a paradox: although the equal treatment and challenge 
provisions of most national arbitration laws are very similar, the tests for apparent bias are 
very different seat-to-seat. The writer will show that this paradox stands even amongst 
UNCITRAL Model Law states, where the relevant posited law is identical and, supposedly, 
uniform. 
In the  four survey chapters of this thesis, the writer will demonstrate that there are three 
competing tests for apparent bias in the leading arbitral seats of the world today. As a 
Common Law practitioner, the writer will use designations derived from English case law to 
describe these standards. The competing tests are: 
(1) the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test (the ‘Sussex Justices test’). This test requires 
that ‘a fair minded and informed observer would have a ‘reasonable apprehension’ 
that the arbitrator was biased. It is derived from the judgment of Lord Hewart CJ 
in Sussex Justices. In Chapters 2 and 5 the writer will observe that the majority of 
Common Law states follow the Sussex Justices test, and in Chapter 3 the reader 
will see that the test for bias under European Human Rights Law is to all intents 
and purposes the same. 
(2) the ‘real possibility’ test (the ‘Porter v Magill’ test). This test requires that ‘a fair 
minded and informed observer would say that there was a ‘real possibility’ that 
the arbitrator was biased. It comes from the 2002 decision of the House of Lords 
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in Porter v Magill. In Chapter 5 the writer will observe that nearly all of the 
Common Law states that followed Gough now follow Porter v Magill. In this 
thesis the  Porter v Magill test will be shown to be the middle ground or 
‘compromise’ test: its First Arm (court vantage) comes from Sussex Justices and 
its Second Arm (‘real danger’) comes from Gough. 
(3) the ‘real danger’ test (the ‘Gough test’). This test requires that the Court must find 
there to be a ‘real danger’ of bias before apparent bias will be made out. It comes 
from the decision of the House in Gough. Chapter 2 will show that the Gough test 
has the highest threshold in its Second Arm, and a different First Arm to Sussex 
Justices (Gough doesn’t use a ‘reasonable third person’ vantage point). 
In this thesis the writer will argue that the second and third tests - ‘real possibility’ and ‘real 
danger’ - make it harder to succeed on an allegation that there was a lack of impartiality and 
independence. This makes the arbitral award stronger at the all-important enforcement stage. 
Given that there is a trans-national public policy strongly in favour of the use of arbitration as 
a means of settling international commercial disputes, and accepting that a process is only as 
good as its product, it will be argued that the ‘real danger’ test, or failing that the ‘real 
possibility’ test, should be used in ICA because it limits the prospect of arbitrators being 
removed and arbitral awards being rendered unenforceable for bias. It is the purpose of this 
thesis to reason out this conclusion.  
4. Sourcing Procedural Fairness in ICA
The modern rules of procedural fairness grew up around public and ‘quasi-public’ bodies. 
One need only skim the pages of an administrative law text book to see that racing 
associations, licensing authorities and trade unions have played an equal (perhaps even 
superior) role in the development of the laws of procedural fairness as municipal courts and 
tribunals. These origins have not prevented the application by analogy of these rules to 
private bodies like arbitral tribunals. Indeed, this thesis will show that the vast majority of 
modern legal systems impose the same standard of impartiality and independence on 
arbitrators as they do upon judges. 10
Most national arbitration laws do not allow the parties to contract out of the ‘fundamental’ 
rules of procedural fairness
27. These fundamental rules include the right to challenge for a 
lack of impartiality or independence
28. Impartiality and independence are mandatory 
requirements under Article 4 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985; as amended in 
2006)
29. Arbitration agreements that purport to totally exclude the rules of procedural fairness 
will be read down by most national courts on the basis of offence to public policy
30. The 
writer takes no issue with this – these basic rules are essential to arbitration and it is rational 
to treat them as mandatory. And even if their exclusion ex contractus was permissible it 
would, practically speaking, be very difficult to achieve. This is because the rules of 
procedural fairness enter the arbitral process in different ways and at different stages. 
According to William Park ‘the international  business lawyer must call the talents of an 
archeologist to find legal sources, and on the skills of comparative anthropology to discern 
what judicial decisions will be enforced in a cross-border dispute’
31. Whilst this is certainly 
true for the sources of substantive law, the writer has found procedural law to be less 
hazardous. The three sources of the rules of procedural fairness in ICA are:
(1) Municipal laws: the municipal arbitration law of a state – be it a  sui generis
Arbitration Act or a chapter of the local code of civil procedure – will bind the 
tribunal to act fairly. All of the municipal arbitration laws studied in this thesis
include the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (1958)
32. Some include the UNCITRAL Model Law. The 
‘impartialityand independence’ provision of the Model Law (Article 12) is referred to 
regularly in this thesis. Attaining status as a New York Convention state is a relatively 
simple matter of accession and ratification. Becoming a Model Law state is more 
complicated; the Model Law is not a Convention. It is a template municipal law with 
   
27 See for example Bezerksgericht, Affoltern am Albis, 26 May 1994, XXIII YBCA 754 (1998) at 24-7, 
confirmed by the Zurich Court of Cassation, 26 July 1995, where the court refused to enforce an award rendered 
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28 See Bezerksgericht, Affoltern am Albis, 26 May 1994, XXIII YBCA 754 (1998) at 24-7, confirmed by the 
Zurich Court of Cassation, 26 July 1995. 
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30 See the decision of the Higher Regional Court of Cologne, 10 June 1976, IV YBCA 258 (1979) at 6, cited in 
Lew et al, above note 6 at 308. Exceptions are limited to those states that allow the parties to contract out of 
state court supervision: Tunisia, Turkey, Switzerland and Belgium. 
31 Above note 8, p.518
32 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘New York Convention’ or the ‘NYC’ 11
certain optional provisions (eg. the Article 7 ‘Agreement in Writing’ requirement). A 
state becomes a Model Law seat by passing a municipal arbitration law which 
UNCITRAL considers to be a Model Law statute. At present there are around 45 
Model Law states – the figure is inexact due to variation in the status of the enacting 
political units: some are states (eg. Australia) and some are territories within states 
(eg. Macau and Hong Kong are Model Law Special Administrative Regions of the 
People’s Republic of China, which as a country is not Model Law)
33. Some Model 
Law states enact and add to the template of the Model Law – the arbitration laws of 
these seats are referred to by ICA specialists as ‘Model Law Plus’.  
(2) Institutional rules: institutional rules are usually incorporated by reference into the 
arbitration agreement. Since the foundation of the International Chamber of 
Commerce in 1923, ICA has been in a process of competitive ‘institutionalisation’
34. 
Although every institution is different, the procedural rules of all arbitral institutions 
require that basic rules of procedural fairness be observed in the decision making 
process. When a set of institutional rules are chosen, they ‘out-rank’ all but the 
mandatory provisions of the municipal law of the seat in which they are put to use. If 
the rules prescribe a process for the determination of challenges to arbitrators, then so 
long as it does not offend the mandatory laws of the seat this process will have to be 
exhausted before recourse to a state court is available to the aggrieved party. An 
example of this institutional challenge model can be found in the arbitration rules of 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). The SCC rules provide that when a 
challenge is made, the matter will go to a standing panel of the Arbitration Institute of 
the SCC for final determination
35.   
(3) The Arbitration Agreement: the Doctrine of Party Autonomy allows for the tailoring 
of the arbitral process within the parameters of the mandatory laws of the seat. This is 
most common on ad hoc arbitrations. Party Autonomy requires that the number of 
provisions of a municipal arbitration law that are treated as mandatory (or non-
waivable) is minimal. For the most part, it is open to the parties to make their own 
rules, including (to a limited extent) rules of procedural fairness. This thesis will 
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assert this prerogative in that the writer will propose a ‘Gough Clause’ in which a 
higher standard for the disqualification of arbitrators is implemented. 
There is, depending on your view, a fourth source: trans-national customary commercial law 
(or lex mercatoria). In the last quarter of the twentieth century, international legal practice 
and European scholarship (Berthold  Goldman,  Klaus-Peter  Berger  et al) revived the lex 
mercatoria. In Chapter 6 the writer will argue that lex mercatoria is a valid source of the 
rules of procedural fairness in ICA, and that the trans-national customary expression of the 
rule against bias is the same as the ‘justifiable doubts’ wording of Article 12 of the Model 
Law. As for the test that informs the rule, the writer will argue that the IBA Guidelines are lex 
mercatoria, and that they display a preference for the test in Porter v Magill. 
The IBA Guidelines identify circumstances that may expose arbitrators to bias challenges. 
They include three colour-coded ‘Application Lists’: Red, Orange and Green
36. The Red List 
deals with situations where a conflict of interest exists. In recognition of the Doctrine of Party 
Autonomy (and its limits), the Red List is split in two. The ‘Non-Waivable Red List’ 
identifies conflicts of interest where the arbitrator must not act; the situations in the 
‘Waivable Red List’ must be disclosed, and the arbitrator may only act where the parties are 
fully aware and give their express consent. In the middle is the Orange List, which describes 
situations where a conflict could exist in the eyes of the parties. At the far end of the 
spectrum is the Green List of matters where no conflict of interest will exist and disclosure is 
not necessary. 
The writer will examine this fourth source separately in Chapter 6. Until then the focus will 
be on posited arbitration law. 
5. The Role of the Lex Arbitri 
The first point of entry is the election of a procedural law for the arbitration – the lex arbitri) 
- which may take the ‘singular’ form of a contractual choice of a place for the proceedings 
(which brings with it a national procedural law to govern them
37) or the ‘dual’ form of a seat 
   
36 The full text of the IBA Guidelines Application Lists is included in Chapter 6  
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and a set of rules (eg. the clause states ‘ICC Rules Arbitration in Singapore’). Allegations of 
bias that invoke the procedural rules of the arbitration (as opposed to the principles of 
procedural fairness recognised in the law of the seat) are usually made whilst the proceedings 
are under way. Depending upon the lex arbitri, the allegation will either be made as a 
challenge heard by the tribunal, or as separate institutional or state court proceedings for the 
removal of an arbitrator. In contrast, once the award is made it will be the bias law of the seat 
that will be pleaded in an annulment application. Indeed, this is the only option in some
states: American arbitration law, for example, provides no procedure for mid-arbitration bias 
challenges - the parties simply have to wait for an award to be handed down before they can 
make the bias challenge in the form of an application for annulment. This approach is, 
however, a rarity; all Model Law countries, and the vast majority of leading non-Model Law 
seats, have arbitration laws which expressly provide for mid-proceeding challenge and 
removal ofarbitrators. 
The second point of entry is at the stage of enforcement of the arbitral award under the New 
York Convention. This is when national laws other than the mandatory laws of the seat will 
be relevant. There are two possibilities in the post-award phase. First, bias may be pleaded as 
a compositional irregularity for the purposes of New York Article V(1)(d) – member states 
may refuse to enforce awards where the composition of the delivering arbitral authority was 
not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration was conducted. Secondly, 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention provides that the recognition and enforcement 
of a foreign arbitral award may be refused by the national courts of a member state if its 
enforcement or recognition would be contrary to the public policy of that state. Article V(1) 
is for the party opposing the award to plead. The grounds listed at Article V(2) may be 
invoked by the court on its own initiative  sua sponte. The public policy exception is, 
therefore, a reserve power to refuse enforcement that is at the court’s convenience. 
6. The New York Convention and ‘Public Policy’ 
The origins of the expression ‘public policy’ lie in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. For the 
purposes of this preface, public policy can be defined as the set principles that protect the 
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beyond the scope of this thesis, but does have interesting ramifications for procedural fairness. See the 
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interests of a community. Its meaning is not fixed by the New York Convention, and the most 
states prefer to ‘define the exact exclusion rule as each situation arises’
38. The Civil Law
equivalent of public policy is probably ‘public order’ (ordre public)
39, although it may be that 
this Continental expression connotes ‘a wider range of judicial concerns’
40 than the Anglo-
Saxon notion of ‘public policy’. Public morals, health and safety are widely (if not 
universally) recognised public policy considerations; so are the prohibitions against fraud and 
corruption, and ‘internationally recognised basic standards of human rights and morality’
41. 
But the devil is in the details: some public policy considerations are ‘state-specific’. State-
specific public policy considerations are reflections of the economic and social preferences of 
individual national communities. They are not necessarily shared by other communities. For 
example, the domestic public policy of a free market state will include a policy rule that the 
law does not countenance anti-competitive trade practices
42. The courts of this state will be 
guided by this aspect of public policy when, for example, they refuse to enforce an agreement 
between traders that fixes the price of cement. The same result might not follow if the 
agreement was taken to the courts of a state with a planned economy, where state directives 
(rather than supply and demand alone) fix commodity prices. The extension of the legal 
concept of ‘public policy’ is, therefore, unclear. This is due in part to the general and specific 
contextual inputs discussed above. It is also deliberate: public policy is closely related to state 
sovereignty. To define ‘public policy’ in a civil judgments enforcement treaty (such as the 
New York Convention, the Inter-American Convention or the Ryadh Convention) would be 
to limit the sovereignty of its signatory states - something diplomats and their governments 
are loathe to do. 
What is clear, however, is that the New York Convention Article V(2)(b) ‘public policy’ 
exception has both substantive and procedural dimensions. An example of ‘substantive 
public policy’ in action would be a Court in an Islamic country refusing to enforce an arbitral 
award handed down in relation to an agreement for the sale of alcohol or pornography. 
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39 Dr Christoph Liebscher, in his book ‘The Healthy Award: Challenge in International Commercial 
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Redfern and Hunter give the example of an award relating to profits from a casino
43. Western 
states invoke similar prohibitions in relation to the sale of small arms. ‘Procedural public 
policy’ is closely related to due process, and as such includes the tenets of procedural 
fairness: the parties must be treated equally and each allowed the opportunity to present their 
case. 
The mandatory provisions of the Model Law reflect these pillars of procedural public 
policy
44. Article 18 (Equal Treatment of Parties) is one of these ‘imperative articles’; it is 
mandatory and cannot be excluded by agreement. Article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention captures both the substantive and procedural forms of public policy. As such it 
entitles national courts to refuse to enforce arbitral awards where one or more of the 
arbitrators comprising the tribunal were (actually or apparently) biased when they made their 
decision. A respondent who seeks the protection of Article V(2)(b) will be required to show 
that the arbitrator lacked the degree of impartiality and independence that is required as a 
matter of procedural public policy. What approach to procedural public policy is employed 
will depend upon where the Respondent makes this request. Developed states are more likely 
to assess a bias challenge using principles of trans-national procedural public policy. The 
courts of less experienced seats tend to approach public policy domestically. One of the tasks 
of the writer is to explain how these two judicial methods produce different tests for apparent 
bias.
7. Defining ‘Bias’ in ICA
The word ‘bias’ will be used in this thesis as a generic term to connote the status of a decision 
maker who is (either actually or apparently) not impartial and independent with respect to 
one of the parties to the dispute before them or the subject matter of that dispute. A bias 
challenge is an action against an arbitrator, run after they have been appointed (or confirmed, 
in the ICC system), in which apparent or actual bias is alleged by the party initiating the 
challenge (the ‘challenger’). Whilst not exclusively, this thesis is more concerned with the 
test for apparent bias than actual bias. The writer’s focus in this regard is justified on three 
main grounds: firstly, actual bias (like corruption, its most extreme form
45) is rare in the ICA 
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record. This thesis will point to some examples but they are few and far between. Secondly, 
actual bias is universally repugnant. It will always entitle the aggrieved party to vacatur, and 
as such it is uncontroversial as a procedural rule. Thirdly, the rule against actual bias does not 
rely on a test for its application; actual bias is distinctly factual and does not require the use of 
any form of analogy or legal fiction. 
The majority of national arbitration laws – including those of all UNCITRAL Model law 
states - recognise an apparent lack of impartiality as a basis for challenging an arbitrator
46. As 
has been noted, Article 18 of the Model Law requires that the parties be treated equally. 
Article 12 of the Model Law reads ‘An arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances 
exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence’. Article 10(1) 
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules creates a very similar rule, as does General Standard 2 
of the IBA Guidelines. General Standard 2(c) of the IBA Guidelines expands on the test for 
‘justifiable doubts’, explaining that doubts are justifiable where a reasonable and informed 
party would conclude that there was a likelihood that the arbitrators, in reaching his or her 
decision, may be influenced by factors other than the merits of the case as presented by the 
parties. In arbitral proceedings between two states in 1995 under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules the appointing authority elaborated on the standard created by Model Law Article 
12(2):
the test to be applied is that the doubts existing on the part of the Claimant here must 
be justifiable on some objective basis. Are they reasonable doubts as tested by the 
standard of a fair minded, rational, objective observer? Could that observer say, on the 
basis of the facts as we know them, that the Claimant has a reasonable apprehension 
of partialityon the part of the Respondents’ arbitrator?
47
English and Commonwealth readings anchor the term ‘impartiality’ to public perception, 
observing Lord Chief Justice Hewart’s famous dictum in Sussex Justices that ‘justice must be 
done and be seen to be done’. The courts of many other states, including those of the Civil 
Law tradition and seats supervised by the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, 
have agreed that impartiality is a matter of ‘appearances’
48. Commenting on General 
Standard 2 of the IBA Guidelines - which in Chapter 6 the writer will argue are lex 
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mercatoria - Australian arbitrator Professor Doug Jones (a member of the IBA working Party 
that produced the Guidelines) confirmed ‘appearances, not fact, are the touchstone’
49. This 
thesis will show that the primacy of appearance is well settled in the jurisprudence of bias 
challenges; it will also show why this approach is misconceived at law. 
Municipal laws
50 and institutional rules
51 rarely define ‘impartiality’. As a result, it is with 
some reluctance that the writer approaches the task. ‘Impartiality’ certainly does not mean 
utter indifference
52, and in this thesis the writer will argue that it also has a different meaning 
to the word ‘neutrality’
53. Rather, ‘impartiality’ means ‘complete receptivity to the parties’ 
arguments
54’:  the concurrent absence of both party and  outcome preference. ‘Party 
Preference’ relates to identity  – the identity of the decision maker and identities of the 
disputants; ‘Outcome Preference’ means pre-judgment of one or more of the legal issues in 
dispute.  One of the things the reader will take away from this  thesis is that outcome 
preference is becoming more and more complicated in ICA. Party preference is the older 
formof bias. 
(a) Party Preference
When a decision maker is more inclined to decide in favour of one party than the other, then 
that decision maker will have a Party Preference. The writer’s theory of Party Preference 
presumes two things: firstly that there is more than one party to the proceedings (‘the 
presumption of party multiplicity’); and secondly that neither party chose the decision maker 
(‘the presumption against adjudicatory choice’). An unthinkable situation would be when 
there is only one party whose rights and liabilities are being determined, and that party alone 
has chosen the person that will judge the same. Party Preference will not be available to that 
party as a ground of review because both presumptions fail in their situation. Actionable 
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th Annual Meeting and Conference, Bali 3-7 May 2005 
50 Exceptions include Sweden and the People’s Republic of China. 
51 Exceptions include the Code of Ethics of the American Arbitration Association (1977) and the International 
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(Kluwer 1994), p.83
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party preference depends upon the validity of both presumptions, and the failure of one will 
render the ground unavailable. This is why, the writer will argue later, it makes sense that 
party-appointed arbitrators are not subject to the same standard of impartiality as non-party 
appointed arbitrators
55. Party preference is not actionable in such a situation because if the 
party appointed arbitrator has a party preference then it can be assumed to be for the party 
that appointed them (and the other party accepts this violenti non fit injuria), and the ‘one-
per-party’ rule means that the preferences of the party appointed arbitrators cancel each other 
out when they make their decision.  
Due to its close relation to identity, party preference may take a number of different forms. It 
may be based on (1) the characteristics of the party (relative to the characteristics of the 
decision maker (‘Identity Characteristics’), or (2) the familiarity of the relevant party with the 
decision maker (‘Party Familiarity’). 
Identity Characteristics include:
(i) Nationalityor domicile (causing ‘Catalina Bias’
56);
(ii) Race (causing ‘Noble China Bias’
57);
(iii) Political persuasion/association (causing ‘Pinochet Bias’
58);
Identity characteristics (ii) and (iii) usually do not apply to corporate parties. It is true that 
corporations can have sophisticated politics, especially when they are wholly or partly state-
owned – the political persuasion of a para-statal entity (and the arbitrator they appoint) is 
most likely to arise in investor-state arbitration
59. Generally though, corporate identity will 
generally depend on domicile and business type, but may also be influenced by the identities 
of the company officers as natural persons (in which case all five identity characteristics will 
be applicable to those people). This is especially so where company officers appear as 
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witnesses before the decision maker and constitute the secondary identity of the corporation. 
Secondary identity may also extend to the corporation’s advocates, but this is more properly 
an aspect of familiarity. 
Types of Party Familiarity include:
(i) Professional familiarity: the party and the decision maker have or have had 
professional dealings (eg. the decision maker has judged the party before, or 
has acted as counsel or advocate for the party in the past) (‘Rustal Trading 
familiarity’
60); 
(ii) Commercial familiarity: the party and the decision maker have either 
continuing or past commercial dealings, or common commercial interests (eg. 
the arbitrator owns shares in the corporate party – ‘bias by portfolio’; the 
writer will call this ‘Saudi Cable familiarity’
61); 
(iii) Social familiarity: the party (or their witnesses) and the decision maker know 
or are related to one another (eg. by consanguinity, marriage, membership of 
the same chambers or common membership of social or sporting clubs; the 
writer will call this ‘Laker Airways familiarity’
62);
(iv) Representative familiarity: the officers, agents or servants called as witnesses 
by, or the advocates of, the party are professionally, socially or commercially 
familiar to the decision maker, or vice versa (‘ASM Shipping familiarity’
63).
The newest form of ASM Shipping Familiarity is Hrvatska Counsel Conflict, 
where the objection is to counsel rather than to the arbitrator they know. To 
date this new ground for challenge is only recognized in ICSID 
jurisprudence
64.   
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Each of the first three heads of familiarity can be categorised as either pecuniary or non-
pecuniary. Commercial familiarity is, naturally, pecuniary in nature. The professional and 
social forms of familiarity are, generally, non-pecuniary (although the basis for professional 
familiarity may have originally been commercial familiarity). Being secondary, 
representative familiarity may fall into either category depending upon the basis of the 
familiarity of the natural person and the decision maker. 
(b) Outcome Preference 
This is often referred to as ‘Prejudgment’ or ‘Substantive Bias’. An outcome preference can 
be based on party preference or legal opinion. Outcome preferences that flow from party 
preference will include, at their most extreme, situations of corruption where the decision 
maker’s outcome preference has been procured by payment or favour. This is what the writer 
will term ‘Procured Bias’. It is rare and only a handful of national arbitration laws deal with it 
expressly (examples include the PRC
65 and Japan
66). Procured Bias will be actionable as a 
contravention of public policy in every state. It is also important to note that a small handful 
of states have laws which forbid their nationals from acting against the national interest, and 
these laws extend to arbitrators. Syria is an example: if a Syrian national is appointed as an 
arbitrator in a matter involving the state of Syria, or a Syrian state enterprise, then they will 
have a de jure outcome preference because, if they decide against the Syrian party, they 
commit a crime. Such laws are very rare, and are not considered in detail in this thesis. 
The more common form of  outcome preference is where the arbitrator goes into the 
arbitration with a view as to who should win, and why. Outcome preferences based on legal 
opinion are actionable where a decision maker gives the appearance that they have judged the 
facts or merits prior to the scheduled hearing
67. This substantive bias may be the result of an 
arbitrator’s prior determination of a matter that is factually or legally similar to the case now 
before them (‘Telekom Malaysia Bias’
68), their previous public expression of opinion on a 
legal issue that is live in the current proceedings (‘Uni-Inter Bias’), or involvement in the 
facts of the dispute. The latter will include situations where the decision maker has acted as 
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counsel in the matter at an earlier stage. Outcome preferences can be abstract, or policy-
based. The challenge in Himpurna California Energy Ltd (Bermuda)  v The Republic of 
Indonesia
69 provides a colourful illustration: counsel for Indonesia challenged the Chairman 
of the tribunal – one of the world’s leading arbitrators – on the basis that his well known 
commitment to international arbitration gave rise to the appearance that he had prejudged the 
issue of jurisdiction. Counsel claimed the Chairman was
well known throughout the arbitration community to be on a constant crusade to 
elevate international arbitration, and thus the power of international arbitrators such as 
himself, to a level above and beyond the jurisdiction of any court in the world. He has 
now found himself in a situation in which he believes he can prove his theory and 
ignore the rightful jurisdiction of the Indonesian courts, at the same time preventing 
such courts from engaging in their proper and legal authority to review his previous 
decision
70
This kind of challenge – where the conflict of Mitsubishi pro-arbitration policy and 
sovereignty is projected onto the arbitrator personally – will be referred to as ‘CalEnergy 
Bias’. In ICSID arbitration, where the substantive legal principles of foreign investment law 
are derived from sources which include the decisions of ICSID (and ad hoc ISA) tribunals, 
the problem of ‘Issue Conflict’ (of which Telekom Malaysia bias is one form) is especially 
acute, and is the subject of a separate discussion in Chapter 7. The new avenue of Hrvatska
Counsel Conflict is also considered in the ICSID chapter of this thesis. 
 
8. The Question of ‘Independence’ 
Independence has been described as the modus operandi of the arbitrator
71.  In ICA, 
independence issues usually arise where the arbitrator has a relationship with a party; where 
the arbitrator has a relationship with an entity linked to a party; and where the arbitrator has a 
relationship with counsel (or an entity linked to counsel)
72. Strictly speaking – and the writer 
must - these situations do not bring the arbitrator’s impartiality into question: they only cast a 
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shadow on his independence. But the distinction between impartiality and independence is 
not well recognized: many commentators see the two terms as ‘legally synonymous’
73; others 
have labeled attempts to distinguish the two concepts as pedantic. The writer respectfully 
disagrees: for reasons offered below, it will be put that there most definitely is a difference 
between the two notions, and when issues of independence arise they are often confused with 
impartiality. There is one main reason for this: as shall be observed in the survey chapters 
that follow, impartiality is often paired with ‘independence’ in national laws and procedural 
rules. The due process ‘guarantee’ at Article 6 of the 1950 European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms uses both adjectives, as does Article 
14.1 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
74. The dual 
requirement of ‘impartiality and independence’ can be found in Article 5.3 of the Arbitration 
Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration, which states ‘Arbitrators shall be and 
shall remain at all times impartial and independent of the parties’. Article 10(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules states that ‘Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances 
exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence’
75. 
As has been noted, Article 12(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law is cast in similar terms, with 
a corresponding disclosure requirement at Article 12(1). It follows that Model Law states 
recognise the dual requirement of impartiality and independence. 
In fact, few national laws and institutional rules depart from this norm, and the dual standard 
seems to prevail. There are four important exceptions
76. The first is the ICC. The General 
Provisions (Article 7) of the ICC arbitration rules require ‘independence’ but do not mention 
impartiality
77. Sub-article (1) of the General Provisions states ‘every arbitrator must be and 
remain independent of the parties involved in the action’. Sub-article two requires disclosure 
of circumstances which may ‘call into question the arbitrator’s independence’.
78 Article 11(1) 
provides that an arbitrator may be challenged for a ‘lack of independence or otherwise’. The 
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word ‘Impartiality’ is used in Article 15 (2), where it is paired with the adjective ‘fairly’. This 
semantic preference for ‘independence’ mirrors the French lex arbitri. The New Code of 
Civil Procedure (NCCP) makes no express reference to impartiality but does ‘independence’,  
going so far as to list eight instances in which the latter will be deemed lacking
79. It is notable 
that French courts have not let the statutory absence of the term ‘impartiality’ deprive 
appellants of recourse to the principle it connotes. It will be observed that the NCCP concept 
of ‘independence’ extends to ‘independence of mind’, an elaboration synonymous with 
impartiality
80. Second and similar is Swiss law. Article 180 of the Swiss Private International 
Law (SPIL) provides for challenges based on a lack of independence but is silent on 
impartiality
81. The Swiss judicial approach is similar to the French, meaning that a lack of 
impartiality can be pleaded notwithstanding absence in the black letters of the SPIL. This is 
also true of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes: although the 
Washington Convention (1965) and the ICSID Arbitration Rules (2006) do not refer to 
impartiality – Article 14 speaks only to the arbitrator’s ‘the capacity to exercise independent 
judgment’ – ICSID tribunals tend to treat a lack of impartiality as a ground for challenge 
nonetheless. The fourth exception is the English Arbitration Act 1996, which is drafted in the 
reverse: section 24 of the English Act requires impartiality but says nothing of independence. 
The London tradition of trade and reinsurance arbitration is the historical cause of this 
drafting
82. Besides demonstrating the almost perfect opposition of Civil and Common Law 
statutory approaches, these examples raise an important question – is there any real difference 
between impartiality and independence? 
9. The Difference Between ‘Impartiality’ and ‘Independence’
Whilst the terms ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’ may be paired so regularly as to appear 
interchangeable, and even though independence is sometimes found to ‘include’ impartiality, 
it is certainly not the case that these words mean the same thing. At best they overlap. The 
writer finds the IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators (1987) useful in this regard. 
Article 3.1 (Elements of Bias) states:
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The criteria for assessing questions relating to bias are impartiality and independence. 
Partiality arises where an arbitrator favours one of the parties, or where he is 
prejudiced in relation to the subject matter of the dispute. Dependence arises from 
relationships between arbitrator and one of the parties, or with somebody closely 
connected with one of the parties  
There is also authority for the proposition that the two requirements have different ‘life-
spans’. The requirement of independence lasts the entire proceeding, and (at least arguably) 
into the period immediately after it
83. Impartiality is more limited in the chronological sense: 
it must end if an award is to be rendered. Sir Robert Jennings, appointing authority for the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (IUSCT) in Re Judge Broms, put it as follows:
any judge, though he ought to begin in an impartial stance, is required as a matter of 
judicial duty eventually and on the basis of the presented arguments to become partial 
to one side or the other. To remain neutral to the end would be a dereliction of duty
84
Some erosion of impartiality is necessary and acceptable for the proper performance of 
adjudicative function; as the arbitrator is convinced his partiality for one side develops and 
increases. The same is not true of the element of independence, which William ‘Rusty’ Park 
has defined as ‘the absence of inappropriate personal or financial links with a party’
85. 
Winning a case does not make the victor literally proximate to the decision maker. It is 
therefore logically sound to say that a decision maker who lacks independence will 
necessarily lack impartiality, but a decision maker who lacks impartiality will not necessarily 
lack independence. This is because the appearance of party preference flows from proximity, 
but the appearance of proximity does not necessarily flow from party preference
86. As was 
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observed by the ICSID tribunal in the second challenge to Arbitrator Kaufmann-Kohler in
Suez & Ors v Argentina, a decision maker does not forfeit their independence just because 
they prefer one party (or outcome) over another
87. They can stay where they are and still find 
for a party. Although multifaceted, independence is a more concrete concept than its 
legislative bedfellow. It is structural and social, being concerned with relationship rather than 
attitude. In Saudi Cable, Lord Justice Potter said
‘Independence’ connotes an absence of connection with either of the parties in the 
sense of an absence of any interest in, or of any present or prospective business or 
other connection with, one of the parties which might lead the arbitrator to favour the 
party concerned
88
Some definitions, particularly those attempted by Continental commentators, draw on the 
French notion of ‘independence of mind’ and relate independence back to impartiality: 
independence becomes the position from which impartial decisions can be made. At the VIth 
Symposium on International Arbitration in Paris in 1988, Pierre Lalive came up with a ‘well 
chosen, albeit cynical’
89 definition: ‘“Independence” implies courage to displease, the 
absence of any desire, especially for the arbitrator appointed by a party, to be appointed once 
again as an arbitrator’. Similarly, it has been said that, as an ‘intellectual process’, 
independence allows the arbitrator to decide the dispute ‘free of all contingency’
90. Professor 
Ahmed El-Kosheri and Dr  Karim Youssef have said that the legal usage ‘independence’ 
refers to the customary mental operations performed  in evaluating opposing claims and 
rendering justice, a function preceded by a ‘process of self-neutralisation’
91. 
This thesis will demonstrate that allegations of Party Preference or Outcome Preference based 
on familiarity will manifest themselves as questions of independence. Where in a Common 
Law jurisdiction the Rule in Dimes is pleaded, the challenge will be more properly 
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characterised as an asserted lack of independence than an allegation of partiality
92. The task 
for the challenger will be to identify the kind of familiarity that exists between the decision 
maker and the relevant party. Putting standards aside for a moment, such a case is simple in 
the evidentiary sense. Either there is familiarity, or there is not. There may be professional 
familiarity where, for example, a panel member has sat on the board of one of the corporate 
parties to the dispute, and a search of company records will prove this.  There may be 
commercial familiarity in the fact that a member of the tribunal has a pecuniary interest in the 
cause. The Dimes example is where the judge holds shares in a corporate party appearing 
before him. More abstract forms of familiarity are, especially in Common Law states that 
have followed the decision of the House of Lords in Pinochet (No.2), captured by the rules of 
bias proper. 
There may be an appearance of bias where an arbitrator and a disputant are members of the 
same golf club. Challenges based on social familiarity like this raise questions of fact. 
According to Binder ‘the test for independence is an objective one, as prior business or 
financial relations are easy to determine’
93. They require only that a line be drawn between 
the dots – if the line is dark enough, the challenge will succeed. Impartiality is, in contrast, 
more abstract and subjective. When a decision maker is said to lack impartiality, their state of 
mind is put in issue. Unless words or deeds support the allegation (like they did in ‘Catalina’ 
v ‘Norma’, for example) it will be necessary to prove on balance that the decision maker had 
in their mind something that they properly should not have. Thus, it is more difficult to prove 
a lack of impartiality than it is a lack of independence. 
10. The Meaning and Place of ‘Neutrality’ in ICA
These questions of definition require the writer to offer an opinion on one more point. The 
expression ‘neutral’ is often used in international arbitration. It has two functions: (1) to 
describe the status of the arbitrator, and (2) to describe the status of a seat. The first function 
is most prominent in the American ADR lexicon, where it is used to distinguish between the 
absolute impartiality and independence expected of Chairmen and the ‘relative’ impartiality 
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and independence of party-appointed arbitrators in domestic proceedings
94. Whilst the writer 
agrees with the Sunkist distinction, the writer finds the American use of the term ‘neutral’ to 
be  problematic, and will in this thesis refrain from using it. For reasons of vernacular 
efficiency and legitimate nexus with sovereignty the second function is less troublesome. 
With respect to the first use, it has been suggested that being ‘neutral’ involves ‘the arbitrator 
taking a certain distance in relation to his legal, political and religious culture’
95. This use of 
the word ‘neutral’ might pin it more to independence than impartiality. The writer’s view is 
that, in ICA, the personal aspect of the term ‘neutral’ is misconceived: impartiality and 
independence are not the same as ‘neutrality’ and cannot be captured by it as a blanket 
expression. Binder has also observed that ‘impartiality is occasionally incorrectly referred to 
as ‘neutrality’
96. 
‘Neutrality’ is a term derived from the Public International Law of armed conflict, connoting 
the status of a sovereign entity that refrains from participation in an armed conflict and 
neither materially assists nor obstructs the belligerents involved in it. Switzerland and 
Sweden were neutral in World War Two; neutrality is ‘the situation of a state which is 
unaligned’
97 and stays that way for the duration of hostilities. Although it is relative to a state 
of affairs, ‘neutrality’ is absolute for those sovereign entities involved. The writer’s objection 
to the term is as follows: an arbitrator may start off much like a neutral state in a time of war, 
but they end up taking a side. Indeed, as Sir Robert Jennings observed in Re Judge Broms, 
they are duty bound to do so
98. The description of the arbitrator as a ‘neutral’ might fit with 
the Anglo-American adversarial nature of modern arbitral practice, but it contradicts the 
function of the arbitrator, which is to render an award. The term ‘neutral’ does not 
acknowledge the necessity and inevitability of the arbitrator’s ‘participation in the conflict’.
The writer suspects that the vernacular acceptance of the term ‘neutral’ is one of the reasons 
the test for bias is set low in most of the states surveyed in this thesis. Neutrality is a 
colloquialism that has elevated impartiality and  independence to the unattainable level of 
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absolutes.  That is not to say, however, that the expression has no place in ICA: the term 
‘neutral’ is rightly (but still analogically) used as a designation for acceptable seats, 
especially in investor-state arbitrations. This is the second use - the ‘jurisdictional aspect’ of 
neutrality. The jurisdictional aspect of the term has a much longer history in the language of 
private international law, where the word ‘neutral’ has long been used to describe the 
objectives of forum selection clauses. In modern ad hoc arbitrations the parties will shop 
around for an appropriate seat, and along with the suitability of municipal law a key 
consideration will often be the perceived neutrality of the candidate state. Experience shows 
that in heated investor-state disputes, neutrality may in fact trump strictly legal considerations
in the selection of seat. 
This is precisely how Stockholm emerged as a seat during the Cold War
99; Swedish
arbitration law was not especially well developed but the Russians saw it as neutral (even 
mildly ideologically hostile) vis-a-vis the United States, and so it was agreed as site for 
arbitration
100. An arbitrator who served in the well known Pertamina arbitration
101 (which, 
like the CalEnergy arbitration, initially involved the Republic of Indonesia) recalled the 
difficulty the tribunal encountered in selecting an appropriate place for the proceedings in 
that heated disputed: ‘we had to find a state that’s not a state - we looked at San Marino and 
Vatican City’
102. After convening in The Hague, the tribunal ultimately settled in 
Switzerland, a state with a legal system which the disputants accepted as a ‘neutral’. The 
writer has no real problem with this use of the word. 
11. Method
Now that the key words have been defined, the method of this study must be explained. The 
reader will notice that a good deal of this thesis is taken up with survey of municipal laws. 
This is necessary due to the method applied in this thesis, which is as follows:
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1. Define key terms and parameters of inquiry
2. Establish variation in the municipal laws of leading seats 
3. Compare municipal laws of emerging seats
4. Identify trend in investor-state (and ICSID) arbitration 
5. Extract principles from trans-national customary commercial law
6. Locate causes of the increased rate of bias challenge
7. Argue for the Gough standard using municipal and trans-national law and policy
8. Test the municipal laws for their tolerance for an agreement implementing Gough for 
challenges (the ‘Gough Clause’)
12. State Selection
The writer has not surveyed every New York Convention member state, and although the 
focus is on uniform jurisdictions, a number of UNCITRAL Model Law states are left out. 
Choices have been made, and they must be explained. Firstly, as a matter of academic 
practicalitythe writer was not in a position to study every jurisdiction in the world; there was 
neither the time nor the need. Only the most productive states, in both the commercial and 
jurisprudential senses, were selected. 
Secondly, although the finger is pointed at times (especially in Chapter 8), there is a Common 
Law bias in this thesis, both in the states selected and the language used. The writer is an 
Australian trained legal practitioner, and is therefore far better placed to study the laws of 
Common Law states than Civil Code jurisdictions. For this reason significant attention is paid 
to England (Chapter 2) and the Model Law/Common Law states of the Asia Pacific region 
(Chapter 5). The United States is given a full chapter (Chapter 4) because of its economic 
significance, the complexity of its dualist arbitration law (some states in the Federation of 
fifty are Model Law, but the Federal Arbitration Act is not) and the fact that US Courts tend 
to take a strict approach to bias challenges that is similar the English position under Gough.  
Each European state considered in Chapter 3 has been chosen on the basis of its:
(i) Significance as a seat, as determined by the volume of arbitrations which are 
physically conducted within its territorial limits (eg. Switzerland), or
(ii) Perceived neutrality as a state (eg. Sweden), or
(iii) Role as a host state for permanent arbitral tribunals (eg. The Netherlands)  30
The writer hopes that the group of states chosen is sufficiently broad as to enable a 
comparative analysis to be undertaken and the argument for the ‘real danger’ test to be 
developed. The reader will see that ICSID investor state arbitration stands alone in Chapter 7. 
This is because ICSID is a stateless institution severed from municipal law by operation of 
the Washington Convention – ICSID is its own jurisdiction. Other international arbitration 
institutions are dealt with in the parts covering the states in which they are located: the ICC in 
the France section of Chapter 3, the LCIA in the chapter on English law, etc. Unlike ICSID, 
these institutions are linked to the municipal legal systems of their surrounding states. 
The ICSID chapter is prefaced by a discussion of the IBA Guidelines and transnational 
customary commercial law (lex mercatoria). The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: firstly to 
argue that the IBA Guidelines are so widely used and accepted that they are part of the lex 
mercatoria; and secondly, to argue that the IBA Guidelines prefer the Porter v Magill test for 
apparent bias (rather than Sussex Justices). In the writer’s opinion, the placement of the IBA 
Guidelines chapter ahead of the investor-state chapter is appropriate because the force of both 
the IBA Guidelines and customary international commercial law is strongest in investor-state 
arbitration. 
Although this thesis will point to certain exceptions, most national courts are averse to the 
application of inflexible rules when it comes to bias and conflict of interest in ICA. The 
majority of courts evaluate allegations of bias on a ‘case-by-case’ basis; every challenge will 
turn on its own facts. The facts of the impugned relationship are paramount where 
independence is put in issue, and where a lack of impartiality is alleged the material facts of 
the challenger’s perception (and the arbitrator’s preference) will be decisive. It follows that, 
in order to fully understand the law as it pertains to bias challenges in ICA, a thorough survey 
of case law must be undertaken. It is for this reason that large portions of this thesis are taken 
up with case summaries and often lengthy recitations of material facts (especially in the 
Common Law chapters). The list of cases provided in this thesis is not exhaustive. Indeed, it 
could not be: unlike state court adjudication, ICA is private (and often confidential) and very 
few institutions publish their challenge decisions.  Indeed, the lack of transparency in 
challenge jurisprudence was one of the driving concerns of the Working Group that drafted 
the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest was the lack of transparency in challenge 31
jurisprudence
103. Challenges are only made public when they are reported by the institution 
that decided them (as is the practice of the ICC, IUSCT, PCA, ICAS and the SCC), made 
directly to a national court from an ad hoc arbitration (in which case the party names are 
often replaced with ‘X’ and ‘Y’ or ‘Undisclosed’), or published by consent of the parties. In 
this sense, it is worth prefacing much of this thesis with the words ‘as far as the writer is 
aware…’  
13. Language
Law is a language game the writer must take very seriously. Accordingly, a glossary of key 
terms precedes the tables of legislation, rules and decisions at the beginning of this thesis. 
The words and expressions defined in the glossary include the Common Law designations 
used above under ‘Party Familiarity’ and ‘Identity Characteristics’. Done properly, there can 
be efficiency in jargon; the Glossary is intended to serve this purpose. 
The writer is a speaker of the English legal language. Accordingly, the Common Law 
tradition of referencing a principle with the name of the case in which it was formulated is 
observed throughout this thesis, both in Common Law and Civil Code states (where the 
absence of  stare decisis makes it less appropriate). The Anglo Common Law designation 
‘Sussex Justices’ will be used to refer to any test for apparent bias that has as its elements (1) 
assessment of the impugned conduct from the vantage of a ‘reasonable observer’ (the ‘First 
Arm’), (2) a ‘reasonable apprehension’ (or ‘reasonable suspicion’) threshold (the ‘Second 
Arm’), and (3) a stated policy imperative of ensuring that ‘justice must be seen to be done’ 
(‘Lord Hewart’s dictum’). The writer will show that the test used by the European Court of 
Human Rights equates with Sussex Justices. The case name ‘Sussex Justices’ is therefore 
used by the writer in respect of Common Law and European Civil Law seats, not to imply 
that the English expression of the test is binding on the Continent, but rather to make the 
point that Strasbourg jurisprudence in this area is consistent with the Sussex Justices line of 
Common Law authority. The writer is not implying any Common Law hegemony in ICA, but 
simply working in his mother tongue. 
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Finally, Latin is used throughout this thesis. In matters involving multiple legal systems the 
‘Plain English’ argument (made loudest in the Anglo-American world) must certainly fail: 
Latin terms provide essential common linguistic ground between Civil and Common Law 
parties, and remain in constant use in international legal practice today. The place of Latin in 
the future language of international law is guaranteed by its centrality to the new lex 
mercatoria, and the importance of Latin terms in the procedural lexicon of ICA (exequatur, 
vacatur, ex aequo et bono, etc). In this thesis, certain principles are also referred to by their 
German and French names (eg. the German Kompetenz-Kompetenz,  the French tronc 
common, etc). Other than in these situations the writer has worked entirely in English. For 
example, the English translation ‘Court of First Instance’ is used for the French Tribunal de 
Grande Instance, ‘Supreme Court’ for Bundesgerichtschoff and so on. For consistency this 
approach is also taken with acronyms. For example, the writer will refer to the French New 
Code of Civil Procedure as the ‘NCCP’, rather than the ‘NCPC’ (which is true to the 
sequence of the French form Le Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile Francais). 33
CHAPTER 2
Lord Hewart’s Ghost
The highest requirement that justice should manifestly be seen to be done may require that a judicial 
decision be overturned because of the manner in which it was reached, without it being demonstrated 
that the result produced injustice. But that is not the system applied to arbitrations by the 1996 
[Arbitration] Act  
- Bowsher J in Groundshire v VHQ (2001)
1
1. Introduction
The kernel of this thesis is that state courts should use a test for apparent bias that makes it 
harder to remove arbitrators and resist the enforcement of their awards. English law shows 
that there are two options for courts supervising arbitral proceedings. The first is to remove 
an arbitrator if a fair minded and informed observer would have a ‘reasonable apprehension’ 
that the arbitrator was biased. This test is derived from the judgment of Lord Hewart CJ in 
Sussex Justices. The second option is to remove if the same notional third person would 
perceive that there was a ‘real possibility’ that the arbitrator was biased. This test comes from 
the 2002 decision of the House of Lords in Porter v Magill. Breaking the 78 year Common 
Law trajectory between these two decisions was the 1993 case of R v Gough. In Gough the 
House of Lords held that the Court must find there to be a ‘real danger’ of bias before 
apparent bias will be made out. Although Porter v Magill marked the end of the force of the 
ratio in Gough, besides the revival of the fair minded observer, the two decisions are similar. 
The Second Arms of both tests posit a threshold that is more difficult to pass for the 
challenger than that laid down in Sussex Justices. The writer will therefore refer to two 
Common Law bloodlines in this chapter: a Gough-Porter v Magill line (marked by the ‘real 
possibility’ test) and a Sussex Justices line (made up of decisions employing the ‘reasonable 
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apprehension’ test).  Later the writer will argue that, where arbitration is concerned, the ‘real 
possibility’ test should be used. 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the law of bias in England. This discussion will begin 
with an analysis of the maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria causa (or the shorter form 
nemo judex in sua causa) and the Rule in Dimes that is its modern expression. The blurring of 
the line between this rule and the rule of disqualification for apparent bias will then be 
attributed to the decision of the House of Lords in Pinochet (No.2). The writer will then 
discuss English arbitration law and the sources of the obligations of impartiality and
independence. A survey of case law follows. This chapter closes with a discussion of the 
effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the English law of bias as it pertains to arbitrators.
2. The Law of Bias in England
The English approach to bias is informed by multiple sources, including Biblical teachings, 
Classical philosophy and Roman law
2. The absence of bias is a critical component of the 
notion of procedural equilibrium which Common Law systems call ‘fairness’. Fairness has 
moral and ethical overtones that draw directly on religious prescriptions. In Chapter 3 the 
writer will briefly argue that the Iron Age peoples of Europe observed customary procedural 
laws directed at achieving fairness, and that these customs persisted even after the arrival of 
the first written laws in Roman times. If it occurred in Europe then the same historical legal 
transition would have occurred in Britain, which first came under Roman control after Caesar 
invaded in 55 BC. It was not until 436 AD that Roman legions left
3. Between these dates 
Roman law was in force in the colony’s towns and cities, most of which were in the south 
east of present-day England. 
In Chapter 3 the writer will observe that the practice of arbitration was well developed in 
Roman law
4. It was a general rule of Roman law that no one could adjudicate in their own 
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cause
5. This basic principle must have been received by the communities of Britannia along 
with the wider body of Roman law. Although there is no hard evidence for the continuity of 
Roman law after the evacuation of the legions in the fifth century, the survival of the nemo 
judex in sua causa maxim in the English Common Law suggests that the Latin prohibition 
against judging one’s own cause was assimilated into the customary laws of the Anglo-
Saxons in the sixth century. Post-Roman invasions by Germanic peoples, some of whom 
probably observed a customary equivalent of nemo judex in their own processes
6, may have 
further strengthened the British footing of the rule. Later, in the Norman Period, the desire for 
impartial adjudication of claims was a driving force behind the Magna Carta (1215)
7. At 
Article 40 of the Magna Carta the Barons and their reluctant King declared that ‘to no one 
will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice’. We can read this as an early bar 
to decisions made in circumstances of Procured Bias. It was a valid objection to a Court of 
Assize that the sheriff-judge was the ‘actual prosecutor or party aggrieved’ or had an ‘actual 
affinity to either party’
8. In Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes (1844) 
the great proto-Positivist David Hume wrote 
It was nothing unusual formerly, to have an assizer rejected, (ordained to stand aside, 
as the style was) because he, or perhaps his wife, was second or third cousin, seconds 
and thirds as they called it, to the prosecutor
9  
Hume gave the cases of Hew Crosbie (1616) and George Mylne (1618) as examples
10. It is 
therefore probably the case that the customary and written laws of England have included 
general rules against bias for well over one thousand years. 
Modern English law recognises two prime forms of bias – ‘actual’ and ‘apparent’. If a judge 
is shown to have actually been biased against a party, then their decision must be set aside
11. 
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8 R v Sheppard 1 Leach 101; R v Edmonds 4 B & Ald 471, cited in Summers, above note 93, p.30
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10 Ibid 
11 Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No.2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 per Lord Phillips at 83; see also 
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The judge is presumed to be impartial and independent
12 and where actual bias is not made 
out it will be for the applicant to establish that the judge appeared to be biased. There is, 
therefore, a distinction between the Common Law rule of automatic disqualification (which 
extends to the rule of automatic vacatur post-judgment) for interest in the cause and the body 
of law that relates to the appearance of partiality. The decision of the House of Lords in 
Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Co Proprietors (1852) 3 HLC 759 is authority for the 
availability of the former rule. 
2.1 The Rule in Dimes 
Dimes involved an application to disqualify Lord Cottenham from hearing a case involving 
the determination of the rights of a corporate entity in which he held a substantial 
shareholding. The appeal to the House of Lords was successful and His Lordship’s judgment 
was reversed. The reasoning in Dimes was predicated upon the ancient maxim nemo judex in 
sua causa: no man may be a judge in his own cause
13. Although Dimes marked an important
point in the development of the Common Law of pecuniary interest disqualification,  the 
decision did not deal with bias as such. It dealt with interests in the cause
14. The Rule in 
Dimes is a basic doctrine of English law. It is separable from the rules against bias in that it 
relates to disqualification by operation of law and not  for any third party supposition of 
impropriety
15. The Rule in Dimes is, therefore, closer to a Common Law ‘guarantee’ of 
judicial independence than a requirement of adjudicative impartiality
16. 
Until recently the record showed that the Rule in Dimes was separate and distinct from the 
rule of disqualification for apparent bias. The conventional wisdom is that appearance is not 
an element of the Rule in Dimes  – it is an element of the rule of ‘discretionary’ 
disqualification for apparent bias. This view prevails in many Common Law states. In 
England the separation of the Rule in Dimes from the body of law we know by the expression 
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15 Ebner per Kirby J at 334
16 Ebner per Kirby J at 449 37
‘apparent bias’ was cast into doubt by the ‘highly technical’
17 decision of the House of Lords 
in Pinochet Ugarte. 
Pinochet (1999)
In October 1998 Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon issued a warrant for the arrest of former 
Chilean strongman Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. Pinochet was arrested in London on a bench 
warrant in October 1998. Pleading sovereign immunity he applied to have the English 
warrant set aside. The application came on before a five peer appellate committee of the 
House of Lords. The committee dismissed Pinochet’s appeal three to two. Pinochet appealed 
on the basis that one member of the Appellate Committee (Lord Hoffman) appeared biased. 
The material facts were that Lord Hoffman was a director of Amnesty International Charity 
Limited (AICL), a charitable company controlled by Amnesty International (AI). Amnesty 
International appeared in the proceedings as an intervener. Lord Hoffman was not actually a 
member of AI or any entity connected with it. His Lordship received no payment for his 
services on the board of AICL and played no role in the formation of AI policy. Pinochet 
argued that Lord Hoffman should have recused himself, and that his failure to do so rendered 
the decision void. In what has been described as a ‘radical departure from precedent’
18 the 
House of Lords agreed, holding that Lord Hoffman should have recused himself, not because 
of the appearance of bias but because he  had an interest in the cause
19. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson identified the ‘critical elements’ of the factual matrix in Pinochet as (1) that AI 
was a party to the appeal; (2) that AI was joined in order to argue for a particular result; (3) 
the judge was a Director of a charity closely allied to AI and sharing, in this respect, AI’s 
objects
20.
In essence, Lord Hoffman’s ‘interest’ was held to be the same as the intervener (Amnesty 
International), namely ‘achieving the trial and possible conviction of Senator Pinochet for 
crimes against humanity’
21. Although the appeal in Pinochet (No.2) was argued on the basis 
of apparent bias the House of Lords chose instead to apply an extension of the Rule in Dimes
“incorporating vague notions of ‘interests’, ‘causes’ and the ‘overriding public interest’”
22. It 
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18 Henry, G, ‘Pinochet: In Search of a Perfect Judge’ [1999] Syd L Rec 26 (1999) 21, p.22
19 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) [1999] 2 WLR 272 at 
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21 Pinochet (No.2) per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 282
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may be, as Lord Hope would later opine
23, that their Lordships took this route because they 
saw that the Appellant’s argument on apparent bias would not get past the high bar set in 
Gough (which was still in force at the time). The other explanation may be that Pinochet was 
an instance of superior court ‘rule making’; an example of an appeal court encountering what 
Ronald Dworkin would describe as a ‘hard case’
24. Either way the effect of the decision was 
profound - ever since Pinochet English courts have struggled with the task of mapping the 
limits of the Rule in Dimes. The cases of AWG Group v Morrison (discussed below in 
relation to Human Rights Law) and Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfields Properties show English 
courts trying to re-chart the channel between Dimes and the rule of disqualification for 
apparent bias. 
2.2 De Minimis Non Curat Lex
Pinochet is a free standing precedent, perhaps even an anomaly, in the broader jurisprudential 
history of the Rule in Dimes. The case law shows that the rule of automatic disqualification 
developed around situations of pecuniary interest. Its purpose was to maintain the absolute 
impartiality of the judiciary. But the Rule in Dimes is not itself absolute. In order to be 
actionable under the Rule in Dimes the relevant interest must be more than trifling, more than 
de minimis. It is also clear that the interest of the decision maker be proximate to the cause of 
one of the parties before them. In Locabail the Court of Appeal put the test for proximity as 
‘whether the outcome of that cause could, realistically, affect the judge’s interest’
25. The 
question is complicated, requiring consideration of interest, outcome and ‘realistic effect’. 
Although none of the appeals were against the awards of arbitrators the Locabail decision 
shows how these integers function.
Locabail (2000)
Locabail involved five separate appeals on the Rule in Dimes. The first two matters involved 
decisions by a duty judge who was in practice as a solicitor. The duty judge’s firm (but not 
the judge himself) was acting for a company which had claims against the husband of one of 
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the parties to the proceedings over which the duty judge presided. This company was not 
connected with the case before the judge. In the third appeal the judge had published papers 
critical of insurance providers. The judge in the fourth matter had worked for the defendant 
government department at the beginning of his career. In the fifth matter the trial judge was a 
director of a property company. One of the parties to the proceedings before him was a tenant 
on land owned by the company. The Court of Appeal prefaced its rulings on the five appeals 
with the following statements of law:
(1) Bias will be presumed where interest in the outcome is shown – it is interest in 
the outcome, and not links to the party, that guides the court.  The question is 
whether the outcome could affect the interest. Parties with full knowledge of 
the interest may waive objection.
(2) Actual bias entitles the litigant to have the judge removed or their judgment set 
aside. Where there is no actual bias the test is whether there is a real danger of 
bias. Where a judge does not know of the allegedly disqualifying interest there 
will be no real danger. 
(3) A judge should not usually disqualify himself, or be disqualified for reasons of 
religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, age, class, means or sexual 
orientation, the judge's or a member of his family's social or educational 
background, or employment history. Previous political associations and 
memberships of social or charitable bodies should not result in 
disqualification
26. 
Four out of five appeals were dismissed. Only the third appeal succeeded – the views 
expressed by the trial judge in previous publications were held to give rise to a real danger 
that he was biased against insurers. All the other appeals were dismissed on de minimis and 
lack of proximity. As will be observed below, the obiter in Locabail is the source of the ‘soft’ 
Common Law rule that judges and arbitrators should disclose circumstances likely to affect 
their impartiality. 
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2.3 Apparent Bias
If we place Pinochet to one side – and we can in this thesis because the ratio does not apply 
to arbitrators  - it seems safe to say that there are in England two separate and distinct 
principles of law that may be activated when impartiality or independence are put in issue:
(1) The rule of ‘Automatic Disqualification’ (or ‘Presumed Bias’) based upon the maxim 
nemo debet esse judex in propria causa as applied in Dimes. The Anglo expression of 
the Rule in Dimes is that ‘no man shall be a judge in his own cause’. This rule was 
expanded into a limited category of non-pecuniary interests by the decision of  the 
House of Lords in Pinochet (No.2)
27. It will be triggered where a decision maker can be 
identified with a party or is so closely connected to the matter as to make it ‘his 
cause’
28. 
(2) The rule of ‘Discretionary Disqualification’ for apparent bias. There has been some 
divergence (even conflict) of English authority on this rule. At present Porter v Magill
prevails and a decision maker will only fall afoul of it where there is a real possibility 
that they were biased. Gough governed this rule between 1993 and 2002; the rule of 
Discretionary Disqualification for apparent bias covers situations of ‘unconscious’ or 
‘imputed’ bias, as well as ‘antecedent’ bias (ie. bias that becomes apparent after the 
decision is made)
29. 
With respect to the second rule, two competing tests for apparent bias developed late in the 
nineteenth century. The first line stems from the decision in R v Fraser
30(affirmed in Sussex 
Justices). It is known by the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test that the decisions that comprise it 
employ
31. The writer will refer to it as ‘Sussex Justices’. The two arms of Sussex Justices are:
(1) Assessment of the impugned conduct from the vantage of a ‘reasonable observer’ 
(the ‘First Arm’), 
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(2) A ‘reasonable apprehension’ (or ‘reasonable suspicion’) threshold (the ‘Second 
Arm’),
This line prevailed in England for much of the twentieth century. Another line, emanating 
from the decision in R v Rand
32(approved by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords 
in Bath Justices
33 and revived more recently in Gough), required that applicants demonstrate 
that there was a ‘real danger of bias’ when the decision was made against them
34. The full 
text of the Gough test is:
Having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the Court should ask itself whether, 
having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the 
relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard 
(or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue 
under consideration by him
To reiterate, the Gough test has two arms:
(1) Assessment of the impugned conduct through the eyes of the court (the ‘First Arm’)
(2) A ‘real danger’ threshold (‘the Second Arm’)
A ‘real possibility’ tributary of this second Common Law stream prevails today as a result of 
the House of Lords decision in Porter v Magill. The Porter v Magill test incorporates the 
First Arm of Sussex Justices and the Second Arm of Gough. 
2.4 Real Differences
A key aspect of the writer’s position in this thesis is that challenges to arbitrators should not 
be decided by the same principles that guide state courts in deciding challenges to judges. 
The writer will argue later that the best means of achieving this is by use of a higher standard 
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34 The ‘real likelihood’ test was applied in R v Camborne Justices, ex parte Pearce [1955] 1 QB 41. See also R v 
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for disqualification of arbitrators  than that which applies to judges  – parties challenging 
arbitrators should be required to show a real and definite possibility of bias rather than a 
suspicion or apprehension of partiality. Courts hearing challenges to arbitrators should apply 
Gough (or Porter v Magill, if the reader disagrees with the writer in respect of point (2) 
below), and refrain from using Sussex Justices. It is essential to this thesis that three threshold 
issues be addressed:
(1) What is the difference between the Sussex Justices ‘reasonable apprehension’ test and 
the ‘real danger’ test laid down by the House in Gough? 
(2) Is there any difference between the Gough ‘real danger’ test and the ‘real possibility’ 
test that is in force today as a result of the decision in Porter v Magill? 
(3) Is there any difference between the Sussex Justices ‘reasonable apprehension’ test and 
the ‘real possibility’ test that is in force today as a result of the decision in Porter v 
Magill?
(1) What is the difference between Sussex Justices and Gough?
The Sussex Justices and Gough tests differ in two ways. Firstly, the vantage points they use 
(their ‘First Arms’) for determination of the appearance of bias. Sussex Justices used a 
notional reasonable person with knowledge of the material facts. Under Gough, the vantage 
point from which the impugned decision maker was to be assessed was that of the court itself. 
In Lord Goff’s mind the notional third person was unnecessary because ‘the court in most 
cases...personifies the reasonable man’
35. Because Porter v Magill dispensed with this aspect 
of Gough
36 there is no need to embark on any further consideration of it at this stage.  
Secondly, the courts in these cases chose very different words to set the bar (their ‘Second 
Arms’). On this point commentators disagree on as to whether the Sussex Justices and Gough 
tests compete in real terms. The writer is of the opinionthat the Second Arms of the two tests 
diverge considerably. Superior court decisions in Common Law states that rejected Gough
support this position. In Webb v The Queen Justice Deane of the High Court of Australia 
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expressed the opinion that the ‘real danger’ standard replaced ‘Apparent Bias’ with a new 
form of ‘Actual (but Unconscious) Bias’ focused on evidence rather than perception of the 
parties. Similar opinions have been given by South African courts
37. 
The ratio in Gough no longer binds English courts. Two decisions are responsible for this: Re 
Medicaments
38 and Porter v Magill
39. The stricter ‘real danger’ test proposed by Lord Goff 
of Chieveley in Gough was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re Medicaments. After its 
review of the authorities the Court of Appeal opted to modify and rephrase the test for 
apparent bias as a question of ‘whether the relevant circumstances would lead a fair minded 
and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was 
biased’ [emphasis added]. In Porter v Magill it was held that the test for apparent bias was 
that applied by the Court of Appeal in Re Medicaments, and not the ‘real danger’ standard set 
in R v Gough
40. In Porter v Magill Lord Hope formulated the test as ‘whether the fair-minded 
and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real 
possibility that the tribunal was biased’. Whether there is any difference between Gough’s
‘real danger’ and the ‘real possibility’ formulation in Porter v Magill is a question the writer 
must attempt to answer.
(2) Is there any difference between a Gough and Porter v Magill?
The House of Lords has repeatedly confirmed the status of Porter v Magill as a ‘modification 
of the Common Law test for bias enunciated in Gough’
41. The only difference between 
Gough and Porter v Magill is the vantage point from which the impugned decision maker is 
to be assessed; apart from their vantage points the tests are the same. In Re Medicaments
Lord Phillips MR agreed
42. There is no difference between a ‘real danger’ and a ‘real 
possibility’; a ‘danger’ is just a possibility of a bad thing - both ratio contain the imperative 
word real. For reasons explained at point (3) below this semantic commonality functions to 
negate any assertion that a court using a ‘real danger’ test would arrive at a different 
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conclusion to a court applying the ‘real possibility’ test preferred under the Second Arm of 
Porter v Magill. 
(3) Is there any difference between Sussex Justices and Porter v Magill?
This is a difficult question. Conflicting judicial opinions have been expressed on whether 
these two tests produce different results. The writer’s view is that the ‘real possibility’ and 
‘reasonable apprehension’ tests are not the same, and do not produce the same result when 
applied to a bias challenge: a ‘real possibility’ is quite different from a ‘reasonable 
apprehension’. Whilst a suspicion (or apprehension) may be reasonably founded in so far as 
it has been formed in the mind of a person as a result of their exercise of the faculty of 
reason, the facts upon which the suspicion is based may not necessarily interact to produce 
the result that the apprehended outcome is a real possibility. 
Algerian judge Mohammed Bedjaoui said that the problem of arbitrator impartiality ‘acquires 
a metaphysical quality’
43. Well, to briefly engage in metaphysics, the word ‘real’ is an 
adjective that draws on a parent concept of ‘reality’, a term we use to describe a state of 
affairs arising out of the observable interplay of material elements which are actual and true. 
Without the word ‘real’ there is harmony between ‘possibility’ and ‘reasonable 
apprehension’. This is because the coming into fruition of a state of affairs that has been 
suspected or apprehended by a person due to their use of logic and reason will necessarily be 
possible – if it was not possible then no logical suspicion or apprehension of it could have 
been formed ab initio. But the Porter v Magill attachment of the word ‘real’ to the word 
‘possibility’ renders this interaction imperfect because the possibility must then satisfy the 
requirements of reality, which exceed those of logic and reason, and include external 
component circumstances. The evidentiary burden imposed by the ‘real possibility’ test is,
therefore, markedly higher than that which an applicant must discharge to make out a 
reasonable apprehension under Sussex Justices
44. 
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3. English Arbitration Law
Under English law the obligations of impartiality and independence flow from different 
sources; impartiality from statute and independence from Common Law.  The Common Law 
rule is that arbitrators are subject to the same standard of impartiality as judges
45. English 
courts have dismissed the view expressed in some other jurisdictions that a more stringent 
standard should apply to arbitrators
46. While  Gough was in force it was applied to 
arbitrators
47. Since Re Medicaments the ‘real possibility’ test has been applied to arbitrators 
in a number of decisions, most recently Norbrook Laboratories
48 and ASM Shipping. Porter v 
Magill stands at present. 
3.1 Statutory Obligation of Impartiality 
The English lex arbitri is comprised of the Arbitration Act 1996 and those rules of Common 
Law that inform it. The English Arbitration Act is widely recognised as a highly progressive 
ordinance. Whilst England is not a Model Law seat, it is clear that much of the 1996 Act is 
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law
49. According to Section 1(a) of the General Principles 
‘the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal 
without unnecessary delay or expense’.  Section 33 identifies the general duties of the 
tribunal. Section 33(1) provides ‘The tribunal shall…act fairly and impartially as between the 
parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing withthat of 
his opponent’
50. The effect of this drafting is that any tribunal convened under English law 
must act fairly and impartially
51. A breach of this rule (or any other rule of procedural 
fairness) will entitle the aggrieved party to challenge the award on the basis of ‘serious 
irregularity’ under section 68
52. Section 68(2) defines ‘serious irregularity’ as irregularity 
‘which the court considers has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant’. 
Section 68(2)(a) makes failure to comply with the general duty of fairness and impartiality 
   
45 See for example the judgment of Rix J in Laker Airways v FLS Aerospace [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 45. 
46 AT&T Corporation v Saudi Cable Company [2000] BLR 29
47 See paragraphs 669H – 670D of Lord Goff’s Judgment in R v Gough. 
48 Norbrook Laboratories Ltd v Tank [2006] EWHC 1055 (Comm) 
49 Philip Alexander Securities and Futures v Werner Bamberger and Ors (1996) XXII YBCA 872 (1997) 
50 Arbitration Act 1996, s.33(1), emphasis added
51 Parliament’s choice of an unconditional, mandatory mode of drafting for section 33 suggests that the parties 
cannot contract out of procedural fairness and impartiality. It follows that English law recognises Article 18 
(Equal Treatment) as a mandatory provision of the Model Law. 
52 See also Hussman v Al Ameen [2000] 2 Lloyd’s L Reps 83; Interbulk Ltd v Aiden Shipping Co Ltd (The 
“Vimeira”) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s L Reps 66. 46
(s.33(1)) a ground for court ordered remission  or  vacatur.  In  Hussman (Europe) Ltd v 
Pharaon
53, the Applicant (Hussman) sought vacatur under s.68, arguing that there was a real 
possibility of bias on the part of the tribunal because the court had criticized the tribunal and 
reduced its fees when setting aside a prior award against the Applicant. Deputy High Court 
Judge Brindle held
To invoke an apprehension of bias is not to establish serious irregularity. In order for 
Section 68 to be invoked its seems to me that Hussman would have to show actual 
bias on the part o the Tribunal….Even if I was otherwise satisfied that the allegation 
of bias or the appearance of bias could bring Section 68 into play, I should add that I 
would not have been satisfied that…serious [sic] injustice had been established
54  
In reaching this his conclusion, Brindle DHCJ referred to the characterisation of section 68 as 
a ‘longstop, only available in extreme cases’ at paragraph 280 of the Departmental Advisory 
Committee (DAC) Report on the Arbitration Bill 1996
55. The more recent decision of Justice 
Morsion in ASM Shipping goes against the dicta of Brindle DHCJ in Hussman: Morison J 
held that showing a real possibility of bias will satisfy both the ‘serious irregularity’ and 
‘substantial injustice arms of section 68. In Norbrook Laboratories
56, Colman J agreed with 
Morison J in ASM Shipping
57; for now, the position is settled. It is notable that the DAC 
Report confirmed that the arbitrators are bound to follow the procedure agreed by the parties, 
even if that procedure violates a mandatory provision of the Act
58. It follows that, on the 
history of the law, the parties can agree that the arbitrators may act unfairly or partially, and 
the arbitrators are bound to comply, regardless of that fact that this agreement may not be 
enforceable in an English court. As the DAC put it ‘the tribunal has the choice of the court 
course preferred by the parties or of resigning’
59. 
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The year 1996 is a key date in this thesis: it was in 1996 that the current English Arbitration 
Act came into force and the shift from a Gough informed ‘real danger’ test to a ‘justifiable 
doubts’ statutory threshold friendlier to Sussex Justices began. The relevant provision of the 
Act is section 24(1)(a), which is an imperfect adoption of Model Law Article 12. It allows 
any party to an arbitral proceeding to apply to the court for removal of an arbitrator during 
arbitral proceedings on the basis ‘that circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts
as to his impartiality’
60. The ‘circumstances’ envisaged by section 24(1)(a) capture both 
pecuniary and non pecuniary interests; Dimes and apparent bias. Regardless of the form they 
take in the pleadings it seems that all allegations of bias in arbitral proceedings will be tested 
against the revised Gough standard laid down in Porter v Magill. This test will be applicable 
regardless of the stage of the proceedings at which they are made
61, meaning that a section 68 
application for vacatur in which the ‘serious irregularity’ is an appearance of bias will be put 
to the same test as a challenge proper
62.  The principal difference between s.24 and s.68 
proceedings is that the ‘serious irregularity’ must be such as to cause ‘substantial injustice’ to 
the applicant
63. The force of this additional requirement has, however, been rendered less 
certain since the strong dicta of Morison J in ASM Shipping
64.  
3.2 ECHR Obligation of Independence
It has been noted that the removal provision of the 1996 Act is only a partial adoption of 
Model Law Article 12. The 1996 Arbitration Act does not use the word ‘independent’; Model 
Law Article 12 does. It follows that in England the source of the obligation of independence 
differs from that of the obligation of impartiality. As V.V. Veeder QC has observed, the 
English Act’s silence on ‘independence’ is attributable to the London tradition of commodity 
trade and reinsurance arbitration, where two party-appointed arbitrators (usually 
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businessmen) would sit together and, if they could not reach a consensus, then they would 
become the parties’ representatives before the umpire
65.  
In English law, the requirement that arbitrators be independent of the parties comes from two 
sources, the first being Article 6 of the ECHR (and the Human Rights Act 1998) and the 
second being the Common Law. Because the ECHR is in force in all of the seats in this 
survey, the role of Human Rights law will be discussed more generally below. For now the 
focus is the municipal law of England and the Common Law obligation of independence.
3.3 Common Law Obligation of Independence
The Rule in Dimes is the source of the Common Law rule of independence. It cancels out the 
effect of the absence of the term ‘independence’ in the 1996 Arbitration Act. A decision 
made by an arbitrator who is not independent will be voidable under the Rule in Dimes.
Although the 1996 Act does not create a rule of automatic disqualification equivalent to 
Dimes there seems little doubt that Dimes is covered by section 24(1)(a) as well
66.  
As we shall see in the survey of the European seats that follows this chapter, the English 
statutory preference for ‘impartiality’ is to be contrasted to the legislative preferences of 
France and Switzerland, where judicial and procedural codes focus on ‘independence’. 
Jurisprudence has accounted for the difference: French and Swiss superior courts tend to read 
the code term independent as including ‘independence of mind’ , the latter being synonymous 
with ‘impartiality’
67. But could the reverse be achieved? Could an English court extend the
English Arbitration Act notion of impartiality to impose a requirement of independence? 
There is obiter in the affirmative. In Saudi Cable Lord Justice Potter noted that s.24 of the 
1996 Act does not refer to ‘independence’. His Lordship’s view was that Parliament’s reason 
for leaving out the word ‘independence’ in its taking from Article 12 of the Model Law was 
that ‘the greater includes the less’ - impartiality captures independence
68. With respect, the 
writer’s view is that this is not correct: a decision maker who lacks independence will 
necessarily lack impartiality, but a decision maker who lacks impartiality will not necessarily 
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lack independence. This is because the appearance of party preference flows from  party 
proximity,  but the appearance of party  proximity does not necessarily flow from party 
preference
69; a decision maker does not forfeit their independence just because they prefer 
one party (or outcome) over another (which they must ultimately do if they are to render an 
award). The arbitrator can prefer an outcome without ever relating themselves to it or its 
beneficiaries. On this basis, it would be more difficult for an English court to manufacture a 
positional form of impartiality than it was for Swiss and French courts to arrive at a mental 
formof independence. 
3.4 No Disclosure Requirement in the Arbitration Act
All major institutional rules contain rules of disclosure
70, and ICA jurisprudence tends to 
identify disclosure as an important step in the arbitral process. It is generally accepted that 
disclosure has a ‘cleansing affect’
71: the arbitrator might have nothing to tell the parties, but if 
they do, and the parties  elect to go on with the arbitration, then the arbitrator will be 
immunised against subsequent challenges based upon the circumstances disclosed. US courts 
treat the duty to investigate potential conflicts of interest and disclose them as a 
‘prophylactic’ measure
72. As will be observed in Chapter 6, there is a strong argument that, in 
international arbitration at least, the obligation to disclose is lex mercatoria: Alvarez has 
identified disclosure as a custom or usage of ICA
73; Yves Derains, former Secretary General 
of the ICC Court of Arbitration, has expressed similar opinions
74. But the English Arbitration
Act does not require that arbitrators give disclosure of circumstances likely to affect their 
impartiality, and it is clear from Saudi Cable that there is no Common Law rule of disclosure: 
in that matter the Court of Appeal rejected the argument advanced by AT&T that the 
arbitrator was obliged to give disclosure under both the Common Law and his contract with 
the parties
75. 
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As yet there is no binding  authority for the proposition that, in an arbitration seated in 
England, the arbitrator must give disclosure to the parties. There is authority (namely the 
Locabail appeals) for the proposition that it is ‘desirable’ that a judge disclose any ‘matter of 
which he becomes aware which could arguably be said to give rise to a real possibility of 
bias’
76, and this soft  proscription  would seem to apply to arbitrators.  In  Norbrook 
Laboratories, for example, Colman J expressed concerns as to the arbitrator’s failure disclose 
communications with witnesses
77 (obiter is suggestive of a rule). In institutional arbitrations 
conducted in England (such as under the LCIA Rules), arbitrators  give disclosure  in
compliance with the institutional rules chosen by the parties, but practitioners report that it is 
not common for disclosure to be given (or even requested) in ad hoc arbitrations seated in 
London
78. These ambiguities aside, it is clear that English law does not require that judges or 
arbitrators investigate potential conflicts of interest once the proceedings have started: the 
limited obligation to investigate accepted by Lord Woolf in Locabail ends when the arbitrator 
enters onto the reference
79. 
Whilst, in the event of non-disclosure, there may be a case to be made under section 68, the 
deliberate exclusion of a disclosure requirement from the 1996 Act
80, coupled with the dicta
of the Court of Appeal in Saudi Cable, suggest otherwise. If an arbitrator failed to give 
disclosure of a non de minimis relationship or interest, the aggrieved party would be hard 
pressed to get the award set aside on the basis of ‘serious irregularity’ under s.68. However, 
the matter not disclosed would, in its own right, need to give rise to justifiable doubts as to 
the arbitrator’s impartiality before vacatur would be available. If the proceedings were still 
on foot, then the remedy would lie in an application for removal under section 24(a) of the 
Arbitration Act. 
4. English Decisions on Arbitrator bias
The historical role of London as place for arbitration has had the effect that English case law 
is rich in decisions concerning bias challenges to arbitrators. In recent years, the archives 
have grown. Not surprisingly, actual bias is relatively rare in the record. The leading case on 
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actual bias is the ‘Catalina’ v ‘Norma’, a case that is today synonymous with racial prejudice 
on the part of the arbitrator. 
‘Catalina’ v ‘Norma’ (1938)
In Re the Owners of the Steamship ‘Catalina’ and the Owners of the Steamship ‘Norma’ the 
English Baronet Sir William Norman Raeburn KC was appointed arbitrator to decide a 
dispute that arose out of a collision between Portuguese and Norwegian-owned ships off the 
English Channel island of Ushant. A witness for the Portuguese applicant swore that he heard 
the arbitrator say about the Portuguese party’s witnesses:
They are not Italians. The Italians are all liars in these cases and will say anything to 
suit their book. The same thing applies to the Portuguese. But the other side here are 
Norwegians, and in my experience the Norwegians generally are truthful people. In 
this case I accept the evidence of the master of the [Norwegian vessel] Norma
81
The owners of the Portuguese vessel Catalina applied to the Divisional Court of the Court of 
the King’s Bench for orders removing the arbitrator. The Court found in favour of the 
applicant, holding that the arbitrator had approached the matter with a bias against the oral 
evidence of the witnesses from Portugal. The award was set aside for actual bias. This case is 
valuable for three reasons. Firstly, it is one of the rare instances in which the supervising 
court found actual bias. Secondly, the case provides a private law example of party 
preference based upon nationality. Judicial nationalism usually arises in public adjudications, 
such as the criminal trial in Berger v United States
82. In Catalina v Norma the dispute was 
purely private, and the nexus with the United Kingdom was consensual. The parties chose to 
go to arbitration in London. State involvement was minimal but nationality bias still arose. 
Finally, the judgment of the Divisional Court shows the primacy of Lord Hewart’s dictum in 
the period before Gough. Charles J (with whom Du Parcq J agreed) identified the 
requirement that justice be done and be seen to be done as being of ‘fundamental 
importance’
83. Here justice could not be done, nor the appearance achieved, because the 
arbitrator clearly neither liked nor trusted Portuguese people. 
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Whilst an arbitrator’s visible animosity towards a party will be actionable, dislike for their 
advocate is harder to plead as a ground of challenge. In Fletamentos Maritimos the Court of 
Appeal held that the fact that an arbitrator holds an uncomplimentary view of the professional 
ability of a lawyer does not mean that they are biased against the party they represent. In this 
case a prominent London maritime arbitrator made known his opinion on the competence of 
the solicitors for one of the parties. Waller LJ and Morritt LJ rejected the challenge on the 
basis that more was needed to generate the appearance of bias against the party themselves
84. 
Morrit LJ observed:  
It is inevitable that Judges and arbitrators will form opinions as to the professional 
skills and integrity of those who appear before them; they are bound to find some 
advocates easier to listen to, and likely, therefore, to be more persuasive than others. 
But the existence of such views, whether held privately or, as in this case, made 
known to others cannot, without more, be sufficient to constitute bias against that 
advocate’s client
85
These comments of Morrit LJ were cited with approval by Colman J in Norbrook 
Laboratories
86. In Norbrook Laboratories an arbitrator in an engineering dispute who 
attempted to limit one party’s number of legal representatives and expressed pre-judgmental 
views on the value of expert evidence proposed by that party was held not to have 
demonstrated any all pervading bias or want of impartiality
87. His Honour applied the Gough
test for apparent bias
88. 
Modern Engineering (1981)
Not surprisingly, apparent bias challenges have generated a higher volume of case law than 
motions in actual bias. In Modern Engineering the English Court of Appeal had occasion to 
consider an allegation of merits prejudgment brought under the misconduct provision 
(s.23(1)) of the Arbitration Act 1950. The Modern Engineering challenge involved a denial 
of natural justice by breach of the right to be heard audi alterem partem. The substantive 
issue which the arbitrator had failed to hear both sides on was whether an architect’s stage 
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certificate could be re-opened in a claim for delay. The arbitrator adjourned after hearing only 
the Claimant’s submissions on the issue. The next day he issued an ‘interim award’ in which 
he held that certificate could be re-opened. The unheard Respondent applied to the 
Commercial Court for removal of the arbitrator, and for orders setting aside the interim 
award. 
In Modern Engineering it was argued that the arbitrator had mis-conducted the proceedings 
by failing to hear both sides before determining a key issue. Modern argued further that the 
arbitrator should be removed because, if he were now allowed to hear their argument on the 
issue of the stage certificate, there would be reasonable grounds for suspecting he had 
prejudged it against them. At first instance Goff J (as His Lordship then was) acknowledged 
the grave errors made but refused to remove the arbitrator because the conduct complained of 
was ‘not so fundamentally wrong and bad as to demonstrate his incompetence to proceed’
89. 
Modern appealed. Lord Denning MR and Lord Justice Dunn upheld the appeal. Lord 
Denning held that the key consideration in disqualifying an arbitrator is ‘his ability to come 
to a fair and just conclusion’
90. His Lordship phrased it as a question of ‘whether the way he 
conducted himself in the case was such that the parties can no longer have confidence in 
him’
91.
The challenge provision of the 1950 Act was worded in favour of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
test for apparent bias
92; the equivalent provision of the 1996 Act (being s.24(1)(a)) takes up 
the UNCITRAL Model Law notion of ‘justifiable doubts’. In Saudi Cable counsel for AT&T 
argued that the ‘justifiable doubts’ referred to in s.24 of the 1996 Act fit more comfortably 
with the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test of Sussex Justices than the ‘real danger’ test preferred in 
Gough
93; the Court of Appeal disagreed, citing with approval the ‘same chambers bias’ 
decision of Rix J (as His Lordship then was) in Laker Airways. 
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Laker Airways (1999)
The well known challenge in Laker Airways
94 came out of a dispute between a US airline 
(Laker) and its fleet service contractor (FLS). The arbitration clause in the service contract 
provided for a three member tribunal. FLS appointed Stanley Burnton QC of 1 Essex Court
as its arbitrator. When Laker learnt that counsel for FLS had recently joined chambers at 1 
Essex Court they asked FLS to appoint a replacement arbitrator for Burnton. FLS refused and 
Laker’s solicitors wrote to Mr Burnton asking him to stand down. Laker’s stated reason was 
that Mr Burnton and counsel for FLS were at risk of accidental unilateral communications as 
a result of their close proximity in chambers. Laker argued that the ‘Chinese Walls’ within 
the cell might not be enough to prevent the passage of information between counsel and 
arbitrator. On receipt of this letter Mr Burnton informed the parties that he would only resign 
if both parties requested it. Laker then filed a section 24 application for his removal. 
Despite the fact that the Applicant did not appear at the hearing, the Court gave full 
consideration to what it considered to be important issues of law. Rix J confirmed the 
objectivity of the test for bias and distilled from section 24 a two stage test:
(1) The Court must determine that circumstances exist, and are not only believed 
to exist (although Rix J was careful to note that a belief could in itself qualify 
as a ‘circumstance’), and
(2) The Court must find that the circumstances justify doubts as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality.
Rix J found that the test under s.24 reflected the Common Law rule of apparent bias. His 
Honour confirmed the separation of the Rule in Dimes from the test for bias, holding that 
where a decision maker has an interest in a cause before them then their disqualification is 
automatic and no investigation of the likelihood of bias will be necessary. Where there is no 
such interest disqualification will turn on whether there is a real danger of bias. Rix J 
commented in obiter that unjustified or unreasonable doubts are not sufficient as ‘it is not 
enough honestly to say that one has lost confidence in the arbitrator's impartiality’. 
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Importantly, in approving Gough, Rix J held the ‘real danger’ test to be compatible with the 
terms of s.24(1)(a). The Rule in Dimes was not invoked in the Laker Airways application. 
Neither was there any need to consider actual bias. Laker’s application was brought on the 
basis of an appearance of partiality generated by the physical proximity of advocate and 
arbitrator. In finding that no such appearance was made out Rix J referred to the DAC 
Report
95. The drafters of the 1996 DAC Report rejected the inclusion of ‘independence’ in 
section 24 and, on His Honour’s reading, not intended to make ‘same chambers’ relations 
actionable. In dismissing pecuniary interest Rix J found that whilst barristers share certain 
expenses, they do not share fees or profits. Rix J characterised barristers as self employed 
legal practitioners who are regulated in such a way as to guarantee their capacity to appear 
against one another without conflict of interest. Barristers know this as the ‘Cab Rank 
Rule’
96. The Applicant bore the onus of proving that there was a real danger of unilateral or 
improper communication between Mr Burnton and counsel for FLS, and had not discharged 
this burden. Rix J drew support for his conclusion from other ‘same chambers’ decisions, 
namely Pilkington Plc v PPG Industries Inc
97 and Nye Saunders v Alan E. Bristow
98. 
The decision in Laker Airways has generally been well received in English superior courts. 
The most recent expression of approval was ASM Shipping Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of 
England [2005] APP.L.R. 10/19. Laker Airways was approved by the Court of Appeal in
AT&T Corporation and Lucent Technologies Inc v Saudi Cable Company
99. 
Saudi Cable (2000)
Saudi Cable is probably the most widely known of all the challenge decisions referred to in 
this chapter. It is of high interest to the writer because it was a decision made in the period 
after Pinochet, but before Re Medicaments, during which the separation of the Rule in Dimes 
from the principle of disqualification for apparent bias was uncertain. Saudi Cable was 
decided by applying the then-binding Gough ‘real danger’ test for apparent bias to section 24 
of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
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A dispute arose
100. The parties appointed one arbitrator each, and agreed to Montreal-based 
lawyer Yves Fortier QC as Chair. Mr Fortier and the party arbitrators were required to sign
ICC statements of independence before entering onto the reference.  The ICC Statement of 
Independence requires appointees to tick one of two boxes; ticking the first box confirms 
independence and the absence (to the best of the appointee’s knowledge) of circumstances 
that may ‘call into question [the arbitrator’s] independence in the eyes of the parties’. Mr 
Fortier ticked the first box and the Tribunal was formed. During the course of proceedings it 
emerged that Mr Fortier was a non-executive director and holder of 474 shares in the 
Canadian outfit Nortel. Nortel were a disappointed bidder for TEP 6. Mr Fortier also held 300 
AT&T shares. The Chairman’s failure to disclose was innocent – as a result of a clerical error 
the curriculum vitae provided by Mr Fortier at the time of his nomination did not mention his 
directorship of Nortel. When AT&T complained Mr Fortier offered to resign his directorship. 
AT&T rejected the same and applied to the ICC for his removal on the grounds that he lacked 
independence. On 24 February 1999 the ICC dismissed AT&T’s challenge. On 15 September 
1999 a third partial award was handed down in favour of the SCC under which AT&T were 
ordered to pay US$30 million (plus interest) as partial compensation for breach of the PBA. 
AT&T commenced in England for removal of Mr Fortier and orders vacating the Tribunal’s 
partial awards.  Due to the date of the PBA the application was brought under s.23 of the
1950 Act.  AT&T argued that Mr Fortier was not disinterested in the outcome of the dispute, 
and that they had been deprived of their right to an impartial arbitrator as a result of the 
accidental failure to disclose. No allegation of actual bias was made. At first instance 
Longmore J dismissed the application, finding that neither the Rule in Dimes nor the rule of 
apparent bias was breached. AT&T appealed. The matter was heard by Lord Woolf MR, 
Lord Justice Potter and Lord Justice May. Their Lordships dismissed the appeal, holding that 
the fact that the arbitrator was a non-executive director of a competitor company that might 
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somehow indirectly benefit from a decision against AT&T was not sufficient for 
disqualification under the Rule in Dimes or to create a real danger of bias.  
In his leading judgment Lord Woolf MR dealt with the arguments run by AT&T against the 
application of Gough to international arbitral proceedings. Counsel for AT&T, Sir Sydney 
Kentridge, argued that the test laid down in Gough is not binding on arbitrators sitting in 
international arbitrations. In support of this submission counsel referred to the part of Lord 
Goff’s judgment in Gough where his Lordship said that the ‘real danger’ test should apply to 
all cases of apparent bias ‘whether concerned with justices or members of other inferior 
tribunals, or with jurors or with arbitrators’. Lord Goff did not refer to arbitrators in 
international matters. Counsel contended that, given this silence and the fact that the Gough
test has been rejected in other jurisdictions
101 the reasonable suspicion test should be applied 
to international arbitrators. The Master of the Rolls answered as follows:
Lord Goff did not deal separately with international arbitrations, but there is no 
principle on which it would be right in general to distinguish international arbitrations 
from the other categories of situations to which Lord Goff referred, when the 
arbitration is, as here, governed by English law
102
It is respectfully submitted that Lord Woolf’s position is correct. The English Arbitration Act 
1996 is monist; a monist lex arbitri does not distinguish between domestic and international 
arbitrations. Monism prevents a different standard being applied to arbitrators in international 
matters – to do so would be to engage in ‘hidden dualism’ (something English courts do not 
do). It follows that it was not open to the Court of Appeal to apply a different standard. This 
begs the question: if the lex arbitri had been a dualist Act would the court have responded 
more favourably to Sir Sydney’s submission? From Lord Woolf’s answer it seems that they
might have. His Lordship conceded that Gough was silent on international arbitration, and his 
resistance to the split proposed was based upon the singular shape of English arbitration 
law
103. 
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The Saudi Cable decision illustrates the operation of other principles of challenge. The failure 
to fully disclose was central to the applicant’s case. AT&T unsuccessfully argued that the 
Chairman’s inadvertent failure to bring his seat to the attention of the parties was a 
procedural breach constituting misconduct, and that his indirect interest in the outcome might 
have affected the way he discharged his responsibilities as arbitrator
104. This was also at issue 
in Rustal Trading. 
Rustal Trading (2000)
Rustal Trading was an application for vacatur under the ‘serious irregularity’ provision at 
section 68 ofthe English Arbitration Act 1996. The arbitration was conducted under the rules 
of the Refined Sugar Association. Rustal discovered that one of the arbitrators had been 
involved in a commodity arbitration against one of their consultants two years before. Rustal 
applied on the basis that this previous adversarial association between party representative 
and arbitrator gave rise to an appearance of bias and constituted a serious irregularity in the 
proceedings. Moor-Bick J dismissed the application
105. His Honour held that where a failure 
to disclose is pleaded, the rule is that sanction against the arbitrator will not be granted unless 
the non-disclosed fact was such as to cause, by the fact of its not being disclosed, a real 
danger of bias
106. In reaching this conclusion Moor-Bick J took into account the nature of the 
dispute and the need for ‘commercial men’ to decide it. His Honour commented in obiter
[it might] fairly be assumed that one of the reasons why the parties have agreed to 
trade arbitration is that they wish to have their dispute decided by people who are 
themselves active traders and so have direct knowledge of how the trade works. 
However, if the arbitrators themselves are to be active traders there is every likelihood 
that at least one member of the tribunal will at some time have had commercial 
dealings with one or both parties to the dispute. That is something which the parties 
must be taken to have had in mind
107
These comments echo the earlier dicta of Straughton J in Tracomin
108; they support the 
proposition that the more specific the subject matter of the commercial dispute, the more 
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party familiarity will be tolerated by English courts. This approach recognises expertise as a 
key feature of commercial arbitration which, in turn, reflects London’s long experience with 
commodity trade and reinsurance arbitration. The writer agrees: where the arbitrator has been 
chosen on the basis of their knowledge and experience in a particular sector of trade and 
commerce, they should not be expected to be free of opinions and associations. The writer 
will later argue that applying the Gough  standard in challenges to specialist arbitrators 
ensures that the procedural element of expertise is accounted for
109. 
ASM Shipping (2005)
In Locabail the Court of Appeal was required to walk a policy tightrope: on the one hand the 
Court attached a great deal of importance to the need to avoid wasting time and costs and the 
injustice arising from inappropriate attempts to abort hearings with bias challenges
110; on the 
other the Court acknowledged the universal and fundamental human right to a fair hearing by
an impartial tribunal
111. This characterisation of ECHR Article 6 was cited with approval by 
Justice Morison in the most recent English challenge case of ASM Shipping
112. 
The ASM Shipping arbitration arose out of the charter of the MV Amer Energy to carry gas 
oil from the Gulf to the Red Sea. The Vessel arrived late and the charterers claimed damages 
for loss of purchase contracts. The vessel owners counter-claimed for unpaid freight and 
demurrage. The tribunal was formed and a partial award in favour of the owners was handed 
down on 26 April 2001. In subsequent proceedings the charterers alleged that the owners had 
not given full and proper discovery. The tribunal made orders against the owners and the 
matter continued
113. Oral evidence was taken. When one of the owner’s principal witnesses (a 
Mr Moustakas) gave evidence the owner became aware that the chairman of the tribunal, 
Duncan Mathews QC, had been involved in an earlier unrelated arbitration in which the 
credibility of Mr Moustakas was at issue. The owners said nothing until two hearing days 
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later, at which time they asked the chairman to recuse himself. He declined to do so and 
application was made to the Commercial Court under section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
In a judgment that has been described as ‘controversial’, Morison J upheld ASM’s 
challenge
114. Because ASM continued for two hearing days Morison J was required to deal 
with the question of waiver of the right to object. Under section 73(1) of the 1996 Act, a party 
who becomes aware that the proceedings have been conducted improperly
115 (or have been 
affected by an irregularity
116) but continues to take part in the proceedings forfeits their right 
to object. Justice Morison summarised the applicant’s position as follows:
[ASM] were faced with a straight choice: come to the court and complain and seek 
[the challenged arbitrator’s] removal as a decision maker or let the matter drop.  They 
could not get themselves into a position whereby if the award was in their favour they 
would drop their objection but make it in the event that the award went against them. 
A ‘heads we win and tails you lose’ position is not permissible in the law as section 
73 makes clear.  The threat of objection cannot be held over the head of the tribunal 
until they make their decision and could be seen as an attempt to put unfair and undue 
pressure upon them.
Justice Morison applied the test laid down in Porter v Magill to hold that, although the 
Owners had waived their right to object by continuing for two days, the chairman should 
recuse himself because ‘an independent observer would share the feeling of discomfort 
expressed by Mr Moustakas and concluded that there was a real possibility that the tribunal 
was biased’
117.
The chairman complied. The owners then challenged the remaining two arbitrators. The 
concurrent challenges to arbitrators Harris and Scott were heard by Smith J. Counsel for the 
owners cited Sussex Justices, Pinochet and Re Medicaments in support of their argument that 
because the chairman appeared to be biased his co-arbitrators should be removed. Judgment 
was handed down in June 2007. In dismissing the section 24 applications Smith J held that 
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there is no general rule of removal for ‘contamination’. His Honour distinguished the 
authorities cited (notably Pinochet) on the basis that because the tribunals in these cases had 
already made their respective decisions it was only natural that the decision makers should 
not participate in their review. These decision makers were standing aside for reasons other 
than contamination. His Honour confirmed the position that an allegation of bias must be 
evaluated in its own context – the only basis on which the remaining members could have 
been challenged was if there was good evidence of their being influenced by discussions with 
the recused chairman. As there was no such evidence the applications failed. 
5. Human Rights Law in England
The UK ratified the  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) in 1953. English courts have been finding breaches of its 
terms since 1975. The principal effect of the 1998 Human Rights Act was that it enabled
individuals to invoke certain Convention rights before domestic tribunals
118. It is settled that 
the requirements of ECHR Article 6 extend to arbitral proceedings
119, with the effect that 
arbitrators are subject to separate and additional obligations of impartiality and independence 
under the ECHR
120.
It will be observed in the survey of European seats that follows that the European Court of 
Human Rights applies a ‘reasonable apprehension’ test for bias, and that the ECHR member 
states have generally followed Strasbourg in this regard. This raises the question: can the 
‘real possibility’ test co-exist with the ECHR? The answer is clearly in the affirmative. 
Despite the passage of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the dicta of the Court of Appeal in 
Director General of Fair Trading v Proprietary Association of Great Britain
121 English 
courts have found little difficulty in applying the ‘real possibility’ test, and before this the 
Gough test, in matters in which breaches of the fair trial ‘guarantee’ under Article 6 of the 
ECHR have been asserted
122. Two decisions demonstrate this. The first is that of the House of 
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Lords in Lawal. The second is the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in 
AWG Group Ltd.
Lawal (2003)
The appeal point in Lawal was whether the practice of using senior barristers as part time 
members of statutory tribunals conflicted with the requirements of ECHR Article 6. The facts 
were that, in an appeal before the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), the QC who appeared 
for the Respondent was a part time member of the EAT and had in that capacity sat alongside 
two of the members of the EAT panel before which he appeared in the instant matter. The 
real possibility pleaded was that these members might unconsciously favour submissions of 
their colleague (senior counsel for the Respondent) over those of the Appellant. The House of 
Lords allowed the appeal, holding that the EAT’s practice of using members of the inner Bar 
as part time judges and also allowing them to appear before members with whom they have 
sat must be discontinued. Importantly, the Law Lords held that there was no difference 
between the Common Law test for bias laid down in Porter v Magill and the requirement of 
impartiality contained in ECHR Article 6. The decision in Lawal also reinforced the primacy 
of Lord Hewart’s dictum that ‘justice must be done and be seen to be done’
123. Lord Steyn 
said that ‘the public perception of the possibility of unconscious bias is the key’
124. 
AWG (2006)
This decision of the English Court of Appeal directly addresses the effect of the 1999 Human 
Rights Act upon the Common Law test for apparent bias. The matter involved a takeover 
agreement between AWG and Morrison. A dispute arose in which AWG alleged that 
Morrison made ‘unconditional representations’ and fraudulently concealed information 
regarding its profits for the 2001 financial year. The matter came on before Evans-Lombe J of 
the Chancery Division of the English High Court of Justice. In the pre-trial phase His Honour 
became aware that AWG intended to call a witness called Richard Jewson. Mr Jewson was a 
well-known acquaintance of Evans-Lombe J. Despite the Appellant’s request, after disclosing 
his relationship with the witness Justice Evans-Lombe decided not to recuse himself. The 
material facts of His Honour’s decision not to stand down were that in the week before the 
trial Justice Evans-Lombe stated that, when he notified the parties of his being acquainted 
with Jewson, AWG indicated that because of his marginal importance and potential to cause 
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delay Jewson would not be called. Morrison requested that Justice Evans-Lombe withdraw as 
a result of his disclosure. Upon learning of Morrison’s request Justice Evans-Lombe 
proceeded to disclose the fact that his family were landowners in the area where AWG’s
water supply business was focused, adding that his relations with AWG were ‘not always 
harmonious’
125. His Honour went on to state that Jewson lived only a mile from him and his 
family, and that their families had known each other for over 30 years. Evans Lombe J stated 
in the opening paragraphs of his judgment that he told Morrison that he ‘would have the 
greatest difficulty in dealing with a case in which Mr Jewson was a witness where a challenge 
was to be made as to the truthfulness of his evidence’
126. 
In the appeal that followed Morrison’s sole objection to Justice Evans-Lombe continuing to 
try the case was that there was a ‘real possibility of apparent bias’
127. Morrison made no 
allegation of  actual bias or personal interest. The Court of Appeal  weighed the risks of 
inconvenience, costs, and delay against fundamental principles of justice (both under the 
Common Law and under Article 6 ECHR). In his leading judgment, Lord Justice Mummery 
of the Court of Appeal concluded that convenience, cost and delay are subordinate 
considerations where concerns as to judicial impartiality are properly invoked. The Court of 
Appeal found that Evans-Lombe J should have recused himself because, even if Jewson was 
not called, it was in the interests of justice and all the parties involved that another judge try 
the case. In reaching this conclusion Mummery LJ held (at 7) that
the test for apparent bias now settled by a line of recent decisions of this court and of 
the House of Lords is that, having ascertained all the circumstances bearing on the 
suggestion that the judge was or ‘would be’ biased the court must ask whether those 
circumstances would lead a fair minded and informed observer to conclude that there 
was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased [emphasis added]
128
The next paragraph of the judgment of Mummery J identifies this ‘line of recent decisions’ as 
being comprised of Taylor v Laurence, Gough, Re Medicaments, Porter v Magill and Lawal. 
All of these decisions were made employing approximations of the ‘real danger’ test. In 
contrast, the ‘true’ ECHR test for apparent bias (or at least that applied on the Continent) 
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corresponds with the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test applied in Sussex Justices. The key 
feature of the AWG Group decision is that the ‘real danger’ Common Law bloodline is cited 
immediately after the description of the guarantee of judicial impartiality in ECHR Article 6 
as ‘the fundamental principle of justice’
129. From their silence on the matter it is apparent that 
the members of the Court of Appeal saw no friction between the ‘real possibility’ test and the 
terms of ECHR Article 6.
6. London Court of International Arbitration
Established in 1893, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) is the world’s 
oldest international arbitration institution. Until very recently the LCIA observed a flat 
prohibition against the publication of  its  decisions,  and this bar extended to rulings on 
challenges to arbitrators. Much like the ICC, during the twentieth century the Court took the 
view that it would be inconsistent with the confidentiality ofproceedings to publish decisions
on challenges. But this rule was overturned in June 2006 when the LCIA voted to commence 
publication of decisions on challenges
130. The driving force behind this reversal was the 
perceived institutional obligation of the LCIA to provide guidance on challenges, especially 
in circumstances not covered by the IBA Guidelines
131. 
The LCIA Rules require that arbitrators remain impartial and independent for the full period 
of the arbitration. No allowance is made for the gradual erosion of impartiality (as envisaged 
by Sir Robert Jennings in Re Judge Broms
132). LCIA Rules Article 5(2) provides: 
All arbitrators conducting an arbitration under these Rules shall be and remain at all 
times impartial and independent of the parties; and none shall act in the arbitration as 
advocates for any party. No arbitrator, whether before or after appointment, shall 
advise any party on the merits or outcome of the dispute [emphasis added]
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The LCIA rules are, therefore, direct  and unconditional  in their imposition of the dual 
obligations of impartiality and independence. The Rules do not acknowledge any Sunkist 
distinction, and make no room for party-arbitrators. Where an arbitrator is disqualified, LCIA 
Rules Article 11(1) gives the Court ‘complete discretion’ to determine whether or not the 
process for their replacement will be the same as the process by which they were appointed. 
Lew, Mistelis and Kroll notes that the LCIA Rules do, in theory, allow arbitrators to request 
replacement of arbitrators
133. The writer is not aware of any arbitration in which this has 
occurred, but given that the LCIA has only recently started publishing its challenge decisions 
it is possible that the situation has arisen in the past. Despite the fact that the LCIA Rules 
Article 29(1) identifies challenge decisions as administrative in nature, the practice of the 
Court has always been to provide reasons for its challenge decisions. 
National Grid (2007)
National Grid went to UNCITRAL Rules arbitration with Argentina over the alleged breach 
of its rights under the UK-Argentina BIT
134. The damage was done when, following its 
currency crisis of 1999, Argentina passed the 2001 Public Emergency and Exchange Rate 
Reform Law (PEERRL)
135. The passage of PEERRL resulted in a number of ICSID claims 
against the Argentine Republic
136. The hearing was held between 9 and 20 July 2007 in 
Washington DC
137. One week later Argentina filed a challenge to American arbitrator Judd L. 
Kessler. The basis of Argentina’s challenge was that Kessler had caused Argentina to 
apprehend prejudgment when he intervened during the cross-examination of an expert 
witness. The witness (Dr Juan Carlos Cassagne) was giving evidence on Argentine  law. 
Counsel for Argentina was  putting questions to Dr Cassagne based around hypothetical 
scenarios. Whilst the witness was responding, Arbitrator Kessler interjected (in Spanish)
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It is now clear that there are certain facts that the witness is not familiar with, but I 
suppose that the basis of his testimony has to do with the hypothetical situation and that 
it’s not hypothetical because we are all here. We know the facts generally speaking that 
there was major harm or major change in the expectation of the investment
138
Whether or not National Grid had suffered ‘major harm’ as a result of the passage of the 
PEERRL was at the heart of merits of the dispute. Argentina challenged Arbitrator Kessler 
for apparent outcome preference. The challenge was brought under UNCITRAL Rule 10 on 
the basis that his comment that ‘there was major harm or major change in the expectation of 
the investment’ showed that he had prejudged the final result
139, and that Arbitrator Kessler
‘completely identified’ with the Claimant’s allegations
140. The parties agreed to submit the 
challenge to the LCIA. 
On 26 September 2007 the LCIA convened a division of the Court for the matter. The 
members were Mr Yves Fortier CC QC (as President), Dr Klaus Sachs and Dr Hassan Ali 
Rahdi. Argentina quickly objected to the President – whether or not the objection was related 
to the Republic’s challenge to Mr Fortier six years prior in Vivendi v Argentina
141 is not clear 
in the judgment. In any event, Mr Fortier withdrew
142.  Irish arbitrator  Paul B Hannon 
replaced him as President.  The oral hearing of the challenge was held on 22 November 2007 
in London. In addition to the UNCITRAL Rules, Argentina relied on a number of authorities
in support of its submission that an objective test was applicable, including Sussex Justices, 
Porter v Magill, Commonwealth Coatings, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration (namely item 3.5.2 on the Orange List) and a report of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  National Grid agreed that the 
question was one of appearance
143, but denied that Arbitrator Kessler’s intervention betrayed 
prejudgment of the merits
144. National Grid also noted that the Argentine challenge did not go 
to Arbitrator Kessler’s independence, only his impartiality. National Grid said that the 
arbitrator was only performing his normal duties as an arbitrator when he interjected as he 
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did. Counsel for National Grid relied upon the dicta of Sir Robert Jennings in Re Judge 
Broms as authority for the proposition that an arbitrator is required to become partial as a 
matter of ‘judicial duty’
145. Because the challenge to Arbitrator Kessler was governed by the 
UNCITRAL Rules, it was open to National Grid to rely on the dicta in Re Judge Broms: if 
the challenge had been subject to the LCIA Rules, National Grid would have been barred 
from relying on the principle of ‘eroding impartiality’ by virtue of LCIA Rules Article 5(2). 
The tribunal applied an objective test to the challenge
146. Considering the broader 
hypothetical context of Arbitrator Kessler’s comments
147,  the members concluded that 
Arbitrator Kessler had not caused an appearance of prejudgment to arise. It was material that, 
immediately after he interjected, Arbitrator Kessler was asked by Counsel for Argentina ‘you 
state that at this stage we already know that there was hard?’ In his answer Arbitrator Kessler 
said ‘I merely say that we are here because there is an allegation of harm or a change in the 
contract that caused problems to the investor’. The members held that the use of the word 
‘allegation’ was incompatible with the assertion that Arbitrator Kessler was prejudiced. The 
tribunal also noted that some confusion was caused by the comments being made in Spanish 
(rather than English, Mr Kessler’s mother tongue). The challenge was dismissed
148. 
LCIA Challenge Decision 18 (2005)
This challenge arose out of an ex parte communication between the sole arbitrator and 
counsel for the Claimant
149. The arbitrator and counsel met for fifteen minutes behind closed 
doors, and in the course of their meeting live issues in the arbitration were discussed. 
Subsequently, in an exchange concerning the meeting the arbitrator made comments casting 
aspersions on the integrity of counsel for the Respondent, and required that an exchange 
between counsel regarding the meeting be deleted from the transcript
150. 
Following the jurisprudence of English courts under s.24 of the Arbitration Act, the LCIA 
Division applied the Porter v Magill ‘real possibility’ test to the challenge. The Division 
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concluded that the sole arbitrator should be removed, commenting that ‘such private meetings 
are not recommendable, as they may lead the other party or even an external observer, in 
certain circumstances, to suspect a lack of impartiality on the part of the arbitrator’
151. The 
Division was careful to note that ‘the mere fact that such a meeting takes place does not, in 
itself, always lead to the conclusion of a real possibilitythat the arbitrator is biased’
152. It was 
the fact that the ex parte communication included live issues in the dispute that made it
improper, and caused the real possibility of bias to arise – if there had been no discussion of 
the merits, it is unlikely that the challenge would have succeeded.    
7. Conclusions
The prohibition against ‘actual bias’ is well established in English law. The 1938 decision 
‘Catalina’ v ‘Norma’ shows it is applicable to arbitrators. As a rule it has enjoyed a 
consistency of application not shared by its normative counterpart, the rule of disqualification 
for ‘apparent bias’. In 1993 the body of Common Law surrounding this rule changed as a 
result of the decision of the House of Lords in Gough, in which the Sussex Justices
‘reasonable apprehension’ test gave way to a new requirement that a ‘real danger’ be shown 
to exist in the eyes of the court (as opposed to the ‘fair minded observer’ favoured in the 
Sussex Justices line). The policy imperative that ‘justice be seen to be done’ was seen by 
many as shelved. As shall be observed in Chapter 5, this new test did not command universal 
acceptance. Whilst it was taken up in Hong Kong and Malaysia, courts in Australia, South 
Africa, Canada and Scotland retained the rule in Sussex Justices. The English law of bias then 
underwent two further shocks, the first being the passage of the 1998 Human Rights Act and 
the second being the controversial 1999 decision of the House of Lords in Pinochet (No.2). In 
Re Medicaments in 2001 the Gough ‘real danger’ test was modified and rephrased as ‘real 
possibility’. In 2002 the revision of Gough was completed by the House of Lords in Porter v 
Magill. The Re Medicaments phrasing was approved and the fair minded observer was 
returned to the equation, hand in hand with Lord Hewart’s ghost. This test is in force today in 
English courts, and at the LCIA. 
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Arbitrators have ridden alongside judges on this bumpy Common Law road. In Saudi Cable
the Gough ‘real danger’ test was applied and the pecuniary interest challenge dismissed. The 
same test was applied in Rustal Trading, with a similar result. The next case on point is ASM 
Shipping, in which the Porter v Magill revision of Gough was applied to the arbitrator with 
very different results. Justice Morison of the Commercial Court ordered that the arbitrator 
should have recused himself because ‘an independent observer would share the feeling...that 
there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased’. In Porter v Magill the ghost of Lord 
Hewart CJ opened the door for this notional third person, and ASM Shipping shows how 
powerful their presence is. ASM Shipping would have failed in the days of Gough. Rustal 
Trading was based on similar ‘prior adversarial association’ grounds to ASM Shipping. The 
challenge in ASM Shipping only succeeded because the vantage point Morison J was bound 
to use was that of the notional third person, whose hypothetical assessment imports Sussex 
Justices-type considerations of public confidence that have no role to play in private 
commercial dispute resolution proceedings. The writer will argue in Chapter 8 that English 
courts were right to apply Gough to arbitrators, and that they should return to Gough (both 
arms: ‘real danger’ and court vantage) in deciding challenges to arbitrators in future.  70
CHAPTER 3
Varying Approaches in Europe
…the tentacles of the Human Rights Act 1998 reach some unexpected places.
- Steel J in Mousaka v Golden Seagull Maritime (2001)
1
1. Introduction
This chapter is concerned with procedural fairness in ICA in certain European states. The 
purpose is to show how the laws of the seven leading European seats – France, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden – diverge in their treatment of bias 
challenges to arbitrators. This chapter commences with a short discussion of the sources of 
the rule against bias in Europe. It then turns to the European Human Rights Law and assesses 
the affect of Strasbourg jurisprudence on the domestic laws of arbitrator bias in ECHR 
member states. It will be observed that, although all the leading arbitral seats of Europe are 
party to the ECHR and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights employ the 
‘reasonable apprehension’ test for bias akin to Sussex Justices, the courts of the European 
seats still vary in the way they approach bias challenges to arbitrators and arbitral awards.  To 
make this observation the writer will examine the municipal laws of a number of 
jurisdictions. Key arbitral institutions and permanent tribunals will also be examined. In 
Chapter 8 the writer will return to the laws of these seats in assessing their tolerance for the 
contractual adoption of the Gough ‘real danger’ test. 
2. Sources of the Rules of Bias in Europe
The European legal rule that a decision maker must not be biased is derived from three main 
sources: custom, Roman law and modern municipal law. The last of these sources is covered 
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‘seat-by-seat’ below. In this preface the writer’s concern is historical; the focus here will be 
on custom and Roman law. The intention of the writer is two-fold: (1) to show the origins of 
the notion that to be valid a decision must not have been made in circumstances of bias, and 
(2) to illustrate the evolution of this notion from its emergence as a relative customary 
proscription to its modern form as an absolute rule of posited law.    
2.1 Customary Law
In the discussion of lex mercatoria that follows this chapter, the writer will provide a 
theoretical explanation for how social rules obtain the force of customary laws. Rather than
double-up here, in this chapter the reader is for argument’s sake asked to accept the Natural 
Law proposition that there is such a thing as customary law, and that the communities of 
early Europe – at some time in the first millennium AD – developed customs to guide them in 
their daily lives. A custom is a non-binding prescription of how to act in a certain situation. 
Derek Roebuck describes the essentiality of customary law as follows:
Every community must have some system of dealing with disputes if it is to be a 
community. It has its own law, which is customary until its ideology insists that 
nothing is law which is not set by the state
2
It is difficult to say to what extent the exclusively customary laws of the ancient Germanic, 
Celtic and Basque peoples of Europe dealt with decision making processes. But some things 
can be said with certainty. Violence is destructive. Experience shows that community 
survival depends upon the prevention of violence by the peaceful settlement of feuds and the 
maintenance of order
3. But this does not mean law follows. Positivists and Natural Law 
adherents continue to disagree on the degree of legal complexity that simple societies require 
(let alone exhibit). The safest proposition is that human groups of any significant size require 
basic notions of right and wrong, and that these notions manifest as do  and don’t rules. 
Substantive prohibitions against murder, rape and theft are therefore likely to have developed 
early. But what about secondary rules, like rules to govern how a person is accused of killing: 
in pre-modern European societies, was there such thing as customary procedural law?
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3 Ibid, p.8472
The kinds of tribal assemblies (described by Roebuck as ‘folk-moots’
4) that were used to 
resolve feuds in Iron Age European communities – the legacy of which is the modern jury -
must have adhered to basic procedural patterns such as consistent meeting places and times 
(probably structured around key dates of the agricultural calendar), ceremonial rules for the 
right to speak (the so-called ‘Speaking Stick’ phenomena
5) and signals for the start and finish
of proceedings
6. According to Roebuck ‘the processes in the assemblies were clearly 
accompanied by acts which were customary and replicated and intended to have some 
consequence’
7 - if they were not then they would have drastically underperformed as social 
processes. This is because a ceremony is an exhibition of power, a power that is maximised 
by knowledge of ceremonial rules. It follows that knowledge of the rules of the assembly 
would have been a key means of wielding and reinforcing power within the group, with the 
outcome that those in control of the assembly (including the priests who would later play the 
role of lawyers) stood to benefit from the development of secondary procedural rules. 
If even the most basic procedural rules were observed in these types of meetings, they must 
have included a rule that the decision could not be made by a party who stood to gain or 
suffer as a result of it. Continental scholars have agreed. Writing in 1861, H. A. Zacharia 
suggested that the rule that ‘no man may be a judge in a matter in which he has an interest’ 
had a considerable history in German customary law
8. Rules usually take a long time to 
migrate from the periphery of a society to the centre. Whilst we should never project the 
present onto the past, it might not be too much to say that the centrality of the rule against 
bias in modern European legal principles of ‘fairness’ and ‘rights’ suggests that the origins of 
the rule are ancient, customary and cultural. But this is theory and conjecture. There is no 
hard evidence for how the peoples of ancient Europe managed and resolved their disputes. 
The record only begins in Roman times. 
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2.2 Roman Law
With the exception of  Sweden, all of the states surveyed in this chapter were Roman 
possessions at one time or another
9. Roman law was in force throughout the Empire, though 
the modern historical consensus is that Germanic and Celtic customary laws governed most 
aspects of the day to day lives of people in Rome’s European provinces. But the more formal 
dealings were, and the higher the status of the actors, the more likely they were to be 
governed by the Roman rules and codes. It seems market forces Romanised commerce faster 
than other branches of social activity, and where there are deals there are disputes. Roman 
commercial law quickly adapted. Courts and full time judges were relatively late additions to 
the Roman provincial structure. Ad hoc dispute resolution methods were favoured as a matter
of necessity rather than policy. For this reason the practice of arbitration was well developed 
in Roman law, especially in commercial contexts
10. The Roman lex arbitri was made up of a 
detailed body of procedural rules, many of which are familiar to the modern day practitioner. 
Much like their modern equivalents Roman arbitrators were under a general duty to act fairly 
and in good faith
11. The origins of this duty appear to be Greek
12. For the purposes of this 
thesis the most important element of Roman arbitration law was the general rule that no one 
could adjudicate in their own cause (nemo debet esse judex in propria causa)
13. Under 
Justinian’s Code (stating the lex lata in AD 524) arbitral awards made in circumstances of 
‘corruption or obvious bias’ were unenforceable
14. In contrast to modern judicial practice, 
which generally treats the prohibition against bias as being subject only to de minimis, the 
Roman form of the rule was far from absolute. As Roebuck put it
Romans saw nothing outlandish in allowing one of the parties in some circumstances 
to act as arbitrator in a matter in which he (or indeed she) had an interest
15
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When the arbitrator had an interest in the cause before them they remained bound by fairness 
and good faith
16. Professor Roebuck’s research has revealed a number of instances in which 
Roman arbitration law tolerated breaches of the nemo judex rule. In his treatise On 
Agriculture Cato the Elder described dispute resolution methods for harvest contracts in 
which one of the  parties was given the role of arbitrator
17. Similar arrangements were 
recommended by Cato in disagreements relating to the milling of olives
18. In Letters (written 
in the period AD 104-107), Pliny describes how he acted as arbitrator in a substantial 
inheritance dispute in which he was a potential beneficiary
19. Justinian’s Digest (AD 533) 
recalled a situation where the arbitrator in a dispute over payment of a dowry was the debtor 
himself
20. The Digest also describes a dispute regarding the obligations of a freed slave to his 
former master in which the former master was decision maker
21. It is clear, therefore, that the 
Roman  lex arbitri did not expect total or perfect impartiality and independence from 
arbitrators. The Digest shows that nemo judex could be broken in circumstances that today 
we would perhaps equate with ‘trade arbitration’ (or expert determination). The Roman bar 
for vacatur was set high as a requirement that the bias be ‘obvious’. 
2.3 Becoming an ‘Absolute Rule’
How then did the rule against bias become absolute and ‘fundamental’ in Europe? Was it the 
advent of Christianity, and the dissemination of notions of divine authority? Probably not –
Rome was well into its third century of Christianity when Justinian’s Code and Digest were 
promulgated, and we have seen that those instruments were not so strict in their prescription 
of nemo judex. The feudal kingdoms and principalities of Europe in the Middle Ages, where 
social hierarchy alone determined the validity of an exercise of power, are even more 
unlikely contexts for the transition to fundamentality. The Separation of Powers Doctrine was 
born in the Enlightenment, so we might properly  stop at 1789, the year of the French 
Revolution, when ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ ushered out the ancien regime and laid the 
foundations of the first French Republic with ideological blocks fashioned by Rousseau and 
Montesquieu et al. In The Spirit of the Laws (1748) Montesquieu – who had served as a judge 
for a time - expressed the view that judges are ‘only the mouth that pronounces the words of 
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the law, inanimate beings who cannot moderate its force nor its rigour’
22. This idea was 
central to the Revolutionary theory of judicial function; inherent in it is the vision of the 
judge as a neutral, benign processor untrammelled by inputs other than law and fact. 
Guaranteeing judicial ‘neutrality’ was a key task of the procedural reforms that followed the 
French Revolution
23. The legislative record shows that the main rights-based reforms took 
place in criminal procedure law. For example, the 1808 French Code of Criminal 
Examination separated the roles of prosecutor and investigating judge
24. But these 
developments were short lived and localised, knots undone by counter-revolution and war. 
Although the theories and happenings of the High Enlightenment certainly set the stage, they 
alone do not explain the elevation of the rule against bias to the status of the absolute 
prohibition which it holds in Europe today. No, we are looking in the wrong place. 
The true evenement was World War Two, in the aftermath of which two things happened: the 
law of nations settled into its modern, posited form; and Human Rights Law was borne. With 
respect to the former, modern Public International Law exhaustively deals with the rights and 
duties of states in times of war, which include the right to be ‘neutral’. In Chapter 1 the writer 
objected to the personal aspect of the term ‘neutrality’ in ICA: the word ‘neutral’ might be 
appropriate as a description of a seat (the ‘jurisdictional aspect’ of the term) but using it to 
describe an arbitrator ignores his function, which is to render a binding award - to ‘take a 
side’ (a distinctly belligerent act). Despite this logical flaw the word ‘neutral’ is widely used 
today (especially amongst American lawyers) as a summary expression for a decision maker 
that is impartial and independent. It will be observed that French courts also toy with an 
additional requirement of ‘neutrality’. This helps explain how the notions of impartiality and 
independence became absolute - they are associated with neutrality, which is an absolute
standard derived from  Public  International  Law
25.  In private international law (which 
includes ICA) ‘neutrality’ is a risky colloquialism, a usage that has elevated impartiality and 
independence to the level of absolutes. The analogy between the arbitrator and a neutral state 
is fundamentally flawed, and is at least partly to blame for the global prevalence of the 
Second Arm of the Sussex Justices test. The writer will return to this point later. The latter 
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post-war source - Human Rights Law - must now be considered in some detail. But before 
dong so the writer must give disclosure: first, the writer is not a scholar of Human Rights 
Law and is, in the discussion that follows, crossing into an area in which he has limited 
expertise. 
3. European Human Rights Law  
The most significant modern source of the modern European legal rule against bias is Human 
Rights  Law, the codified body of fundamental rights and freedoms formed amidst the 
dramatic revision of Public International Law after World War Two. Summers describes the 
birth as follows:
Principles expressed as rights have more protection from the interference from 
politicians and the electorate than norms expressed as mere laws. Indeed this would
seem to be precisely the reason for the creation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In the aftermath of the Second World War, there was a desire to find 
legal means to try and prevent the types of atrocities that took place in Europe in the 
first half of the twentieth century. The Convention can therefore be seen in the context 
of an international attempt to set standards which could not be overridden by the 
competing aims of the various legislatures.
26
In 1950 the forty seven states of the Council of Europe signed the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)
27. All the members of 
the European Community (EC) are signatories to the ECHR, meaning that all of the states 
presently grouped as the European Union (EU) are party to the ECHR. 
Two bodies originally administered the ECHR – the European Commission on Human Rights 
(EHR Com) and the European Court of Human Rights (EHR Court). Both bodies were seated 
in the French city of Strasbourg. The European Commission on Human Rights was dissolved 
in 2001. Its function and case load has been assumed by the European Court of Human 
Rights. All the signatories to the ECHR have incorporated decisions of the EHR Court into 
their municipal laws. The EHR Court and Commission rely on the ‘common core’ of the law 
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of the ECHR member states in reading the Convention
28. There is no doctrine of precedent in 
European Human Rights Law. But although decisions of the  European Court of Human 
Rights are not strictu sensu binding on Council of Europe states, because they interpret the 
ECHR (which is binding) they are highly persuasive. 
Article 6 of the ECHR guarantees the right of every person to a fair trial before an impartial 
and independent tribunal. Although overtly public in its phraseology, Article 6 applies to 
proceedings in which private rights and remedies are at issue. There is, however, good 
authority for the proposition that ECHR Article 6 does not apply telle quelle to civil cases
29. 
The European Human Rights Commission has held that where Article 6 rights are invoked in 
private contexts municipal courts have ‘greater latitude’ than they would in their application 
to a matter of public law
30. 
3.1 The ECHR and Arbitral Proceedings
Notwithstanding the fact that they often fail the element of ‘publicity’ the Human Rights 
Court has held that ECHR extends to arbitral proceedings
31. Arbitral panels qualify as 
‘tribunals’ for the purposes of the ECHR because their functions are decisive of the private 
rights and obligations of individuals
32. The issue is then what must be shown for ECHR 
Article 6 to apply. The jurisprudence of the ECHR Court and Commission provides guidance 
on this jurisdictional question. 
Andersson v Sweden (1997)
From the decision of the EHR Court in Andersson v Sweden
33 we can conclude that the 
following elements must be satisfied in order for ECHR Article 6 to apply:
(1)There must be a dispute (a ‘contestation’)
34, and
   
28 Petrochilos, G, Procedural Law in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2004), p.113
29 Liebscher, C., ‘The Healthy Award: Challenge in International Commercial Arbitration’ (Kluwer 2003) , p.62
30 Van Dijk, EHR Com 7 January 1991, see also Jensen v Denmark, DR 68, 177 at 182, cited in Liebscher, 
above note 29 , p.62
31 For an excellent discussion of the applicability of the ECHR to arbitral proceedings see Altaras, D, 
‘Arbitration in England and Wales and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: Should 
Arbitrators be Frightened?’(2007) 73 Arbitration 3    
32 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece (1994) 19 E.H.R.R. 293, cited in Altaras, above note 
31, p. 264 
33 Andersson v Sweden, decision of EHR Court of 27 August 1997, Report 1997-IV at para 33, cited in 
Liebscher, above note 29, p.6378
(2)The dispute must relate to the existence, scope or manner of exercise of a civil right 
recognised under the municipal law of the relevant member state, and 
(3)The dispute must be ‘genuine and serious’
35, and
(4)The outcome of the proceedings in question must be ‘directly decisive’
36.  
The EHR Court and Commission have defined ‘civil rights’ broadly
37. Contractual
38 and 
proprietary
39 obligations and rights have been held to be within the meaning of ‘civil rights’. 
It seems safe to say that the kinds of rights most often pressed in ICA fall within the scope of 
the ‘civil rights’ contemplated by ECHR Article 6
40.  
Mousaka v Golden Seagull Maritime (2001)
The cross-pollination of arbitration law with principles of Strasbourg Jurisprudence in the late 
1990’s imposed new obligations on arbitrators. This caused a good deal of alarm amongst 
judges and arbitrators, especially in England, where the ECHR was widely seen as 
‘Frenchmen telling Englishmen how to run their courts’. Lord McClusky wrote that the 
ECHR would be ‘a field day for crackpots, a pain in the neck for judges and legislators and a 
goldmine for lawyers’
41. Whilst this may be an overstatement, the ECHR does burden the 
arbitral process. In Mousaka v Golden Seagull Maritime Steel J of the English Commercial 
Court commented that 
the tentacles of the Human Rights Act 1998 [by which the UK gave effect to its 
obligations under the ECHR] reach some unexpected places. The Commercial Court, 
even, when exercising its supervisory role as regards arbitrations, is not immune
42
The tenets of the ECHR have filtered into arbitration so thoroughly that eminent 
commentators, including Lord Mustill, have expressed the view that international arbitrators 
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are now under a duty to ensure that they are familiar with the principles of Human Rights 
Law
43. 
Bramelid & Malmstrom v Sweden (1983)
In this matter the EHR Commission was required to determine whether ECHR Article 6 was 
applicable to compulsory arbitration under the Swedish Joint Stock Companies Act. The 
Commission ruled that statutory arbitrations must be conducted in a manner consistent with 
the procedural guarantees contained in ECHR Article 6
44. In its 1995 decision in Cantafio the 
Commission reached a similar conclusion in relation to compulsory arbitration under Italian 
law
45.
The purpose of this short list of decisions is to establish the general application of ECHR 
Article 6 to arbitral proceedings. There are many other judgments on this interesting question, 
including decisions in the negative
46. We are, however, concerned in this survey with a 
specific element of Article 6: the right to ‘an independent and impartial tribunal’. 
3.2 Fair Trial under the ECHR 
For the purposes of this study the most important provision of the ECHR is the ‘fair trial’ 
guarantee at Article 6 (‘Right to a Fair Trial’). The full text of ECHR 6(1) is as follows:
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be 
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the 
trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
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special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice 
[emphasis added]
The provisions on the right to a ‘fair hearing’ in the various regional and universal human 
rights instruments are, in substance, identical
47. For example, ECHR Article 6 is mirrored by 
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR)
48. But because the EU is a 
federation, the ECHR requirement that member states observe principles of Human Rights 
law is able to be centrally policed
49. International Human Rights Law recognises both actual 
(subjective) and apparent (objective) bias as actionable: in Prosecutor v Fundzijia the 
Appeals Tribunal for the International Court for the Former Yugoslavia held that ‘an 
adjudicator should not only be subjectively free from bias, but also that there should be 
nothing in the surrounding circumstances which objectively gives rise to an appearance of 
bias’
50.  ECHR case law confirms the dicta in Funddzijia: where independence is concerned, 
appearances are everything. 
ECHR Article 6 has mixed vertical and horizontal force, meaning it can be invoked vertically
by public bodies (such as member state courts in supervisory proceedings)
51 and horizontally
(by private parties against a private parties in private proceedings)
52. It is important to note 
that the ECHR does not expressly provide for the horizontal effect of Article 6. Rather, the 
horizontal force of Article 6 is derived from the jurisprudence that has developed in the 
courts of states bound by the Convention
53. 
3.3 EHR Court Principles of Arbitrator Impartiality
The jurisprudence of the EHR Court is quite  well developed in the area of arbitrator 
impartiality.  Strasbourg uses both elements of the Sussex Justices test (‘reasonable 
apprehension’ and third party vantage). The following further principles stand out:
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(1) Subjective impartiality (which when lacking equates to actual bias in Common Law 
parlance) and Objective impartiality (which when lacking equates to apparent bias) 
are to be distinguished (Craxi III v Italy)
54
(2) An arbitrator is entitled to a presumption of impartiality which must be rebutted by 
proof to the contrary if the challenge is to succeed (Craxi III v Italy)
55
(3) In determining a challenge based on objective impartiality the decisive question is 
whether the apprehension can be objectively justified. The subjective opinion of the 
challenging party is relevant but not decisive (Craxi v Italy; Morel v France)
56
(4) The fact that an arbitrator and a party are both members of the same professional body 
does cause a lack of objective impartiality (H.A.R. v Austria; H v Belgium)
57
(5) So long as they have not taken a final position on the matter the fact that an arbitrator 
expresses a preliminary view on a case does not mean they then lack objective 
impartiality to decide it (Buscemi v Italy; Jensen v Denmark)
58
(6) Arbitrators who have even an indirect material interest in the outcome of the case lack 
objective impartiality (Langborger v Sweden)
59
(7) Indirect personal interests  are generally not sufficient to give rise to a lack of 
objective impartiality (Academy Training & Ors v Greece)
60
(8) An arbitrator may not be counsel in the matter over which he presides, or counsel in a 
related matter (Procola v Luxembourg)
61
3.4 Could Sussex Justices be waived?
Where the impartiality of arbitrators is concerned, Strasbourg jurisprudence is not so different 
to the municipal laws of most of the leading European seats. The treatment of nemo judex
may be different in that even ‘indirect’ interests seem to be objectionable (suggesting a 
situation like Saudi Cable might go the other way). But that there is still a place for de 
minimis - Langborger v Sweden shows the arbitrator’s interest must be ‘material’ in order to 
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be actionable. The writer’s principal objection to the Strasbourg approach is its insistence on 
the Sussex Justices test for arbitrators. The question is then whether the parties could waive 
the benefit of this public adjudicatory standard. The majority view is that, whilst the Article 6 
right to an independent tribunal may be waived, the right to an impartial decision maker 
cannot be waived. Professor Georgios Petrochilos has opposed this interpretation; Petrochilos 
is of the view that the ECHR Article 6 requirements of impartiality and independence are 
equally waivable:
the fact that independence and impartiality, as well as party equality, are doubtless 
part of procedural public policy does not make them absolute standards. A court 
controlling an arbitral award should be careful neither to upset the procedural 
arrangements of the parties nor to allow the parties to benefit from their own 
negligence properly to police those arrangements
62
In light of this doctrine, could the parties make ‘procedural arrangements’ with the effect that 
any challenges are which ensue are decided by the Gough test (ie. ‘real danger’ and court
vantage)? Would the following clause be enforced by the Strasbourg Court?
Challenges (‘Gough Clause’)
The Parties agree that any allegations that an arbitrator appears to lack impartiality or 
independence will, at whatever stage and in whatever jurisdiction they are made, be 
finally determined by the relevant authority asking itself whether there was (or is), in 
the relevant authority’s eyes, a real danger that the arbitrator was (or is) biased. 
As a threshold issue it is important to consider if a ‘Gough Clause’ would even be considered 
‘waiver of a Convention right’. It is submitted that it would. Whilst the Sussex Justices test is 
not a ‘Convention right’ per se (ie. it is not part of the written body of the ECHR) it is a 
principle of ECHR jurisprudence that functions to guarantee observance of a universally 
accepted and ‘fundamental’ Convention right.  It is a Convention right derived from 
jurisprudence rather than the text of the ECHR, but for the purpose of waiver a Convention 
right nonetheless. 
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Suovaniemi (1999)
This case was an appeal against the decision of a Finnish court which had held that the 
challenger had waived their right to object to an arbitrator ‘M’ by remaining silent in the 
proceedings. The material facts of the appeal were that one of the members of the tribunal 
was a lawyer who had acted for a third party in negotiations on the termination of a joint 
venture; the dispute the subject of the arbitration concerned the ownership of a company that 
owned the joint venture vehicle. The Human Rights Court agreed with the Finnish court, 
holding that the appellants, who were aware of these facts, had waived their right to an 
independent arbitrator and that their act of waiver had been accompanied by the guarantee of 
fairness derived from representation by counsel.   
In Suovaniemi the European Court of Human Rights did not directly address the question of 
whether the Sussex Justices standard could be waived in favour of Gough. Rather, the case is 
valuable because it illustrates the more general tolerance of the Strasbourg court for the idea 
that ECHR procedural rights can be waived. In finding the Finnish court’s decision 
acceptable for ECHR purposes, the Strasbourg court held that waiver of a procedural right 
under the Convention will only be effective if:
(i) waiver of the relevant right is ‘permissible’ under the Convention, and 
(ii) the waiver is ‘unequivocal’, and
(iii) the waiver is accompanied by ‘minimum guarantees commensurate with its 
importance’
63
These three elements were found to be satisfied; the waiver was effective. The Applicant had 
approved M as arbitrator despite having doubts about his impartiality, making his waiver 
unequivocal for element (ii). The Applicant was accompanied by counsel for all of the 
arbitral proceedings, which satisfied the ‘minimum guarantee’ requirement at element (iii) 
because it ensured that the Applicant had been afforded the opportunity to argue their case. 
What is the outcome if we apply the reasoning of the EHR Court in Suovaniemi to the 
‘Gough Clause’? It appears from Suovaniemi that the waiver of the right to an impartiality 
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judge is ‘permissible’, so element (i) would seem safe. As for element (ii) the wording of the
Gough clause would seem to be express and unequivocal. It might be arguable that a mere 
reference to the case (eg. ‘the parties agree to use the test in R v Gough’) would fail element 
(ii), but that is not what the writer has done. The Gough test, complete with its vantage point, 
is fully elucidated in the clause. Suovaniemi  element (ii) is satisfied. Finally, does 
implementation of the Gough test (in place of the Strasbourg Sussex Justices test) constitute a 
‘minimum guarantee’ for the purpose of Suovaniemi element (iii)? Gough does not abandon 
the parties to the wilds of prejudice and corruption; far from it. Firstly, if we accept that 
Gough deals with apparent (or ‘objective’) bias only, then nemo judex still stands to 
disqualify any arbitrator with an interest in the cause. Secondly, actual bias will always pass 
the Gough test so there is a minimum guarantee in place in this sense. It is submitted that the 
third Suovaniemi element is satisfied. On this basis the writer’s conclusion is that the ‘Gough
Clause’ would survive Strasbourg review.  
3.5 Conclusions on the ECHR
The record shows that, with some linguistic variance, decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights employ the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test for bias
64. The most recent 
illustration of this is Eureko v Poland. Due to the multiplicity of jurisdictions and the 
necessarily infinite variation in the outcomes of their interaction with the rules chosen by the 
parties, we cannot say for certain how the ECHR has affected the law of impartiality and 
independence in ICA. But we can make observations as to how Strasbourg jurisprudence is 
affecting the practice of challenging arbitrators in European seats. 
Challenges are increasingly common in Europe. Whilst the confidentiality of international 
arbitral proceedings (and resulting invisibility of ad hoc arbitrations) functions to limit the 
availability of empirical evidence to support this contention, there is ample institutional data 
to back it up. The leading recorder is the ICC. Until the 1980’s the Arbitration Court of the 
International Chamber of Commerce handled no more than a handful of challenges each 
year
65. By the early 1990’s the rate of challenge had increased significantly, such that the ICC 
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was often considering multiple challenges at any one of its monthly plenary sessions
66. At the 
1990 ICCA Congress in Stockholm lengthy discussions were held on how to respond to and 
minimise the effectiveness of these dilatory and disruptive tactics
67. Where there were six 
challenges run in the ICC Court in 1996, the figure rose to 33 in 2000
68. Between 1998 and 
2006 there were 4,950 new cases filed at the ICC, and a total of 270 arbitrators were formally 
challenged in this period.
69 Anecdotally, arbitrators report that the practice of challenging 
arbitrators is on the rise in Europe, and that arbitration is suffering as a result. Recently, 
Ahmed El-Kosheri and Karim Youssef said 
The increasing use of strategic challenges to arbitrators’ independence is a blight on 
arbitration today. Deliberate attempts to compromise arbitrators’ independence are 
frequent and come in various forms
70
The lawyers agree. In their 2008 European regional overview English practitioners Foster and 
Edwards observed:
the frequency of challenges in European arbitration seems to be increasing. Parties (or 
their legal advisors) have become highly adept at identifying a perceived flaw in the 
arbitral process or an extraneous factor affecting the partiality of an arbitrator, and are 
increasingly willing to make a formal objection when the opportunityarises
71
It is true that at the ICC the success rate is low – something like ten percent
72. In the period 
1995 – 2002 only seven ICC challenges succeeded
73; in 2003 the ICC Court received twenty 
challenges, of which only one got up
74. The highest annual rate of success was in 2002, when 
4 out of 15 ICC challenges succeeded
75. But the rate of withdrawal is high: in his study of 
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ICC arbitrations, Michael Bond found that, in challenges at the appointment stage, 72% of 
prospective arbitrators withdrew or were not confirmed by the ICC Court
76. The tactical 
objectives of procedural disruption, delay and ‘changing the bench’ are therefore achieved 
more often than not when a challenge is filed. This begs the question: what is the cause of 
this effect?
 
In the opinion of the writer, the cause is the prevalence of the Sussex Justices test in the body 
of  Strasbourg jurisprudence that surrounds tribunals sitting in Europe. From counsel’s 
perspective, the viability of a challenge is dependent upon the law under which it is brought. 
The outcome of a challenge will also depend upon the facts of the case. So whilst the Sussex 
Justices standard (or its close Strasbourg equivalent) certainly does not guarantee the success 
of challenges, it must be seen as promoting attempts. From the arbitrator’s perspective, being 
subjected to a test for bias that is framed in terms of appearances presents a risk to reputation 
that is often simply not worth taking: better to stand down than have your name dragged 
through court in a drawn out challenge proceeding.  
The question the writer has tried to address is whether the parties are stuck with the 
Strasbourg Sussex Justices test. The answer is that they are not. Following the reasoning of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Suovaniemi and the doctrine of eminent scholars the 
writer has argued that the Strasbourg equivalent of the Sussex Justices test could be excluded 
by use of a ‘Gough Clause’. 
4. Municipal Laws 
In order to make the point that the inclusion of a ‘Gough Clause’ would be beneficial for 
parties arbitrating in Europe, the writer must examine how the courts of the leading European 
seats evaluate and decide allegations of arbitrator bias. 
4.1 FRANCE
Since the storming of the Bastille the notion of equalite has held a high seat in the national 
consciousness of the people of France; the independence of the judiciary is central to patrie. 
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The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen stated that all citizens were 
equal in the eyes of the law. More recently, the advent of the ECHR has reinforced the 
primacy of equalite in French law. Consistent with the Republic’s obligations as a signatory 
to the ECHR and other international Human Rights agreements, French law guarantees fair 
and equal treatment in legal proceedings. French courts have repeatedly identified due 
process as a ‘superior and indispensable principle of the law’
77 that is applicable without 
exception
78. In recent years, the geographic and jurisprudential proximity of the European 
Court of Human Rights has lowered the tolerance of Paris courts for breaches of procedural 
fairness.  
The grounds upon which a municipal judge may be challenged for lack of independence are 
found in the New Code of Civil Procedure (NCCP). It has been observed that France is one of 
a handful of states where the dual requirement of independence and impartiality is not 
imposed in black letters. Article 341 of the NCCP describes situations of impermissible social 
proximity rather than state of mind. Although earlier court decisions used to refer only to 
‘independence’, treating matters of attitude as ‘independence of mind’, more recent decisions 
refer to impartiality expressly
79. Article 341 exhaustively lists the factual bases upon which a 
judge may be challenged for wont of independence:
(a) the judge or their spouse have a personal interest in the dispute;
(b) the judge or their spouse are a creditor, debtor, possible heir or gift recipient of 
one of the parties;
(c) the judge or their spouse have certain family ties with one of the parties or their 
spouses;
(d) there were or still are ongoing legal proceedings between the judge or their 
spouse and one of the parties or their spouse;
(e) the judge was already involved in the case as a judge or arbitrator or has been 
counsel to one of the parties;
(f) the judge or their spouse are in charge of administering one of the parties;
(g) there is subordination between the judge or their spouse and one of the parties;
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(h) there is friendship or known resentment between the judge and one of the 
parties. 
The circumstances listed in Article 341 are of interest for their attention to personal and
familial relations. This reflects the bureaucratic Civil Law tradition of the judge as a career 
public servant. The situations of dependence listed at Article 341 reflect the Napoleonic 
tradition of ‘professional judging’ – absolute rules in the terms of items (e) and (h) above 
would be unworkable in a Common Law system where judges are appointed from the 
independent Bar, effectively by peer selection
80. The NCCP takes a broad view on the 
parameters of the family unit. Article 341 deploys a more abstract concept of familial 
proximity than the procedural laws of other code states, using the words ‘certain family ties’ 
rather than terms that reference permissible degrees of consanguinity
81. It is notable that 
seven out of eight criteria extend to the spouses of the judge and the parties (the exception 
being the ‘friendship or known resentment’ criterion). 
France is one of the most highly developed arbitral jurisdiction in the world; the Paris Court 
of Appeal is seen by many practitioners as the most world’s experienced court in matters of 
arbitration. French arbitration law is dualist, and France is not a Model Law state. The 
provisions of Book IV of the NCCP form the basis of the French lex arbitri. The NCCP is 
applicable to international arbitrations seated in France
82. The NCCP pays comparatively 
little attention to the requirement that an arbitrator be independent; this is consistent with the 
broader French approach to due process, which Redfern and Hunter label ‘minimalist’
83. 
Under Article 1452(2) arbitrators must disclose potential grounds for challenge of which they 
are aware
84; Article 1463 alludes to ‘grounds for challenge’. Other than in these provisions, 
the NCCP does not take the matter of arbitrator independence much further. But the NCCP is 
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much more thorough in its treatment of judicial independence, and arbitrators are subject to 
standards of independence very  similar to those which apply to judges
85. In an arête de 
principe handed down in 1973 the Court of Cassation held
Intellectual independence is essential for the exercise of jurisdictional powers arising 
from whatsoever source, and is one of the essential attributes of arbitrators
86  
The Paris Court of Appeal has held that arbitration finds its jurisdictional value in the 
independence of arbitrators and the respect of fundamental guarantees
87.  French 
jurisprudence has it that partiality, in the form of either party or outcome preference, will be 
actionable where ‘reasonable doubts’ are made out by the aggrieved party
88. French courts 
take allegations of bias very seriously. The evidentiary burden is, however, set relatively
high. Whilst the test for a lack of independence stands as one of reasonable doubt
89, French 
courts apply this test objectively
90 and, it seems, pragmatically: the challenge will normally 
fail if the evidence does not reveal a ‘definite risk’
91 of hostility or prejudgment on the part of 
the arbitrator
92. 
As a general rule, French law requires the same standard of independence from arbitrators as 
it does from judges
93. When an arbitrator is appointed, they acquire the status of a judge
94. 
The impermissible circumstances envisaged by NCCP  Article 341 then  apply to them  in 
full
95. French superior courts initially took the view that the criteria for an arbitrator to be 
deemed independent were limited and identical to those listed under Article 341 NCCP
96.
French appeal courts have read Article 341 exhaustively. In Graine d'élite Clause v. Gérin
the Court of Cassation held that the Article 341 grounds for challenging a judge are all that 
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are available to parties challenging arbitrators
97. The current position is, however, that in their 
application to arbitrators these criteria are listed inclusively. The preference of the Paris Court 
of Appeal is to apply a more general expression of the standard of independence for 
arbitrators than that voiced in the NCCP. It follows that arbitrators may be challenged for 
reasons  other than those enunciated in the NCCP
98, including, it would seem, a lack of 
impartiality (or ‘independence of mind’)
99. It is also clear that French law recognises what the 
writer has termed Saudi Cable and ASM Shipping Familiarity  - the parties may object to 
relationships with counsel and not just the party they represent. The Paris Bar Rules impose 
an obligation of independence upon any avocat who acts as an arbitrator
100. There is no 
Sunkist distinction in French law: in proceedings before a panel, the standard of independence 
is the same for party appointed arbitrators and ‘neutral’ chairpersons
101
In arbitrations where French law is lex arbitri arbitrators can be challenged during or after the 
proceedings. There is no American-style bar to prevent the parties from going to court with 
their challenge in the middle of the arbitration. French courts apply the same test to post-
award applications as is applicable to mid-hearing challenges
102. When the award has been 
made, French law allows appeals against the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards in 
five circumstances only, one of which is where the recognition or enforcement would be 
contrary to ‘international public order’ (ordre public attenue)
103. Ordre public attenue has 
procedural and substantive arms; the Paris Court of Appeal has made it clear that compliance 
with the fundamental notions of due process is part of the French procedural aspect of ordre 
public attenue
104. In the Dutco case the Court of Cassation held that any unequal treatment of 
the parties in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal will offend French domestic  public 
policy
105. Similarly, the Court of Cassation has held that international procedural public 
policy will also be offended where bias is made out, and that a lack of independence will be 
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actionable under international public policy without the need to refer to any particular legal 
text
106. 
Article 1592(4) of the New Code of Civil Procedure requires that French courts set aside 
judgments and awards rendered in circumstances where due process has not been observed. 
For awards rendered outside France, the public policy exception at NCCP Article 1592(5) 
will entitle the aggrieved party to resist enforcement where there has been a denial of due 
process.  
Galeries Lafayette (1972)
Galeries Lafayette was a domestic arbitration in 1972
107. In French arbitral jurisprudence the 
Galeries Lafayette decision marks the beginning of French judicial opposition to the idea that 
a lower standard of impartiality and independence should apply to party-appointed 
arbitrators. The Court of Cassation took the view that the appointment of each arbitrator is 
not a unilateral act at all, even when initiated by one party alone. The Court said that the 
power to appoint results from the common intention of the parties
108. Part of this meeting of 
the minds is that the parties together take into account the qualities of the persons they might 
call upon to decide their dispute. The power conferred on these prospective judges is judicial. 
The Court of Cassation went on to hold that ‘an independent mind is indispensable in the 
exercise of judicial power, whatever the source of that power may be [and it is] one of the 
essential qualities of an arbitrator’
109.
In contrast to American and Swiss courts, French tribunals follow Galeries Lafayette and 
roundly reject the Sunkist distinction between ‘neutral’ and party-appointed arbitrators. 
Notwithstanding the fact that French arbitration law is dualist, French superior courts have 
applied the reasoning in Galeries Lafayette to international arbitrations as well
110. French 
courts are, however, more likely to consider the issue of impartiality (either as ‘independence 
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of mind’ or a separate requirement in addition to independence) in international contexts
111. 
It is notable that French courts have occasionally referred to an additional requirement of 
‘neutrality’ in international arbitrations
112.
TAI (1991)
TAI is most commonly cited in support of the proposition that, in hearing challenges, French 
courts require that the applicant discharge a heavy burden of proof. In TAI the Paris Court of 
Appeal defined the independence required of an arbitrator as follows:
the independence of the arbitrator is essential to his judicial role, in that from the time 
of his appointment he assumes the status of a judge, which excludes any relation of 
dependence, particularly with the parties. Further, the circumstances relied on to 
challenge that independence must constitute, through the existence of material or 
intellectual links, a situation which is liable to affect the judgment of the arbitrator by 
creating a definite risk of  bias in favour of a party to the arbitration [emphasis 
added]
113
The  rule in TAI is  similar to the position in English law prior to the introduction of the 
Arbitration Act 1996
114 (at which time the shift from ‘real danger’ to ‘justifiable doubts’ 
occurred). Whilst the threshold applied in TAI is ex facie close to the Second Arm of Gough, 
and the learned author’s observation is certainly good, it is submitted that the broader pattern 
of French jurisprudence favours Sussex Justices.  The 1999 decision of the Court of Cassation 
in Qatar v Creighton supports the writer’s conclusion in this regard.   
Philipp Brothers (1990)
French courts have shown themselves willing to make special allowance for party familiarity 
in trade arbitrations where the parties and the arbitrators are professionals in a common 
commercial field. In the first challenge in Philipp Brothers
115 the court held that the mere fact 
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that the arbitrator has had commercial dealing with or even adverse to a party does not 
deprive them of independence of mind. The challenge was to all members of the tribunal, and 
after examination of the individual relationships and dealings advanced by the applicant, the 
court found no evidentiary basis for removing the arbitrators. 
It seems that if the applicant could have shown enmity or friendship then they may have 
succeeded. It is notable that the applicant in Philipp Brothers was successful in a later 
challenge brought on the basis of the structural subordination
116. The Paris Tribunal de Grand 
Instance held that the list of arbitrators at the relevant institution was too small for that 
institution to be able to conduct a review of the first instance decision with ‘sufficient 
independence of mind and the necessary impartiality’. 
Annahold (1992)
In Annahold BV et al v L’Oreal et al the Paris Court of Appeal was faced with a situation 
where, after the handing down of the award, a replacement arbitrator began consulting to a 
company of the same group as a party to the proceedings in which he had just become functus 
officio
117. The Court of Appeal held that the same  ‘reasonable doubt’ test  for a lack of 
independence was to be applied to post-award applications as that applied to mid-hearing 
challenges and that, on this test, reasonable doubts arose because the consultancy contract 
signed by the arbitrator implied that he had prior undisclosed relations with the party which 
subsequently became his employer. 
The situation in Annahold BV was similar to that in Société des Equipements Industriels 
Stolz, where  an arbitrator was found to lack independence because he was concurrently 
retained to provide technical assistance to one of the parties to the arbitration
118. These cases 
make it clear that Rustal Trading Familiarity is actionable under French law. Annahold is also 
cited as authority for the proposition that the obligation to disclose is on the arbitrator alone: 
the Court of Appeal took the view that if the parties were bound to disclose their relationship 
with the arbitrator, the disclosure obligation would be weakened. 
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KFTCIC (1992)
Kuwait Foreign Trading Contract & Investment Co v Icori Estero involved a challenge for 
Laker Airways Familiarity. The Paris Court of Appeal accepted that relationships between 
arbitrators and counsel are hard to avoid because the international arbitration community is 
small
119. The Court held that two barristers from the same chambers were able to act in the 
same arbitration; one as arbitrator and the other as counsel
120. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court of Appeal accepted expert evidence from Sir Michael Kerr about an LCIA arbitration 
in which an English barrister was challenged on the basis that he was a member of the same 
chambers as counsel for one of the parties. The three-member LCIA panel, composed of an 
eminent Dutch lawyer, the director of the Austrian Chamber of Arbitration, and an English 
QC unanimously rejected the challenge
121.  
Since  KFTCIC, it has  been held that no objectionable relationship will exist where two 
arbitrators participate in seminars and similar professional development activities related to 
the arbitration
122. More direct professional contact will be more likely to offend, especially 
where the relationship is contractual: for example, arbitrators who consult to the directors and 
officers of a party involved in the matter before them will lack independence
123. The same is 
true where the arbitrator is engaged as a consultant by a party shortly after they issue their 
award: this will cause a retrospective appearance of bias to arise
124. 
Marteau (2000)
In Marteau the Paris Court of Appeals court upheld a challenge to the independence of an 
arbitrator who was from an accounting firm that acted as auditors to a subsidiary of the party 
that appointed him
125. 
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Transgrain France (1998)
Transgrain France is persuasive authority for the proposition that an arbitrator will lack 
independence where he is an executive officer of a company that is involved in a parallel 
dispute with one of the parties before him
126. 
Milan Presse (1999)
The NCCP prohibition against familial relationship appears to be wider in arbitration than 
state court proceedings. It extends to counsel and not just the party they represent. Step 
children are certainly within its scope. In Milan Presse
127 the Paris court found that the fact 
that the arbitrator was married to the mother of one of the advocates before him justified 
doubts about his impartiality and independence
128. Milan Presse is another demonstration of 
actionable Laker Airways Familiarity. 
Richy v Warlaumont (1996)
NCCP Article 341 covers situations where the judge is subordinate to a party. French courts 
have also found the reverse to be actionable (ie. where the judge is the superior of a party). In 
Richy v Warlaumont the Court of Appeal of Paris held that the arbitrator’s independence was 
impaired by the fact that he was hierarchically superior to one of the parties
129. This ruling 
raises distinct problems for arbitration, where status and rank are less clear than they are in 
state court adjudication. Unlike the judge and the advocate in a civil court, arbitrator and 
counsel are of a common caste, both being private individuals engaged in the practice of 
commercial dispute resolution. The arbitrator may not formally outrank the advocate but the 
disparity in professional status may be sufficiently clear for one to reprimand (or even give 
orders to) the other
130. Richy v Warlaumont may conceivably provide a basis for a challenge 
in such a situation. In this sense it is an interesting case.   
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Jean Lion (1999)
Vertically staged dispute resolution processes may fall afoul of the rule against subordination. 
In Societe Jean Lion v Societe Etablissements Gortzounian the Court of Appeal of Rouen 
found that grounds to challenge existed in the fact that the arbitrator was the subordinate of 
the president of the first tier panel
131. The Rouen court held that the subordinate arbitrator 
was ‘objectively deprived of his independence’
132.
Qatar v Creighton (1999)
The structure and chronology of multi-party arbitrations may also raise concerns as to the 
independence of arbitrators. In France, the rule seems to be that an arbitrator may act in 
successive arbitrations so long as they do not take a position in the earlier matter that may 
prejudice a party to the later matter. In Creighton the arbitrator acted in an arbitration 
between the prime contractor (Creighton) and its subcontractors, then in the arbitration 
between the prime contractor and the principal (the State of Qatar)
133. 
The Court of Cassation held that there was no basis for challenge because the arbitrator’s 
determination in the first arbitration did not prejudice the State of Qatar in the second.  The 
fact that one party has appointed an arbitrator three times in the past does not cause that 
arbitrator to lack independence when deciding subsequent matters involving that party
134. 
Best practice is to disclose prior appointments, but failure to do so will not disqualify the 
arbitrator
135. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Cassation framed the test for objective 
bias in terms of ‘reasonable doubt’, departing from the rule of ‘definite risk’ laid down by the 
Paris Court of Appeal in TAI.
Setec Bâtiment (1986)
Like Creighton, the Setec Batiment challenge arose out of multi-party arbitral proceedings 
regarding a construction project
136. The first proceeding was between the owner and the 
prime contractor; the second arbitration was between the owner and the engineer, and related 
to the liability of the engineer under certain contractual warranties given to the owner. The 
   
131 Decision of Rouen Court of Appeal, 28 October 1998, Jean Lion v Etablissements Gortzounian [1999] Rev 
Arb 368
132 Above note 29, p.284 
133 Qatar v Creighton at 308 
134 Decision of Paris Court of Appeal, 28 October 1999, Fretal v ITM Enterprises [2000] Rev Arb 299 
135 Fretal v ITM Enterprises at 299
136 [1987] Rev Arb 6397
owner appointed the same arbitrator in both the first and second proceedings and the engineer 
challenged the owner’s appointee in the second proceeding. The judge of the Court of First 
Instance prefaced his ruling by confirming that the arbitrator’s knowledge of the first set of 
arbitral proceedings was not such as to cast doubt on his impartiality or his ability to reach a 
fair decision regarding the second. But examination of the first award did cast doubt - despite 
the fact that the engineer was not a party to that main arbitration, the arbitrator’s award 
gratuitously dealt with the  liability of the engineer. As the engineer’s liability was the 
ultimate issue in the second arbitration, the judge saw fit to make orders disqualifying the 
arbitrator
137. Following the dicta in Setec Batiment and Ben Nasser v BNP
138, the French rule 
is that an arbitrator will only be barred from sitting in related arbitrations where he has made 
a ruling in the earlier matter that can be characterised as prejudicial in the subsequent matter;
French case law therefore prohibits Telekom Malaysia Bias in the narrow, ‘issue conflict’ 
sense. It is an open question, however, whether the rule in Setec Batiment and Ben Nasser 
could be extended to such abstract situations of prejudgment as that encountered in the
Eureko and Vivendi arbitrations, where the appearance of bias was generated from both role 
and issue conflict.  
The decision in Setec Batiment is to be contrasted with that in Gemanco v SAEPA
139, where 
the request for orders of disqualification was denied by the Paris Court of Appeal. It is 
notable that in Abu-Dhabi Gas Liquefaction v Eastern Bechtel Co, a similar situation to Setec 
Batiment, the English Court of Appeal ruled the other way holding that ‘a sole arbitrator may 
be appointed in two different arbitral procedures in which the set of facts is closely 
interrelated…this is desirable to avoid contradictory findings of fact’
140. Given the complex, 
multi-party reality of international commerce today, the English Court’s position in Abu-
Dhabi Gas
Uni-Inter (1990)
The parties in this matter were franchisor and franchisee
141; a dispute arose and the matter 
was referred to arbitration. During the proceedings the applicant learnt that the arbitrator had 
made prior statements of opinion as to a matter of law that was live in the dispute. A 
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challenge followed. The Paris Court of Appeals held the documents adduced by the applicant 
in support of their challenge did not raise doubt as to the impartiality of the arbitrator because 
they did not reveal excessive vehemence or systematic hostility such as might cause  a 
presumption of bias to arise.
Dubai v Halcrow (1993)
In this matter the arbitrator was challenged after his preliminary award on the law applicable 
to a state contract described the legal system of the Emirate of Dubai as ‘somewhat 
autocratic’. The Paris Court of First Instance held that this statement did not demonstrate any 
hostility  towards the state party or prejudice against the arguments advanced by them. 
Interestingly the Paris court dismissed the challenge for lack of a ‘definite risk of bias’
142. No 
Catalina Bias was found to exist. 
4.2 International Chamber of Commerce
France is held in high regard by practitioners of international arbitration. At least one of the 
reasons for the popularity of France as a seat is the role that the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) has played in the development of French arbitration law
143. Article 7(1) of 
the ICC rules states that ‘every arbitrator must be and remain independent of the parties 
involved in the arbitration’.  From the early 1980’s, in a process of rule-making which 
involved the French courts, the ICC pioneered the rule of disclosure in ICA. In Chapter 8 the 
writer will examine this process in more detail. Here we are concerned with the rules 
themselves:  ICC Rules Article 7(2) requires that arbitrators sign a declaration of 
independence; Article 11(1) confers the right to challenge an arbitrator ‘whether for lack of 
independence or otherwise’. Like the Swiss Rules, the ICC Rules extend the obligation of 
impartiality beyond the person of the arbitrator to the proceedings themselves
144. Article 
15(2) requires that ‘in all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall act fairly and impartially and 
ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present its case’. Where a party alleges 
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a breach of this mandatory procedural rule, the ICC Court will evaluate the challenge. All 
arbitral proceedings before the ICC court are confidential
145, and challenges are no exception. 
Article 2.13 of the ICC rules provides that decisions on challenges are final and the reasons 
shall not be communicated. 
The challenge procedure is split into two phases: the first stage of the challenge is written 
submissions to the Secretariat; the second stage is where the challenge is decided by the ICC 
Court in Plenary Session. ICC Court challenge decisions are not published. The result of 
these articles is that we have relatively little institutional guidance on what standards of 
impartiality and independence prevail. A high threshold has been hinted at by some notable 
commentators – former Secretary General Yves Derains has observed, for example, that 
the [ICC] Court has not normally accepted to replace an arbitrator unless it appears 
likely that he is not, in fact, independent [emphases added]
146
The public position of the ICC Court is, however, that no uniform  standard is applied:
challenges are assessed on a case-by-case basis. Because reasons are not given, it is difficult 
to say whether the declared position of the Chamber is supported by its practices. However, 
we can observe a faint pattern from following successful challenges blindly reported in 
‘Independence of Arbitrators’, the Special Supplement to the ICC Bulletin of 1997.
ICC Challenge 1
The Claimant challenged the Respondent’s co-arbitrator who, after being confirmed by the 
ICC Court, disclosed that he had given legal advice the Respondent in the past, and had been 
involved in the development of the project to which the contract the subject of the dispute 
related
147.  
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ICC Challenge 2
The Respondent challenged the sole arbitrator on the basis that he was a member of a law 
firm allied to the accounting firm that had acted as auditors for the Claimant. The arbitrator 
then disclosed that his firm was a member of an alliance of firms linked to a group of 
accounting firms, of which the auditor’s firm was a member
148. This case illustrates a broader 
problem of modern legal practice: as the former Secretary General of the ICC Anne Marie 
Whitesell observed in 2007, the rise in the number of global alliances of law firms and multi-
disciplinary partnerships has caused new issues of independence to arise in ICC 
proceedings
149. 
ICC Challenge 3 
The Respondent challenged the Chairman on the basis that a foreign office of his law firm 
was acting for a party in an unrelated state court proceeding against the Respondent’s parent 
company
150. 
ICC Challenge 4
The Respondents (a state and a state agency) challenged the arbitrator appointed on their 
behalf. The basis of their challenge was that the arbitrator had acted as counsel for parties 
claiming against them in unrelated proceedings, several of which were on foot at the time of 
the challenge
151.  
ICC Challenge 5
The Claimant challenged the Respondent state’s arbitrator on the basis that he failed to 
disclose the fact that he was a member of the Respondent government’s legal advisory 
branch
152.  
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ICC Challenge 6
The Respondent challenged the arbitrator appointed on their behalf on the basis that he failed 
to disclose that he had served as Chairman on a non-ICC tribunal convened in respect of the 
same construction project as the ICC case. The arbitrator responded that, because the non-
ICC arbitration had never progressed to the hearing stage, he did not consider his 
independence to be impaired. The Court disagreed, and removed the arbitrator
153.  
Saudi Cable (2000)
Challenges arising out of arbitrations governed by the ICC Rules sometimes end up in state 
courts, mostly when the losing party commences proceedings against the award. The writer 
has already discussed the challenge in Saudi Cable in Chapter 2. It is, however, pertinent to 
revisit that matter here. The reader will recall that the ICC rules on disclosure and 
independence were at issue in the Saudi Cable case
154. The English Court of Appeal reviewed 
the decision of the ICC on the challenge to Arbitrator Fortier, effectively disregarding the 
Article 2.13 finality provision of the ICC rules.  The ICC Statement of Independence requires 
appointees to tick one of two boxes; ticking the first box confirms independence and the 
absence (to the best of the appointee’s knowledge) of circumstances that may ‘call into 
question [the arbitrator’s] independence in the eyes of the parties’. Ticking the other box 
confirms independence but discloses possible causes for doubt. In Saudi Cable Arbitrator 
Fortier ticked the first box, failing to bring to the attention of the ICC and the parties the fact 
that he was a non-executive director of, and small shareholder in, a competitor of one of the 
parties. The English Court of Appeal held that the inadvertent non-disclosure of a fact which 
might have affected the appointment process  is not sufficient to lead to a real danger of 
bias
155. Guided by the ECHR, and applying an objective ‘reasonable suspicion’ test, it is 
probable that a French court would not have reached the same conclusion
156.   
Cubic Defence (2001)
The appeal in Cubic Defence Systems arose out an action against the ICC for damages for the 
inadequate organization of the arbitral proceedings. The proceedings included a challenge. 
Amongst other things, Cubic Defence Systems alleged that the ICC Court of International 
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Arbitration had failed to deal with its challenge in accordance with ECHR Article 6. After 
failing at the first level of appeal, Cubic took the matter to the Court of Cassation. The Court 
of Cassation dismissed the appeal, ruling that the ICC Court was not subject to the ECHR 
because the Convention only bound member states and their courts
157. The Court preferred to 
characterise the ICC Court as a ‘not-for-profit organisation’ rather than a judicial body. 
Commentators have suggested that this decision extends to arbitral institutions generally
158.  
4.3 BELGIUM
Belgium’s arbitration law is found at Part 6 of the Judicial Code (BJC). The Law of 19 May 
1998 (Amending Belgian Legislation Relating to Arbitration) inserted the present arbitration 
articles into the BJC. Belgian arbitration law affords almost unfettered Party Autonomy: 
Belgium is notable because (along with Switzerland) it is one of about four states in the world 
where the parties can fully contract out of recourse to municipal courts
159. Under Article 
1717(4) of the Belgian Code, the agreement to fully exclude judicial review must be express 
and in writing
160. The availability of full exclusion suggests that measures such as the ‘Gough
Clause’ proposed by the writer would be upheld as effective by a Belgian court. After all, 
such an arrangement would not even constitute a full exclusion of judicial review, and would 
therefore barely touch the sides of BJC Article 1717(4). 
Whilst Belgium is not a Model Law state, certain provisions of BJC Part 6 closely resemble 
the UNCITRAL template; this is true of the challenge provisions of the BJC. Article 1690 
covers impartiality and independence. It is a partial adoption of Article 12 of the Model Law. 
BJC Article 1690(1) reads ‘Arbitrators can be removed if the circumstances are such as to 
raise legitimate doubts as to their impartiality or independence’
161. The recent challenge 
decision in Eureko B.V. v Republic of Poland
162 shows the application of this Article of the 
BJC. 
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Eureko v Poland (2007)
The Eureko matter began as an Investor-State Arbitration (ISA) between a Dutch insurance 
company and its host state. Eureko claimed that the Polish nationalisation of a leading
insurance company breached the Netherlands-Poland Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). The 
three member tribunal handed down its partial award on liability in August of 2005. By 
majority, the tribunal found Poland to be in breach of the BIT. In October Poland served a 
notice of recusal on Arbitrator Schwebel. Poland alleged that Arbitrator Schwebel was 
advising Sidley Austin, the lawyers for United States multinational Cargill Corporation, in a 
concurrent but unrelated BIT arbitration against Poland. The Republic’s factual contention in 
this regard was based upon an erroneous report in American Lawyer magazine. Poland also 
alerted the court to the fact that Schwebel’s Washington office was in the same building as 
Sidley Austin’s. On these grounds Poland argued that Schwebel had a relationship with 
Sidley Austin in the Cargill case that caused him to appear to lack impartiality and 
independence. 
Judge Stevens of the Brussels Court of First Instance held that Poland’s application for 
recusal was without merit. In reaching his conclusion His Honour did not cite any standard 
for bias, actual or apparent. It seems that His Honour did not feel that he had to: it was 
common ground that Schwebel’s involvement in the Cargill case was misreported, and given 
the impugned arbitrator’s denial of the same there was no compelling evidence to support the 
Article 1690 challenge. The mere fact Shwebel and Sidley Austin shared a building in 
Washington was not enough to cause Laker Airways Familiarity depriving him of impartiality 
or independence
163. The judgment is interesting for its passive acceptance of Lord Hewart’s 
dictum in Sussex Justices. In his summary of Poland’s argument Judge Stevens wrote:
[Poland argues] that it has justifiable legitimate doubts as to the impartiality and the 
independence of Mr Schwebel and relies namely on the English saying “justice must 
not only be done, it must also be seen to be done”; this is a principle developed by 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
164
His Honour’s ostensible acceptance of this submission suggests that a ‘reasonable 
apprehension’ test was applied to Poland’s challenge. This inference is supported by the fact 
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that Belgium is a party to the ECHR and a leading EU seat. On appeal Poland advanced the 
additional objection that Schwebel was co-counsel with Sidley Austin in an unrelated 
concurrent ICSID arbitration (Vivendi v Argentina, see Chapter 8), and that Shwebel and 
Sidley Austin had cited the Eureko award as authority for certain propositions they were 
making on behalf of their clients against Argentina before the ICSID tribunal. The issue was 
whether Schwebel’s impartiality was cast into doubt by the fact that he participated as 
arbitrator in the making of an award in one arbitration (Eureko v Poland) that would aid his 
arguments as counsel in another (Vivendi v Argentina). In its judgment of 29 October 2007, 
the Belgian Court of Appeals declined to rule on Poland’s additional objection on the basis 
that Poland failed to notify the arbitrators in accordance with the Belgian procedural rules or 
make the ‘issue conflict’ argument before the Court of First Instance. Despite the absence of 
outcome, the Eurerko appeal provides a fascinating illustration of the unique problem of 
Telekom Malaysia bias in ISA, where a handful of practitioners are involved in substantive 
rule-making as arbitrators and substantive rule-using as counsel. ICA is not exposed to the 
problem Telekom Malaysia bias because the community of practitioners is bigger and the 
bodies of substantive legal principles applied by tribunals are usually municipal in origin.   
4.4 THE NETHERLANDS 
The Netherlands has not adopted the Model Law. Dutch arbitration law is monist – the Dutch 
Arbitration Act 1986 (DAA) does not distinguish between domestic and international arbitral 
proceedings. The Netherlands is the seat of several important international tribunals, namely 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) and the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
(IUSCT). Dutch courts use a ‘justifiable doubts’ test for impartialityand independence which 
draws on Article 12 of the Model Law and Strasbourg Jurisprudence.  
Aegon Verzekering Leven (2007)
This dispute arose out of an insurance agreement. The insurer denied liability under the 
policy and the Claimant commenced arbitration. The appointing authority – the Netherlands 
Arbitration Institute  – put in place a three member tribunal that included two medically 
qualified experts. Both of these experts had physically examined the Claimant. The Claimant 
challenged the impartiality and independence of these two arbitrators. At first instance the 
NAI dismissed the challenge. The Claimant appealed and the president of the District Court
upheld the challenges. The Respondent appealed to the Supreme Court. 105
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court’s ruling. The Supreme Court applied the 
standard that there must be ‘justified doubt about the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence’
165. The Court held that whilst an arbitral tribunal is generally free to apply the 
rules of evidence provided that the parties have not agreed otherwise, arbitrators should leave 
it to the parties to gather and present the evidence. The tribunal’s proper role is then to review 
the evidence led. To the extent that an arbitrator is required to investigate they must do so ‘in 
accordance with the principles of impartiality of the arbitrator, the equality of the parties and 
fundamental principles of due process’. Importantly, the Supreme Court expressed this rule as 
conditional upon an absence of contrary agreement by the parties, suggesting that where the 
parties have opted out of such procedural  protections the tribunal may inform itself in 
accordance with their bargain
166. The Supreme Court determined that, because there was no 
such contrary agreement, in conducting their physical examinations of the Claimant the 
arbitrators had violated the fundamental principles of impartiality and independence and that 
the District Court was right to uphold the challenge to them.
4.5 Permanent Court of Arbitration
The most significant permanent arbitral tribunal in The Netherlands is the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA). The PCA was established by the Hague Conventions for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 and 1907. Disputes between states may be 
referred to the PCA. Disputes between private parties and states may also be referred to 
arbitration under the auspices of the PCA. Parties may elect to use the UNCITRAL Rules or 
the PCA rules. The current PCA rules are based upon the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules. 
Whilst the PCA was a key institution in the early 20
th century, handling such famous cases as 
the Russian Indemnity Arbitration (1912) and the Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration
(1922), its substantive case load fell after World War Two
167. The PCA has, however, 
enjoyed a period of rebirth in the last decade as an alternative seat for ISA proceedings. More 
generally, the Court also plays an important role in the appointment of arbitrators in 
international disputes. This function may be performed at ad hoc request, or as a result of the 
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use of the UNCITRAL Rules. Under UNCITRAL Rules 11 and 12 the Secretary General of 
the International Bureau of the PCA is designating authority, meaning they are empowered to 
nominate a third party to serve as appointing authority in the disputed appointment process. 
An example of this role being played is the designation of Sir Robert Jennings as appointing 
authority to hear the Iranian challenge to Judge Broms of the IUSCT in 2001
168. If asked to 
do so by the parties the Secretary General may also act as appointing authority in his own 
right.  
The significance of the PCA is rising because of this appointment function and the fact that 
the UNCITRAL Rules are the most widely used arbitration rules today (so much so that they 
may well be lex mercatoria). There is currently a push within UNCITRAL to broaden the 
role of the PCA as appointing authority where the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are used
169. 
If such changes are made the importance of the PCA in the practice of international 
commercial arbitration will climb further. This will, in turn, elevate The Netherlands as a 
seat, because the PCA is subject to Dutch municipal law. The combined effect of Articles 
1035(2) and 1073 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (DCCP) is that the District Court of 
The Hague has jurisdiction to hear challenges arising out of proceedings before international 
arbitral tribunals including the PCA (and the IUSCT).
Telekom Malaysia (2005)
In 1997 Telekom Malaysia (TM) paid USD$38m for a 30% stake in Ghana Telecom. As part 
of the acquisition TM took over the management of the former public utility on the condition 
that they install 40,000 landlines by 2002
170. In early 2000 TM paid USD$50 million more in 
an attempt to acquire a further 15% of Ghana Telecom. When Ghana’s currency crashed TM 
began to take significant losses, due mostly to the fact that it was purchasing material in US 
dollars and billing its users in rapidly devaluing Ghanaian cedi. Looking for a way out TM 
demanded that Ghana buy back TM’s share in Ghana Telecom. No agreement was reached. 
TM then alleged expropriation against the host state. 
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In 2002 TM commenced arbitration against the Republic of Ghana under the investor 
protection provisions of the Malaysia-Ghana BIT. The parties submitted to UNCITRAL 
Rules arbitration at PCA in The Hague with the Secretary General of the PCA as designated 
appointing authority. TM appointed Freshfields partner Nigel Blackaby and Ghana appointed 
Dr S.K.B. Asante. These two party-appointed arbitrators agreed to Albert Jan van den Berg as 
chairman. Both Mr Blackaby and Dr Asante were successfully challenged before the 
appointing authority. Professor Emmanuel Gaillard and Robert Layton were put in place by 
the appointing authority as substitutes. 
In November 2005 Ghana challenged Professor Gaillard on the basis that he was serving as 
counsel in a similar but unrelated investor-state dispute in which he was pressing an 
expropriation claim on behalf of a foreign consortium against the Kingdom of Morocco
171.
When Professor Gaillard refused to stand down the challenge went to the appointing 
authority,  with Ghana relying on the objective test in General Standard 2 of the IBA 
Guidelines
172. It is notable that both Emmanuel Gaillard and Albert Jan van den Berg were
members of the 19 member Working Party that produced the IBA Guidelines
173.  The 
Secretary General held that there were no circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to Professor Gaillard’s impartiality or independence. Ghana then applied to the 
District Court of The Hague. In his decision Judge Von Maltzahn summarised Ghana’s 
apprehension as follows:
[Ghana] argues that Prof. Gaillard in his capacity of counsel to RFCC will of course 
advance all the arguments he can think of in order to plead the annulment of the 
award in the RFCC/Morocco case. By contrast Prof. Gaillard in his capacity of 
arbitrator should be unbiased when judging the question whether or not the ruling in 
the RFCC/Morocco case is relevant to the examination of the case in the present 
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arbitration proceedings. In this situation he will not be able as an arbitrator to be an 
unbiased participant in consultations with his fellow arbitrators, or appearances will at 
any rate be against him 
174
Ghana’s challenge was therefore based on a risk of merits prejudgment by involvement in 
concurrent (but unrelated) investor-state proceedings. The question was whether a decision 
against Ghana would strengthen Professor Gaillard’s position as counsel for RFCC again 
Morocco, or as E R Meerdink put it, whether by deciding for Ghana (and against Telekom 
Malaysia) Professor Gaillard would be ‘generating case law against his client’s position’
175. 
Counsel for Ghana, Arthur Mariott QC (another member of the IBA Working party), 
acknowledged that the applicant was in some difficulty. In his submissions to the District 
Court counsel conceded that ‘there is no automatic or general principle of conflict of interest 
applied to bar those who are advocates from acting as arbitrators. There are strong policy 
reasons against such a rule’. In opposing the challenge TM argued that Ghana should have 
raised the issue of Professor Gaillard’s independence earlier and by not doing so had waived 
its right to do so, that the facts of the RFCC v Morocco arbitration were different, and that the 
situation at hand was analogous to that dealt with at item 4.1.1 of Green List of the IBA 
Guidelines and as a result did not require disclosure
176. Judge Von Maltzahn disagreed. In 
upholding the challenge Von Maltzahn J cited Article  1033  of the Dutch Code of Civil 
Procedure as authority for the proposition that a challenge to an arbitrator must be assessed 
from an objective point of view on the basis of the facts and circumstances ofthe case
177. His 
Honour also noted that the analysis of whether there are sufficient grounds for a challenge 
should also take account of outward appearance. Von Maltzahn J held that 
account should be taken of the fact that the arbitrator in the capacity of attorney will 
regard it as his duty to put forward all possibly conceivable objections against the 
RFCC/Morocco award. This attitude is incompatible with the stance Prof. Gaillard 
has to take as an arbitrator in the present case, i.e. to be unbiased and open to all the 
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merits of the RFCC/Morocco award and to be unbiased when examining these in the 
present case and consulting thereon in chambers with his fellow arbitrators. Even if 
this arbitrator were able to sufficiently distance himself in chambers from his role as 
attorney in the annulment proceedings against the RFCC/Morocco award, account 
should in any event be taken of the appearance of his not being able to observe said 
distance. Since he has to play these two parts, it is in any case impossible for him to 
avoid giving the appearance of not being able to keep these two parts strictly 
separated 
178
Judge Von Maltzahn made orders requiring Professor Gaillard to stand down as attorney in 
RFCC v Morocco within ten days or resign as Chairman in the instant matter. When 
Professor Gaillard complied Ghana challenged him again on the basis that he had already 
participated in certain decisions and that Ghana was prejudiced as a result. Judge Punt of the 
District Court dismissed the second challenge on the basis that the decisions made were 
neither prejudicial to Ghana nor illogical. His Honour was impressed most by the fact that the 
decisions in question were purely procedural in nature
179. The second challenge fell on this 
ground because the bias pleaded in the first challenge related to the merits of the host state’s 
defence. Punt J held that against this background there was ‘no ground for an assumption or 
appearance of partiality or prejudice on the part of Professor Gaillard with regard to his 
contribution to these non-substantive decisions of the Tribunal’
180. 
4.6 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
The IUSCT was established by the Algiers Accords
181 to resolve compensation claims arising 
out of the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-81. Its functions include the conduct of arbitrations 
relating to the post-Revolution nationalisation of US assets.  The IUSCT uses a modified 
version of the UNCITRAL Rules
182. It is seated in The Hague. The IUSCT panel is 
composed of nine members: three US-appointed, three Iran-appointed, and three ‘neutrals’ 
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from other states. For private claims there is allowance for sole arbitrators and panels of 
three. State-state claims are heard by the full nine member tribunal en banc. Procedural 
peculiarities aside, the IUSCT is notable for the volume of high value disputes it has heard 
since its formation in 1981.  
Articles 11 and 12 of the IUSCT Rules prescribe the method by which challenges to 
arbitrators may be made. Articles 6 and 7 provide that the parties may ask the Secretary 
General of the PCA to designate an appointing authority to decide a challenge. Article 6(4) 
provides that:
In making the appointment, the appointing authority shall have regard to such 
considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial 
arbitrator and shall take into account as well the advisability of appointing an 
arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties
In the extreme political climate of the Algiers Accords, the large panels and tiered 
appointment procedures provided for by the IUSCT rules were seen as necessary to ensure 
the all important party  perception of neutrality. The IUSCT uses the ‘justifiable doubts’ 
standard set by UNCITRAL Rule 10(1).  IUSCT challenges have attracted a great deal of 
scholarly attention. This is mostly attributable to the extraordinary nature of the Tribunal and 
its mandate. But it is also because many of the challenges have involved allegations of bias 
based upon political persuasion and ‘judicial nationalism’, run against a backdrop of strained 
international relations. In September 1984, the IUSCT was the theatre of one of the most 
extraordinary bias challenges following a physical attack on Swedish ‘neutral’ arbitrator by 
two Iranian arbitrators
183. In Challenge to Arbitrators Kashani and Shafeiei
184 the IUSCT 
appointing authority was faced with the task of deciding the US challenge to the assailants. It 
is important that due consideration be given to this exceptional case and its background facts. 
Re Arbitrators Kashani and Shafeiei (1982)
Judge Nils Mangard was appointed as neutral member and presiding arbitrator of Chamber 
Three of the IUSCT in 1981. On 28 December 1981 the agent for Iran wrote to Judge 
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Mangard, informing him of the fact that they ‘no longer believed in [his] neutrality’ and 
suggesting that he should resign from his post. He refused to stand down. On 1 January 1982 
the agent for Iran again wrote to Judge Mangard purporting to disqualify him on the grounds 
of bias. Iran put it that Judge Mangard had engaged in ‘unsound political propaganda’ by 
condemning the practice of capital punishment by Iran. In the challenge that followed the 
agent for Iran wrote that ‘The obvious implication of such statements is nothing but a 
groundless prejudgment against a political system whose acts will be brought before you for 
evaluation and neutral decision’
185.  The agent for Iran stated that Judge Mangard was 
incapable of fairly judging acts attributed to the Islamic Republic of Iran
186. Iran asked the 
Tribunal to refrain from holding further hearings until Judge Mangard was replaced
187. The 
Tribunal took the unprecedented step of hearing the matter en banc. Iran argued that it had a 
right to disqualify a judge that was derived from its status as a sovereign nation rather than 
the rules of the Tribunal. The majority held that the only challenge procedure open to Iran 
was that prescribed by the UNCITRAL Rules adopted in the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
Importantly, Iranian arbitrators Mahmoud Kashani and Shafie Shafeiei wrote a separate 
opinion in favour of Iran
188.  
The Tribunal referred the challenge to the Secretary General of the PCA in accordance with 
UNCITRAL Rules 11 and 12. The Secretary General nominated Dr Charles Moons, President 
of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, to act as appointing authority in the matter. An oral 
hearing was held on 17 February 1982. The only exhibits before Judge Moons were Iran’s 
letter ‘disqualifying’ Judge Mangard, the US answer, the Tribunal’s full court decision and 
Judge Mangard’s reply
189. Judge Moons rejected the Iranian challenge on evidentiary 
grounds: Iran had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove if and when Judge Mangard 
had said the things alleged
190. If Iran had been able to prove their case at the hearing it is 
probable that Judge Moons would have found their doubts to be justified and made orders of 
disqualification
191.  
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Iranian arbitrators Kashani and Shafeiei began to express a lack of confidence in his abilities 
and independence. The relationship between the members of the tribunal deteriorated rapidly. 
In later memoranda the Iranian members would allege that Mangard ‘worked solely to 
support the demands of the United States and American nationals’
192 and that he always 
decided in their favour, often without giving reasons. The situation reached a climax in 
September 1984 when the Iranian arbitrators Kashani and Shafeiei physically attacked 
Mangard in the entry hall to the Tribunal. After the fracas the Iranian arbitrators refused to 
apologise or undertake to behave properly, and made it clear that they intended to bar Judge 
Mangard from entering the Tribunal Chamber in future. The correspondence between the 
parties and the appointing authority reveals the total breakdown of relations that had 
occurred. Arbitrator Kashani was quoted in the memorandum of the US agent as saying that 
Mangard was ‘already a corpse’ and that ‘If Mangard ever dares enter the Tribunal, either his 
corpse or my corpse will leave it rolling down the stairs’
193. 
On 17 September the United States challenged Kashani and Shafeiei. The US challenge was 
based upon two grounds; first that the Iranian arbitrators should be removed under Article 
13(2) of the Rules on the basis of the de facto impossibility of their performing their judicial 
function in future, and second that their attack on Judge Mangard gave rise to justifiable 
doubts as to their impartiality or independence. The US agent argued that the attack and 
subsequent statements showed that
Mr Kashani and Mr Shafeiei identify themselves so completely with what they 
consider to be the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran that they will resort to 
unprecedented physical violence to protect those interests…Arbitrators who resort to 
physical violence in order to protect the interests of the party that appointed them 
demonstrate such a deep-seated bias that they must be presumed to display similar 
partisanship in future 
194
The Secretary General again designated Judge Moons. Due to his being the subject of earlier 
allegations of partiality by Kashani, Judge Moons recused himself. Whilst the Secretary 
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General was considering a replacement Iranian officials advised that arbitrators Kashani and 
Shafeiei were being replaced by their Government. The United States ceased pressing its 
challenge, and no appointing authority was named. Ultimately no decision was made in the 
matter. It seems safe to say, however, that the US challenge would have been successful. 
There can be no doubting that the relevant arbitrators were actually biased in favour of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. But this is a rare and extreme case of ‘judicial nationalism’, where 
physical actions (as opposed to words, written or spoken) prove the lack of independence and 
impartiality. 
Re Judge Briner (1988)
The records of the IUSCT disclose other challenges. In 1988 Judge Robert Briner, chairman 
of IUSCT Chamber Two, was challenged by Iran in Amoco Oil Company v The Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran
195. In Amoco there was well over US$1.5 billion at stake, and 
the composition of the three member tribunal was such that ‘the third country arbitrator – and 
he alone – would determine the outcome of the case’
196. Iran argued that Judge Briner had 
failed to disclose that he was sole director of a Swiss subsidiary of Morgan Stanley & 
Company. Employees of Morgan Stanley were called as expert witnesses in the Amoco 
arbitration. Iran’s position was that this relationship gave rise to justifiable doubts as to Judge 
Briner’s impartiality or independence, and that his failure to disclose it gave rise to an 
additional ground of challenge
197. At first Judge Briner refused to withdraw. Amoco labeled 
the challenge ‘a transparent attempt to delay’ the award
198. Memoranda were filed with the 
Appointing Authority (Judge Moons again). Before any decision was reached Judge Briner 
withdrew, repeating his earlier denial but citing the bona fide beliefs of the challenger and the 
best interests of the Tribunal as his reasons for standing down
199. 
Seven months later, during proceedings in the matter of Phillips Petroleum v The Islamic 
Republic of Iran
200, Iran challenged Judge Briner again. This time Iran alleged that Briner had 
deliberately breached the procedural rules of the Tribunal by conferring with the US 
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arbitrator in the absence of Iran’s member, and that the award was tainted with efforts to 
conceal or slant evidence in favour of the Claimant
201. Judge Moons rejected the challenge. 
His reasons were procedural: the bulk of the documents supporting the challenge were not 
filed within the 15 day time limit set by Article 11. 
Re Judge Broms (2001)
Most recently, in December 2000 the IUSCT handed down a decision (A23) regarding the 
security account used to pay awards against Iran. In his dissenting opinion, the third party 
Finnish Judge Bengt Broms recited the terms of discussions between members on the merits 
of the application. The United States filed a challenge with the appointing authority, alleging 
that Judge Broms’ breaches of tribunal rules on the secrecy of deliberations
202 gave rise to a 
reasonable apprehension of pro-Iranian bias. The US argued that by inappropriately divulging 
information about the internal deliberations of the panel Judge Broms had displayed a strong 
sympathy for the Iranian position, and that on this basis their doubts as to his impartiality and 
independence were justified. The appointing authority, Sir Robert Jennings, dismissed the US 
challenge
203. Sir Robert held that 
the materials put before the appointing authority do not anywhere suggest that Judge 
Broms is so beholden in some way to the Iranian Government such that he has lost his 
independence of thought and action… The question of impartiality is more difficult. 
There is no doubt, judging by his opinion in Case A28, that he strongly sympathises 
with what he sees as the Iranian position, and that he is correspondingly to that extent 
opposed to what he sees as the United States position. But any judge, though he ought 
to begin in an impartial stance, is required as a matter of judicial duty eventually and 
on the basis of the presented arguments to become partial to one side or the other. To 
remain neutral to the end would be a dereliction of duty….I do not see how one can 
infer from the evidence of his single Opinion that the United States suspicions of 
partialityare justified
204
The appointing authority took the view that the circumstances in which Judge Broms broke 
tribunal rules were not such that justifiable doubts as to his impartiality and independence 
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arose. In the context of this thesis, Re Judge Broms is valuable for two reasons. Firstly, it 
shows that independence and impartiality are separable heads of challenge under the 
modified UNCITRAL arbitration rules in use at the IUSCT, and that impartiality involves 
more complex considerations (and difficulty for the applicant) of law and fact than 
independence. Secondly, Sir Robert’s judgment demonstrates that independence is an 
‘absolute’ requirement of the arbitral process and  impartiality is not. Some erosion of 
impartiality must occur if an arbitrator is to discharge their duty to decide. This erosion is – as 
Sir Robert notes – only legitimate in so far as it is dictated by the arguments presented. Other 
causes will be illegitimate and will expose the arbitrator to challenge and removal.     
4.7 GERMANY
Germany is a Model Law monist jurisdiction
205. German arbitration law is derived principally 
from the  Code of Civil Procedure (GCCP). The Model Law’s dual requirement of 
independence and impartiality was adopted without alteration by German Federal Parliament. 
Consistent with this approach, German courts use a Model Law ‘justifiable doubts’ test for 
challenges to arbitrators
206.  GCCP Article 1036(1) states that an arbitrator must be 
independent and impartial and that they can be challenged ‘if circumstances exist that give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence’. The same article of the
GCCP obliges the arbitrator to disclose conflicts of interest
207. Article 11(1) of the Arbitration 
Rules of the German Institute of Arbitration (DIS) also uses a ‘justifiable doubts’ test. 
GCCP Article 1036 does not list the circumstances in which ‘justifiable doubts’ will arise. 
German appeal courts tend to read Article 1036 in a manner consistent with the GCCP rules 
for the disqualification and recusal of judges
208. GCCP Article 41 excludes a state court judge 
from sitting in determination of a matter where:
(1) the judge is party, co-debtor, co-creditor or liable to recourse;
(2) the matter involves a (present or former) spouse of the judge;
(3) the matter involves a person with whom the judge has certain family ties;
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(4) the matter is one in which the judge is or was retained as attorney ofrecord or as a 
legal advisor to a party, or is or was authorised to appear as the legal representative of 
a party;
(5) the matter is one in which the judge is examined as a witness or an expert; or
(6) the matter is one in which, in earlier court or arbitration proceedings, the judge was 
involved in the issuance of the decision under appeal, provided that this does not 
concern the activity of a commissioned or requested judge
209.
GCCP Article 42 permits challenge when a reason exists that justifies a lack of confidence in 
the impartiality of the judge. Challenges to judges are increasingly common in Germany. In a 
recent conversation with the writer, a Munich Appeal Court judge reported that ‘a judge in 
my court is challenged almost weekly’
210. Despite this phenomenon German courts are averse 
to hearing challenges to arbitrators, especially after the award has been made
211. This is the 
result of a policy preference for upholding the certainty of the arbitral bargain and process
212. 
Post-award challenges must show ‘grave and obvious partiality or dependence’ if the award 
is to be set aside
213. 
Billerbeck (1976)
Prior  to  reunification in 1990, German courts gained some experience with nationality 
challenges in arbitrations involving parties from Communist states. In Billerbeck the parties 
were from Switzerland and East Germany
214; they had agreed to arbitrate before the 
Arbitration Court of the East Berlin Chamber of Commerce (EBCC). The EBCC Arbitration 
Court followed the rules of the Chamber of Foreign Trade of the German Democratic 
Republic, which only allowed arbitrators appointed from its list. All of the people on the list 
were East German nationals. An award was made against Billerbeck and they resisted 
enforcement under the Geneva Convention 1927. The West German Supreme Court enforced 
the award, rejecting the argument that the solely East German tribunal might be inherently 
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predisposed against the Swiss party
215. No actionable apprehension of  Catalina Bias was 
found. In reaching this conclusion the Supreme Court focused on the proven behaviour of the 
tribunal and whether it showed partiality.
X v Y (2007)
The challenge in X v Y was run in the Higher Regional Court of Central Frankfurt on an 
allegation of Uni-Inter Bias. The underlying dispute arose out of a merger of two companies. 
After the merger, the Claimant sought an indemnity from the Respondent against penalties 
for breaches of European and American anti-trust regulations. The Respondent declined to 
give such comfort and the Claimant commenced arbitration under German Institute of 
Arbitration (DIS) Rules. The Claimant sought a declaratory judgment from the tribunal that 
any anti-trust penalties were for the Respondent to bear. The proceedings went to a primary 
hearing. The tribunal did not conduct a secondary hearing on the merits of the Claimant’s 
argument that EU and US antitrust laws had been offended, preferring instead to accept that 
the Claimant’s allegations in this regard were substantiated
216. 
Just before the award was handed down the Claimant learned that counsel for the Respondent 
had given a lecture on ‘Arbitration Proceedings and Anti-Trust Law’ at a DIS symposium. 
The Chairman served on the Board of the German Institute of Arbitration, and his name had 
appeared as a co-editor of the DIS journal in which counsel’s lecture was published. The 
Chairman’s introduction effectively prefaced counsel’s paper. The Claimant asked the 
Tribunal to disqualify the Chairman under Article18.1 of the DIS rules. The petition was 
declined and the Tribunal rendered its award. The Claimant then petitioned the Higher 
Regional Court of Central Frankfurt to review the decision of the tribunal pursuant to GCCP 
Article 1037. 
The court phrased the relevant test as ‘whether there are sufficient objective reasons to cause 
a reasonable person in the position of the party to fear that the arbitrator had prejudged the 
matter and is thus not impartial’
217. Applying this to the facts the court dismissed the 
application for review. The court held that, although the Chairman had served on the Board 
of the Institute at which counsel for the Respondent gave the lecture in question, and the topic 
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of the lecture given was closely related to the merits of the dispute in which the Chairman 
was hearing counsel for the Respondent, there was no evidence that the Chairman shared the 
legal positions voiced by counsel in the lecture. Second, although the Chairman served as co-
editor of the DIS journal and his name appeared underneath the introduction to the volume, 
when challenged the Chairman explained that he had not written the introduction and had he 
not read the anti-trust article before its publication
218. The court also made general remarks 
on the permissibility of professional association between counsel and arbitrator in 
circumstances where they are practitioners in a common specialty field such as anti-trust 
arbitration.  Significantly, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration were cited with approval by the Frankfurt Court. 
D v E (2007)
In D v E the parties shared a medical practice. The Claimant alleged that the Respondent had 
physically attacked him and his wife. A three member tribunal was convened to decide the 
dispute. The Chairman was a  former criminal court judge. A  partial award was made in 
favour of the Claimant. The Respondent applied for orders removing the Chairman on 
grounds of bias. The Respondent claimed that the Chairman had attempted to intimidate the 
Respondent’s attorney during proceedings. The request was based upon a sarcastic comment 
allegedly made by the Chairman  to the Respondent’s counsel, and a letter subsequently 
written by the Chairman to counsel for the Respondent pressing her to withdraw allegations 
about the comment or face perjury charges. The Chairman’s letter also questioned the 
motives of counsel (who had previously jointly represented Respondent and Claimant).
The Court held that the standard for assessing arbitrator bias was the same as that used for 
judges. Pursuant to the GCCP, a judge can be disqualified if the evidence gives rise to 
justified concerns about his or her impartiality or independence. However, such evidence 
must be objective rather than subjective
219. The Court held that there was insufficient 
objective evidence to support a finding of bias on the part of the Chairman. The Chairman’s 
advice to the Respondent regarding his attorney’s conflict of interest in the matter did not 
support a finding of arbitrator bias. The Court held that a party could only succeed on an 
allegation of bias if the arbitrator’s animosity was aimed directly at the client
220. Secondly, 
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the Court determined that the chairman’s suggestion that the Respondent’s claims constituted 
perjury was also insufficient for finding that the arbitrator was biased. Central to this finding 
was the fact that the Chairman addressed these concerns in a letter, so as to remain ‘outside of 
the context of the arbitral proceedings’
221. Finally, the Court held that arbitrators have a right 
to defend themselves against wrongful allegations, even where the arbitration is on foot, so 
long as their exercise of this right is done in an objective and appropriate manner and within 
the bounds of the law. The Court found that the Chairman’s letter fell within these bounds. 
Accordingly, the application for removal was dismissed. 
Undisclosed v Undisclosed (2006)
In the underlying proceedings the Claimant and the Respondent had entered into a takeover 
contract, which included an arbitration clause stipulating that any disputes would be settled 
by ‘A’, who would act as a jointly appointed arbitrator. ‘A’ was the Claimant’s brother. In an
attempt to settle the dispute a conciliatory hearing was convened by ‘A’. Arbitrator ‘A’ 
proposed that the Respondent pay the Claimant €35,000 in full and final satisfaction. When 
Respondent rejected the proposal ‘A’ expressed regret in the following terms ‘I am sorry that 
you did not accept B’s excellent offer. I had warned you urgently that any other arrangement 
would result in much greater expenses for you’
222.
The Claimant then commenced arbitration on its claim. The Respondent applied to the Court 
to have ‘A’ removed. The Respondent advanced three grounds in support of its application. 
First,  the Respondent argued that the arbitrator’s familial relationship to the Claimant
violated German constitutional principles of impartiality and independence, with the effect 
that the arbitration clause that had caused ‘A’ to be appointed was unenforceable. Second, the 
Respondent claimed that the actions of ‘A’ as conciliator prior to the arbitration disqualified 
him from acting as an arbitrator. Third, the Respondent claimed that ‘A’ was biased. Their 
final submission was based upon the arbitrator’s statements about the rejected offer and his 
refusal to grant the Respondent a stay of arbitration (which the arbitrator stated was ‘just 
another trick’ to ‘gain time’)
223. 
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The Court rejected the Respondent’s first argument, holding that the arbitrator’s appointment 
was valid. Importantly, the Court then proceeded to distinguish the standards used for 
dismissal of judges from those used for dismissal of arbitrators. The Court explained that, 
because in arbitration the parties have a direct influence on the tribunal’s composition, ‘a 
party may challenge an arbitrator only for reasons of which it became aware after the 
appointment was made’
224. Because the Respondent knew ‘A’ was the Claimant’s brother 
before the appointment was made, the Respondent’s argument on familial relationship could 
not succeed. The Court also rejected the Respondent’s second argument, finding that the 
arbitrator’s attempts to settle the case during the conciliatory hearing did not disqualify him 
from acting as an arbitrator. Since the Respondent had actively participated in the 
conciliatory hearing, and the attempts at settlement were in the best interests of both parties, 
the Court found the situation to be analogous to those in civil proceedings before German 
courts, where judges do the same thing. Finally, the Court agreed that the statements made by 
‘A’ regarding the Claimant’s offer, as well as the arbitrator’s denial of the  Respondent’s 
motion to stay the arbitral proceedings, were sufficient to raise doubts about the arbitrator’s 
impartiality. But despite these merits the Court ultimately refused to remove ‘A’ because 
these objections were not raised in the timely matter required by the GCCP. 
4.8 AUSTRIA
Austria is the leading Model Law seat in Central Europe.  Vienna regularly hosts ICC 
proceedings, and the institutional case load of the Vienna International Arbitration Centre 
(VIAC) is increasing. The Austrian arbitration law has recently undergone amendment. The 
new law came into force on 1 July 2006 (on which day the revised Vienna Rules came into 
force also).  The new law shows the influence of German arbitration law and Model Law 
jurisprudence. Like many Civil Law states Austria does not have a free-standing arbitration 
ordinance. Instead, Articles 557 to 618 of the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure (ACCP) 
govern arbitral proceedings. The ACCP does not distinguish between domestic and 
international arbitrations, with the effect that Austrian arbitration law is monist.  
Article 588 adopts a modified version of Article 12 of the Model Law. Proof of actual bias 
will result in removal of the relevant member of the tribunal. Actual bias is also grounds for 
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vacation of the award under ACCP Article 611. Apparent bias is approached ‘case-by-case’. 
Local practitioners report that a ‘reasonable third person test’ prevails
225; as long as there is 
an ‘objectively justified doubt’ as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence the 
challenge will succeed
226. Commentators have suggested that the Austrian domestic public 
policy of maintaining judicial integrity informs the application of the challenge, disclosure 
and vacatur articles of the ACCP
227. This domestic policy setting may explain why Austrian 
courts are hesitant to take into account international instruments like the IBA Guidelines in 
challenge proceedings
228. 
OG Decision 11 June 1969
In this case the Austrian Supreme court was required to decide whether it was a violation of 
the requirements of impartiality and independence for a three member tribunal composed 
entirely of Bulgarian nationals to sit on a matter in which one of the parties was Bulgarian. 
The Supreme Court enforced the award, holding that ‘it is not a violation of the Austrian 
public policy to recognise an award made by an arbitral tribunal to which the parties have 
subjected themselves in conformity with their agreement’
229.  
OG Decision 28 April 1998
Before the promulgation of the new arbitration law - Article 588 of which creates an express 
duty of disclosure - the posited law of Austria did not include a requirement that arbitrators 
disclose circumstances likely to call into question their impartiality or independence. In this 
challenge the Austrian Supreme Court held that the duty to disclose was part of Austrian 
law
230.
4.9 SWITZERLAND
Switzerland has an esteemed history as a seat for international  arbitration, and Swiss 
jurisprudence has played a leading role in the development of the law and practice of ICA. 
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Switzerland also has a long standing human rights tradition. After joining the Council of 
Europe in 1963, Switzerland ratified the ECHR in 1974. The General Procedural Guarantees 
contained at Article 29 of the Swiss Constitution grant every person the right to equal and fair 
treatment in judicial and administrative proceedings
231. Article 30 of the Constitution requires 
absolutely that judicial proceedings be conducted with independence and impartiality
232. 
Swiss courts read Article 30 of the Constitution in a manner that is consistent with EHRC 
Article 6. Although they have shown themselves to be cautious in their application of the 
ECHR to arbitral proceedings
233, because an arbitration is a ‘judicial proceeding’ for 
Constitutional purposes it seems safe to say that an arbitrator sitting in Switzerland must 
respect the fundamental rules of procedural fairness codified in ECHR Article 6
234. 
Arbitral proceedings seated in Switzerland are governed by the Swiss Private International 
Law (SPIL). The SPIL is non-Model Law and dualist. As has been noted above Switzerland 
is one of the few states with a national arbitration law that is strictu sensu silent on the 
requirement of impartiality. The SPIL provides for challenges based on a ‘lack of 
independence’ but does not refer expressly to ‘impartiality’ as a ground. Nevertheless, even 
before the drafting of the New Swiss Constitution in 2000 (which does use the term in its fair 
trial guarantee
235) Swiss courts treated the requirement of impartiality as fundamental
236. As 
in France,  pre-award challenges based on allegations of bias are subjected to the same 
standard as post-award applications
237. Where a tribunal has failed to act impartially Swiss 
courts will annul its award under the SPIL
238. Post award applications for  vacatur  are 
governed by Article 190 SPIL. Like Belgium, Swiss law allows full exclusion of judicial 
review. The requirements of Article 192 are similar to the Article 1717(4) of the Belgian 
Judicial Code. The agreement must be written and in specific terms, and neither party may 
have its domicile, habitual residence or place of business in Switzerland. 
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SPIL Article 190(2)(d) provides that an award can be set aside where equal treatment has not 
been afforded to the parties. Where an arbitrator is subsequently found to have lacked 
independence an application may also be made under Article 190(2)(a). This item of the SPIL 
covers ‘irregular constitution’.  The alleged irregularity will be viewed through the glass of 
Swiss procedural law. Violation of a fundamental principle of procedural law will offend 
Swiss notions of public policy
239, with the effect that (assuming competence under the NYC) 
vacatur may be sought under Article V(1). Where the procedurally defective award is non-
Swiss rendered sua sponte vacation under NYC Article V(2)(b) may also become possible. In 
international matters, the Swiss reading of public policy is similar to the French. Purely Swiss 
notions of public policy, even international public policy, will not apply in international 
arbitration unless they are shared by other states
240. 
A ‘legitimate doubts’ test for apparent bias prevails in Switzerland
241. Article 180(1)(c) SPIL 
governs pre-award challenges and applications for removal. In Swiss law there is persuasive 
authority for the proposition that arbitrators are subject to a lower standard of independence 
than cantonal and federal judges. It seems that a ‘bare minimum of independence’ will 
suffice
242. Swiss courts take this view for the practical reason that, in contrast to judges, 
arbitrators regularly have contact with parties and their lawyers. Generally speaking these 
kinds of professional contacts will not be enough to establish an objectionable lack of 
independence in a Swiss court
243. This does not mean that the standard applicable to judges is 
not relevant for arbitrators. Indeed, Article 18 of the Inter-Cantonal Arbitration Convention 
(‘the Concordat’) provides that a party can object to an arbitrator on any grounds which the 
now-repealed Swiss Federal Judicial Organization Act (OG) provided for the obligatory or 
facultative withdrawal of the federal judges, and on any grounds set out in rules of arbitration
to which the parties have submitted
244. In the past the Swiss Supreme Court has held that the 
grounds for exclusion and refusal listed in the OG must be taken into account by arbitrators 
   
239 Muller, A.K., ‘Enforcing Foreign Arbitration Awards in Switzerland: Procedural Obstacles and Practical 
Issues to Consider Beforehand’ (2007) 73 Arbitration 2 at 215
240 Above note 28, p.98 (FN 250); this can be viewed as a tronc commun reading of international public policy. 
Consistent with this preference for commonality Swiss courts interpret the New York Convention concept of 
‘public policy’ narrowly
241 SPIL Article 180(1)(c)
242 Above note 29, p.291
243 See the decision of the Swiss Supreme Court (BG), 9 February 1998 [1998] Bull ASA 634. 
244 Concordat, Art ice 18. See Loi fedrale d 'organisation judiciaire du 16 December 1943, RS 173.110, Articles 
22 and 23 (setting forth the grounds for mandatory and discretionary recusal of judges); cited in Tupman, above 
note 229, p.36124
when they discharge their duty to disclose
245. Under OG Article 22 a judge was excluded 
when:
(i) in all matters in which the judge, or a person with whom the judge has certain 
family ties, or a person for whom the judge acts as guardian or advocate, or
(ii) with whom it is associated by way of adoption, has an immediate interest in 
the outcome of the dispute;
(iii) the judge has already acted in the matter as a member of an administrative or 
judicial authority, as a counsel of a party or as an expert witness.
Article 23 stipulated that a judge must refuse to act when:
(i) the case involves matters concerning a legal entity of which the judge is a 
member;
(ii) special friendship or personal enmity or a special relationship of liability or 
dependency exists between the judge and a party; or
(iii) facts exist which make the judge appear biased in the case at hand.
The OG has been replaced by the Federal Supreme Court Act 2007 (BGG)
246. The BGG 
came into force on 1 January 2007. The BGG rules for the withdrawal and disqualification of 
judges are similar to those that were in force under the OG. BGG Article 34(1) provides that 
a judge or law clerk is excluded:
(a) if they have a personal interest in the case;
(b) if they have been involved in the case in a different position, be it as member of an 
agency or administrative body, as counsel, expert or witness;
(c) if they are married to a party, his/her counsel or another person that has treated the 
case in a lower instance, or if they are the registered partner of such a party or live in a 
steady relationship with such a party;
(d) if they are related by blood (in a straight line or up to the third degree) or related 
by marriage to a party, his or her counsel or another person that has heard the case in 
a lower court; or
   
245 See BG decision 28 April 2000 [2000] Bull ASA 558
246 BGG Article 131 provides that the BGG repeals and replaces the OG in full.  125
(e) for other reasons, especially because of friendship with or a special hostility 
towards one party or his/her counsel
247
BGG Articles 34(1) covers the circumstances envisaged by OG Article 22. The BGG also 
makes certain extensions to the OG subject matter: the degree of disqualifiable consanguinity 
is clarified (‘to the third degree’; Article 34(1)(d)) and homosexual relationships are 
accounted for  (‘registered partners’; Article 34(1)(c)). The disqualifying circumstances of 
Article 34 also expressly extend to the judge’s law clerk (greffier). It is notable that Article 
34(2) provides that ‘the involvement in an earlier supreme court procedure is not in itself a 
reason for exclusion’. The writer is not aware of any challenge that has been decided by 
reference to the BGG. However, given that Swiss courts tend to require the same standards of 
independence for arbitrators as that which they expect of judges, and considering the well 
developed body of Federal case law applying the judicial disqualification provisions of the 
OG to arbitrators, it is probable that future judicial applications of the challenge and vacatur
provisions of the SPIL will be informed by the terms of BGG Article 34. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence stresses that when a lack of independence is pleaded the
circumstances are to be considered objectively
248. This rule applies equally in arbitral 
proceedings. Swiss courts have repeatedly expressed the opinion that the violation of the duty 
to disclose any relevant facts does not give rise to an automatic right of challenge
249. The 
facts themselves (including those facts not disclosed) will determine the availability of the 
right to challenge
250. Although a case-by-case approach is taken, the facts of previous 
applications provide important guidance. Profound hostility (or close friendship) between 
judge and advocate may be relevant
251, but generally the independence of a judge will be 
measured by relation to the party and not their lawyers
252. A judge will not lack independence 
when a lawyer they have briefed in an unrelated matter appears before them
253. This situation 
is to be distinguished from that of a previous or ongoing business relationship between judge 
and party
254. Previous business relationships (including attorney-client relationships)
255 will 
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only be relevant if non-negligible commercial or ‘emotional’ ties remain
256.  Not surprisingly, 
justifiable doubts were found to exist where an arbitrator was a board member of a corporate 
party to the proceedings before him
257. Justifiable doubts were found where the arbitrator was 
an advisor to a firm that represented one of the parties before him
258. The mere fact that the 
arbitrator has acted for a party in the past, or acts as counsel in a similar but unrelated matter, 
will not be enough to expose the award to vacatur
259. It has also been held that common 
membership of the board of a charitable institution will not usually raise sufficient doubt
260. 
It is important to note that the Swiss lex arbitri expects less independence from party-
appointed arbitrators than it does sole arbitrators and neutral chairs. Although this Sunkist-
type distinction is not as well settled in Switzerland as it is in domestic arbitration law in the 
United States, it is supported by the drafting history of the SPIL. Supreme Court rulings have 
also confirmed its existence
261. It seems to be that the criteria of OG Articles 22 and 23 will 
still apply but ‘less severely to the party-appointed arbitrator’
262. In Chapter 4, the writer has 
expressed his respectful approval of this distinction
263. 
Centroza v Orbis (1966)
This 1966 judgment of the Swiss Federal Court prevented the appointment of a local 
magistrate as arbitrator on the grounds that the magistrate’s wife was an assistant to the 
counsel for the Respondent
264. Importantly, in disqualifying the magistrate the Federal Court 
defined arbitrators as judges.
SA v V (Hong Kong)
In SA v V the Swiss Federal Court held that a common commercial interest existing between 
counsel and arbitrator, generated by the fact of their owing a law firm together, did not justify 
a challenge to the arbitrator’s independence.
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Ligier & Diffucia (1989)
The fact that an arbitrator has a relationship with a material witness may cause justifiable 
doubts  as to his independence to arise. The case of Ligier & Diffucia v Alfa Lancia 
Industriale provides an interesting example in this regard
265. This matter involved a dispute 
between two automobile companies: the key witness in the proceedings was a former client 
of the sole arbitrator; it was also apparent that the arbitrator would act as counsel to that key 
witness again in future. The Swiss Supreme Court held that the circumstances objectively 
justified the doubts as to the arbitrator’s independence
266. 
X v Y (2007)
This dispute arose out of a contract between an Algerian brewery (X) and a German company
(Y) specialising in beverage packaging machinery
267. The materials facts of the application
were that the arbitral panel had included in its award a five page section entitled ‘Claimant’s 
Attitude’ detailing why it felt X’s behaviour was incompatible with good-faith performance. 
X pointed to this portion of the interim award in support of its argument that the tribunal was 
irregularly constituted. The Supreme Court acknowledged that it would have been better if 
the tribunal had not used such ‘vivid and partly ironic language to describe the behaviour of 
X’
268, but concluded that it did not have grounds for criticising the conduct of the tribunal. 
The Supreme Court based this conclusion on several factors. Firstly, the arbitral tribunal had 
followed X’s argument in the first interim award it made. Secondly, Y had requested that the 
tribunal limit its liability to 10%. This was denied, a ruling that was similarly in favour of X. 
These interim orders in favour of X negated the appearance of bias. Finally, X never 
presented any other evidence of the arbitrator’ lack of impartiality. As a result of this paucity 
of evidence the Supreme Court focused on the real effects of the alleged ‘irregular 
constitution’ of the panel, and in so doing strengthened the rule that each challenge is be 
determined on a case-by-case basis
269. 
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A Ltd v B Inc (2004)
A Ltd. v B. Inc. provides a ‘cloak and dagger’ illustration of the circumstances in which bias 
challenges are sometimes run in ICAs. Whilst the arbitration was on foot the Chairman of the 
arbitral tribunal discovered that he was under private surveillance in relation to an allegation 
of bribery made by an unknown party. Incensed, he announced at the next hearing that the 
police had investigated his report and advised that one of the parties to the dispute before him 
had arranged the surveillance. The Chairman explained that he wanted the surveillance to 
stop, and requested that the party which commissioned the surveillance step forward. The 
Chairman explained to the parties that his impartiality would not be affected if the party gave
him even ‘semi-credible’ reasons for commissioning the surveillance services. No party came 
forward. The Claimant then formed the view that the Chairman assumed it was them who
commissioned the surveillance because they had been unsuccessful in the proceedings thus 
far. On the basis of this perception the Claimant challenged the arbitrator. 
The matter went to the First Civil Division of the Swiss Federal Court. The Court said that
the Chairman’s reaction to the surveillance was ‘appropriate and does not permit the drawing 
of a conclusion of bias against one of the parties’
270. The Court concluded that the Chairman 
was allowed to address the parties and request disclosure in the manner which he did, and 
that his actions in this regard did not automatically lead to a conclusion that he had lost his 
impartiality. The Court held that the Chairman was permitted to announce what his attitude 
would have been if he found out which party had him put under surveillance provided his 
choice of words was neutral (which the Court found it was). So long as the Chairman’s 
statements did not contain any personal attacks or allude to any party-specific suspicions they 
did not raise any doubts concerning his impartiality. The challenge was dismissed
271. 
4.10 Court of Arbitration for Sport
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is seated in Lausanne, in the Canton of Vaud. It 
was created in 1983 by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Due to its increased use 
as a forum for the settlement of high value sports media and entertainment licensing disputes 
the CAS is an important arbitral institution today. It is the peak institution for the specialist 
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practice of sports law and dispute resolution. As has been observed, with specialisation 
comes the risk of bias; the CAS has some experience with challenges. In fact, it is to a 
challenge that the CAS owes its present institutional form. In Grundel v International 
Equestrian Federation the challenger (a German horse-rider) argued that the CAS lacked 
independence from the IOC
272. 
Grundel (1993)
Grundel’s appeal rested on the submission that when the CAS dismissed his appeal against 
suspension, it lacked the independence required of arbitral tribunals under Swiss law because 
the body that suspended him (the International Equestrian Federation) was a member a 
member federation of the IOC, and the IOC established the CAS. The First Civil Appeals 
division of the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that although the CAS would lack independence 
in a proceeding in which the IOC was a party, and despite the fact that there was a prima 
facie appearance of bias in the instant matter, the CAS was sufficiently independent of the 
IOC to justify upholding its decision against the Appellant. The Court did, however, express 
concern as to the institutional proximity of the CAS and the IOC, commenting in obiter:
Certain objections with regard to the independence of the CAS could not be set aside 
without another form of process, in particular those based on the organic and 
economic ties existing between the CAS and the IOC. In fact, the latter is competent 
to modify the CAS statute; it also bears the operating costs of this court and plays a 
considerable role in the appointment of its members
273
The IOC reacted to the obiter in  Grundel by establishing the International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) in 1994. In order to sever its organic and economic ties, the IOC 
divested itself of its responsibility for the CAS, transferring control of the court to the new 
Council. The regulatory framework of the CAS was renovated, and a CAS Code was 
implemented in 1994. Today, the IOC has far less influence over the CAS appointment 
process: only one in five arbitrators on the CAS list is an IOC nominee
274.  Generally 
speaking, the Grundel restructuring has been successful. In Lazutina v CIO & FIS the Swiss 
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Federal Tribunal held that the changes made post-Grundel made the CAS sufficiently 
independent of the IOC
275.   
The  CAS  Code split the CAS into two divisions: Ordinary Arbitration and Appeals 
Arbitration. There is also an Ad Hoc Arbitration Division. Each Division has a President, 
whose powers include jurisdiction to rule of pre-appointment applications. Applications 
(including challenges) made post-appointment are heard by the tribunal itself, and then by the 
ICAS
276. In ad hoc arbitrations the President of the Ad Hoc Division is competent to rule on 
challenges. CAS tribunals, the ICAS and the President are bound by the Code. The official 
English version of Article 11 of the 2004 CAS Code reads:
A member of the ICAS or the Board may be challenged when circumstances allow 
legitimate doubt to be cast on his independence vis a vis one of the parties to an 
arbitration...He shall spontaneously disqualify himself when the subject of a decision 
is an arbitration procedure in which a sports-related body to which he belongs or 
appears as a party or in which a member of the law firm which he belongs is an 
arbitrator or counsel
277
The recusal provision of the CAS Code reflects the statute’s heritage: much as the the ICAS 
was established in response to concerns as to the organic proximity of the CAS to the IOC, 
Article 11 attempts to ensure a separation of arbitrator and party. It focuses on the situation of 
the decision maker rather than his attitude. The CAS Code refers only to the requirement of 
independence and says nothing of impartiality. None of the CAS Arbitration Rules refer to 
impartiality as a procedural requirement or ground of challenge. Rule 33 of the CAS Rules is 
in the following terms:
R33 Independence and Qualifications of Arbitrators 
Every arbitrator shall be and remain independent of the parties and shall immediately 
disclose any circumstances likely to affect his independence with respect to any of the 
parties. 
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Similarly, the challenge provision of the CAS Rules (Article 34) states ‘An arbitrator may be 
challenged if the circumstances give rise to legitimate doubts over his independence’
278. 
Article 12 of the CAS Ad Hoc Rules ‘no arbitrator may act as counsel for a party or other 
interested person before the ad hoc Division’
279, and Article 13 provides that an arbitrator 
may be challenged by a party if circumstances give rise to legitimate doubts as to his or her 
independence’
280. 
The writer has found nothing to indicate that a lack of impartiality is a valid ground for 
challenge under the CAS Code. Both reported post-Grundel challenges (Celtic Plc v UEFA 
and Cross Country Skiers) dealt with a lack of independence: Celtic v UEFA is a decision of 
the Board of the ICAS on prior service against a party as counsel; Cross Country Skiers is a 
decision of the Swiss Supreme Court on professional connections between arbitrators. If 
impartiality is available as a head of challenge it would be derived from the SPIL, Swiss 
public policy or the ECHR.  
Celtic Plc v UEFA (1998)
This challenge was brought on the basis of an arbitrator’s previous function as counsel in a 
matter in which a party to the instant matter was involved. The case provides an interesting 
illustration of Common Law and Civil Law systems in conflict. In his challenge hearing 
before the Board of the ICAS (Celtic Plc v UEFA), ICAS Decision of 2 October 1998) the 
challenged arbitrator (Michael Beloff QC) put it that English practice allowed him to be 
counsel in one hearing and arbitrator in the next. The challenged arbitrator referred the Board 
to the ‘Cab Rank Rule’, which he summarised in his description of an English barrister as 
a professional person putting forward his client’s case against the other side in the 
particular manner in which he is instructed. The next day he might well be acting for 
the other side in another case. As a result of these factors it is impossible to assert that 
simply because I act against UEFA in one case, I cannot impartially arbitrate in 
another case in which UEFA are a party, especially when the case has no connection 
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other than UEFA’s participation in them. To hold otherwise would be to deny the 
independence of any English barrister of his client
281
The ICAS Board disqualified Mr Beloff. The ICAS referred to their governing code and 
stated that an arbitrator’s independence 
must be assessed according to the circumstances of the case and thus not on the basis 
of general or subjective assumptions which are not objectively verified in the case in 
hand. A serious doubt regarding an arbitrator’s independence must be based on 
concrete facts that can justify, objectively and reasonably, a lack of confidence on the 
part of a person reacting in a reasonable manner
282  
Strasbourg principles of objective verification won the day. Whilst the decision in Celtic v 
UEFA can perhaps be seen as an illustration of Continental intolerance for client-counsel 
connections, it was referred to with apparent approval by Morison J in ASM Shipping (a 
matter in which Mr Beloff appeared as counsel).   
Cross-country Skiers (2003)
In this matter the Supreme Court of Switzerland upheld the decision of the CAS to withdraw 
awards from two cross-country skiers and suspend them for two years for doping. The skiers 
challenged the decision based on an alleged lack of independence, arguing Laker Airways
Familiarity (ie. the arbitrators who formed the panel had worked together before). The Swiss 
Supreme Court held that the fact that each member of the arbitral tribunal was in some way 
associated with their fellow members did not give rise to legitimate doubts concerning their 
independence: 
In the small world of international arbitration, individuals often find themselves 
working together on different cases … it is not uncommon for the same person to be 
an arbitrator in one particular case and the counsel to a party in another case, pleading 
in front of one of his fellow arbitrators from the previous case  
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The challenge was held to be unfounded. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrators who 
ruled against it at first instance did not infringe Swiss procedural public policy
283.
Subsequently, the ICAS expressed the wish that the representation of parties before the CAS 
shall no longer be performed by active CAS members or their colleagues from law firms
284. 
4.11 SWEDEN
According to Dezalay and Garth, in the 1970’s ‘Sweden’s neutrality and moral authority, 
coupled with its location just north of the Baltic Sea, made Stockholm a strong potential site 
for arbitration of what were then called East-West disputes, especially those between the 
Soviet Union and the United States’
285. The perception of Sweden as a neutral site quickly
extended beyond East-West dispute contexts. For example, the first Chairman of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal was a Swede (Judge Gunnar Lagergren). Sweden continues to 
play an important role in ICA, especially in the resolution of disputes involving parties from 
the former Communist states of Eastern Europe and the People’s Republic of China. 
Stockholm can be expected to reassert its significance as these economies are integrated into 
the European Union.
Swedish arbitration law is non-Model Law and monist. The Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) 
does not expressly require independence of arbitrators, referring only to impartiality. The 
Swedish Act is also notable for the fact that Article 8 provides a list of instances in which 
impartiality will be deemed lacking
286. 
Article 8 of the Swedish Arbitration Act provides as follows. 
8. If a party so requests, an arbitrator shall be discharged if there exists any 
circumstance which may diminish confidence in the arbitrator’s impartiality. Such a 
circumstance shall always be deemed to exist:
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(1) where the arbitrator or a person closely associated to him is a party, or 
otherwise may expect benefit or detriment worth attention, as a result 
of the outcome of the dispute;
(2) where the arbitrator or a person closely associated to him is the director 
of a company or any other association which is a party, or otherwise 
represents a party or any other person who may expect benefit or 
detriment worth attention as a result of the outcome of the dispute;
(3) where the arbitrator has taken a position in the dispute, as an expert or 
otherwise, or has assisted a party in the preparation or conduct of his 
case in the dispute; or
(4) where the arbitrator has received or demanded compensation in 
violation of section 39, second paragraph
287
Along with the Arbitration Law of the PRC, the Swedish Arbitration Act is the only national 
arbitration law to provide such a list
288.  The Article 8 list is not exhaustive
289, and 
circumstances beyond its scope may still qualify as circumstances which may diminish 
confidence in the arbitrator’s impartiality. Article 9 requires disclosure of circumstances that 
might fall afoul of Article 8. Article 34 provides that where an arbitrator has been challenged 
successfully their award may be set aside in whole or in part. 
Re Judge Lind (2006)
This plea of bias was made in the context of a post award challenge to enforcement. Jilken 
commenced arbitration against Ericsson. After appointing their arbitrators the parties agreed 
to former Swedish Supreme Court Judge Johan Lind as Chairman. The proceedings were 
conducted and an award in favour of the Respondent was handed down on 7 June 2004. The 
Claimant learned that the Chairman of the tribunal had previously worked as a consultant for 
Mannheimer Swartling, a major Swedish law firm retained by Ericsson. The Claimant 
challenged the arbitral award, arguing that the Chairman should have disclosed his 
relationship with Ericsson’s lawyers and that in failing to do so he had breached Article 9 of 
the Arbitration Act. Ericsson argued that the Claimant had known of the circumstances earlier 
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and had not objected to Judge Lind’s involvement, with the effect that the Claimant had lost 
its right to challenge by operation of Article 34 of the Act. Ericcson also argued that the 
circumstances were not such as to bring into question Judge Lind’s impartiality or 
independence. 
The Svea Court of Appeals stayed the execution and enforcement of the arbitral award while 
it heard the challenge
290. The Court of Appeals embarked on a detailed examination of Judge 
Lind’s relationship with Mannheimer Swartling. Heavy reliance was placed upon the terms of 
the contract of engagement, which stressed inter alia the independence of Judge Lind’s 
arbitration practice within the firm. Judge Lind himself gave evidence that he conducted his 
arbitration practice separately from his business with Mannheimer Swartling and that he 
always disclosed his relationship with the firm. The Court of Appeals held that Judge Lind 
did not appear to lack impartiality or independence because the reality of his relationship with 
Mannheimer Swartling was that, although he wrote opinions and memoranda of advice for 
them, he ran his arbitration practice separately. The application was dismissed. The Claimant 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Sweden. 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Svea Court of Appeal. First, the Supreme 
Court found that the Claimant had not waived its right to object under Article 34 of the 
Arbitration Act
291. The Court then objectively assessed the circumstances of Judge Lind’s 
relationship with Ericcson’s lawyers. The judgment lays the facts out as follows:
(1) Judge Lind was a part time consultant to Mannheimer Swartling. The nature of his 
engagement was unclear. The court took the view that, although the contract of 
engagement described him as a consultant, he was probably a part time employee. 
He was listed as a staff member on their website and had an office in their rooms. In 
a report of the Swish Bar Association Disciplinary Committee Judge Lind was 
described as an employee of the firm (this report also expressed the opinion that 
Judge Lind should have recused himself in the instant matter)
292.  
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(2) Judge Lind derived approximately 20% of his income from his arrangement with 
Mannheimer Swartling. Whilst this income stream was significant Judge Lind was 
not found to be dependent upon it
293. The relationship with Ericcson generated 
significant income for Mannheimer Swartling and had caused the firms partners to 
disqualify themselves from acting in claims against Ericcson in the past
294.  
(3) Judge Lind operated as an arbitrator from his office at Mannheimer Swartling. In 
the instant matter the parties had received correspondence from him on Mannheimer 
Swartling stationary
295
The Supreme Court found that these circumstances required disclosure and, if the parties 
objected, recusal. It was immaterial that Judge Lind was not a partner of the firm retained by 
the Respondent. The Supreme Court held:
the relationship between the law practice and the client is of commercial importance 
to the law practice, it must be considered that the bands of interests and loyalties 
between the partners of and lawyers employed in the law practice, on the one hand, 
and the client, on the other, constitute a circumstance that may diminish confidence in 
the impartiality of an arbitrator employed at the law practice, when the client is a 
party in the arbitration…Such a conclusion finds support in the IBA Guidelines and in 
case-law from the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
296
The Supreme Court set aside the award in full and ordered costs against Ericcson. The 
general reaction of the Swedish arbitration community was one of relief and satisfaction. The 
Svea Court’s judgment was heavily criticised and read as contrary to the public policy of 
promoting confidence in arbitration.  
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4.12 Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
Stockholm emerged as the seat of preference for disputes between Soviet and Western parties 
towards the end of the Cold War
297. Whilst this was a gradual process, a key event occurred 
in 1976-7 when  the American Arbitration Association and the Soviet Foreign Trade 
Arbitration Commission entered into an Optional Clause Agreement outlining the consensus 
that disputes between US and Soviet entities should be submitted to arbitration at the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)
298. Today, despite the 
fall of the USSR the SCC remains popular as a site for arbitrations between Western parties 
and Russian, Eastern European and Chinese entities
299. This is largely due to the fact that the 
dispute resolution provisions of investment treaties between these states often designate SCC 
arbitration as an alternative to ICSID arbitration.  
Unless the parties agree otherwise, challenges to arbitrators in SCC proceedings are heard 
first by the fellow arbitrators
300. The parties then have two options. They may agree that the 
appeal against the challenge decision may be finally heard by an arbitral institution
301. Under 
the SCC rules, an institutional nomination under Article 11 of the Arbitration Act puts the 
challenge before the Board of the Arbitration Institute of the SCC. The decision of the Board 
is final
302. Much like the Court of the ICC
303, the Board does not provide reasons for its 
decisions on the challenge of arbitrators. The alternative is that the challenge decision is 
appealed to the District Court of jurisdiction. When arbitrators are challenged in Swedish 
state courts the SCC often reports to the court as amicus curae
304. 
Article 17 of the SCC rules requires that an arbitrator shall be impartial and independent. The 
records of the SCC show that the most common cause for challenge is that the arbitrator (or 
their firm) have had previous contact with one of the parties involved
305.  There have also 
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been challenges on common arbitrator-party nationality, apparent outcome preference based 
on pecuniary interest and prior relations with counsel
306. In her concise survey of challenges 
decided by the SCC Board in the period January 1999 to June 2002 Marie Ohrstrom, general 
counsel to the Arbitration Institute of the SCC, reported  that only three out of the thirteen 
challenges run in this period were upheld
307. 
SCC Arbitration 60/1999
This interesting challenge arose out of arbitral proceedings between Chinese and Japanese 
parties on liability to repay a debt. The Japanese Claimant sought repayment from the 
Chinese Respondent. The Respondent appointed as its party arbitrator a person who was both 
a CIETAC panellist and chief judge of the people’s court of the city of its domicile. Counsel 
for the Respondent practiced in the same city. 
The Claimant challenged the Respondent’s arbitrator on the grounds that Chinese courts 
engage in local protectionism, and that the Claimant was at risk of injustice because they 
were a foreign company in a dispute with a local entity. The Claimant also argued a type of 
Rustal Trading Familiarity: the Respondent’s counsel appeared regularly in the Chinese court 
presided over by their arbitrator. The Claimant said this was grounds for reasonably 
suspecting that the arbitrator would favour the Respondent as a sonseuqence of his familiarity 
with their counsel. The SCC board held that there were no grounds for ordering 
disqualification of the Respondent’s appointee. 
The Respondent then challenged the Claimant’s nominee, a partner of a Japanese law firm. 
The Claimant’s appointee disclosed that one of his partners had, from time to time, advised 
the Claimant on retainer. The Claimant’s appointee made it clear that the partner retained was 
not acting or in any way involved in the matter at hand. In his submissions to the board the 
arbitrator cited decisions of French and English courts in support of his refusal to stand down. 
Despite his apparent distance, the SCC board upheld the challenge and disqualified the 
Claimant’s arbitrator.  
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SCC Arbitration 60/2001
This challenge arose out of an agreement for the sale and purchase of land in Sweden. The 
Claimant was Swedish and the Respondent was Dutch. The Claimant appointed a partner of a 
Swedish law firm as its arbitrator and proceedings commenced. In an innocent omission, the 
Claimant’s arbitrator failed to disclose that his partner was counsel for the Claimant’s parent 
company in proceedings before a Swedish state court. Despite the fact that the two corporate 
entities were legally separate, the SCC Board found that there were justifiable doubts as to 
the arbitrator’s impartiality and independence.   
SCC Arbitration 87/2000
In this arbitration between an English Claimant and a Swedish Respondent the Claimant 
challenged the Respondent’s party arbitrator. The challenge relied on Laker Airways
Familiarity: the arbitrator’s cousin was a board member of the Respondent’s corporate parent. 
The Respondent argued that the relation was remote and outside the circumstances envisaged 
under Article 8 of the Arbitration Act. The SCC board agreed and dismissed the challenge. 
SCC Arbitration 120/2001
The Claimant and the Respondent in this matter were both corporations domiciled in the 
Philippines. A dispute arose out of their Energy Cooperation Agreement, the disputes clause 
which provided for UNCITRAL Rules arbitration in Sydney, Australia. The parties appointed 
arbitrators and the proceedings began. The Respondent objected to the Claimant’s nominee. 
The matter went to the appointing authority designated by the Secretary General of the PCA. 
The Respondent’s challenge asserted that Claimant’s appointee had
(i) engaged in improper unilateral communications in the Philippines with the 
Claimant and their lawyers, 
(ii) made decisions on fees in violation of Article 39 of the UNCITRAL Rules, 
(iii) failed to disclose those aspects of his conduct that were pleaded as improper 
(including the fact that the Claimant had paid for his trip to the Philippines),
(iv)  failed to disclose that he had acted as nominated arbitrator on six occasions on 
behalf of other companies associated with the Claimant appointed through the same 
lawyers as were briefed in the matter at hand
308
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As is too often the case, the challenged arbitrator withdrew. The Respondent then alleged that 
during this first challenge the Chairman of the tribunal made active attempts to persuade the 
Respondent to withdraw its challenge. These attempts included letters (framed as ‘friendly 
invitations’) imploring the Respondent to discontinue its challenge, expressing opinions on 
the merits of the challenge, and stating that he was willing to proceed even in the event the 
Claimant’s arbitrator was actually biased
309. The letters also denied that the procedural orders 
made to date displayed any lack of impartiality or independence on the part of the Claimant’s 
arbitrator. The Respondent requested the Secretary General of the PCA to designate  an
appointing authority. The Secretary General referred the matter to the SCC. The Board of the 
SCC held that 
the circumstances relied on by [the Respondent] in support of its challenge do not -
neither separately, nor jointly - give rise to justifiable doubts as to the impartiality and 
independence of [the Chairman]
310
The Respondent’s challenge to the Chairman was dismissed. The matter is of interest because 
it shows that co-arbitrator demonstrations of support for challenged arbitrators can cause 
secondary challenges to be launched. This risk is especially high in situations where co-
arbitrators are required to rule at first instances on challenges to their friends on the panel. 
Best practice would seem to be to refer the challenge to the appointing authority and refrain 
from getting involved - ‘silence is an arbitrator’s mother tongue’
311.   
Rapla Invest (2006)
This challenge arose out of a claim for monies due under an agreement between TNK Trade 
Ltd (TNK) and Swonco Swedish Oil AB (trading as Rapla Invest) for the sale and supply of 
oil
312.  Rapla denied liability and counter-claimed. The contract provided for SCC Rules 
arbitration before a panel of three. The parties appointed their arbitrators (TNK nominating 
prominent Russian arbitrator Professor Sergei Lebedev and Rapla appointing Swedish lawyer 
Hans Liljeblad). Norwegian advocate Helge Jakob Kolrud was agreed as Chairman
313. The 
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tribunal convened and the hearing took place over seven days in January 2004. A unanimous 
award was handed down in favour of TNK on 19 March 2004
314. Rapla’s counter-claim was 
dismissed in full
315. After the final award was handed down, Rapla found out that Professor 
Lebedev had two years earlier been an arbitrator in a SCC arbitration in which a Ukrainian 
subsidiary of TNK was a remote party. Rapla also discovered that Professor Lebedev had 
appeared as counsel for this same subsidiary in insolvency proceedings in the Luhans’k Court 
of Financial Cases. Lebedev did not disclose any of these prior associations with TNK when 
he accepted the nomination
316. 
Rapla applied to the Svea Court of Appeal for vacatur. Rapla argued that the tribunal had 
failed to consider one of their heads of argument, and that Professor Lebedev lacked 
impartiality and independence required of him under the SCC rules and Swedish law.  TNK 
resisted the application. The Court of Appeal found for TNK, holding that although 
disclosure of his past appointment and brief would have been appropriate, neither the 
circumstances relied upon nor the failure to disclose warranted setting aside of the award. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Svea Court relied on the disclosure and challenge provisions of 
the Swedish Arbitration Act, rather than the SCC Rules. It was also relevant the 
circumstances were on the Orange List of the IBA Guidelines. The Court of Appeal stressed 
that the assessment of the impugned acts and circumstances was to be undertaken from an 
objective point of view
317. Importantly, the Court expressed the view that the ‘requirements 
of impartiality should be interpreted equally irrespective of the arbitrator’s professional 
background and should not be lowered in cases where the reason for challenge is not known 
until after an awards has been made’
318. This is to be contrasted with the practice of German, 
French and Swiss courts, where post-award allegations of bias are subjected to a more 
stringent standard (and are therefore less likely to succeed)
319.  Despite the dismissal of the 
challenge the dicta of the Court of Appeal in Rapla v TNK Trade illustrates the tendency of 
Swedish courts to strictly police arbitrator bias.    
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5. Continental Conclusions
The leading European seats have a common Roman legal heritage. Their laws of procedural 
fairness all recognise the Latin maxim nemo judex in sua causa. It has been observed that, 
where Roman law tolerated breaches of nemo judex, modern European legal systems tend to 
treat the rule as an absolute prohibition. The writer has suggested that the post-World War 
Two advent of Human Rights law caused the elevation of this rule. To that end, the writer 
prefaced his study of the European seats with a short analysis of Strasbourg Jurisprudence on 
the issue of impartiality and independence. It has been observed that the Strasbourg Court 
applies a test for ‘objective bias’ that closely resembles that laid down by the House of Lords 
in Sussex Justices. The writer has pointed to the prevalence of this ‘reasonable apprehension’ 
test as an explanation for the increased rate of bias challenge in Europe. The ‘Gough Clause’ 
– which the writer will propose more fully in Chapter 8 of this thesis – was put forward and 
tested against Suovaniemi v Finland, the leading EHR Court decision of waiver in arbitration, 
as a possible cure for this procedural ailment. 
All of the leading European seats observe the rule that ‘no man may be a judge in his own 
cause’ and apply it to arbitrators, either as a result of their posited laws of arbitration or 
jurisprudence developed in municipal courts. They call it ‘Subjective Bias’. The rule of 
‘Objective Bias’ (the Continental equivalent to the Anglo-American notion of ‘Apparent 
Bias’) is similarly universal. The force of both rules has increased with the elaboration and 
development of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. But this is where the common ground ends. While 
the municipal laws of most of the seats surveyed in this chapter impose the same standards of 
independence and impartiality on arbitrators as they do on judges, it is arguable that Swiss 
law does not. Swiss law is silent on impartiality, referring only to a lack of independence as a 
ground for challenge.  French arbitration law takes the same approach. In these seats the 
requirement of impartiality is instead derived from public law, jurisprudence and doctrine in 
these states, and the notion of ‘independence of mind’. But despite this common statutory 
approach, the record suggests that Swiss and French outcomes differ considerably: a French 
court is much more likely to remove an arbitrator than a Swiss court hearing the same matter. 
Dutch courts belong somewhere near the French: case law makes it clear that Netherlands 
courts police the requirement of impartiality and independence quite strictly. 143
At the other end of the scale are Swedish courts, which are even more likely to find 
actionable bias than their French and Dutch counterparts. Whether this is the result of 
Sweden having an arbitration law that actually lists the situations where bias will be made 
out, or the traditions of Swedish ‘moral authority’ and ‘neutrality’, remains to be seen. Then 
there are Germany and Austria, both Model Law states, which have arbitration laws that 
recognise both heads of Article 12 (impartiality and independence). The removal provision in 
the Belgian Judicial Code is the same, although the BJC is not a Model Law statute. Case law 
shows that the courts of these seats are less likely to find for the challenger than a court 
hearing the same matter in France or Sweden. This is especially likely in Germany where 
post-award bias challenges are evaluated against a ‘grave and obvious partiality or 
dependence’ standard.  The arbitration laws of Switzerland and Belgium allow full Party 
Autonomy: the parties may contract out of judicial supervision and review. These laws of 
Belgium and Switzerland must therefore be seen as the most resistant to bias, and, it has been 
submitted, the most likely to accept the writer’s ‘Gough Clause’. The case law surveyed in 
this chapter makes it clear that the Black Arts are flourishing in Europe. With this in mind, 
parties seeking to mitigate the threat of bias challenges by going to arbitration in Belgium or 
Switzerland and contracting for a higher test. 144
CHAPTER 4
The American Way
If a lack of bias is defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of a judge, then no 
one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will
- Justice Frank in Re Linahan (1943)
1
1. Introduction
American lawyers are schooled in an esteemed tradition of rights-driven Constitutionalism. 
American trial procedures are strongly competitive, even when compared to other Common 
Law states. The arrival of large American law firms in the 1980’s saw the projection of many
distinctly American practices and procedures onto ICA. This process corresponded with the 
emergence of the Black Art of bias challenge in international arbitration. In Chapter 8 the 
writer will examine the causal relationship between the influx of the Anglo-American 
technocrats and the rise in bias challenges. In the meantime, this chapter has a slightly 
broader focus, being the American law of bias challenges. By way of preface, the right to a
fair hearing before an impartial tribunal is a  guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution
2. An equivalent of the Rule in Dimes was 
endorsed in 1927 in Tumey v Ohio, when the US Supreme Court considered Prohibition-era 
state laws that empowered city mayors to try certain liquor-related offences. Any fine 
imposed was divided between the state and the city, with the latter using the income stream 
derived from the fines imposed to pay the officials involved. The damning feature of this 
model was that the mayor received fees in addition to his salary, but because these fees were 
drawn from fines,  the  mayor  only got paid when he convicted. The Supreme Court 
unanimously held that subjecting a defendant to trial before a judge having ‘a direct, 
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personal, pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant’ was a breach of the due process 
guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
3. In 1968, the ratio
in Tumey v Ohio guided the Supreme Court to its conclusion in the leading US case on 
arbitrator bias, Commonwealth  Coatings.  This chapter will show that, in all US federal 
appeals circuits except the Ninth, Justice White’s the narrow reading of the Federal 
Arbitration Act expression ‘evident partiality’ is preferred, with the result that it is properly 
difficult to get an arbitral award set aside for apparent bias. 
The United States is a complicated federation of fifty states, each with its own state and 
federal courts, the latter supervised by eleven different  appeal circuits beneath a single 
Supreme Court. American arbitration law is firmly dualist: State arbitration and contract laws 
will govern arbitration agreements and awards when Federal law is not applicable
4. A clear 
notion of the scope of US Federal arbitration law seems to be wanting
5; an observation that is
borne out by examination of appeal court judgments that grapple with the question of 
applicable law
6. The expansion of  the Constitutional notion of ‘interstate commerce’ has 
certainly increased the coverage of federal arbitration law in recent years
7. Although a 
number of states have sui generis international arbitration statutes
8, interstate and 
international arbitrations are generally governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and 
the common law that has developed around it
9. The dualism of the US lex arbitri is 
comparable to the arbitration law of Canada, were the majority of the provinces have dualist 
Model Law arbitration acts that stand beneath an otherwise monist Model Law Federal
arbitration statute. Complex dualism demands that the writer start this chapter with state law. 
2. State arbitration law 
All US states have commercial arbitration laws, either in the form of free standing statutes or 
chapters of their state codes of civil procedure. In 1955, forty nine US states adopted the 
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Uniform Arbitration Act, and twelve states have adopted the Revised Uniform Arbitration 
Act 2000
10. RUAA Section 12 expressly requires that the arbitrator give disclosure and make 
‘a reasonable inquiry’ into matters likely to affect his impartiality or independence; RUAA 
Section 23 uses the same ‘evident partiality’ standard for vacactur as FAA Section 10(a)(2).
This shared wording makes decisions under FAA Section 10(a)(2) persuasive in vacatur
applications brought under the RUAA Section 12, an inter-relation that has exposed state 
challenge jurisprudence to the unwieldy Commonwealth Coatings ratio. 
The RUAA does not address the subject of international arbitration, but that does not mean its 
application to an international matter is beyond the realms of possibility. The Prefatory Note 
to the RUAA neatly sums up the interplay of state and federal arbitration law:
[the FAA] covers any commercial agreement to arbitrate and the resultant arbitration 
award unless the matter involves only American citizens and has no reasonable 
relationship to any foreign country and the courts have broadly applied the statute. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that state arbitration law will have major application to an 
international case. There are two instances where state arbitration law might apply in 
the international context: (1) where the parties designate a specific state arbitration 
law to govern the international arbitration and (2) where all parties to an arbitration 
proceeding involving an international transaction decide to proceed on a matter in 
state court and do not exercise their rights of removal under [the FAA] ….and the 
relevant provision of state arbitration law is not preempted by federal arbitration law 
or the New York Convention. In these relatively rare cases, the state courts will refer 
to the RUAA unless the State has enacted a special international arbitration law
11
Eleven US states have their own international arbitration laws; UNCITRAL considers five of 
these states to be Model Law seats
12. Two of the US Model Law states – California and 
Texas – warrant special consideration in this chapter because they have Model Law Plus 
arbitration laws that provide non-exhaustive lists of circumstances that must be disclosed 
under Model Law Article 12. 
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2.1 Texas
The Texas law of international arbitration is Chapter 12 (Arbitration and Conciliation of 
International Commercial Disputes) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (TCPRC). 
Section 172.209 deals expressly with conflict of interest for conciliators
13; Model Law Plus 
TCPRC Section 172.056 provides a comprehensive (but non-exhaustive) list of the 
circumstances which must be disclosed by an arbitrator before they enter onto the reference
14. 
Under s.172.056(A)(1) the arbitrator must disclose within 21 days of appointment if he or 
she:  
(a)  has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party;                 
(b)  has personal knowledge of a disputed evidentiary fact concerning the proceeding;
(c)  served as an attorney in the matter in controversy;                   
(d)  is or has been associated with another who has participated in the matter during 
the association;
(e)  has been a material witness concerning the matter;                    
(f)  served as an arbitrator or conciliator in another proceeding involving a party to the 
proceeding;  or
(g)  has a close personal or professional relationship with a person who:  
(i)  is or has been a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of 
a party;
(ii)  is acting or has acted as an attorney or representative in the proceeding;
(iii)  is or expects to be nominated as an arbitrator or conciliator in the 
proceeding;
(iv)  is known to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the 
outcome of the proceeding; or
(v)  is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding;                
Under sub-section (2)(a) the appointee must disclose if they (either individually or as a 
fiduciary) or their spouse or child has a financial interest in (i)  the  subject matter in 
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controversy; or (ii) is a party to the proceeding. Under sub-article (2)(b) the appointee must 
disclose  ‘any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the 
proceeding’. Sub-Article (3) requires disclosure where ‘the person, the person's spouse, a 
person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of that person:
(a)  is or has been a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of 
a party;
(b)  is acting or has acted as an attorney in the proceeding;         
(c)  is known to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the 
outcome of the proceeding;  or
(d)  is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.                 
Disclosure is non-waivable in respect of sole arbitrators
15, and chairmen
16. The disclosure 
obligation is ongoing
17: if new circumstances arise the affected arbitrator would seem to have 
the same 21 days period to disclose them to the parties
18. 
2.2 California
The equivalent Model Law Plus section of the California Code of Civil Procedure is (CCCP) 
s.1297.121. The circumstances listed in the California Code are substantially the same as 
those in the Texas Code. The California code obligation to disclose is similarly mandatory 
and non-waivable for sole arbitrators and chairs
19; the principal difference between the two 
state laws is that the Californian code uses a shorted disclosure window of 15 days
20. A good 
example of the operation of the challenge provisions of Californian arbitration law is the 
matter of Guseinov v Burns. 
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year prior to the existing arbitration; and (4) the mediation was the only previous contact 
between the arbitrator and the Claimant’s attorney (there was no ongoing relationship 
present). The court disagreed with the Appellant’s classification of the arbitrator as a 
‘witness’ to the prior proceedings; the arbitrator had indeed testified but only in connection 
with a motion to disqualify him which was unrelated to the merits of the dispute
26. Lastly, on 
the issue of disclosure the court noted that the arbitrator had orally disclosed his involvement 
in the previous dispute ten months prior to the application for his disqualification. The 
Appellant raised no objection at that time. The result was that the court was not required to 
consider whether this act satisfied the CAA requirements for disclosure because the right to 
plead it as a breach had been waived by conduct. The appeal was dismissed. 
Prince (2004)
Prince  involved a dispute between a homeowner  and his insurance policy provider, the 
California Fair Plan Association (CFPA)
27. The arbitration clause in the insurance contract 
provided for a three member panel with party arbitrators and a ‘neutral’ chairman. Prince 
designated Leon Lamprecht and the CPFA selected Eugene Twarowski. The party appointees 
selected Thomas Menalo as Chairman of the tribunal. In June of 1997, in a document titled 
‘Disclosure Statement of Appraiser’ Twarowski disclosed that he had been used by CFPA as 
an appraiser seven times, and by parties insured by them nine times, in the previous year. 
Prince objected to Twarowski’s service as arbitrator on the ground that he had failed to give 
full disclosure as required by the CAA, and further that he was not a ‘disinterested appraiser’ 
as required by the California Insurance Code. The Superior Court denied Prince’s petition 
and the arbitration went ahead. 
In 1999, Lamprecht and Menalo signed an award which set the replacement cost of the house 
at $322,880. Twarowski did not sign the award.  Between 1999 and 2001, Menalo was 
replaced by retired state court Judge Bruce Sottile as a result of CFPA’s allegations of bias. 
In June of 2001, before any hearings on the appraisal had commenced, Prince’s attorney 
requested that Twarowski disqualify himself due to the 16 appraisals he had completed for 
the CFPA in 1996-1997. Twarowski responded that he had actually appeared as CFPA’s 
appraiser in closer to forty matters, although many of those matters never proceeded to 
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arbitration. Nothing more transpired regarding arbitrator Twarowski. On 18 October 2001 
Twarowski and Judge Sottile signed a final award. Prince moved to vacate on the basis of 
Twarowski’s ‘extensive and profitable, but undisclosed, financial relationships with CFPA’
28. 
Prince also alleged that he had made a timely demand that Twarowski disqualify himself. The 
trial court found no evidence of bias on Twarowski’s part and held that Prince had waived the 
right to challenge. The motion for vacatur was dismissed. Prince appealed. 
Issues of governing law were raised in the appeal. The California Court of Appeals held that 
the CAA governed the proceedings at hand because the appraisal clause in the contract 
constituted an ’agreement’ within the meaning of California state law. The court concluded 
that it was required to vacate the award if it found the arbitrator making the award had failed 
to disclose ‘within the time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification of which 
[Twarowski] was then aware’
29. The court went on to hold that even if Twarowski’s previous 
engagements as an appraiser were grounds for disqualification his giving disclosure three 
times in a four-year period meant he could not possibly have ‘failed to disclose’ within the 
meaning of California law; the court also rejected the Appellant’s argument that Twarowski 
was required to disqualify himself given his prior service as a CFPA appraiser. Prince’s 
contention was that these previous engagements gave rise to reasonable doubts. The Court of 
Appeal held that even if Twarowski had been the neutral arbitrator for the panel he would not 
have been required to disqualify himself. The court referred to CAA section 1281.9 (a)(1), 
under which a neutral arbitrator must disclose
whether or not he or she has a current  arrangement concerning prospective 
employment or other compensated service as a dispute resolution neutral or is 
participating in, or, within the last two years, has participated in, discussions 
regarding such prospective employment or service with a party to the proceeding
30
The court interpreted this provision of the CAA to mean that only ‘inducements offered by 
future service’
31 were relevant when considering an allegation of arbitrator bias under the 
CAA. Past employment as an appraiser was not enough to disqualify an individual from 
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acting as an arbitrator in future insurance dispute resolution proceedings
32. The court decided 
that the post-1997 revisions to the CAA only allow an award to be vacated where an 
arbitrator has failed to disclose a ground for disqualification, not where he should have (but 
did not) disqualify himself
33. 
2.3 The ‘Sunkist Distinction’
Perhaps the most interesting feature of America’s dualist arbitration law is that, in contrast to 
most national laws and institutional rules
34, in domestic proceedings US courts distinguish 
between the level of impartiality required of party-appointed  arbitrators  and ‘neutral’ 
Chairmen
35. The Prince case shows how this approach guides state courts
36; the party 
arbitrator distinction first received judicial approval in Cia de Navagacion Omsil SA v Hugo 
Neo Corp, where the court acknowledged the status of party-appointed arbitrators as ‘an 
amalgam of judge and advocate’
37. Not all circuits agree with the Sunkist approach, and it is 
only taken in challenges brought under state law, meaning it will only be available to courts 
reviewing arbitrator conduct in domestic arbitral proceedings and will not apply to inter-state 
and international matters governed by the FAA
38. The words ‘or either of them’ in FAA s.10 
make it clear that the same level of impartiality and independence is expected of every 
member of the tribunal under Federal arbitration law
39.  
The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, jointly adopted by the AAA and 
the American Bar Association in 1977, confirmed the reasoning of the New York court in 
Hugo Neo. In sync with the IBA, in 2004 the AAA/ABA published a new version of the 1977 
Code of Ethics; the 2004 revision of the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics was recently treated as 
persuasive by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Regency Productions Inc., v Nippon 
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Herald Films, Inc
40. The Tenth Canon of the 2004 AAA/ABA Code exempts party-appointed 
arbitrators from certain rules of conduct prescribed under other Canons. Under Canon X of 
the AAA/ABA Code, a party-appointed arbitrator is not expected to be neutral and, unless the 
parties or the rules applicable to the arbitration provide otherwise, is not obliged to comply 
with the same standards as the third or ‘neutral’ arbitrator.  Under Canon X, the party-
appointed arbitrator is freed from the general duty of impartiality imposed by Canon V except 
that the party-arbitrator is allowed to be predisposed towards the party which appointed 
him
41; provided the arbitrator has put the other party on notice of his intention to do so, he 
may communicate with his appointing party about the case
42. At all times, however, the 
party-arbitrator is bound to act with fairness, integrity and in good faith, and may not do 
anything to harass witnesses or delay the proceedings
43. The rules of the leading international 
arbitral institutions reject this Canon of the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics
44. The 1997 revision 
of the AAA International Arbitration Rules, which removed the ‘non-neutral arbitrators’ 
option in international arbitral proceedings, reflects this institutional disapproval. In Sunkist 
Soft Drinks Inc. v Sunkist Growers, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals accepted that 
a party-appointed arbitrator ‘may be predisposed or sympathetic’ to the position of the party 
that appointed them
45. The AAA domestic rules only seem to require the chairperson to be 
neutral
46; in a three member tribunal convened under state law, with two party-appointed 
arbitrators and a neutral third, only the chair will be held to the Commonwealth Coatings
standard. This is not an absolute rule, and the parties may agree that the same standard apply 
to both party arbitrators and their chairman. There is authority for a similar approach in Swiss 
arbitration law
47, and the laws of certain Arab states also recognise a Sunkist-type 
distinction
48. As will observed in Chapter 7, it is apparent from the challenge decision in 
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Amco Asia that ICSID jurisprudence also accepts a slightly lower standard of independence 
for party appointed arbitrators
49.
The merits of the Sunkist distinction continue to be debated amongst members of the ICA 
community. It is sometimes said that the judicial practice of holding party arbitrators to a 
slightly lower standard of impartiality and independence is better accepted in the Common 
Law world than it is in the Civil
50. This is a view bred from observation of the American 
system: the truth is that today the courts of most Common Law states (including England) do 
not accept the Sunkist distinction. Undeniably,  however, amongst ICA lawyers there is a 
practice of appointing people who you know will like your client’s case, and this practice is 
by no means limited to the United States. Recently, an Australian  lawyer gave a good 
example: 
We had a construction dispute in Asia recently. We wanted to go against the 
respondent’s Japanese parent company, which was a non-signatory to the build 
contract containing the arbitration clause. We decided that arguing that the parent was 
bound under the Group of Companies Doctrine was our best bet of dragging them in, 
so we appointed a Swiss arbitrator who we knew was open to our argument
51
In such a situation, the appointing lawyers and the arbitrator know exactly what they are 
doing: the lawyers had the whole thing planned; and, certainly by the time he hears their 
argument on jurisdiction, the arbitrator will know why he was appointed, and he will react 
accordingly. In a three-member party-made tribunal, some predisposition is inevitable. In the 
UK, Martin  Hunter stepped into the realm of the ‘unspoken’ when he described  how he 
appoints party arbitrators:
what I am really looking for in a party-nominated arbitrator is someone with the 
maximum predisposition toward my client, but with the minimum appearance of 
bias
52
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Jacques Werner has described the party-arbitrator as ‘a friend, who must be independent 
enough to award against the party who appointed him should the merits of the case warrant it, 
but who will ensure that all the arguments of his party get a thorough and fair hearing’
53. At 
Columbia University, Professor Hans Smit teaches his students that the only consideration for 
a lawyer appointing a party-arbitrator is how sympathetic they are to your client’s case
54. But 
it can go too far, and the party-arbitrator can become like an advocate
55. This is bad for 
arbitration, but as a risk it is kept in check by the Smithian self-interest of the parties: Craig, 
Park and Paulsson have made the point that the use of biased, party-appointed arbitrators is 
counter-productive because, from the perspective of the other arbitrators, the presence of an 
‘arbitrator advocate’ on the panel discredits the case of the party that appointed them
56. 
Custom, therefore, steps in at the extreme, and so should the law, but not before. The Sunkist
distinction between party appointed and ‘neutral’ arbitrators is eminently sensible, and 
reflects ‘the prevailing thinking…that a balance should be sought between the ideal of 
independence and the realities of the world of arbitration’
57; Sunkist simply acknowledges 
what is already accepted in practice: there is a difference between positive bias and general 
sympathy for the party that appointed you
58. The writer is not saying that party arbitrators 
should be immune from bias challenges; the writer is saying only that party arbitrators are not 
by custom, and should not be by law, held to the ‘absolute’ standard of impartiality and 
independence posited by Sussex Justices. In Chapter 8, the writer will tender a compromise: 
Gough for party arbitrators; Porter v Magill for ‘neutral’ chairs. To impose the same standard 
on all members of the tribunal is against logic and reason. In the writer’s opinion, courts that 
flatly deny the Sunkist distinction deny the existence of a custom that is both legitimate and 
well settled in ICA. This suggests they are either out of their depth or in denial.    
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3. Federal arbitration law 
United States arbitration law is principally derived from the Federal Arbitration Act
59. Boston 
Professor William Park recently described the FAA as ‘a statute of ancient vintage that might 
be called either venerable or antiquated depending your perspective’
60. The core of the FAA 
(being the provisions now contained in Chapter 1) was adopted by US Congress in 1925; the 
New York Convention was implemented in 1970 as FAA Chapter 2, and the Panama 
Convention five years later as Chapter 3. Congress added two new sections in 1988, 
concerning the Act of State Doctrine and appeals against decisions on arbitration agreements
respectively. The FAA long predates the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the federal republic of 
the United States is not a Model Law seat per se. The United States is, however, a very well 
developed arbitral jurisdiction: US laws on ICA have been harmonised with international 
practice (including practice as framed by the Model Law) by Supreme Court action in the 
mid 1980’s
61. As a result, US federal common law is the source of much of the modern 
content of American arbitration law, including the requirement that arbitrators disclose 
circumstances likely to affect their impartiality or independence. But recent experience shows 
that this body of case law is difficult to use: although the three most recent bias cases (being 
Positive Software, AIMCOR and New Regency)  confirm the  federal common law rule of 
disclosure, they diverge in ways which ‘significantly impair the ability of arbitrators to 
understand their disclosure and investigation responsibilities’
62.  
Broadly speaking, Model Law standards of impartiality, independence and disclosure are 
recognised in US federal law. Section 10(a)(2) of the FAA allows for arbitral awards to be set 
aside where there was ‘evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators’
63. In the context of 
this study, the most important difference between the UNCITRAL Model Law and US 
federal arbitration law is that the FAA makes no allowance for the mid-proceeding bias 
challenges or applications for the removal of arbitrators: in an international arbitration seated 
in the USA, if a party suspects bias they must wait for the award before they can make their 
challenge in form of a motion for vacatur.
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3.1 The ‘Vacatur Only’ Rule
US courts have consistently held that, under the FAA, vacatur is the only remedy for 
arbitrator bias or a failure to disclose
64. As Louis Epstein has observed, this ‘vacatur only’ 
rule would function satisfactorily if the FAA did not require that a party must assert an 
objection to avoid waiving it
65: the threat of challenge becomes a Sword of Damocles, 
dangling over the heads of the arbitrators for the remainder of the proceeding. This, of course,
damages the arbitral process. Consciously or subconsciously, the arbitrators may become 
more sympathetic to the aggrieved party’s case out of a desire to avoid the challenge process 
that will follow if they award against them; and if an award is made and then set aside for 
bias, the parties will have significant costs thrown away.  The counter argument is that 
‘vacatur only’  minimises judicial intervention, and prevents obstruction of the arbitral 
process by barring the parties from taking challenges to state courts. US courts have taken 
this side: in Insurance Co. of North America v Pennant Insurance Co the court said that 
allowing challenges mid-proceeding ‘could have the disadvantage of enmeshing district 
courts in endless peripheral litigation and ultimately vitiate the very purpose for which 
arbitration was created’
66. Whilst the writer agrees that challenges are bad for arbitration –
indeed, this is the point of this thesis – the plain fact is that challenges do occur; forcing the 
parties to wait for the award is Ostrich policy: it prefers the risks of procedural irregularity 
and the duplication of costs to the realityofbias challenges. In the writer’s view, a better way
would be for the FAA to adopt a modern approach, along the lines of the Model Law, and 
allow mid-proceeding challenges; US courts could then maintain the relatively strict ‘evident 
partiality’ tests developed since Commonwealth Coatings. This combination of statute and 
common law would do more to limit peripheral litigation than the current system: if the 
lawyers know that challenges have low prospects of success when they get to court, logic 
dictates that they will try them less. In Chapter 8, the writer will reason this proposition out. 
Chapter 2 of the FAA governs the enforcement and recognition of awards rendered by 
tribunals sitting outside the US, where challenges may (as a general rule) be launched mid-
   
64 Aviall Inc., v Ryder Systems, 110 F.3d 892, 895 (2d Cir. 1997); Gulf Guarantee Life Insurance Co. v 
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.., 304 F.3d 476, 490 (5
th Cir. 2002); Global Reinsurance Corp – US 
Branch v Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 465 F.Supp. 2d 308 (SDNY 2006)  
65 Epstein, L., Arbitrator Independence and Bias: The View of a Corporate In-House Counsel’ ICC Bulletin 
2007 (Special Supplement), p.64
66 Insurance Co. of North America v Pennant Insurance Co.,1988 US Dist LEXIS 2466 (D. Pa. 1988); see also 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v Argonaut Insurance Co., 264 F.Supp. 2d 926, 936 (D.Cal. 2003)158
proceeding. At US federal common law, bias is a ground for non-recognition of foreign 
arbitral awards under both the compositional irregularity (Art V(1)(d)) and public policy (Art 
V(2)(b)) exceptions contained in the New York and Inter-American enforcement 
conventions
67. It is settled that the due process guarantee, and the case law that has developed 
around it, extends to arbitral tribunals. The writer has, however, found that commentators 
disagree as to whether the US law of arbitrator bias is closer to that of England or Europe: on 
the one hand, in 2003, Lew, Mistelis and Kroll listed the United States as a jurisdiction where 
an equivalent of the ‘real danger’ test is in force
68; on the other hand, in his 2004 treatise on 
procedural law in ICA, Professor Petrochilos seems to take the view that ‘United States law is 
moving in the opposite direction [to England post-1996] to approach the standard prevailing 
in Europe’
69. This divergence in opinion is attributable to a lack of clarity in US case law: 
there is only one Supreme Court authority on arbitrator bias, and undesirable variation in 
circuit court readings of the controlling ratio. Key components of the test for bias remain 
unclear. Case law provides a confusing prognosis, for example, on whether the judge-
arbitrator analogy is alive in the United States: there is authority for the proposition that 
standards equal to, higher
70, and even lower
71 than those applicable to state court judges bind 
arbitrators sitting in the US. The position is unclear, but it seems from the obiter of Justice 
White in Commonwealth Coatings that a slightly lower standard is applicable to arbitrators
72. 
This was the conclusion reached by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in  Morelite 
Construction, where the court read Commonwealth Coatings as binding authority for the 
proposition that ‘the standards for disqualification of arbitrators [are] less stringent that those 
for federal judges’
73. But, as the cases surveyed below demonstrate, other US appeals courts 
have disagreed with the Second Circuit in  Morelite. What is clear is that US courts will 
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vacate awards rendered by decision makers with an actionable pecuniary or non-pecuniary 
interest in the cause – the clearest basis for ‘evident partiality’ is a material and undisclosed 
financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings
74. As the record reveals, apparent bias 
challenges have proven more ‘troublesome’ for US courts
75. 
Commonwealth Coatings (1968)
The  sole and controlling  Supreme Court decision on arbitrator bias is Commonwealth 
Coatings Corp v Continental Casualty Co. This matter involved an undisclosed business 
relationship between the Chairman (the ‘neutral arbitrator’, the use American parlance) of the 
arbitral tribunal and a party. The material facts of the matter were that, prior to the arbitration, 
the Chairman (a consulting engineer) consulted one of the parties in relation to project the 
subject of the dispute. The Chairman’s total fees as consulting engineer were $12,000; the 
Chairman did not disclose his prior relationship with the party. The three arbitrators rendered 
a unanimous award in favour of the party the Chairman had consulted, and it was not until 
after the award that the losing party became aware of this. Only the failure to disclose was 
pleaded; actual bias was not argued in the action against the award. The Supreme Court set 
aside the award on the basis that the FAA section 10(a) requirement of impartiality had not 
been met. 
3.2 Struggling with the ratio in Commonwealth Coatings
Appeals  courts have struggled to arrive at a general standard for arbitrator  bias  from 
Commonwealth Coatings
76. The reason Commonwealth Coatings is a difficult judgment to 
apply is that the five judges who made up the majority reached their common conclusion on 
different grounds: this is why Commonwealth Coatings has been labeled a ‘plurality plus’ 
decision
77. Justice Black delivered the Supreme Court’s judgment. Black J stated the rule as 
being that ‘the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that 
might create an impression of bias’
78. His Honour held that ‘arbitrators must not only be 
unbiased but must also avoid even the appearance of bias’
79. In Justice Black’s strict view,
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automatic disqualification was triggered by non-disclosure of a material dealing.  Justice 
Black was joined by four of his brothers, but a fifth vote was required for majority. 
Justice White ultimately agreed with Justice Black, but did so in the form of a concurring 
opinion (in which he was joined by Justice Marshall). Significantly, White J made further
remarks, and these extra remarks have proven to be the most problematic aspect of the 
Commonwealth Coatings judgment. Justice White began his concurring opinion with the 
words ‘While I am glad to join my Brother Black’s opinion in this case, I desire to make 
these additional remarks’. White J went on in his opinion to say:
the Court does not decide today that arbitrators are to be held to the standards of 
judicial decorum of Article III judges, or indeed of any judges…[arbitrators are not] 
automatically disqualified by a business relationship with the parties before them if 
[the parties] are unaware of the facts but the relationship is trivial
80
His Honour was careful to instruct arbitrators to err on the side of disclosure, seeing the 
question of triviality as a matter for the court rather than the arbitrator’s discretion. Justice 
White’s  concurring opinion  was based upon the finding that the arbitrator’s undisclosed 
relationship was not trivial: the fees rendered by the Chairman were a non de minimis sum, 
and the dealing with the party was accordingly objectionable. Over the last forty years, in 
applications for vacatur under the FAA, US federal courts have regularly been asked which 
member of the majority produced the ratio in Commonwealth Coatings: Black or White? The
significance of this task lies in the fact that, whereas Justice Black’s expression of the 
automatic disqualification rule was not expressed as being subject to de minimis, Justice 
White’s opinion did account for  mere trifles. Although lower courts usually defer to the 
opinion of Justice White, courts and commentators continue to lament the ‘disarray’ created 
by Commonwealth Coatings
81. A good example can be found in the Morelite Construction 
case, where the  US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described the ratio in 
Commonwealth Coatings as one of ‘ongoing uncertainty’
82. 
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Morelite Construction (1984)
The underlying dispute in this matter was between a builder and a union
83. Morelite applied 
to the District Court for orders disqualifying Arbitrator Campbell on the grounds that his 
father was the Vice-President of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, the international union of which the Claimant was a local chapter. Canella J denied 
the motion and the matter proceeded. In June of 1983 Campbell handed down an award in 
favour of the UBCJA. In September 1983 Morelite moved for vacatur pursuant to FAA 
section 10, again claiming that the position of Campbell’s father precluded Campbell from 
acting impartially as sole arbitrator. Despite admitting that he was ‘troubled by the 
relationship’ Canella J denied Morelite’s motion and granted the UBCJA’s cross-petition for 
confirmation of the award. In March of 1984 final judgment was entered in favour of the 
Benefit Fund and UBCJA. Morelite appealed.
Tellingly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit began its judgment with the words ‘In 
deciding this appeal, we are once again called upon to address the elusive standards under 
which an arbitrator's award may be vacated pursuant to Section 10 [FAA]
84. After searching 
for the ratio in Commonwealth Coatings, and weighing the ‘competing interests inherent in 
the use of arbitration’
85, the Court of Appeals described the policy tension as follows:
If the standard of “appearance of bias” is too low for the invocation of Section 10, and 
“proof of actual bias” too high, with what are we left? Profoundly aware of the 
competing forces that have already been discussed, we hold that “evident partiality” 
within the meaning of [FAA] 9 USC. Sec. 10 will be found where a reasonable 
person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the 
arbitration
86
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Applying their common human experience, the Court of Appeals held that, even though there 
was no evidence of how close the arbitrator and his actually father were, or how close their 
views on the merits of the dispute were, they were bound by their ‘strong feeling that sons are 
more often than not loyal to their fathers, partial to their fathers, and biased on behalf of their 
fathers’
87. The judgment of the District Court was reversed and the award set aside
88. 
Other US appeal circuits have followed the Second Circuit in Morelite Constructions and 
used a ‘reasonable impression’ approximation of the rule of apparent bias
89. Most recently in
Positive Software
90, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the ratio in 
Commonwealth Coatings was to be found in the judgment of Justice White. The majority in 
Positive Software found that the standard that flows from the judgment of Justice White is 
that where non-disclosure occurs:
an award may not be vacated because of a trivial or insubstantial prior relationship 
between the arbitrator and the parties to the proceedings. The ‘reasonable impression 
of bias’ standard is thus to be interpreted practically rather than with the utmost 
rigor
91
It is clear, therefore, that some U.S courts have preferred a practical approach to the apparent 
bias of arbitrators. Policy considerations familiar to the reader have informed this approach. 
3.3 US public policy
The ratio in Commonwealth Coatings has been described as a superior court ‘declaration of 
public policy’
92. The force of the rule of automatic disqualification for non-disclosure seems 
to have waned in recent years, corresponding with the pro-enforcement shift in US public 
policy. Generally speaking, the pro-enforcement trend began in the late 1970’s. Apparent bias 
became more difficult to make out in an enforcement context as American judicial 
interpretations of the  New York Convention Article V(2)(b) ‘public policy’ exception 
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hardened
93.  In the landmark decision in Parsons &  Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe 
Generale de L'Industrie du. Papier, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made the US 
position  clear when it held that foreign arbitral awards may only be denied enforcement
where the same would violate the ‘most basic notions of morality and justice of the forum 
state
’94. The reason for this shift was that at this time US were becoming concerned with 
reciprocity under the New York and Inter-American  arbitral awards  enforcement 
conventions. In International Produce the Court voiced its concern that the public policy 
defence should not be too easily invoked ‘lest foreign courts frequently accept it as a defence 
to enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in the United States’. Ensuring the finality of 
arbitration as an international commercial dispute resolution mechanism was, it seems, a 
countervailing policy consideration for the Court of Appeals in International Produce. The 
enforcing Court in International Produce held that the appearance of bias was not enough to 
vacate the award
95. Increased international capital flows, and observations of the in-country 
benefits of the same, must also have played their part in the emergence of pro-enforcement 
policy in the United States. It remains to be seen whether these policy considerations will 
weather the storm of the Global Financial Crisis. 
Fertilizer Corp (1981)
Where another state’s law has been chosen as lex arbitri and issues of procedural fairness 
arise, the ethical and professional standards of the situs will be taken into account by 
American courts as a result of the application of conflict of laws principles. For example, in 
Fertilizer Corp, Indian rules of impartiality and independence were considered
96. In 1976 an 
award was made against IDI. Fertilizer Corp of India (FCI) petitioned an Indian court for 
confirmation of the award, and IDI commenced for vacatur in another Indian court. FCI then 
filed for exequatur in the US District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under the New 
York Convention. The Ohio court exercised its discretion to stand the matter down pending 
determination of the action for vacatur in India. Amongst other objections (including non-
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retroactivity of the New York Convention)
97 ICI argued that the public policy of the United 
States would be offended by the enforcement of the award because it was rendered in 
circumstances of apparent bias. The arbitrator appointed by ICI had served as counsel for ICI 
in two previous matters and had failed to disclose this to the FCI. FCI submitted that this 
failure to disclose was fatal to the enforcement action, regardless of the fact that there was no 
actual bias against them. The Court held that the failure to disclose had not tainted the award 
because the lex arbitri ofthe arbitration did not require disclosure and, in any event, the three 
arbitrators were unanimous in their ruling against FCI.  
Andros Compania (1978)
The record shows that Andros Compania is often cited as authority for the pragmatic, even 
tolerant approach to the independence and impartiality of arbitrators.  The challenge in 
Andros Compania arose out of a disputed claim for demurrage under a charter party 
agreement
98.  Marc Rich’s appointee, Captain George Stam, died before the proceedings 
commenced. Marc Rich appointed Jack Berg as his replacement party arbitrator. Manfred 
Arnold, manager of the Maritime Division of the National Bank of North America was 
selected by the party arbitrators as the chairman. Disclosure was given and the matter went 
ahead. An award was handed down in favour of Andros for US$109,028. 
Andros petitioned the District Court for the Southern District of New York for orders of 
confirmation. Marc Rich countered with a motion for vacatur, arguing that full disclosure had 
not been given by Chairman Arnold. The affidavits in support alleged that Mr Arnold had 
failed to disclose the fact that he ‘had a close personal and professional relationship with 
Lloyd C. Nelson, one of the principals of Orion & Global, the firm which actually operates 
the vessel’. Lengthy affidavits of reply were filed. Brient J of the District Court denied the 
request for vacatur, confirmed the award and ordered costs against Marc Rich. Marc Rich 
appealed. The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit was careful not to take a dogmatic 
approach to the application of the Commonwealth Coatings standard, preferring instead a 
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‘case-by-case’ approach to the evaluation of allegations of arbitrator bias
99. The Court 
dismissed the appeal, holding
it can fairly be concluded that the relationship between Arnold and Nelson was a 
professional one, growing out of their service as arbitrators. There was no "business 
relationship" in the ordinary sense between them or between their employers
100
From the decision in Andros Compania it can be gleaned that courts under the Second Circuit 
will  treat the Commonwealth Coatings standard as being subject to certain realities of 
commercial dispute resolution, including de minimis professional engagements and prior 
dealings
101. 
Lucent Technologies (2003)
The operation of the rules of disclosure and the Commonwealth Coatings test for ‘evident 
partiality’ can be seen in the case of Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Tatung Co. Lucent commenced 
arbitration against Tatung (a Taiwanese corporation) on its claim for unpaid royalties due 
under a patent license agreement
102. The disputes clause in the license agreement provided for 
AAA International rules arbitration with a three member tribunal. Lucent appointed J. David 
Luening and Tatung named Ed Fiorito; Leuning suggested Roger Smith as chair, and Fiorito 
agreed. Disclosure was given pursuant to Article 7(1) of the AAA International rules. 
Leuning disclosed that he had been retained as counsel by Lucent (through their lawyers 
Kirkland & Ellis) on unrelated matters between April 1998 and December 1999. Smith also 
disclosed that he was counsel for a firm that also did work for Lucent. Disclosure was made 
to the AAA, but it seems that Tatung never received the copy disclosure documents from the 
institution. They raised no objection and the matter proceeded. 
After two years an award was made against Tatung in the sum of $12,551,613 (plus interest). 
Lucent petitioned in the Southern District of New York for confirmation of the award and 
Tatung sought orders of vacatur. Tatung’s request for vacatur pleaded as grounds the fact 
that the arbitrators Leuning and Smith had failed to disclose the fact that they had both 
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separately been retained by Lucent as patent licensing specialists in the past, and that they 
owned a plane together between 1974 and 1990. Applying Commonwealth Coatings the 
District Court confirmed the award and denied the Tatung’s motion to vacate
103. Rakoff J 
described the application as ‘a classic example of a losing party seizing upon a pretext for 
invalidating the award’
104. His Honour held that nothing about the relationship between 
Leuning and Lucent ‘provides strong evidence of partiality by the arbitrator that would justify 
vacating the award’. Leuning’s co-ownership of a plane with the chairman was ‘too 
insubstantial’ to warrant setting aside. Tatung appealed. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision. The Court of Appeals 
held that Tatung’s failure to learn of an arbitrator’s prior relationship with Lucent did not 
require vacatur where the arbitrator had previously disclosed the relationship to the arbitral 
institution and the information was available to both parties. The Appellant was not entitled 
to assume that the arbitrator had not submitted a disclosure to the AAA and could have 
inquired about the disclosure at any time. The airplane ownership was distant in the past and 
de minimis. On the issue of previous associations, the Court of Appeal cited its decision in 
Morelite Construction where it commented in obiter that ‘specific [legal practice] areas tend 
to breed tightly knit professional communities. Key members are known to one another, and 
in fact may work with, or for, one another, from time to time’
105. The court referred to its 
1981 decision in International Produce, where the court dismissed an application for vacatur 
based upon prior association challenge in a maritime arbitration
106. In International Produce
the Second Circuit recognised that 
arbitrators in important shipping arbitrations have typically participated in many prior 
maritime disputes, not only as arbitrators but also as parties and witnesses. They have 
therefore almost inevitably come into contact with a significant proportion of the 
relatively few lawyers who make up the New York admiralty bar 
107
The Court of Appeals took the view that patent licensing was a very specific area and 
connections and prior associations of the kind in the matter at hand were perfectly normal.
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Positive Software (2004)
Positive Software suggests that the Fifth US Circuit Court of Appeals (the jurisdiction of 
which includes Texas) is now aligned with the six other US appeals circuits that have adopted 
a more stringent requirement than a mere ‘appearance of partiality’
108. The arbitration in 
Positive Software also related to intellectual property rights: Positive Software claimed that 
New Century (and five others) infringed its patent in a piece of finance software called 
‘LoanForce’. A total of $38 billion was claimed in damages. Positive Software and New 
Century submitted their dispute to arbitration under the AAA Rules in 2003. Consistent with 
institutional appointment procedure, the parties ranked the arbitrators on the list provided by 
the AAA; a sole arbitrator was appointed on this basis. The arbitrator notified the AAA and 
the parties that he had no past relationships with the parties or their lawyers. 
The hearing was conducted and the sole arbitrator handed down an award in favour of New 
Century. Aggrieved by the ruling, Positive Software then investigated the sole arbitrator’s 
background and discovered that he had failed to disclose a previous relationship with counsel 
for New Century. The relevant relationship was professional: the arbitrator and the lawyer 
had been employed by two different firms that had both represented Intel Corporation in a 
complex patent litigation proceeding eight years earlier. Arbitrator and counsel never met, 
spoke, or appeared together in those proceedings. Intel Corporation was represented by seven 
different law firms in the proceedings. Arbitrator and counsel were two of approximately 
thirty five lawyers involved. The only aspect of the proceedings that linked the arbitrator to 
the lawyer was the fact that both of their names were on pleadings filed in the matter. Positive 
Software applied to the District Court for the Northern District of Texas for vacatur. The sole 
arbitrator’s failure to disclose was pleaded as evidence of his lack of impartiality. 
The District Court held that the sole arbitrator’s failure to disclose his significant prior 
relationship with counsel for New Century had created an appearance of partiality that 
required  vacatur
109. New Century appealed this decision. A panel of the Fifth Circuit 
dismissed the appeal. The Fifth Circuit panel’s opinion was that the prior relationship ‘might 
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have conveyed an impression of possible partiality to a reasonable person’
110. Both courts 
construed the FAA s.10(a) expression ‘evident partiality’ broadly. Neither court found actual 
bias on the part of the sole arbitrator. It was the fact that the arbitrator had failed to disclose 
the prior association, and had by this failure created an impression of possible partiality, that 
motivated the Fifth Circuit to uphold the District Court’s vacatur. New Century petitioned for 
rehearing en banc. In rehearing the appeal the full court of the Fifth Circuit was required to 
answer two threshold questions of key importance to this chapter:
(1) Is the proper approach to the interpretation of the FAA section 10(a) expression 
‘evident partiality’ narrow (per White J in Commonwealth Coatings) or broad (per 
Black J)? 
111
(2) If the broad interpretation of FAA s.10(2) is proper, will the remedy of vacatur be 
appropriate where there is a mere appearance of bias caused by non-disclosure? 
The court held 11-5 that the proper approach was to interpret FAA s.10(a) narrowly.  The 
court followed the binding statement of the rule of disqualification for non-disclosure made 
by  Justice White in Commonwealth Coatings. The full Fifth Circuit court held that ‘the 
Federal Arbitration Act does not mandate the extreme remedy of vacatur for non-disclosure 
of a trivial past association’
112. The court found that de minimis was a feature of the ratio in 
Commonwealth Coatings, commenting that Justice White’s opinion ‘fully envisioned 
upholding awards when arbitrators fail to disclose insubstantial relationships’
113. Following 
Justice White, the Fifth Circuit court found that the arbitrator’s relationship with counsel for 
New Century was trivial and the fact that it was not disclosed did not entitle Positive 
Software to vacatur. The majoritynoted that even if Justice White’s opinion was not the ratio
– and the stricter position taken by Justice Black bound them instead – Commonwealth 
Coatings was distinguishable on the facts. That case involved a party-arbitrator relationship 
that was commercially significant and directly related to the project in dispute.  The 
relationship Positive Software was, in contrast, ‘tangental, limited and stale’
114.   
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The majority took into account a number of public policy grounds in deciding against a broad 
interpretation of ‘evident partiality’. Firstly, the majority expressed concern that a ‘mere 
appearance’ standard for vacatur (which would be consistent with a broad approach to FAA
s.10(a)) would jeopardise the finality of arbitration, in so far as: 
losing parties would have an incentive to conduct intensive, after-the-fact 
investigations to discover the most trivial of relationships, most of which they likely 
would not have objected to if disclosure had been made. Expensive satellite litigation 
over nondisclosure of an arbitrator’s ‘complete and unexpurgated business biography’ 
will proliferate
115
Secondly, the majority observed that a broad approach to FAA s.10(a) would hold arbitrators 
to a higher ethical standard than United States judges. The court noted that ‘had the same 
relationship occurred between an Article III [federal] judge and the same lawyer, neither 
disclosure nor disqualification would have been forced or even suggested’
116. Finally the 
majority saw the ‘mere appearance’ reading of FAA s.10(a) as posing a threat to expertise.
Arbitration would lose the benefit of specialised knowledge, because the best lawyers 
and professionals, who normally have the longest list of potential connections to 
disclose, have no need to risk blemishes on their reputations from post-arbitration 
lawsuits attacking them as biased 
117
Public policy is a mountain with slippery slopes. The heads advanced by the majority are well 
conceived regardless of their possible formal weaknesses – there is no denying that, at least 
where crafty procedural lawyers are concerned, success promotes attempts. This is especially 
so where vast sums of money (and prospective legal fees) are involved. Although these
policy grounds were put in support of a decision made on appeal against vacatur  of a 
domestic award, they are equally valid for international matters. In fact, even before Positive 
Software, there was good authority for the proposition that American notions of due process 
should not be applied inflexibly where arbitration is concerned. 
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AIMCOR (2008)
Applied Industrial Material Corp (AIMCOR) went to arbitration with Ovalar Makine Ticaret 
ve Sanayi, A.S. over a contractual dispute, with AIMCOR as claimant and Ovalar as 
respondent
118. The three member tribunal was chaired by a Mr Fabrikant, CEO and President 
of Seacor, a large company with 50 offices worldwide. The hearings were split into liability
and quantum; before the liability hearing began Fabrikant advised that he had no matters to 
disclose. Shortly after, in September 2003, the arbitrators were told that a third party 
(Oxbow) had taken over AIMCOR. Again, Fabrikant advised he had no matters to disclose. 
Just before the liability phase was completed in April 2005, Fabrikant advised that it had 
come to his attention that the St Louis office of Seacor had done a deal with Oxbow for the 
carriage of petroleum coke, but that he had not been involved in the transaction. No party 
objected, and the decision on liability was made 2:1 in favour of AIMCOR. Frabikant’s vote 
was instrumental in the award on liability. Before the quantum hearing began, Ovalar 
engaged new counsel. Counsel requested that Fabrikant withdraw, but the Chairman refused. 
Counsel for the respondent then conducted an investigation of the relationship between 
AIMCOR’s new parent and the Chairman’s company. It turned out that Seacor had been 
carrying coke for Oxbow since 2004, and had earned $275,000 for its services. On the basis 
of this undisclosed commercial relationship, Ovalar moved for vacatur in the Federal District 
Court. The matter went on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed their 1984 position in Morelite Construction, 
holding that the proper standard for ‘evident partiality’ under the FAA is ‘where a reasonable 
person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party’
119; significantly, the 
Court of Appeals also distinguished the FAA standard from the standard applicable to US 
federal judges
120. As Mark Kantor has noted, the standard applied in AIMCOR is higher than 
the bars set by Article 12(2) of the Model Law and General Standard 2(c) of the IBA 
Guidelines
121; in the writer’s opinion, the Morelite/AIMCOR  test comes very close to a 
requirement that actual bias be shown before the award will be set aside. The writer sees high 
post-award standard as a function of the ‘Vacatur Only’ rule. On the question of disclosure, 
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the Court of Appeals held that under  Commonwealth Coatings an arbitrator is bound to 
disclose and investigate potential conflicts of interest, and that both obligations are ongoing. 
The Court framed the duty to investigate in the following terms:  
Where an arbitrator has reason to believe that a nontrivial conflict of interest might 
exist, he must (1) investigate the conflict [which may reveal information that must be 
disclosed under Commonwealth Coatings] or (2) disclose his reasons for believing 
there might be a conflict and his intention not to investigate
122
AIMCOR is the first Second Circuit decision to address the scope of the duty to investigate.
The majority were careful to add that they were not creating a free-standing duty to 
investigate, and that mere failure to investigate will not be enough on its own to warrant 
vacatur; if the arbitrator fails to investigate a potential conflict and then fails to disclose, 
these failures will be indicative of ‘evident partiality’. Because both duties were found to 
have been breached by Fabrikant, and the amount made by Seacor in its deals with Oxbow 
was not de minimis, the Court of Appeals ordered that the award be set aside
123. 
National Shipping (1992)
In National Shipping the court had occasion to consider the applicability of American bias 
standards to foreign arbitral awards, finding relevant considerations to include the law of the 
seat, the institutional rules chosen by the parties, custom and curial law
124. The National 
Shipping  matter was submitted to arbitration before a three member tribunal. National 
appointed Manfred W. Arnold, Transamerican appointed Donald J. Bilski. Arnold and Bilski 
selected John P. Palmer as Chairman. The proceedings were conducted and an award was
handed down in favour of Transamerican. National then moved to vacate the award against it, 
alleging that Arbitrator Bilski lacked impartiality. 
According to National, during the arbitration Bilski engaged counsel for Transamerican 
(Richard E. Repetto) to represent him in an unrelated arbitration matter, a fact which Bilski 
did not disclose. In his disclosure statement Bilski declared that ‘with regard to the law firms 
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involved, both are well known to me…[the Respondent’s lawyers] are on my company’s 
approved list and I do send them legal work on a regular basis’
125. National argued that this 
did not constitute adequate disclosure under the FAA. Repetto asserted in an affidavit that he 
did not act as Bilski’s attorney in the later arbitration but merely drafted a letter to the parties 
involved in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Maritime Arbitration of the 
Maritime Law Association. Repetto stressed that he received no compensation and took no 
further action in connection with that matter. 
The District Court relied upon Justice White’s opinion in Commonwealth Coatings. The court 
rejected a requirement of a showing of ‘outright chicanery’ or proof of actual bias, preferring 
instead an assessment of the ‘totality of the circumstances in deciding the existence of evident 
partiality’
126. The procedural fact of non-disclosure was not enough. Edelstein J took the view 
that the actual relationship must be assessed before a finding of evident partiality can be 
made
127. His Honour found relevant considerations to be the local commercial practices of 
the seat of arbitration, the arbitrator’s financial interest in the arbitration, the nature of the 
relationship between arbitrator and the allegedly favoured party, and whether the allegedly 
improper relationship existed during the arbitration
128. Using these criteria the court held that 
Bilski’s connection to the later arbitration proceeding did not warrant vacatur. Edelstein J 
found that while there was a professional relationship between Bilski and Repetto, there was 
no attorney-client relationship between them and therefore no business relationship that could 
lead  to Bilski having a pecuniary interest in the second matter. The court in National 
Shipping  took notice of the fact that maritime law is a small, specialised field where 
‘practitioners have frequent professional contact’
129. The court held that common 
membership of a Bar Association, or the arbitrator and the attorney having some other non-
pecuniary professional relationship, does not justify a finding of evident partiality under FAA 
s.10
130. 
ANR Coal (1999)
In  ANR Coal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit surveyed US case law and 
concluded that the applicant needed to show that there was a real risk of a lack of impartiality 
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on the part of the arbitrator
131. This matter arose out of a contract for the purchase of coal 
between ANR Coal and Cogentrix
132. The disputes clause provided AAA Rules arbitration 
before a three member tribunal. The parties made their appointments, but the party arbitrators 
were initially unable to agree upon a Chair. The AAA struck several names from the list 
based upon their objections. One of the replacements listed was Mr Wilburn Brewer, partner 
at a South Carolina law firm that had represented Carolina Power in electrocution cases. 
ANR objected to Brewer’s placement on the list for this reason. The AAA rejected this 
challenge. ANR did not use any of its preemptory strikes on Brewer, and he was eventually 
selected because he received the highest average ranking. ANR filed no further challenges to 
Brewer because, it later said, ‘given there was no assurance the challenge would be granted, a 
failed challenge could potentially offend the ‘neutral’ arbitrator as a challenge to his 
integrity’
133. The hearing was conducted and an award was handed down against ANR (with 
Brewer in the majority). After the award was rendered ANR discovered that Brewer’s firm 
had represented Carolina Power not only in electrocution cases but also in cases involving the 
right to deliver electric service. ANR petitioned for vacatur on the basis of Brewer’s alleged 
lack of impartiality. The District Court vacated the award and Cogentrix appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned the judgment. The Court of Appeals 
dismissed ANR’s first contention that Brewer’s failure to fully disclose his relationship with 
Cogentrix itself warranted vacatur of the arbitral award. ANR’s contentions relied heavily on 
Commonwealth Coatings, but the court in ANR Coal felt that ANR’s arguments were based 
on misinterpretation of that authority
134. The court viewed the nature of the undisclosed 
relationship between the parties in Commonwealth Coatings as imperative to the outcome, 
not the mere fact that said relationship was undisclosed. In fact, the court viewed the fact that 
the arbitrator had not disclosed a ‘repeated and significant’ relationship that existed ‘over a 
period of four of five years’
135 as the central material fact in Commonwealth Coatings. The 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court dicta that an arbitrator does 
not have a duty to reveal  ‘all information regarding his past or present relations with a 
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party’
136. In this sense the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals displayed a clear preference for 
the narrow interpretation of impartiality as set forth by Justice White in Commonwealth 
Coatings. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected ANR’s contention that Brewer’s failure to 
disclose the extent of his relationship to Cogentrix was evidence of his lacking impartiality 
requiring vacatur. In dismissing this head of argument the Court of Appeals relied on its 1995 
decision in Consolidated Coal. In Consolidated Coal the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit used the following four-factor test to determine whether an arbitrator had 
demonstrated evident partialityunder the FAA: 
(1) the extent and character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of the 
arbitrator in the proceeding; 
(2) the directness of the relationship between the arbitrator and the party he is alleged 
to favour; 
(3) the connection of that relationship to the arbitration; and 
(4) the proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration proceeding”
137.  
The Court of Appeals added an objective standard for evaluating partiality, phrased as a 
question of whether ‘a reasonable person could assume the arbitrator had improper 
motives’
138. The court held that the relationship between Brewer and Cogentrix was not direct 
or personal enough to warrant a finding that Brewer lacked impartiality. The court found that 
there was no evidence that an unfavourable finding in the arbitral proceeding in question 
would have lead to costs being passed on to Brewer’s client Carolina Power.  The Court of 
Appeals looked deeper into the circumstances of the matter as a whole, concluding that ANR 
had not met its ‘heavy’ burden of meeting the ‘onerous’ standard of proof set forth in the 
controlling cases
139. Further, the Court of Appeals found that all four parts of the 
Consolidation Coal test must be equally weighed; the mere satisfaction of one factor - such 
as proximity in time - will not be enough on its own to demonstrate a lack of impartiality. 
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ANR Coal therefore affirms the preference of the Fourth Circuit for the narrow interpretation 
of ‘evident partiality’ employed by Justice White in Commonwealth Coatings.
Schmitz v Zilveti (1976)
US courts have proven themselves reluctant to vacate awards on the basis of prior firm 
representation of a party. As a general rule the previous association must be known to the 
arbitrator in order for their failure to disclose it to be actionable - this general proposition is 
derived from the 1976  Anaconda case
140. The challenge in Schmitz v Zilveti was quite 
different. It arose out of an arbitration conducted under the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) Code of Arbitration Procedure (1990). Section 23(a) of the NASD Code 
requires that arbitrators must disclose (1) any direct or indirect financial or personal interest 
in the outcome, (2) any financial, business, professional, family, or social relationships that 
are likely to affect impartiality or might reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias; 
and (3) any personal relationships with any party, its counsel, or witnesses. NASD Code s. 
23(b) provides that ‘persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitrators should 
make a reasonable effort to inform themselves of any interests or relationships described in 
[section 23(a)]
141 . 
The challenged chairman (Mr John Conrad) was a partner of a law firm that had represented 
the parent company of Zilveti, Meris, and Prudential-Bache Securities in at least nineteen 
cases over a period of 35 years. The most recent representation ended approximately 21 
months before the arbitration at hand commenced. The District Court applied Commonwealth 
Coatings and the general rule of knowledge to conclude that Conrad was not aware of the 
conflict of interest and had no duty to disclose it. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed with the lower court. The Court of Appeals stated the law as being that evident 
partiality will only be made out where (1) an actual conflict of interest exists, or (2) the 
arbitrator knows of but fails to disclose information which would lead a reasonable person to 
believe that a potential conflict exists. In the instant matter the Court of Appeal addressed the 
exception to the general Anaconda rule of knowledge as follows:
Though lack of knowledge may prohibit actual bias, it does not always prohibit a 
reasonable impression of partiality. As Appellants argue, an arbitrator may have a 
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duty to investigate independent of its Commonwealth Coatings duty to disclose. A 
violation of this independent duty to investigate may result in a failure to disclose that 
creates a reasonable impression of partiality under Commonwealth Coatings
142
Conrad was under a duty to investigate by virtue of NASD Code s. 23(b)
143. He failed to 
discharge this duty and, although he lacked actual knowledge of the conflict he had 
constructive knowledge sufficient for his non-disclosure to cause a reasonable impression of 
partialityunder Commonwealth Coatings. The Court of Appeals set aside the award. 
The ratio in Schmitz v Zilveti is consistent with General Standard 7(c) of the IBA Guidelines 
– it creates a common law constructive knowledge exception to the more general actual
knowledge rule laid down in Anaconda. The Anaconda requirement of actual knowledge is 
most significant where large law firms and corporate clients are involved. Whilst the 
constructive knowledge exception to Anaconda is only binding on courts under the Ninth 
Circuit, because this circuit is the largest (with appellate jurisdiction over Western US states 
of Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Washington state, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii 
and the Pacific territories) the availability of the rule in Schmitz v Zilveti is relatively wide. In 
other circuits, however, the rule in Anaconda stands: barring any special duty to investigate, 
there will be no order of vacatur unless the arbitrator actually knew of the association when 
he or she entered onto the reference
144. 
New Regency (2007)
New Regency Productions and Nippon Herald Films entered into an agreement for Nippon 
Herald to distribute a number of films in Japan. In 2003 a dispute arose, with Nippon Herald 
alleging breach of the distribution agreement
145. The matter went to arbitration under the 
arbitration rules of the American Film Marketing Association (AFMA), and by the list 
procedure specified in the AFMA Rules, the parties jointly selected attorney William J 
Immerman as their sole arbitrator. In July 2004, Immerman rendered an award in favour of 
New Regency, the Respondent in the arbitration. The arbitration concluded in December 
2004. When New Regency sought confirmation of the award, Nippon Herald countered with 
a motion for vacatur. The basis of the motion was that Immerman failed to disclose that, 
   
142 Schmitz v Zilveti, 30 F.3d 1043 (9
th Cir. 1994) per Wiggins J at para 23 
143 Schmitz v Zilveti per Wiggins J at para 26 
144 Anaconda at 109-12
145 New Regency Productions, Inc. v Nippon Herald Films, Inc 501 F.3d 1101 (9
th Cir. 2007)177
during the proceedings, he took a position as ‘Senior Executive Vice President and Chief 
Administrative Officer’ at a company (Yari Film Group) that was negotiating a finance and 
co-production agreement with New Regency for a film called ‘The Night Watchman’. The 
film was a significant project for Yari Group and New Regency – Keanu Reeves was signed 
in the lead role. The court accepted that Immerman had no knowledge of the deal when he 
gave disclosure at the beginning of the arbitration, or at any subsequent material time. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that, via his position at Yari Group, Immerman had 
a substantial interest in a firm which was doing more than trivial business with a party to the 
dispute; the rule in Commonwealth Coatings was therefore triggered. The Court of Appeals
noted  that  Schmitz v Zilveti functioned  to  exclude ‘actual knowledge’ as an element of 
‘evident partiality’: it was no excuse that Immerman did not actually know of the Night 
Watchman deal – under the ‘constructive knowledge’ exception expressed in Schmitz v 
Zilveti, Immerman was deemed to have known; Immerman had breached both his AFMA 
Rules duty to investigate potential conflicts, and his federal common law duty to disclose. 
What motivated the court was the fact that Immerman had not disclosed his new employment 
at Yari Group - considering AIMCOR the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that if 
Immerman had given disclosure, the parties would reasonably have expected him to check 
for conflicts between them and his new employer
146. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals 
set aside the award.  
Where other federal appeals circuits have approved the narrow approach to ‘evident 
partiality’ per Justice White in Commonwealth Coatings, it is apparent that the Ninth Circuit 
has gone in a different direction: in New Regency, the Ninth Circuit read the FAA ‘evident 
partiality’ standard relatively broadly, with the result that an undisclosed (and uninvestigated)
transaction between the arbitrator’s new employer and a third party attracted vacatur. Much 
like Schmitz v Zilveti, the outcome in New Regency must be seen as exceptional. In the other 
circuits, for the award to be set aside the arbitrator must have been personally involved with 
the matters in which his firm was related to the party, and those matters must have had some 
connection to the dispute at hand
147. The pecuniary interest must also pass a test for 
remoteness: challenge will not be upheld, nor disqualification ordered, where the relevant 
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pecuniary interest can only be affected by factors outside the decision maker’s control
148. 
Decision makers who stand to benefit commercially from a decision against a business rival 
will be disqualified and their awards set aside
149. Blood and marital relationships to parties 
are similarly objectionable
150, although probably only to the third degree
151. Sexual 
relationships with a lawyer for one of the parties will certainly cause justifiable doubts to 
arise – in the Mission Insurance case (an insurance arbitration) vacatur was ordered after it 
was revealed that the arbitrator had spent two of the nights of the arbitration in the hotel room 
of a female lawyer who acted for the successful party
152. Much like in the Catalina & Norma, 
a judge who appears prejudiced against a party because of their ethnicity will be disqualified 
on the basis of default party preference
153. 
Substantive outcome preference - or prejudgment of the merits - will only be actionable as a 
non-pecuniary sub-form of bias where there has been a significant degree of involvement 
with the merits of a case
154. Prior involvement of a decision maker in a matter of similar facts 
will rarely be cause for review, and a mere expression of opinion will not be enough to 
disqualify
155. Decision makers hearing matters involving their former clients may be 
successfully challenged for the appearance of bias, but this rule does not extend to the clients 
of the decision maker’s former partners
156. It may be of some comfort to users of hybrid 
Mediation-Arbitration processes that US courts have not been willing to find partiality where 
there is a staged combination of adjudicatory and other functions in a single decision maker 
(eg. where the decision maker has investigated a matter before they judge it)
157. Finally, 
because there is no  Pinochet equivalent in US law the American rule of Automatic 
Disqualification for non-de minimis interest in the cause does not extend to non–pecuniary 
interests. 
   
148 Virginia Electric and Power Co v Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., 407 F.Supp. 324 at 327-8 (ED Va 
1976) 
149 Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564 (1973); see also Lucas v State; ex rel Board of Medical Registration and 
Examination 99 NE 2d 419 (Ind 1951)  
150 Low v Town of Madison, 60 A 2d 774 (Conn 1948); Taylor v County Commissioners of Worcester, 105 Mass 
225 (1870)
151 Moody v City of University Park, 278 SW 2d 912 (Ct Civ App Tex 1955) 
152 ‘Report on the Mission Insurance case’, Wall Street Journal, 14 February 1990, cited in Lew et al, above 
note 68 at 264 (FN 40). 
153 Berger v US, 225 US 22 (1921), where the trial judge remarked ‘one must have a very judicial mind, indeed, 
not to be prejudiced against German Americans in this country’ 
154 American Cyanamid Company v FTC, 363 F 2d 757 at 768 (6
th Cir. 1966)  
155 O’Carroll v CAB, 144 F 2d 993 (DC Cir 1944) 
156 State of New Hampshire ex rel Thomson, State Board of Parole, 342 A 2d 634 (NH 1975) 
157 Federal Trade Commission v Cement Institute, 333 US 683 (1948) 179
4. Proposed changes to the FAA
America is changing again, and both sides of US politics have recently proposed changes to 
the Federal Arbitration Act. Starting from the left, in 2007 Democrat Senator Russell 
Feingold  (Wisconsin)  introduced the Arbitration Fairness Act Bill
158. Senate and House 
hearings were held on the Bill in 2007, and the Commercial and Administrative Law Sub-
Committee of the House of Representatives Judicial Committee endorsed the proposal. 
Despite expectations of swift passage, the Bill is stalled in the House of Representatives
159. If 
passed, the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) will overturn the doctrines of  Kompetenz-
Kompetenz and Separability.  The AFA will also go a long way towards overturning the 
Mitsubishi Doctrine in that it will significantly narrow US rules of arbitrability: under the 
AFA arbitration agreements will be invalid where they relate to employment, consumer and 
franchise disputes, as well as disputes arising under any statue intended to protect civil rights 
or regulate transactions between parties of ‘unequal bargaining power’
160. Needless to say, 
such measures will not advance the practice of arbitration in America. According to the 
Washington Post, the AFA ‘goes too far’
161; the writer strongly agrees. 
From the right, Republican Senator Jeff Sessions (Alabama) sponsored the Fair Arbitration 
Act Bill
162. The Bill was introduced on 17 April 2007. It focuses on complaints and denials of 
rights in arbitration, its stated purpose being ‘to establish fair procedures for arbitration 
clauses in contracts’
163. To that end, it will overhaul the US laws of arbitrator appointment,
disclosure and challenge. Firstly, the Fair Act will ban ad hoc arbitrations, with S.2(b)(2)(C) 
requiring that
the arbitration shall be administered by an independent, neutral alternative dispute 
resolution organization to ensure fairness and neutrality and prevent ex parte
communications between the parties and the arbitrator
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Given this prohibition it is somewhat surprising that the Fair Act also appears to ban the 
institutional appointment of arbitrators, with S.1(b)(2)(B) providing that ‘each party shall
have a vote in the selection of the arbitrator’
164. The mandatory language of this provision 
suggests that the party-arbitrator system will be imposed on all users if the Fair Arbitration 
Act Bill gets up. Secondly, the Fair Act will impose much broader disclosure requirements on 
arbitrators than those applicable under the FAA. Fair Act S.1(b)(2)(B)(iii)(I) bars arbitrators 
from appointment  if they have a ‘personal or financial interest in the results of the 
proceedings’; S.1(b)(2)(B)(iii)(II) prevents the appointment of persons who have ‘any 
relation to the underlying dispute or to the parties or their counsel that may create an 
appearance of bias’. The combined effect of these provisions is to elevate appearance over 
fact, and extend nemo judex (and the rule in Tumey v Ohio) from the dispute into the domain 
of its ‘results’. Confirming these outcomes is the fact that Fair Act S.1(b)(2)(B)(iii) makes the 
ABA/AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes applicable de jure. It is 
notable that the word ‘shall’ prefaces all of these sub-sections, suggesting that the Fair Act’s 
stricter rules of impartiality and independence are intended to be non-waivable. If this is the 
case then the Bill will also ratchet back US notions of party autonomy in the arbitral process: 
‘neutrality’ will become the guiding consideration in appointment, and the parties will no 
longer be able to waive party familiarity in favour of expertise.  
If either bill becomes law, it will damage the practice of arbitration in the United States. 
Frankly, the AFA will make the US a seat to be avoided: without Kompetenz-Kompetenz and 
the Doctrine of Separability the arbitral process cannot function efficiently. The Fair 
Arbitration Act will reverse Commonwealth Coatings and the jurisprudence that has 
developed illuminated its ratio, introducing an appearance-driven test and the strict disclosure 
and conflicts of interest rules of the ABA/AAA Code of Ethics. Although the future of both 
Bills is uncertain, the politics of the Global Financial Crisis – which include a ‘rethinking’ of 
corporate self-regulation – will likely give strength to proposals to reform US arbitration law.
The United States could do a lot better than the FAA, but these kinds of changes would not 
be steps forward. 
   
164 Ibid at p.447; emphasis added181
5. Conclusion
US federal arbitration law relies heavily on common law supplementation – the FAA is out of 
date. The ‘Vacatur Only’ Rule is evidence of the Act’s age: in the arbitration laws of nearly 
every other country there is a provision which creates a procedure for challenge and removal 
mid-proceeding. But, on the up-side, Vacatur Only has produced a rich tapestry ofprecedent: 
from the cases considered in this chapter we can conclude that most United States appeal 
courts  are skeptical of allegations of  arbitrator  bias, so much so that the United States 
probably can be said to be a jurisdiction where something like the ‘real danger’ test is in 
force. It is clear from the jurisprudence that where bias challenges are run against arbitral 
awards, US courts will read the FAA expression ‘evident partiality’ narrowly consistent with 
the concurring judgment of Justice White and his brothers in Commonwealth Coatings. The 
only exception is the Ninth Circuit, where the tendency is to ‘deemphasize Justice White’s 
narrowing language’
165. The decision in New Regency illustrates this exceptional preference. 
Where foreign awards are concerned, the prevailing narrow reading of FAA s.10 (a)(2) is 
complimented by the narrow reading of the New York Convention public policy exception.
US courts have been construing public policy narrowly since the mid 1970s, at which time 
the federal judicial policy of promoting arbitration as a dispute resolution method in cross-
border commerce emerged. This chapter has shown that US courts tend to display an anti-
vacatur, pro-enforcement bias where questions of impartiality and independence are raised 
post-award. This approach makes eminent sense: by protecting the arbitral product they are 
safeguarding the process. But recent legislative proposals suggest that the high-water mark of 
the Mitsubishi Doctrine – and the pro-arbitration, pro-enforcement rules that come with it –
may have already passed. If the ‘Fair Arbitration Act’ becomes law, the United States will 
become a seat in which the practice of the Black Art of bias challenge is aided by a test for 
bias that incorporates the Second Arm of Sussex Justices.
   
165 Positive Software, para 283183
test
5, as does Brunei
6. In Chapter 8 the writer will argue that the Gough ‘real danger’ test, or 
failing that the ‘real possibility’ test used in Porter v Magill, is the most appropriate for 
challenges to arbitrators and that the superior courts of Australia, Singapore and Canada 
should abandon Sussex Justices in its favour. If for public policy reasons they are unwilling to 
do so, then they should follow the courts of Hong Kong and New Zealand and use Porter v 
Magill for arbitrators. 
2. Summary of the English Position 
In Chapter 2 the writer traced the Common Law blood line of the ‘real danger’ test and 
observed that the ratio in  Gough no longer binds English courts. Two decisions are 
responsible for this: Re Medicaments
7 and Porter v Magill
8. The stricter ‘real danger’ test 
proposed by Lord Goff of Chieveley in Gough was considered by the Court of Appeal in Re 
Medicaments. After its review of the authorities, the Court of Appeal opted to modify and 
rephrase the test for apparent bias as a question of ‘whether the relevant circumstances would 
lead a fair minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibilitythat the 
tribunal was biased’. Whilst Re Medicaments ushered back in the hypothetical, fair minded 
observer (thereby breaking the First Arm of Gough), the Court of Appeal only modified Lord 
Goff’s ‘danger’ to ‘possibility’.  As was noted in Chapter 2, the Second Arm of  Gough
survived Porter v Magill. 
In Porter v Magill the House of Lords approved the Re Medicaments test for apparent bias, 
thereby ending the jurisprudential life of the  First Arm of  Gough and the ‘real danger’ 
expression of its Second Arm
9. In England, bias challenges to arbitrators are now tested 
against Porter v Magill. In Chapter 2 it was observed that versions of the ‘real danger’ test 
have been applied to arbitrators in a number of decisions since 1993
10, the most notable of 
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which are Saudi Cable
11 and  Rustal Trading  (both applying  Gough)
12, and Norbrook 
Laboratories
13 and ASM Shipping (both applying Porter v Magill)
14.
3. Approaches to Bias in the Asia Pacific 
This chapter has a limited geo-jurisdictional scope: it covers only those states of the Asia 
Pacific of the Common Law family that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law – writer 
will refer to these countries as ‘Anglo-Model Law’. For this reason, it does not deal with 
other Common Law states in the region, such as Brunei (where Porter v Magill prevails)
15, 
which have not made arbitration laws on the UNCITRAL template. The geographic scope of 
this chapter also excludes South Africa, which, like Australia, has kept the Sussex Justices
test
16. The writer’s intention in the chapter is two-fold: first, to shows that the law of bias is 
an example of undesirable variation within Model Law seats (ie. challenge provisions of 
uniform  lex arbitri informed by non-uniform Common Law rules of apparent bias), and 
second, to frame the argument for the ‘real danger’ test made in Chapter 8.  
At this point, it is worth outlining the key features of the Model Law vis-à-vis challenges to 
arbitrators:
Article 4: Waiver of Right to Object - the effect of this Article is that, if it comes to the 
attention of a party that a mandatory provision of the Model Law (such as Article 18 –
Equal Treatment) has not been complied with, then that party must state their objection or 
they will be deemed to have waived their right to object. In the context of this thesis, 
Article 4 will operate to bar a party from challenging an arbitrator where they become 
aware of circumstances that justify doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence, but fail to speak up. 
Article 11: Appointment of Arbitrators - when a state adopts the Model Law, it must 
designate a court or other authority in its enactment of Article 6 to perform the role of 
appointing authority under Article 11. Most Model Law states designate a tier of their 
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courts, but some (such as Singapore and Hong Kong) designate arbitration institutions to 
perform this function (in these examples, SIAC and HKIAC respectively). Either way, 
when the default appointment process is activated, the challenge provisions of the Model 
Law (Articles 12 and 13) apply telle quelle, and the parties may challenge the default 
appointees as they would challenge party-appointees or sole arbitrators.
Article 12: Grounds for Challenge - when an arbitrator is appointed, he or she must 
disclose and matters likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or 
independence. This disclosure obligation is ongoing, meaning if things come up during 
the proceedings, the arbitrator must promptly give fresh disclosure to the parties. Once 
disclosure is given, the arbitrator can only be challenged for new matters, or old matters 
which were not disclosed (or matters of which the challenger was legitimately unaware 
when they agreed to the arbitrator). This rule draws on the waiver provision at Article 4. 
Additionally, the arbitrator may also be challenged if they are not qualified to decide the 
dispute.  
Article 13: Challenge Procedure - party autonomy extends to the challenge process, 
subject to the ‘within thirty days’ right of the parties to seek final review of the challenge 
decision by the court or other authority specified in Article 6 (which is the same court or 
authority that exercises the default appointment function in Article 11). The parties can, 
for example, contract in and out of time limits for the challenge; agree who will decide 
the challenge (especially important in ad hoc proceedings in Model Law states); and how 
the submissions will be made (oral, written, or both). In this thesis, the writer will say that 
this autonomy extends to the ‘Gough Clause’ – the parties may exercise their right to 
procedural freedom at Model Law Article 13(1) and contract into a higher ‘real danger’ 
test for bias. 
Article 18: Equal Treatment of Parties - the parties must be treated equally in the 
arbitration, and audi alterem partem must be respected throughout the proceeding: if the 
parties are not treated equally, or one party is not given the opportunity to fully ventilate 
its case, then the aggrieved party will be entitled to have the award set aside under Article 
34. Actual bias necessarily constitutes unequal treatment; the mere appearance of bias is 
not unequal treatment, but will be actionable in the form of an Article 12 ‘justifiable 
doubts’ challenge. As was observed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Noble China, the 186
equal treatment provision of the Model Law is mandatory and non-derogable, meaning it 
will stand no matter what arrangement is made to the contrary
17. 
Article 34: Set Aside the Award – either party may apply for the award to be set aside 
where there is actual or apparent bias on the part of an arbitrator. The exclusive grounds 
upon which the application may be made are itemised at Article 34(2)(a); apparent bias 
may constitute an actionable compositional irregularity under Article 34(2)(a)(iv) – this 
was the plea in the Hong Kong case of Logy Enterprises, for example
18. In addition (or 
the alternative), the court may sua sponte set the award aside on the basis of objective 
(subject matter) non-arbitrability, or offence to public policy. As has been observed, the 
recognition and enforcement of an award rendered by a biased arbitrator is against 
procedural public policy in all Model Law states, and will attract a writ of vacatur.  
It is worth making a final prefacing remark on precedent: in Anglo-Model Law states, the 
decisions of other Anglo-Model Law states are often treated as persuasive, but generally not 
binding. A decision of the Australian Federal Court on Article 12 of the Model Law would, 
for example, carry persuasive weight in a challenge application to a Singapore court. This is 
because the wording of the two acts (being, in this example, the Australian International 
Arbitration Act 1974 and the Singapore International Arbitration Act 2002) is the same; if the 
facts of the two challenges were the same (or very similar), then the Australian decision 
would be treated as highly persuasive by the Singapore court. The affect of this regional 
judicial inter-relation is that all of the decisions surveyed in this chapter form part of a single, 
broad body of jurisprudence. The key point of this chapter is that, although they may (and, in 
the writer’s opinion should) follow one another, they are not: the Anglo-Model Law seats of 
the Asia Pacific have gone their own way on the test for arbitrator bias. 
3.1 AUSTRALIA
Australia received the English laws and customs of procedural fairness in the period 1788 to 
1988
19. The High Court of Australia has interpreted the ‘judicial power’ in Chapter III of the 
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Constitution of Australia (1901) as operating to guarantee impartiality and the appearance of 
impartiality throughout the Australian court system
20. The Australian judicial system was 
severed from England by the passage of the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth). The rule of automatic 
disqualification for pecuniary interest laid down in Dimes is part of Australian law. It seems 
to remain in its ‘original’ form, free standing and separate from the principles of apparent 
bias.  Both the Sussex Justices and  Gough  streams entered Australian law. Although 
something like a ‘real danger’
21 was accepted for a time after the dicta ofthe High Court in R 
v Stevedoring Industry Board
22 Australian courts have generally preferred the rules laid down 
in Sussex Justices. Australian courts have demonstrated a good deal of pragmatism in their 
application of the Sussex Justices standard which is, it has been held, ‘to be observed in the 
real world of litigation’
23. 
In Webb v The Queen, the High Court of Australia had occasion to consider the then-recent 
House of Lords decision in Gough. The High Court departed from Melbourne Stevedoring
and held that the test for apparent bias in Australia is ‘whether a fair minded lay observer 
might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution 
of the question the judge is required to decide’
24. It is implicit in this ruling that the Court 
also rejected the Gough approach to review ‘through the eyes of the court’
25. The High Court 
of Australia’s view reflects the primacy of Lord Hewart’s dictum in Sussex Justices that 
‘justice must be done and be seen to be done’
26, and the policy of promoting and preserving 
public confidence in the administration of justice. In Johnson the High Court confirmed the 
applicability of the ‘reasonable apprehension’ standard laid down in Sussex Justices (and the 
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absence of the ‘real danger’ test) to matters of apparent bias under Australian law
27. Canadian 
courts have also rejected Gough
28. 
As in England, Australian law does not distinguish between judges and arbitrators in the 
standard of impartiality that is required. In arbitration as in litigation before a court, the 
principles of natural justice require that any interest that is more than de minimis must be 
disclosed. Failure to do so will expose any subsequent award to vacatur by the competent 
courts of the seat. In terms of standards, arbitrators are subject to the ‘reasonable 
apprehension’ test enunciated by the High Court in Watson and Webb. This was confirmed by 
the Victorian Court of Appeal in Gascor
29 where the court stated that the test for whether an 
arbitrator was biased was that of the reasonable apprehension of a fair minded lay observer 
with knowledge of the material facts
30. In Gascor, the arbitrator had decided technical issues 
in favour of the sellers in an earlier arbitration, and the buyer claimed that substantially the 
same technical issues were live in the dispute which gave rise to the challenge; the arbitrator 
had also been counsel in an earlier matter (which also involved an on-shore gas terminal) in 
which he had criticised expert witnesses which the buyer intended to call. The Victorian 
Court of Appeal refused to remove the arbitrator, and dismissed the appeal.   
Australian arbitration law is dualist – the Uniform Commercial Arbitration Acts of the 
states
31 govern domestic arbitral proceedings, and the International Arbitration Act 1974
(Cth)
32 governs international commercial arbitrations in which Australian law is lex arbitri
33. 
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apprehension is to be established to the court’s satisfaction: it is a reasonable and not a fanciful or fantastic 
apprehension that is to be established…’(see paragraph 342 of the judgment of Tadgell JA). 
31 1984-5
32 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘IAA’ or the ‘Australian Act’
33 The IAA also covers enforcement and recognition of foreign arbitral awards.189
The state Acts define ‘misconduct’ as including partiality and bias
34, and allow supervising 
courts to remove
35 arbitrators and set aside their awards
36 where misconduct has occurred. As 
an UNCITRAL Model Law statute
37 the IAA incorporates the Article 12 rules for the 
impartiality and independence of arbitrators. The effect of this incorporation of Article 12 is 
that, in contrast to the state arbitration laws which do not create express disclosure 
obligations for arbitrators, the Federal Act requires disclosure of circumstances that are likely 
to give rise to ‘justifiable doubts’
38. Bias will also render foreign arbitral awards 
unenforceable - section 19(b) of the IAA defines the expression ‘public policy’ as used in 
Model Law Articles 34 and 36 as including the observance of the principles of natural justice. 
Australian institutional rules tend to employ UNCITRAL standards for appointment, 
disqualification and removal
39. 
When a challenge is brought under the International Arbitration Act, it is clear that Australian 
courts read the ‘justifiable doubts’ ground at Article 12(2) of the Model Law in a manner 
consistent with the Sussex Justices standard. This is because the requirement of impartiality 
and independence is a monist aspect of Australian arbitration law. The standards of 
procedural fairness in domestic and international arbitration are those laid down by Article 
12. In Gascor the Victorian Supreme Court held that bias is approached the same way 
whether the dispute is international or domestic
40. Binding the court in Gascor was the case 
of Gas and Fuel Corporation, where the Supreme Court of Victoria followed Lord Hewart 
CJ, and held that a reasonable suspicion of bias will be made out where the party or a 
member of the public would reasonably consider the arbitrator did not or would not decide 
the dispute in a fair and unprejudiced manner
41. The ratio in Gascor is the leading statement 
of law in Australia. In 1995 the Supreme Court of Western Australia applied it to remove an 
arbitrator who failed to disclose that he had run a short course on construction contracts for 
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35 Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) s.44(a) 
36 Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) s.42(2) 
37 The UNCITRAL Model Law forms Schedule 2 to the IAA. 
38 Section 21 of the IAA allows the parties to contract out of the Model Law; see American Diagnostica Inc v 
Gradipore (1998) 44 NSWLR 312. If the parties to an international arbitration contract out of the Model Law 
the lower disclosure obligations created by the relevant state Act will apply to their arbitrators. 
39 See the arbitration rules of ACICA, IAMA, AMTAC, WAIDM et al
40 Gascor v Ellicott [1997] 1 VR 332
41 Gas and Fuel Corporation of Victoria v Wood Hall Ltd & Leonard Pipeline Contractors Ltd [1978] VR 385190
one of the parties: Giustiniano Nominees
42. By their approval of Gascor, state courts continue 
to follow Sussex Justices. 
Sea Containers (2002)
This case involved an application for removal of an arbitrator under s.44 of the New South 
Wales Commercial Arbitration Act (1985). The underlying dispute related to a shipbuilding 
contract. The arbitrators (a retired judge and a barrister) in this case required that the parties 
commit to the payment of a cancellation fee to account for the prospect of their dispute not 
proceeding to a hearing
43. At a preliminary conference the Plaintiff’s solicitors refused to 
agree to cancellation fees, arguing that payment and security had not previously been 
required and that there were no grounds for their demanding a commitment to a cancellation 
fee. The Defendant agreed to the arrangements proposed by the arbitrators, including the 
cancellation fee. After a series of verbal and written exchanges between the panel and the 
solicitors for the Plaintiff the proceedings continued. Before the merits hearing commenced 
the Plaintiff applied to the court for removal of all three arbitrators, pleading an apprehension 
of bias arising out of the discussions over fees. 
The matter came on before Justice Gzell of the New South Wales Supreme Court. Gzell J 
prefaced his decision by confirming the force of the Sussex Justices test as applied in Gascor 
and Johnson
44. His Honour was careful to acknowledge that the authorities did not point to an 
inflexible principle as to when a cancellation fee can be demanded, noting that ‘what 
constitutes misconduct of apprehended bias will depend upon the facts in each case’
45. The 
test applied was that in Johnson: ‘whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably 
apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution 
of the question the judge is required to decide’
46. Mr Clifford, the Managing Director of the 
Plaintiff – who was present at the directions hearing - filed affidavits attesting to his personal 
apprehension of bias. Although Gzell J noted that Mr Clifford’s evidence was not 
determinative, His Honour found that it was consistent with an objective evaluation of the 
events
47. Gzell J held that ‘each of the arbitrators misused his position in applying pressure to 
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43 Sea Containers at 78
44 Sea Containers Ltd at para 27
45 Sea Containers at para 32
46 Sea Containers at para 27
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the parties to agree to a cancellation fee and that constituted misconduct in terms of s.44(a) of 
the [New South Wales] Act’
48. All three arbitrators were removed.
Du Toit (1993)
Another instance of the reasonable apprehension test being applied in a domestic arbitration 
context is Du Toit v Vale & Ors
49. Du Toit involved an application for vacatur based on 
technical misconduct by failure to disclose prior association with a party. The alleged 
misconduct lay in the arbitrator’s failure to disclose the fact that he had sat as a member of a 
building industry disciplinary tribunal that had suspended the building license of the 
defendant builder four years earlier. The defendant builder (as applicant for vacatur) gave 
evidence that, although he recognised the arbitrator as a member of the Builder’s Registration 
Board (and alluded to this when he spoke to the arbitrator after the preliminary conference) it 
was only after the award was made and inquiries were conducted that he realised that the 
arbitrator was a member of the Builder’s Registration Board that suspended him. In contrast, 
the arbitrator – who took the ‘unusual step’ of appearing as a Respondent in the proceedings 
for vacatur – admitted that he recognised the defendant builder at the preliminary conference. 
The arbitrator’s ‘defence’ was implied waiver: as a result of their having a short conversation 
in which the builder asked if the arbitrator was still a member of the Registration Board,  the 
arbitrator wrongly assumed the builder was fully aware and had consented to the arbitrator 
acting. 
Scott J found that the arbitrator was under an obligation to disclose his prior knowledge of the 
defendant builder, and that by not doing so he was guilty of technical misconduct under 
s.42(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1985 (WA). Key to this finding was the fact that 
the builder was not aware that the arbitrator was actually a member of the panel that 
suspended his license at the time he spoke to him. The builder could not waive his right to 
object because he was not fully aware of the circumstances of his previous association with 
the decision maker. Scott J held (at 156) that
the award made by the arbitrator in this case should be set aside because an impartial 
observer with knowledge of the facts in all the circumstances of this case, would, in 
my view, undoubtedly entertain a reasonable apprehension that the arbitrator might 
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not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the questions 
involved in this case
Du Toit was decided by applying the formulation of Sussex Justices that was used by the 
High Court of Australia in Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association
50. 
Livesey (1983)
Livesey is best known as authority for the proposition that the reasonable apprehension of 
bias is to be applied through the eyes of a ‘fair minded observer’, and indeed it is from this
rule that the judgment’s general value is derived. But in the context of this chapter the 
decision is of special significance. Livesey was an appeal on what the writer has termed 
‘professional familiarity’ prejudgment bias. Two of the appeal court judges who heard 
Livesey’s appeal had earlier sat in an appeal against a Barrister’s Admission Board decision 
in which his witness Ms Bacon had been denied admission to the Bar on the basis that she 
lacked good character
51. Despite the issue being raised, neither judge disqualified themselves. 
The High Court upheld the appeal. 
There is obiter in Livesey which suggests that the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test may not be 
an absolute rule. In upholding the appeal the High Court held:
where it is not suggested that there is any overriding consideration of necessity, 
special circumstances or consent of the parties, a fair-minded observer might 
entertain a reasonable apprehension of bias by reason of prejudgment if a judge sits to 
hear a case at first instance after he has, in a previous case, expressed clear views 
either about a question of fact which constitutes a live and significant issue in the 
subsequent case or about the credit of a witness whose evidence is of significance on 
such a question of fact [emphasis added]
52
There is some strength to the proposition that where it is not suggested that there are special 
circumstances of consent, Sussex Justices will apply. Livesey therefore leaves open the 
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application of a lower standard (such as Gough) where ‘special circumstances’ exist. It is 
submitted that arbitral proceedings constitute special circumstances. 
Pindan v Uniseal (2003)
But case law shows that notwithstanding the obiter in  Livesey it will be a ‘reasonable 
apprehension’ that will be conclusive in bias challenges brought in arbitral proceedings. No 
higher standard will be applied by an Australian court. This is evident from Pindan Pty Ltd v 
Uniseal Pty Ltd. In Pindan the Supreme Court of Western Australia applied Sussex Justices
to an application for  vacatur based on an apprehension of bias arising from party 
communications with an arbitrator. During the course of the proceedings Uniseal wrote to the 
arbitrator to explain why it was having trouble paying his fees. In his written reply the 
arbitrator said that he ‘sincerely sympathise[d]’ with Uniseal’s cash position. Pindan applied 
for vacatur and removal of the arbitrator (whose award on quantum was pending). 
The Court held that communication between the arbitrator and counsel for Uniseal did not 
give rise to an actionable apprehension of bias
53. Pindan also argued prejudgment bias caused 
by the exposure of the arbitrator to communications in which a ‘without prejudice’ offer of 
settlement was made by Uniseal
54. Although his office received it, the arbitrator never read 
the letter, and ordered it to be destroyed. Subsequent correspondence with the parties referred 
to an unsuccessful attempt to settle. McKechnie J held that, in the circumstances, an 
apprehension of bias was not caused by the arbitrator’s knowledge of the fact of the offer 
being made and rejected
55. His Honour was careful to acknowledge that the letter offering 
settlement ‘would have inevitably raised a reasonable apprehension of bias had the 
arbitrator seen it and in that event I would have no hesitation in acting [to set aside and 
remove the arbitrator]’. His Honour went on in obiter (at 15) to stress that ‘this finding is not 
intended to extend to facts in other cases’.
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Substantive knowledge of an unsuccessful offer of settlement may give rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias, but the arbitrator must (it seems) have read the communication in 
which the offer was made. Mere knowledge of the fact that an offer was made will not be 
enough. In reaching conclusions McKechnie J approved Gascor; Pindan was later followed 
in Ace Constructions. The reasonable apprehension standard was also applied to arbitrators in 
Aussie Airlines
56 and Cook International
57. 
3.2 HONG KONG
Like Australia, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People’s 
Republic of China is an UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdiction
58. The lex arbitri ofHong Kong 
is the Arbitration Ordinance (HKAO)
59, together with those rules of Common Law that have 
remained in force after (or have been adopted since) the return of Hong Kong to the PRC in 
1997. As shall be observed, Hong Kong retains a strong jurisprudential link with the Crown
Courts. This is confirmed by the fact that Hong Kong courts have followed Gough. 
Because of its status as a ‘seat within a seat’ Hong Kong law requires closer attention than 
the other seats in this study. The HKAO is a dualist arbitration law – there are separate 
regimes for international and non-international arbitrations. International arbitrations are 
governed by the Model Law as adopted by the HKAO. The domestic regime is based upon 
English law, including the English Arbitration Act 1996. Hong Kong is an important seat for 
ICA. The seat has a well developed institutional framework as a result. The Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) is the leading arbitral institution. The HKIAC 
Domestic Arbitration Rules (1993) are regularly used for local disputes. Article 3.2 of the 
Hong Kong Domestic Arbitration Rules requires that an arbitrator must be both impartial and 
independent. There is a relatively high degree of inter-operability between the HKIAC 
domestic rules and the Arbitration Ordinance. The HKIAC is, for example, the appointing 
authorityunder Model Law Plus s.12 of the HKAO. The same function is delegated the SIAC 
under Singapore’s Model Law Plus arbitration act.  
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HKAO Section 2GA identifies the general responsibilities of the tribunal in the conduct of 
arbitration proceedings. Subsection (1)(a) requires inter alia the tribunal ‘to act fairly and 
impartially as between the parties’. This requirement is mandatory and cannot be excluded 
by contract
60. Section 40E is specific to Mainland Awards
61, setting out exhaustively the 
grounds upon which enforcement of a Mainland PRC award may be refused. Section 
40E(2)(e) provides that Hong Kong courts may refuse to enforce a Mainland Award arbitral 
award where the composition of the tribunal, or the procedure it followed, was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties or the law of the PRC. Sub-section (3) listed 
offence to public policy as a ground for refusal to enforce a Mainland Award. Section 
44(2)(e) is the non-specific equivalent of section 40E(2)(e) – refusal is open where tribunal 
composition or arbitral procedure were not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or 
‘the law of the country where the arbitration took place’
62. As has been noted in Chapter 1, 
public policy is an additional ground for refusal to enforce an award rendered in a New York 
Convention state
63. The public policy of the HKSAR will be offended where fundamental 
principles of procedural fairness are not observed. The principle of conflict of interest is 
within the public policy of Hong Kong
64. 
HKAO Section 26(1) deals with applications for the removal of named arbitrators. HKAO 
s.26(1) provides 
Where an agreement between any parties provides that disputes which may arise in 
the future between them shall be referred to an arbitrator named or designated in the 
agreement, and after a dispute has arisen any party applies, on the ground that the 
arbitrator so named or designated is not or may not be impartial, for leave to revoke 
the authority of the arbitrator or for an injunction to restrain any other party or the 
arbitrator from proceeding with the arbitration, it shall not be a ground for refusing 
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available at http://www.hkiac.com.hk/HKIAC/pdf/Rules/e_revised_guide.pdf
61 Mainland Awards are defined by s.2 of the HKAO as meaning arbitral awards rendered inside the territory of 
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64See for example the comments made in obiter by Liu JA in Logy Enterprises Ltd v Haikou City Bonded Area 
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the application that the said party at the time when he made the agreement knew, or 
ought to have known, that the arbitrator, by reason of his relation towards any other 
party to the agreement or of his connection with the subject referred, might not be 
capable of impartiality [emphasis added] 
The effect of this provision is to limit the availability of implied waiver/collateral estoppel 
arguments against the challenge. It is consistent with the interpretation of the ‘equal 
treatment’ provision (Article 18) of the Model Law as mandatory and non-waivable. This in 
turn suggests that Hong Kong law ranks procedural fairness above Party Autonomy in ICA. 
The strength of this reading is, however, weakened by the fact that Hong Kong courts are 
generally resistant to applications based on arbitrator bias.
Hong Kong courts have followed Gough and displayed a preference for the ‘real danger’ test 
for apparent bias. The Revised Commentary on the HKIAC Domestic Arbitration Rules 
confirms this, referring explicitly to Gough in its discussion of the Article 3 requirement of 
impartiality and independence
65. The same standard is applicable in international arbitral
proceedings. In Logy Enterprises Ltd
66 the Hong Kong Court of Appeal followed Gough, and 
subsequent decisions of the Court of Final Appeal have followed the Porter v Magill
formulation of Gough’s ‘real danger’ test
67. 
Logy Enterprises (1997)
Logy Enterprises involved an appeal against the concurring lower court decisions of Leonard 
and Sears JJ to grant leave to enforce an arbitral award handed down by a three member 
tribunal convened under the China International  Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC) Arbitration Rules (1994). The matter began as a claim by Haikou 
against Logy for damages for short shipment of steel wire rods. Pursuant to the CIETAC 
Rules each party nominated an arbitrator from the CIETAC list. CIETAC appointed the 
chairman. Haikou’s nominee was unable to act. At the direction of Haikou CIETAC 
appointed a replacement. CIETAC rules arbitration took place in Beijing on 5 December 
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1994. On 24 March 1995 the tribunal found for Haikou, ordering that Logy pay damages. 
Logy failed to pay and Haikou commenced enforcement proceedings in Hong Kong. Leonard 
J granted leave to enforce the CIETAC award. Logy applied to set aside the order made by 
Leonard J.
Logy argued that the composition of the tribunal was not in accordance with the law of the 
seat (the PRC), and that Hong Kong courts should refuse enforcement under HKAO 
s.44(2)(e). The facts led in support of Logy’s application were that the replacement arbitrator 
appointed by CIETAC was a Director of the Inspection Technology Section of the Import and 
Export Commodity Inspection Bureau (CCIB). A certificate issued by the Haikou branch of 
this Chinese government agency was an exhibit in the hearing. Logy pointed out that Article 
2 of the CIETAC rules provided that CIETAC should act independently and impartially in 
resolving disputes’, and that Article 53 of the CIETAC rules states that a CIETAC tribunal 
shall independently and impartially make its award in accordance with the principle of 
fairness and reasonableness’
68. Logy argued that the replacement arbitrator’s position in the 
CCIB, coupled with the fact of the CCIB-rendered certificate being material to the conclusion 
reached by the tribunal, gave rise to bias or a conflict of interest. Logy argued that the 
enforcement of an award vitiated by bias would be contrary to the public policy of the PRC 
and Hong Kong. 
Sears J refused to set aside the order granting leave made by Leonard J. His Honour was 
motivated by the fact that the replacement arbitrator’s role at the CCIB was limited to the 
inspection of import and export commodities related to safety, hygiene and environmental 
protection. Following Gough Sears J found no real danger that the replacement arbitrator was 
biased, and that as a result the application must fail. Logy went to the Hong Kong Court of 
Appeal. Central to the case of the Appellant was that the tribunal had made blatant and 
irrational errors which could only be explained by bias. Counsel for Logy put it that the 
tribunal had failed to take into account certain items of evidence, and had failed to address 
that part of Logy’s defence which relied upon the price clause of the agreement. The strength 
of the Appellant’s inference of bias required some determination of the strength of these 
allegedly neglected aspects of the Appellant’s case. The Appellant was, therefore, effectively 
asking for de facto merits review of the award. The HKAO strictly limits the power of the 
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court to do this. Liu JA noted at 486 that ‘we are unable to infer bias or risk of bias from 
circumstances which we are not free to unravel’.
Liu JA held the Appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proving that the composition 
of the tribunal was against PRC law, or that there was a real danger of bias on the part of the 
replacement arbitrator. The arbitrator’s position in the CCIB did not give rise to any real 
danger of bias. Accordingly, His Honour dismissed the appeal. Nazareth VP agreed, finding 
that no breach of the CIETAC rules had been shown to have occurred. His Honour expressed 
the view that the ‘tenuous interest’ of the replacement arbitrator in verifying the CCIB 
inspection certificate was ‘anything like a personal interest’
69. Bokhary JA agreed with Liu 
JA, finding that there was on the evidence presented no real danger of bias, and no resulting 
offence to the public policy of the PRC or Hong Kong. In his averments to the rules chosen 
by the parties Bokhary JA commented in obiter that
Article 28 of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules, which in effect disqualifies any 
arbitrator who has a personal interest in the case, is in harmony with the Common 
Law rules (declared in R v Gough) that any real danger of bias on the part of an 
arbitrator disqualifies him’ [citation omitted] 
70
CIETAC Article 28 provides for removal where a party has ‘justified reasons to suspect [an 
arbitrator’s] impartiality and independence’. It is clear from the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal that Gough is law in Hong Kong. The truly separate position of the Rule in Dimes is 
also recognised in Hong Kong
71. As Bokhary JA observed Dimes and Gough are different 
grounds of attack; personal interest being founded upon the Rule in Dimes and a real danger 
of bias being founded on the stricter reading of the rule of apparent bias laid down in 
Gough
72. 
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China Harbour (2007)
China Harbour is the most recent instance of arbitrator bias being pleaded in a Hong Kong 
court. In China Harbour the Hong Kong Court of Appeal confirmed the Porter v Magill
73
expression of the Gough test
74. China Harbour involved an application for vacatur based on 
apparent bias. The facts were that, some six years before the award was handed down, the 
arbitrator (a barrister) had advised the applicant on the matter. At the arbitral hearing the 
arbitrator and his former client had not recognised one another, although the arbitrator had 
asked the applicant whether he looked familiar to him. The applicant’s reply was in the 
negative and the hearing was conducted. A final award was handed down on 17 January 
2005. The applicant was the judgment debtor. When he realised his former association with 
the arbitrator he applied to have the award against him set aside on a number of grounds, 
including apparent bias. 
After repeated dismissal the applicant ended up at cassation. The Court of Final Appeal 
dismissed the matter
75. The Court held that the arbitrator was not obliged to check his files 
from six years earlier, and that he was entitled to assume that both parties considered him 
suitable to act. Chief Justice Li agreed with his brother in the lower Court of Appeal that the 
policy favouring the finality of arbitration required dismissal of the applicant’s claim
76.
3.3 SINGAPORE
Singaporean arbitration law is Model Law dualist. Domestic arbitral proceedings are 
governed by the Arbitration Act 2001. International proceedings fall under the International 
Arbitration Act 2002
77 . The International Arbitration Act is a Model Law statute
78. The 
statutory provisions concerning the impartiality and independence of arbitrators are the same 
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as in the other Model Law states surveyed above. The leading Singaporean decision on 
challenge for apparent bias is Turner (East Asia). 
Turner (East Asia) (1988)
The challenge in Turner arose out of a construction dispute. The arbitration clause in the sub-
contract between the parties provided for a sole arbitrator with Singapore law as lex arbitri
and lex contractus. The parties could not agree and, on the Respondent’s vide originating 
summons the court appointed a Mr Smith on 9 April 1987.  Turner’s solicitors raised a 
question of whether the arbitration was a domestic arbitration for the purpose of Singaporean 
law. Turner’s solicitors also raised an issue relating to the application of the Singapore Legal 
Profession Act. In correspondence between the arbitrator and the solicitors for Turner the 
arbitrator used language that was ‘sarcastic, to the point of being hostile’
79 to express his 
opinion that these questions were posed as dilatory tactics. Turner applied for removal of 
Arbitrator Smith under section 17(1) of the Singapore Arbitration Act, alleging misconduct. 
The challenge was heard by Chao Hick Tin JC of the Supreme Court of Singapore. After 
noting the ‘conflict in authorities’
80 His Honour applied the Sussex Justices ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ test. In his review of the divergent Commonwealth authorities Chao Hick Tin JC 
cited with approval the decision of Ackner LJ in R v Liverpool City Justices
81. Following 
Liverpool City Justices the test was applied as a question of whether ‘a reasonable and fair 
minded person sitting in court and knowing all the relevant facts [would] have a reasonable 
suspicion that a fair trial for the applicant was not possible’
82. 
It is important to note that Turner pre-dates Singapore’s adoption of the Model Law and 
would not be binding upon a Singaporean court considering a challenge under the current 
Arbitration Acts. It may be that in such a situation today the Singapore court would apply 
Porter v Magill. In Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew the Singapore Court of Appeal used a 
‘real danger’ test
83. But more recently in Re Shankar the Court of Appeal stated that ‘it is 
settled law in Singapore having regard to several pronouncements of the Singapore Court of 
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Appeal that the “reasonable suspicion” test is the law of Singapore’
84. The obiter of Chao 
Hick Tin JC in Turner (rejecting the ‘real likelihood’ test propounded in Camborne Justices) 
supports this conclusion
85. The safest position is, therefore, that in light of Turner and Re 
Shankar Singapore courts can be expected to apply the  Sussex Justices reasonable 
apprehension test to bias challenges to arbitrators.  
3.4 MALAYSIA
Malaysia is a recent addition to the Model Law family of arbitral jurisdictions. Prior to the 
coming into force of the new Act the lex arbitri of Malaysia was the Arbitration Act 1952. In 
Kuala Ibai Development
86 the court found that bias was within the meaning of ‘misconduct’ 
as that term was used in the 1952 Act. This case remains the leading Malaysian authority on 
arbitrator bias. 
The Arbitration Act 2005
87 came into force on 15 January 2006. The Malaysian equivalent of 
Model Law Article 12 is section 14(3)(a), which provides that an arbitrator may be 
challenged if ‘the circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts as to that arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence’. Whilst there is no superior court authority for the proposition 
that an arbitrator is subject to the same standards of impartiality and independence as a state 
court judge, the writer has found nothing in Malaysian jurisprudence to suggest otherwise. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that Malaysia is now a Model Law state and the 
subjection of arbitrators and judges to the same standard would be in keeping with the 
jurisprudence of the wider community of Model Law states.
The question of what principle of national law will inform a Malaysian court in its reading of 
the challenge provisions of the 2005 Act is a difficult one to answer. Some ‘crystal ball 
gazing’ is required. This is because there are few Malaysian cases on arbitrator bias. A 
serious challenge is sub judice at present
88. However, the wider body of case law on natural 
justice suggests a ‘real danger’ test would be applied
89. In fact, much like their counterparts 
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in Zimbabwe, Malay courts have followed Gough quite strictly, and stand by it today. In 
Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor & Anor the Federal Court considered the various 
formulations of the  Gough test. Abdul Hamid Mohamad FCJ (with whom Shim CJ and 
Yaakob CJ agreed) held that Malaysian courts were bound to follow the ‘real danger’ test as 
result of the acceptance of Gough in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau
90, in which the Federal Court 
of Malaysia unanimously rejected the ‘real possibility’ revision of Gough laid down by the 
House of Lords in Porter v Magill
91. 
3.5 NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand’s Model Law statute was enacted in 1996. The New Zealand Arbitration Act
does not distinguish between domestic and international arbitration. As in the other states 
discussed in this chapter, under New Zealand law arbitrators are held to the same level of 
impartiality and independence as state court judges. The Rule in Dimes is treated as a 
separate principle of natural justice and has been applied to arbitrators and arbitral awards
92. 
In recent years there has been some variation in the New Zealand law of apparent bias. 
Although the Court of Appeal cited Gough with approval in Auckland Casino Ltd. v. Casino 
Control Authority
93, a revised test very close to Sussex Justices was used more recently in 
Erris Promotions Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue
94. New Zealand now appears to 
prefer the ‘real possibility’ test; the Court of Appeal approved Porter v Magill in Muir v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue
95. As a result, although there is no authority on point it is 
likely that, hearing an arbitrator bias challenge today, a New Zealand court would take a 
similar approach to that of the English Court of Appeal in ASM Shipping
96. 
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3.6 CANADA 
Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that every person has 
a right to trial before an independent and impartial tribunal
97.  Canada is a complex 
confederation of fourteen provinces and territories, all of which have Model Law arbitration 
Acts. With the exception of Quebec, all of the Canadian provinces and territories have dualist 
arbitration laws (ie. their state laws regulate domestic and international arbitrations 
differently). Whilst the Federal Arbitration Act is monist, applying the same procedural rules 
to international, interstate and purely domestic arbitrations, commentators have noticed that 
Canadian courts exhibit hidden dualism where procedural fairness is at issue
98. Canadian 
practitioners Drymer and Manevich commented recently
Formally there would appear to be little or no difference between the standards of 
impartiality and fairness imposed on domestic and international arbitrations in 
Canada. Nonetheless, the attitude of the courts in applying those standards has 
differed considerably as between the two contexts 
99
As a predominantly Common Law country, Canadian laws of natural justice have been 
shaped by developments in England. The Rule in Dimes has long been accepted by the 
superior courts of Canada, and although Canadian courts have approved Pinochet (No.2)
100
Canadian authority properly distinguishes between the apprehension of bias and the principle 
of judicial disqualification propounded by the House in Dimes
101. The Canadian test for bias 
is that stated by De Grandpre J in The Committee for Justice and Liberty v The National 
Energy Board: ‘the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by a reasonable and 
right minded person in the community in which the matter occurred, applying themselves to 
the question and obtaining thereon the required information’
102. Canadian courts did not 
follow Gough and have not followed Porter v Magill. Some provincial arbitration acts appear 
to codify the Sussex Justices test; sections 15 and 46 of the Ontario Arbitration Act provide 
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that an arbitrator may be removed by the court, or their award set aside, where there is a 
reasonable apprehension of bias or the arbitrator has failed to conduct the arbitration with 
equality and fairness
103.  
The ‘Model Law Plus’ monist Quebec Code of Civil Procedure provides that the arbitrator 
may be challenged if there is ‘reasonable cause to fear that the arbitrator will not be 
impartial’
104, or if the circumstances in which a judge may be challenged are shown to 
exist
105. Although not a Common Law seat, and thus technically outside the scope of this 
inquiry, Quebec deserves special attention in this chapter because its arbitration law allows 
the parties to contract out of the challenge procedure outlined in Model Law Article 13(1). In 
contrast to the enacting laws of other Model Law seats The Quebec Code of Civil Procedure 
does not list Model Law Article 13 as a provision from which the parties may not derogate
106. 
Other Canadian jurisdictions have shown themselves to be tolerant to waiver. 
Noble China (1998)
In Noble China the award was rendered in Ontario. The award debtor applied for vacatur, 
alleging a breach of Ontario arbitration law equivalent of the Model Law Article 18 (Equal 
Treatment). The applicant also alleged racial bias on the part of the arbitrator. The arbitration 
agreement excluded state court review. The Court of Appeal was required to determine 
whether the parties’ waiver of the right to apply for vacatur under the Ontario Act equivalent 
of Model Law Article 34 was effective. The General Division of the Court of Appeal held:
Article 34 does not contain any of the familiar mandatory language. [The Applicant] 
argues that the requirement of a full opportunity to present one’s case and equality of 
treatment are mandatory provisions of the Model Law under Article 18 and that 
violation of them constitutes grounds for setting aside an award. I accept this. [The 
Applicant] further argues that since the parties may not derogate from those 
fundamental principles in an arbitration agreement, it necessarily follows that they 
may not derogate from the only means under the Model Law for enforcing those 
principles. I accept the first part of the decision, but I do not accept the 
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second…Excluding recourse to the courts to set aside an award is not contrary to 
Article 18 nor contrary to any other mandatory provision of the Model Law
107
Whilst the Ontario Court of Appeal did not rule on the allegation of bias in Noble China, the 
above obiter suggests that Ontario can be placed on the list of ‘maximum Party Autonomy’ 
states where full waiver of municipal court recourse is permitted. It has been observed that 
the lex arbitri of Belgium, Switzerland, Tunisia and Turkey also allow the parties to exclude 
Article 34
108. Food Servers of America suggests that British Columbia could also be added to 
this list. For reasons discussed above there may also be a case for the addition of Quebec
109.  
Szilard v Szasz (1955)
Although there is no Canadian authority for the application  of Sussex Justices in an 
international arbitration, there is ample domestic authority to support the probability of its 
application. The leading decision on arbitrator bias is Szilard v Szasz
110. The application was 
for disqualification of an arbitrator on the basis of his ongoing business association with a 
party. The material facts were that the arbitrator and his wife were joint tenants with the party 
on an investment property. The property was the subject of a joint mortgage. The Supreme 
Court of Canada applied the Sussex Justices test. In the leading judgment Justice Rand held 
that ‘arbitration must be untrammeled by such influences as to a fair minded person would 
raise a doubt of that impersonal attitude which each party is entitled to’
111. The Court found 
that, although there could be no inference of bias from the fact of joint tenancy alone, the 
‘probability or the reasoned suspicion of biased appraisal and judgment, unintended though it 
may be, defeats the adjudication at its threshold’
112. In Holland v. City of Vancouver Manson
J of the Supreme Court of British Columbia applied Sussex Justices to find for the existence 
of ‘prejudicial bias’ where the arbitrator had ignored the opinion of a state court
113. 
Decisions applying the Model Law and New York Convention show that, in the event of a 
post-award bias challenge or bias defence to enforcement, Canadian Courts would read the 
NYC Article V(2)(b) public policy exception narrowly consistent with the pro-arbitration 
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public policy of the New York Convention. In Quintette Coal the Court of Appeal of British 
Columbia cited with approval the pro-arbitration dicta of Justice Blackmun of the United 
States Supreme Court in Mitsubishi
114. The Quintette Coal decision has itself been approved 
by other provincial courts of appeal
115. Canadian commentators have suggested that this 
Mitsubishi persuasion would cause Canadian courts to reject any bias defence to enforcement 
that did not demonstrate a violation of the most fundamental Canadian notions of justice
116.  
4. Regional Conclusions
In apparent bias challenges to arbitrators Hong Kong courts apply the Porter v Magill
revision of the Gough ‘real danger’ test. A New Zealand court would likely do the same. 
Malaysian courts have approved Gough over  Porter v Magill, though there is as yet no 
binding precedent for the application of either test to an arbitrator.  Australian and 
Singaporean courts have rejected Gough and retained Sussex Justices. The writer has 
mentioned Canada and South Africa as examples of other Common Law states that have 
stayed with Sussex Justices. Despite the fact that, as fellow UNCITRAL Model Law states, 
Singapore and Australia have substantially the same laws for international arbitration as 
Hong Kong, Malaysia and New Zealand, they use the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test when an 
arbitrator is challenged for apparent bias. The Anglo-Model Law states of the Asia Pacific are 
not in harmony on the question of what test should be used to determined bias challenges to 
arbitrators. The law of bias is therefore an example of undesirable variation within Model 
Law seats: although all of the states surveyed in this chapter have arbitration statutes which 
are identical, and their decisions may carry persuasive weight, the Common Law that informs 
Model Law Article 12 is different seat-to-seat. Given that the stated objectives of the Model 
Law include the creation of a ‘unified legal framework’ for ICA, this disharmony is 
regrettable. 
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CHAPTER 6
Rules of Bias in the Lex Mercatoria
Commercial law may be truly declared in the language of Cicero…to be in a great measure, 
not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world
- Justice Story in Swift v Tyson (1842)
1
1. Introduction
Whilst more comfortably seated in the Positivist camp than amongst adherents to Natural 
Law Theory, the writer accepts that there is such a thing as customary trans-national 
commercial law or Lex mercatoria. This chapter will not enter into the debate over the 
legitimacy of lex mercatoria or the significance of its contributions to the law and practice of 
ICA, suffice to say that there is a growing body of state court authority for the proposition 
that an arbitral tribunal may legitimately apply ‘internationally accepted principles of law 
governing contractual relations’
2, especially where the applicable substantive national law 
does not provide clear guidance
3. The primary purpose of this chapter is not to debate the lex 
mercatoria but rather to search for a single rule within it. To that end, the writer will in this 
chapter attempt to answer two questions:
(1) Does the lex mercatoria include a rule against apparent bias?
(2) If it does which of the three tests (Sussex Justices, Porter v Magill or Gough) most 
closely corresponds with the lex mercatoria test for apparent bias?
   
1 41 US (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842)
2 Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v R’as al-Khaimah National Oil Co [1987] 3 WLR 1023; 
lex mercatoria falls within the scope of English Arbitration Act 1996 s.46(1)(a)
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The writer will begin by identifying the sources of lex mercatoria. The threshold question of 
whether lex mercatoria includes procedural rules will then be dealt with. The writer will 
show how a rule becomes a custom. The writer will then turn to the IBA Guidelines and show 
that there is growing acceptance of the IBA Rules and increasing interplay between them and 
municipal law. In order to distill from them a general approach to bias and show that they are 
lex mercatoria the writer will mimic the appendices to Berger’s seminal work The Creeping 
Codification of the lex mercatoria by marking up the waivable-Red, Orange and Green Lists 
of the IBA Guidelines with analogous state court decisions, provisions of municipal laws and 
institutional rules
4. The writer will reach the conclusion that although the Sussex Justices
elements are well represented in municipal and a-national sources, and the ‘reasonable 
apprehension’ test may on this basis have a good claim to lex mercatoria, the waivable-Red, 
Orange and Green Lists of the IBA Guidelines display tolerance for Party Familiarity that is 
much closer to the Second Arm of  Porter v Magill, and possibly even Gough, than the 
Second Arm of Sussex Justices. 
2. Procedural lex mercatoria  
The lex mercatoria is created by and for the participants in international trade
5. It is most 
commonly associated with substantive, rather than procedural law. Indeed, one of the current 
definitions of lex mercatoria is ‘non-national substantive rules’
6. Supporting this is the fact 
that the vast majority of the international instruments identified as sources of lex mercatoria
are substantive in nature. In his seminal contribution The Creeping Codification of the lex 
mercatoria (1999) Professor Berger identifies the sources of lex mercatoria as:
(1) International Uniform Law
7 (‘International sources’)
(2) Municipal Law (‘Municipal Sources’)
(3) Arbitral awards and case law from state courts (‘Jurisprudential Sources’)
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(4) Legal Doctrine
8 (‘Doctrinal Sources’)
There is undeniably a procedural dimension to the lex mercatoria. To a large extent it is 
overlooked by scholars of international commercial law. Its most basic manifestation is the 
methodical usage that, with the consent of the parties, an arbitrator may decide ex aequo et 
bono (or amiables compositeur), a customary rule that is often cited as the very basis for the 
availability of lex mercatoria
9. Other procedural rules of lex mercatoria include:
(i) Absent choice of law the law with the closest connection to the contract prevails (the 
‘Centre of Gravity Test’)
10
(ii) The lex causae may not be changed
11
(iii) Specialised laws prevail over general laws (lex specialis derogate legi generali)
12
(iv) Arbitral proceedings are not suspended if one of the parties goes bankrupt
13
(v) The burden of proof is on the Claimant or the party who advances a proposition 
affirmatively (actori incumbit probatio)
14
Most of the sources of lex mercatoria are silent on arbitration – neither the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 1994 (UPICC) nor the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) discuss arbitration 
or arbitrators. Article 6:106 (Determination by a Third Person) of the Principles of European 
Contract Law 1998 (PECL) provides for third party determination of prices or contractual 
terms but does not mention arbitration
15. Besides actual arbitration rules and laws (such as the 
Model Law, the UNCITRAL Rules and possibly the ICC Rules) the best source is probably 
the International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) Conditions of Contract for 
Construction 1987 (‘the Red Book’), which proscribes a two-tier dispute resolution procedure 
under the authority of a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB)
16 and ‘last-resort’ ICC Rules 
arbitration
17. In drafting the UPICC the UNIDROIT Working Group accepted the Red Book 
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as a source of trans-national commercial law
18. It is therefore arguable that the Red Book 
brings ICC disclosure rules into the lex mercatoria
19. Indeed, it may be that the ICC Rules 
were already there. Whether it is ICC-shaped or not, there is certainly a disclosure obligation 
under lex mercatoria. According to Yves Derains, former Secretary General of the ICC Court 
of Arbitration:    
The arbitrator must inform the parties of any factors that might lead one of them to 
challenge him. He has to examine his conscience, and ensure that he does not run the 
risk of misjudgment in view of links with the parties or with the case. This is a real 
international custom or usage
20
Alvarez and Donahey have expressed similar opinions
21. With this in mind, the writer would 
reverse engineer the disclosure custom, and say that equal treatment was lex mercatoria first: 
today, the requirement that the arbitrator treat the parties equally is so well represented in 
municipal arbitration laws and institutional rules as to qualify for trans-national customary 
legal status
22. As John Austin would have had it (if he had really believed in customary law) 
these obligations would be empty if they were not accompanied by a sanction of some kind. 
There must be a corresponding lex mercatoria rule which provides that an arbitrator may be 
challenged if they fail to disclose. The question is, therefore, not whether a challenge rule 
exists, but what its formulation would most likely be. Answering this question requires that 
the writer offer an explanation of how a practice becomes a customary rule.  
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3. Becoming a Rule of Customary Law
Lex mercatoria is a commercial, international species of customary law. A custom is a non-
binding prescription of how to act in a certain situation. Customs develop where people 
accept them and see them as necessary
23. They arise separate from posited laws and systems, 
in response to recurring states of affairs rather than coercive measures taken by the state. This 
is what Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek meant when he used the expression ‘spontaneous 
order’ (his ‘cosmos’). Cosmos is the order developed out of the non-coerced behaviour of the 
members of a group (who act in rational response to self motivated incentives). American 
Economic Legal theorist Francesco Parisi has said that customary laws are made up of two 
formative elements:
(a) Generality - a quantitative element (the actual existence of the norm as a social 
practice)
(b) Opinio Juris – a qualitative element (the acceptance of the practice as a 
prescription of necessary social behaviour)
For a norm to satisfy the first element, it must be general as a practice amongst members of a 
community. Generality does not mean universality – the norm may enjoy widespread but not 
total acceptance, and still qualify as a custom. And there is no minimum time limit applicable 
before a norm may qualify for consideration as a practice. Indeed, the complete lack of 
formalities and tangible objective sources is what separates customary law from posited law; 
there is no international constitution or Hart-type ‘Rule of Recognition’ that determines 
whether a custom passes the test for generality. As Hayek said, custom is cosmos, not taxis. If 
the spontaneous order of practices includes observation of a particular norm, then it will 
satisfy Parisi’s first formative element. 
The second formative element is qualitative: is the norm necessary? This is what is known in 
public customary international law as opinio juris ac necessitatis.  Opinio functions to 
distinguish between those customs that are behavioral regularities (non-essential patterns of 
human behaviour in a normative setting) and those that are internalised obligations (which 
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are enforceable customs). When a behavioural regularity is a response to a social rule that 
satisfies opinion (ie. it is perceived as an essential norm of social conduct) then it will be an 
enforceable custom.  
Some situations will be more conducive to the development of enforceable customs (ie. 
norms that satisfy Generality and Opinio). The more common it is for a set of facts to repeat 
itself, the more likely a custom is to develop about how people should behave when faced 
with it. The more common it is for people to ‘swap sides’, the more likely a norm is to enjoy 
Opinio - this is what is known as ‘Role Reversability’. Lon Fuller observed that game 
situations involving repeated role reversals facilitate the emergence and recognition of 
customary law: individuals who exchange roles in their social interactions have incentives to 
constrain their behaviour to socially optimal norms of conduct in consideration of reciprocal 
constrains undertaken by others. Game Theorists see similar things.  
4. Sourcing a Challenge Rule in the lex mercatoria
With Parisi’s formative elements in mind we may test the various possible sources to see 
which one has the highest claim to being the lex mercatoria formulation of the rule against 
bias. In the preceding Chapter we have seen that the arbitration laws of UNCITRAL Model 
Law states adopt the Article 12 wording in their challenge provisions; Article 12 of the 
Model Law provides that ‘An arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist that 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence’. Article 10(1) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules creates a very similar rule (as does General Standard 2 of the 
IBA Guidelines).  ICC Rules Article 11(1) confers the right to challenge an arbitrator 
‘whether for lack of independence or otherwise’. All forty-five Model Law states share this 
drafting
24, including states such as Germany, Austria, Hong Kong and Singapore whose 
significance as seats causes their state courts to produce a high volume of case law, with the 
result that the second Parisi element (Opinio Juris) is readily made out. This is important 
because the case law of state courts is a key source of lex mercatoria. 
The arbitration laws of many non-Model Law states adopt the Article 12 standard.  England 
is the leading example. The English Arbitration Act 1996 is not a Model Law statute, but its 
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drafting was heavily influenced by the UNCITRAL instrument
25. In Chapter 2 we saw that 
the English Act’s challenge provision is an imperfect adoption of Model Law Article 12, the 
difference being that the English section refers only to ‘impartiality’
26. Similarly, whilst 
Belgium is not a Model Law state, the challenge provision of the Judicial Code (Article 1690) 
closely resembles Model Law Article 12
27. Dutch courts use a ‘justifiable doubts’ test for 
impartiality and independence which draws on Article 12 of the Model Law and Strasbourg 
Jurisprudence
28.  In Chapter 4 the writer observed that the ICA laws of the United States –
another significant non-Model Law seat - have been harmonised with Model Law standards 
of bias and disclosure as a result of Supreme Court action in the mid 1980’s
29. 
The principal exceptions are France, Switzerland and Sweden, each of which approach bias 
challenges differently. French courts apply NCCP Article 341 and only require independence. 
A ‘legitimate doubts’ test for apparent bias prevails in Switzerland
30, the relevant source 
being SPIL Articles 180(1)(c) and 190(2) and the disqualification grounds for the judges 
under the new Federal Supreme Court Act. Swedish arbitration law is very strict on bias, 
listing circumstances where impartiality will be deemed lacking at Article 8 of the 1999 Act. 
France and Switzerland (and to a lesser extent Sweden) are leading seats, and their courts 
generate a great deal of arbitral case law. So although they are outnumbered by Model Law 
and ‘Article 12 states’, and therefore defeated on Generality, their unique challenge rules 
must be seen as legitimate competitors under Opinio Juris. 
Overall, however, Model Law Article 12 succeeds on both Opinio Juris and Generality. It 
must be seen as the leading candidate - it is so well represented in municipal laws of the 
leading seats as to qualify for lex mercatoria  on this basis alone. It is repeated in the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which are the most widely used rules for ad hoc proceedings, 
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and taken up by the IBA Guidelines. It is submitted, therefore, that there is a challenge rule in 
the lex mercatoria and that its wording is that of Model Law Article 12 (or UNCITRAL Rule 
10(1)). The next issue is what test for bias informs it – is it the Second Arm of Sussex 
Justices, Porter v Magill or Gough? In this thesis, the writer has shown that the Sussex 
Justices test is the most common test used by state courts to determine apparent bias in 
arbitrators. Although it competes with  Porter v Magill across the Common Law world, 
because Sussex Justices is part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence it would seem to carry the day on 
both Parisi’s formative elements and tronc common.  But the IBA Guidelines cast some doubt 
on this conclusion: although they refer to the First Arm of Sussex Justices (the vantage of ‘a 
reasonable and informed third party’), the situations which the Orange List identify as 
permissible suggest that a higher threshold may have been envisaged for the Second Arm; 
Finnish lawyer Matti Kurkela put it well when he said ‘the IBA Guidelines introduce “a 
Protestant” view of bringing common sense to the “orthodox hypocrisy” of being more papal 
than the Pope’
31. Because they make less instances of conflict of interest actionable, the 
Porter v Magill and Gough test must be seen as complimenting ‘IBA Protestantism’.      
5. Are the IBA Guidelines lex mercatoria?
As a ‘stateless’ body whose members include the most prominent practitioners of ICA, the 
International Bar Association is uniquely placed to provide guidance on conflicts of interest 
for arbitrators. To that end, in May 2004 it published a set of Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration. The Working Party that drafted the IBA Guidelines was 
made up of 19 members, representing 14 jurisdictions. The IBA published Rules of Ethics for 
International Arbitrators in 1987: because they are broader in scope the Rules of Ethics are 
not replaced by the 2004 Guidelines; they are superseded on to the extent that they cover the 
conflicts of interest
32. 
When the IBA Guidelines were drafted, it was hoped that they would be treated as persuasive 
authority by state courts and arbitral tribunals faced with conflicts of interest
33. For the most 
part, the IBA Guidelines have been well received by users of arbitration, those ‘users’ being 
firstly the parties; and secondly, arbitrators, arbitration institutions and state courts. That is 
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not to say, however, that they have enjoyed unanimous approval: one of the recurring 
objections to the IBA Guidelines is that their focus on ‘appearances’ has caused the practice 
of giving elaborate, American style  ‘life story’ disclosure to increase in ICA; another 
criticism is that the Guidelines favour the same subjective test for apparent bias the whole 
way through the arbitration, and do not distinguish between the different stages of the 
proceedings
34. Pierre Lalive was against detailed ethical codes which lack universality
35. The 
writer agrees with some of these criticisms, but would like to put them to one side for the 
minute. In this chapter, the writer is concerned with identifying which test the IBA 
Guidelines carry into the lex mercatoria. 
The model of ethical (rather than strictly legal) regulation of arbitrator conflicts of interest 
has developed out of necessity. In his 1998 study of the theory of arbitration, Oppetit 
remarked that, if the parties could not appoint arbitrators of their choice, then
In the absolute, remedies would lie either in arbitration before a single judge, or in 
generalizing appointment of arbitrators unconnected with the parties: the adoption of 
such heroic measures is still doubtless a long way off…hence the current preference is 
to insist on the role of ethics
36  
Codes of ethics have a pedagogical and preventative purpose
37. The IBA Guidelines are not 
legal provisions, and do not override national laws or rules chosen by the parties - they are 
prescriptions of ‘best practice’ for international arbitrators. As has been foreshadowed, the 
writer is of the opinion that the IBA Guidelines have a strong claim to being lex mercatoria. 
Parties use them, and it is increasingly common for state courts to refer to them in challenge 
proceedings. In her 2006 statement to the IBA Section on Business Law, JudithGill, Chair of 
the IBA Guidelines monitoring sub-committee, reported that the IBA Guidelines were in use 
in seven important jurisdictions in Western Europe and in the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Canada
38.  
   
34 Veeder, V.V., ‘L’independence et L’impartialite de l’arbitre dans l’arbitrage international’, in Clay, T., 
Jeuland, E., (eds), Mediation et arbitrage (Litec 2005), p.219, English translation cited by Lord Steyn in 
‘England: The Independence and/or Impartiality of Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration’, ICC 
Bulletin 2007 (Special Supplement), p.96-7
35 Lalive, P., The Arbitral Process and the Independence of Arbitrators, ICC Publication 472 (ICC 1991), p. 119
36 Oppetit, N., Theorie de l’arbitrage (PUF 1998), p.33
37 Canivet, G., Joly-Hurard, J., La deontologie des magistrats (Dalloz 2004)  
38 De Witt Wijnen, O.L.O., ‘The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration Three 
Years On’, ICC Bulletin 2007 (Special Supplement), p.108216
The first time the IBA guidelines were cited by a national court was in the decision of the 
District Court of The Hague in Telekom Malaysia. Today, the record is well balanced 
amongst Civil Law and Common Law states. Regarding the former grouping, in Anders 
Jilkén v. Ericsson AB; Re Judge Lind the Swedish Supreme Court used the IBA Guidelines in 
conjunction with the Swedish Arbitration Act to rule for disqualification
39. The Brussels 
Court of Appeal used them in Eureko v Poland
40 (to dismiss the challenge), as did the Higher 
Regional Court of Central Frankfurt in X v Y
41 (challenge dismissed). Common Law courts 
have also made use of the Guidelines in challenge hearings. Bound by Porter v Magill, 
Justice Morison of the English Commercial Court considered the IBA Guidelines in ASM 
Shipping
42 (challenge upheld). The Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals relied in part on the 
IBA Guidelines in Positive Software
43, finding that the relevant circumstances were on the 
Green List (challenge dismissed). In AIMCOR  the Second US Circuit Court of Appeals 
measured the arbitrator’s non-disclosure in accordance with the IBA Guidelines (vacatur 
granted)
44. The IBA Guidelines also appear in the judgment of the Florida District Court in 
HSN Capital LLC (USA) & Ors v Productora y Commercializador de Television SA de CV 
(Mexico)
45, and were treated as persuasive by the Ninth US Court of Appeals in New Regency 
Productions Inc., v Nippon Herald Films, Inc
46.
The field in which the influence of the IBA Guidelines is strongest is certainly Investor-State 
Arbitration (ISA). The Guidelines play an important role when tribunals decide challenges in 
ad hoc and institutional ISA proceedings. As has been observed, the Green List was 
considered by the District Court of The Hague in Telekom Malaysia
47 (challenge upheld). 
Similarly, the IBA Guidelines were used by the LCIA panel in the challenge to Arbitrator 
Kessler in National Grid PLC v Argentina
48 (challenge dismissed). ICSID jurisprudence 
displays an increasing acceptance of the IBA Guidelines. There are a number of examples: in 
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49 the remaining 
members of the ICSID tribunal relied upon IBA Standard 7(c) to dismiss the challenge; in 
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda dd v Slovenia
50 the ICSID panel used the IBA Guidelines to deal 
with an unprecedented objection to the participation of David Mildon QC as counsel for the 
Respondent (objection upheld). 
Although there are instances of sua sponte reference, in most of the above cases the court or 
tribunal relied upon the IBA Guidelines because the parties  referred to them in their 
submissions. As has been observed, lex mercatoria is made by users for users: it is, therefore, 
what the parties actually do that is most important when we determine whether or not a 
practice has a claim to the status of international customary commercial law. And it is evident
that the parties do treat the IBA Guidelines as legal standards: in 2007 Geoff Nicholas and 
Constantine Partasides observed that the Guidelines ‘are now being referred to widely by 
parties challenging arbitrators, parties opposing the challenge to arbitrators and institutions 
that are deciding those challenges’
51.  In fact, challengers appear to be using the IBA 
Guidelines in an increasingly formalistic manner, almost like a code.  The challenge in 
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda provides a good example of this: the lawyers for the Claimant (HE) 
proposed disqualification  rather delicately ‘having in mind the IBA Guidelines’
52; the 
lawyers for the Respondent wrote back rejecting the Claimant’s interpretation of the IBA 
Standards (but not denying their application); the Respondent’s lawyers replied rejecting the 
Claimant’s reading of the IBA Standard as ‘narrow’
53. Similarly, in National Grid PLC v 
Argentina the challenger (Argentina, again) proposed disqualification on the basis of the IBA 
Guidelines (and inter alia the test in Commonwealth Coatings); the respondent (National 
Grid) argued that ‘Argentina was able to point to only one situation from the Orange List that 
might tangentially cover the issue’
54.  If we apply the theory of Parisi, the fact that 
practitioners use the IBA Guidelines as if they were binding statements of law is making them
binding statements of customary law.
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Finally, the IBA Guidelines are being incorporated into the municipal arbitration laws of 
Model Law Plus states, giving them an important posited platform. The best example is the 
United Arab Emirates. Articles 12(1)(c) and (d) of the new Federal Arbitration Law of the 
United Arab Emirates (2008) are near perfect adoptions of items (c) and (d) of the 
Explanation to IBA General Standard 2
55 - this is a sovereign entity adopting a provision of 
an industry code as its federal law. If this is anything more than a one-off, the status of the 
IBA Guidelines will be elevated significantly. Consistent with this development in the UAE 
is the trend towards the statutory recognitionofarbitral institutions in the Model Law seats of 
the Asia Pacific. The arbitration laws of Singapore and Hong Kong, for example, contain 
Model Law Plus provisions which delegate authority to appoint arbitrators to the leading 
international arbitration institution in each seat (being SIAC and the HKIAC respectively). In 
late 2008 the Australian Attorney General announced that he was considering delegating both 
the power to appoint and to determine challenges to arbitrators to the Australian Centre of 
International Commercial Arbitration (ACICA). When an arbitral institution is delegated the 
function of an appointing authority, its institutional rules, codes of ethics and challenge 
jurisprudence creep into the law of the state in which it is seated. In the customary sense, the 
practices of its arbitrators also enter the equation. In the Hong Kong example, HKIAC 
appointment rules and practices legitimately inform Hong Kong arbitration law by operation 
of s.12 of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance. The IBA Guidelines then also indirectly 
inform Hong Kong arbitration law because the majority of arbitrators on the HKIAC list are 
IBA members who observe the IBA Guidelines in practice. The same is true of Singapore 
and SIAC, and, likely in the future, Australia and ACICA. Elsewhere in the region, the 
Arbitrators and Mediators Institute of New Zealand has adopted the IBA Guidelines for use 
when acting as appointing authority
56. The Guidelines also influenced CIETAC when it 
drafted its ethical rules for arbitrators
57. 
Arbitral institutions are a key conduit for the IBA Guidelines, and, in the New World at least,
it is clear that the current is increasingly strong towards the law. In the Old World, however, 
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the progress of the IBA Guidelines has been markedly slower. The ICC expressed certain ‘in 
principle’ objections to the IBA Guidelines when they were published;  Anne Marie 
Whitesell, who was ICC Secretary General when the Guidelines were drafted and passed by 
the IBA, explained the Chamber’s position in the following terms: 
From the ICC’s perspective, there is a fundamental incompatibility between the [ICC] 
Rules and the IBA Guidelines. Article 7(2) of the Rules requires a subjective 
approach to disclosure, i.e. an ICC arbitrator is required to disclose in writing any 
facts or circumstances which might be of such a nature as to call into question his or 
her independence ‘in the eyes of the parties’. Hence, it is not possible in ICC 
arbitration to have a list of situations which are said to be objective and never to 
require disclosure as provided in the IBA Guidelines’ Green List
58
In practice, parties to ICC arbitrations do refer to the IBA Guidelines in appointment and 
challenge procedures, and the rate of reference seems to be increasing
59. In 2004, very soon 
after their publication by the IBA, reference was made to the Guidelines in one arbitrator 
confirmation and one challenge
60; one confirmation and two challenges in 2005; four non-
confirmations and three challenges in 2006
61. Additionally, between 2004 and 2007, the IBA 
Guidelines were referred to in three ad hoc UNCITRAL Rules arbitrations in which the ICC 
Court was asked to decide challenges
62.  
The writer’s opinion is that the IBA Guidelines qualify as lex mercatoria on the basis of their 
growing acceptance in the jurisprudence of state courts and arbitral institutions, and their 
representation in municipal arbitration laws. The Guidelines satisfy both of Parisi’s formative
elements: a growing number of state courts and arbitral institutions treat them as persuasive, 
and because so many serving arbitrators are IBA members, the Guidelines have a good claim 
to both Generality and opinio juris. Hayek would have agreed. It has been observed in the 
Chapter 1 that the international arbitration community is a ‘mafia’ of individuals who exhibit 
a very high degree of Role Reversability (‘he who is counsel one day may be arbitrator the
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next’). The spontaneous order which as developed out of the non-coerced behaviour of the 
members of the international arbitration mafia (who act in rational response to the self 
motivated incentives of future appointments to either Bench or Bar) has produced customary 
rules of bias and conflict of interest that reflect the tenets of the IBA Guidelines. Members of 
this closed community use the IBA Guidelines to ensure they are not breaching the customs 
of the group when they reverse roles. The context of this cosmos and the custom it generates 
is both trans-national and commercial. The IBA Guidelines are therefore lex mercatoria. 
If the reader is willing to entertain the above submission, the writer can pose the final 
question of this chapter: which test for bias do the IBA Rules seem to prefer? General 
Standard 1 adopts the dual standard:
Every arbitrator shall be impartial and independent of the parties at the time of 
accepting an appointment to serve and shall remain so during the entire arbitration 
proceeding until the final award has been rendered or the proceeding has otherwise 
finally terminated
The UNCITRAL Model Law’s ‘justifiable doubts’ test is used by the IBA in General 
Standard 2
63. As has been observed, UNCITRAL Model Law Article 12 and UNCITRAL 
Rule 10(1) are usually interpreted in a manner consistent with Sussex Justices. For example, 
in Challenge Decision of 11 January 1995 the panel held that ‘doubts are justifiable or serious 
[for the purposes of UNCITRAL Rule 10(1)] if they give rise to an apprehension of bias that 
is, to the objective observer, reasonable’
64. This thesis has identified many other examples. 
The IBA Working Group clearly agreed with this approach. The Explanation to the General 
Standard 2 states:
(c) Doubts are justifiable if a reasonable and informed third party would reach the 
conclusion that there was a likelihood that the arbitrator may be influenced by factors 
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other than the merits of the case as presented by the parties in reaching his or her 
decision.
(d)  Justifiable doubts necessarily exist as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence if there is an identity between a party and the arbitrator, if the arbitrator 
is a legal representative of a legal entity that is a party in the arbitration, or if the 
arbitrator has a significant financial or personal interest in the matter at stake 
[emphasis added] 
The hypothetical vantage point used in the elucidation to General Standard 2 is that of the 
‘reasonable and informed third party’, and not the court.  Gough’s First Arm is not 
recognized. This is confirmed by sub-item (b) of the Explanation to General Standard 2, 
which states: 
In order for standards to be applied as consistently as possible, the working Group 
believes that the test for disqualification should be an objective one. The Working 
Group uses the wording ‘impartiality or independence’ derived from the broadly 
adopted Article 12 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the use of an appearance test, 
based on justifiable doubts as to the impartiality or independence of the arbitrator, as 
provided in Article 12(2) of the UNICTRAL Model Law, to be applied objectively (a 
‘reasonable third person test’)
The Working Group’s preference for the ‘reasonable third person’ takes up the First Arm of 
Sussex Justices. The Guidelines place high importance on the appearance of fairness, thereby 
confirming the applicability of Lord Hewart’s dictum in Sussex Justices that ‘justice must be 
done and be seen to be done’ to private dispute resolution processes. This suggests that the 
IBA favours the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test over the ‘real danger’ test. Supportive of this 
reading is the fact that the word ‘real’ has been deliberately left out of the Explanation to 
General Standard 2. A number of tribunals have followed the IBA Guidelines to a Sussex 
Justices result: for example, in National Grid the LCIA Division concluded that the standard 
was one of a third person’s ‘reasonable apprehension’
65. It is worth noting that the LCIA 
division did not invoke this test sua sponte: Argentina cited Sussex Justices in support of its 
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argument that Arbitrator Kessler had caused an appearance of partiality to arise by 
intervening during the examination of an Argentina expert witness
66.
The record shows that a tribunal applying the IBA Guidelines is more likely to dismiss a 
challenge than uphold it. It is apparent that the pure, strict form of the Second Arm of Sussex 
Justices is usually ‘watered-down’. The solution is Porter v Magill – it must be, otherwise the 
reasonable apprehensions of challengers would more often result in success and 
disqualification. The practice of cynical assessment of challenges – which is itself driven by 
customary forces including reciprocity and Role Reversibility (‘I could be next’) – is either 
informed by or corresponds with a higher threshold for disqualification than reasonable 
apprehension. When the IBA Guidelines are used, the First Arm of Sussex Justices is 
certainly observed, but alongside the Second Arm of Porter v Magill; the Second Arm of 
Porter v Magill is also evident in the Orange List. 
6. The Lists
Unlike other ethical codes and guidelines for arbitrators (such as the AAA and ABA models), 
the IBA Guidelines create a twin duty to both disclose  and investigate. Under the IBA 
Guidelines, the arbitrator has a duty to make reasonable inquiries to investigate any potential 
conflict of interest, as well as any facts or circumstances that may cause his or her 
impartiality or independence to be questioned. This is General Standard 7(c). Matters which 
much be investigated  and disclosed are those which would need to be investigated or 
disclosed ‘in the eyes of the parties’; the Working Party’s choice to use a different vantage 
point for investigation and disclosure (‘party vantage’, as compared to the ‘reasonable third 
person’ perspective which is applicable at the review stage) was ‘a well known effort by the 
IBA to reach out to the ICC’
67. 
General Standard 2(b) requires that the arbitration decline appointment (or presumably stand 
down, if the matters have just come to his attention) where a reasonable third person, having 
the knowledge of the relevant facts, would have justifiable doubts as the arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence. The IBA Guidelines identify circumstances that may expose 
arbitrators to challenges in bias. They include three colour-coded lists – Red, Orange and 
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Green. The Red List deals with situations where a conflict of interest exists. In recognition of 
the Doctrine of Party Autonomy (and its limits) the Red List is split in two. The ‘Non-
Waivable Red List’ identifies conflicts of interest where the arbitrator must not act (or must 
resign, if they have already entered onto the reference). The situations in the ‘Waivable Red 
List’ must be disclosed, and the arbitrator may only act where the parties are fully aware and 
give their express consent. In the middle is the Orange List, which enumerates situations 
where a conflict may exist in the eyes of the parties depending upon the facts of the case. At 
the  pre-appointment stage, Orange list matters are usually disclosed; in practice, once 
disclosed, the relevant Orange List circumstance turns red and the disclosing candidate will 
not be appointed
68. At the far end of the spectrum is the Green List: matters where no conflict 
of interest will exist and disclosure is not necessary. The Green List circumstances will never 
provide grounds for recusal or disqualification of arbitrators. 
Below, each IBA list item is italicised and its lex mercatoria sources (being municipal laws, 
institutional rules and state court decisions equivalent to or applying it) are listed below it in 
bold.  
1. NON-WAIVABLE RED LIST
1.1. There is an identity between a party and the arbitrator, or the arbitrator is a 
legal representative of an entity that is a party in the arbitration.
French NCCP Article 341; German CCP Article 41; CAS Ad Hoc Rules Article 
12;  Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(a); California CCP s.1297.121;  Procola v 
Luxembourg (EHR Court decision of 28 September 1995)
1.2. The arbitrator is a manager, director or member of the supervisory board, or has 
a similar controlling influence in one of the parties 
Morelite Construction 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984) 
1.3. The arbitrator has a significant financial interest in one of the parties or the 
outcome of the case.
Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(a); Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) Article 8(1);
German CCP Art 41; NASD Code s.23(b)(2); Argentina Arbitration Act 
768(2)(i);  Indonesian Arbitration Law (No.30/1999) Article 12(1)(c); CIETAC 
Ethical Rules Article 5; Re Skene’s Award (1904) 24 NZLR 591
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1.4. The arbitrator regularly advises the appointing party or an affiliate of the 
appointing party, and the arbitrator or his or her firm derives a significant financial 
income therefrom. 
NASD Code s.23(b)(1); Schmitz v Zilveti, 30 F.3d 1043 (9
th Cir. 1994)
2. WAIVABLE RED LIST
2.1. Relationship of the arbitrator to the dispute
2.1.1 The arbitrator has given legal advice or provided an expert opinion on the 
dispute to a party or an affiliate of one of the parties. 
Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(b); German CCP Art 41; Texas CPRC 
s.172.056(A)(1)(c); California CCP s.1297.121; CIETAC Ethical Rules Article 3; 
Commonwealth Coatings 393 US 145 (1968); China Harbour [2007] BLR 435 HK 
CA
2.1.2 The arbitrator has previous involvement in the case. 
Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(b); German CCP Art 41; Texas CPRC 
s.172.056(A)(1)(e); California CCP s.1297.121; CIETAC Ethical Rules Article 3; 
Commonwealth Coatings 393 US 145 (1968)
2.2. Arbitrator’s direct or indirect interest in the dispute
2.2.1 The arbitrator holds shares, either directly or indirectly, in one of the parties or 
an affiliate of one of the parties that is privately held.
Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(a); Argentina Arbitration Act 768(2)(i);  Indonesian 
Arbitration Law (No.30/1999) Article 12(1)(c);  Texas CPRC 
s.172.056(A)(2)(a)(ii); California CCP s.1297.121; NASD Code s.23(b)(1); 
CIETAC Ethical Rules Article 5; Szilard v Szasz [1955] SCR 3
2.2.2 A close family member of the arbitrator has a significant financial interest in the 
outcome of the dispute.
NCCP Art 341; Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) Articles 8(1) and 8(2); 
Indonesian Arbitration Law (No.30/1999) Article 12(1)(c);  Texas CPRC 
s.172.056(A)(1)(g)(iv),  s.172.056(A)(2)(a)(ii); California CCP s.1297.121; NASD 
Code s.23(b)(2)
2.2.3 The arbitrator or a close family member of the arbitrator has a close 
relationship with a third party who may be liable to recourse on the part of the 
unsuccessful party in the dispute.
Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) Articles 8(1) and 8(2); Argentina Arbitration Act 
768(2)(ii); Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(g)(iv); California CCP s.1297.121; NASD 
Code s.23(b)(2); ANR Coal 173 F 3d 493 (4
th Cir 1999)225
2.3. Arbitrator’s relationship with the parties or counsel
2.3.1 The arbitrator currently represents or advises one of the parties or an affiliate 
of one of the parties.
German CCP Art 41; CAS  Ad Hoc Rules Article 12;  Texas CPRC 
s.172.056(A)(1)(c); California CCP s.1297.121; NASD Code s.23(b)(2);  Société 
des Equipements Industriels Stolz S.A. v. Ets. Letierce [1988] Rev Arb 316; 
Annahold Rev Arb 483 (1986)
2.3.2 The arbitrator currently represents the lawyer or law firm acting as counsel for 
one of the parties.
Eureko B.V. v Republic of Poland R.G. 2006/1542/A; NASD Code s.23(b)(2)
2.3.3 The arbitrator is a lawyer in the same law firm as the counsel to one of the 
parties.
Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d); California CCP s.1297.121; NASD Code 
s.23(b)(2); Re Skene’s Award (1904) 24 NZLR 591
2.3.4 The arbitrator is a manager, director or member of the supervisory board, or 
has a similar controlling influence, in an affiliate of one of the parties if the affiliate is 
directly involved in the matters in dispute in the arbitration. 
NASD Code s.23(b)(2)
2.3.6 The arbitrator’s law firm currently has a significant commercial relationship 
with one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties.
Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d); California CCP s.1297.121; NASD Code 
s.23(b)(2);  Schmitz v Zilveti, 30 F.3d 1043 (9
th Cir. 1994);  JCP Enterprises et 
Affaires [2002] Lyon (6 May 2002) 808; Jilkén v. Ericsson AB (Re Judge Lind) 
Case No. T2448-06 [2007] 3 SIAR;  SCC  Arbitration 60/1999;  SCC Arbitration 
60/2001
2.3.7 The arbitrator regularly advises the appointing party or an affiliate of the 
appointing party, but neither the arbitrator nor his or her firm derives a significant 
financial income therefrom.
2.3.8 The arbitrator has a close family relationship with one of the parties or with a 
manager, director or member of the supervisory board or any person having a similar 
controlling influence in one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties or with a 
counsel representing a party.
NCCP Article 341; German CCP Art 41; Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) 
Articles 8(1) and 8(2); Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(c); NASD Code s.23(b)(3); 
Argentina Arbitration Act 768(2)(ii); Indonesian Arbitration Law (No.30/1999) 
Article 12(1)(c); CIETAC Ethical Rules Article 5; Milan Presse [1999] Rev Arb 226
381; JCP Enterprises et Affaires [2002] Lyon (6 May 2002) 808 Undisclosed v 
Undisclosed (BG Decision 1 April 2006); SCC Arbitration 87/2000
2.3.9 A close family member of the arbitrator has a significant financial interest in 
one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties.
NCCP Article 341; Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(c); Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) 
Articles 8(1) and 8(2); Argentina Arbitration Act 768(2)(ii);  Texas CPRC 
s.172.056(A)(1)(g)(iv); California CCP s.1297.121; NASD Code s.23(b)(3); Szilard 
v Szasz [1955] SCR 3
3. ORANGE LIST
3.1. Previous services for one of the parties or other involvement in the case
3.1.1 The arbitrator has within the past three years served as counsel for one of the 
parties or an affiliate of one of the parties or has previously advised or been 
consulted by the party or an affiliate of the party making the appointment in an 
unrelated matter, but the arbitrator and the party or the affiliate of the party have no 
ongoing relationship.
Rapla Invest v TNK Trade (Svea Court of Appeal T5044-04 (2006); Positive 
Software 476 F.3d 278 (5
th Cir. 2007); Fertilizer Corp of India 517 F. Supp 948 
(S.D. Ohio 1981); Lucent Technologies 269 F.Supp.2d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y.2003);
National Shipping 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18725 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Marteau v CIGP
[2000] Rev Arb 2999; Celtic Plc v UEFA (ICAS Decision of 2 October 1998)  
3.1.2 The arbitrator has within the past three years served as counsel against one of 
the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties in an unrelated matter.
Rustal Trading [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Reps 14; ASM Shipping [2005] APP.L.R.10/19; 
Eureko R.G. 2006/1542/A
3.1.3 The arbitrator has within the past three years been appointed as arbitrator on 
two or more occasions by one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties.
Schmitz v Zilveti, 30 F.3d 1043 (9
th Cir. 1994); SCC Arbitration 120/2001
3.1.4 The arbitrator’s law firm has within the past three years acted for one of the 
parties or an affiliate of one of the parties in an unrelated matter without the 
involvement of the arbitrator.
SCC Arbitration 60/1999;  SCC Arbitration 60/2001; Compania de Aguas de 
Aconquija SA v Argetina (Arb/97/3)(Challenge Decision 3 October 2001)  
3.1.5 The arbitrator currently serves, or has served within the past three years, as 
arbitrator in another arbitration on a related issue involving one of the parties or an 
affiliate of one of the parties.227
Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(f); Qatar v Creighton [1999] Rev Arb 308;  ASM 
Shipping [2005] APP.L.R. 10/19 
 
3.2. Current services for one of the parties
3.2.1 The arbitrator’s law firm is currently rendering services to one of the parties or 
to an affiliate of one of the parties without creating a significant commercial 
relationship and without the involvement of the arbitrator.
Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d); California CCP s.1297.121; Compania de Aguas 
de Aconquija SA v Argetina (Arb/97/3)(Challenge Decision 3 October 2001)  
3.2.2 A law firm that shares revenues or fees with the arbitrator’s law firm renders 
services to one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties before the arbitral 
tribunal. 
Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d); California CCP s.1297.121;  Argentina 
Arbitration Act 768(2)(i); Re Skene’s Award (1904) 24 NZLR 591
3.2.3 The arbitrator or his or her firm represents a party or an affiliate to the 
arbitration on a regular basis but is not involved in the current dispute.
ANR Coal 173 F 3d 493 (4
th Cir 1999)
3.3. Relationship between an arbitrator and another arbitrator or counsel.
3.3.1 The arbitrator and another arbitrator are lawyers in the same law firm.
3.3.2 The arbitrator and another arbitrator or the counsel for one of the parties are 
members of the same barristers’ chambers.
Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d); California CCP s.1297.121;  Laker Airways v 
FLS Aerospace [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 45;  Pilkington Plc v PPG Industries Inc
(unreported, High Court Commercial Division, 1 November 1989); Nye Saunders 
v Alan E. Bristow (1987) 37 BLR 92; KFTCIC [1992] Rev Arb 568
3.3.3 The arbitrator was within the past three years a partner of, or otherwise 
affiliated with, another arbitrator or any of the counsel in the same arbitration. Texas 
CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d); Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(b); Fletamentos Maritimos 
[1997] 2 LlL Rep 302
3.3.4 A lawyer in the arbitrator’s law firm is an arbitrator in another dispute 
involving the same party or parties or an affiliate of one of the parties
TF (1998) 16 Bull ASA 634
3.3.5 A close family member of the arbitrator is a partner or employee of the law firm 
representing one of the parties, but is not assisting with the dispute.228
Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) Article 8(2); Centroza v Orbis (Swiss Federal
Court 26 October 1966) 
3.3.6 A close personal friendship exists between an arbitrator and a counsel of one 
party, as demonstrated by the fact that the arbitrator and the counsel regularly spend 
considerable time together unrelated to professional work commitments or the 
activities of professional associations or social organizations.
NCCP Article 341; Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(e); Texas CPRC 
s.172.056(A)(1)(g)(ii); California CCP s.1297.121; NASD Code s.23(b)(3)
3.3.7 The arbitrator has within the past three years received more than three 
appointments by the same counsel or the same law firm.
California CCP s.1297.121; Prince Unreported 3d, WL 1330484 (June 15, 2004)
3.4. Relationship between arbitrator and party and others involved in the arbitration
3.4.1 The arbitrator’s law firm is currently acting adverse to one of the parties or an 
affiliate of one of the parties.
Eureko R.G. 2006/1542/A
3.4.2 The arbitrator had been associated within the past three years with a party or 
an affiliate of one of the parties in a professional capacity, such as a former employee 
or partner.
Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) Article 8(2);  Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d);
California CCP s.1297.121; Philipp Brothers [1990] Rev Arb 497; Du Toit (1993)
9 WAR 139
3.4.3 A close personal friendship exists between an arbitrator and a manager or 
director or a member of the supervisory board or any person having a similar 
controlling influence in one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties or a 
witness or expert, as demonstrated by the fact that the arbitrator and such director, 
manager, other person, witness or expert regularly spend considerable time together 
unrelated to professional work commitments or the activities of professional 
associations or social organizations.
NCCP Article 341; Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(e); Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) 
Article 8(2); Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(g)(i); California CCP s.1297.121; 
NASD Code s.23(b)(3); H.A.R. v Austria (EHR Com decision 10 September 1998, 
No.40021/98); H v Belgium (EHR Court decision 30 November 1987); Andros 
Compania 579 F.2d 691; Ligier & Diffucia [1989] Rev Arb 505
3.4.4 If the arbitrator is a former judge, he or she has within the past three years 
heard a significant case involving one of the parties.
NCCP Article 341; Du Toit (1993) 9 WAR 139229
3.5. Other circumstances
3.5.1 The arbitrator holds shares, either directly or indirectly, which by reason of 
number or denomination constitute a material holding in one of the parties or an 
affiliate of one of the parties that is publicly listed.
Swiss BGG Article 34(1)(a); Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) Article 8(1); 
Argentina Arbitration Act 768(2)(i); Indonesian Arbitration Law (No.30/1999) 
Article 12(1)(c);  Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d); California CCP s.1297.121; 
CIETAC Ethical Rules Article 5
3.5.2 The arbitrator has publicly advocated a specific position regarding the case that 
is being arbitrated whether in a published paper or speech or otherwise.
Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) Article 8(3);  Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(e);
California CCP s.1297.121; Abu-Dhabi Gas Liquefaction v Eastern Bechtel Co
[1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 425; Uni-Inter [1991] Rev Arb 359; S.A. Setec Bâtiment v. 
Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Charbonnages [1987] Rev Arb 63; X v Y
Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main 4 October 2007; Challenge 
Decision 11 January 1995 (1997) 22 YCA 227(UNCITRAL)
3.5.3 The arbitrator holds a position in an arbitration institution with appointing
authority over the dispute.
Swedish Arbitration Act (1999) Article 8(3)
3.5.4 The arbitrator is a manager, director or member of the supervisory board, or 
has a similar controlling influence, in an affiliate of one of the parties, where the 
affiliate is not directly involved in the matters in dispute in the arbitration.
Commercial Agraria Hermanos Lucena v Transgrain France [1998] Rev Arb 699; 
Re Judge Briner Case No.55/1988 IUSCT
4. GREEN LIST
4.1. Previously expressed legal opinions
4.1.1 The arbitrator has previously published a general opinion (such as in a law 
review article or public lecture) concerning an issue which also arises in the 
arbitration (but this opinion is not focused on the case that is being arbitrated).
Buscemi v Italy (EHR Court decision 16 September 1999, No.29569/95); Jensen v 
Denmark (EHR Com decision 7 January 1991); Republic of Ghana v Telekom 
Malaysia District Court of The Hague, 18 October 2004, (Challenge No. 13/2004); 
Qatar v Creighton [1999] Rev Arb 308; Gemanco v. S.A.E.P.A [1991] Rev Arb 87;
Dubai v. Halcrow [1993] Rev Arb 455; Re Judge Mangard Challenge Decision 
January 15, 1982, 7 Iran US Cl. Trib. Rep. 281, 292 (1981-82)  230
4.2. Previous services against one party
4.2.1 The arbitrator’s law firm has acted against one of the parties or an affiliate of 
one of the parties in an unrelated matter without the involvement of the
Arbitrator 
Anaconda  418 F.Supp.107, 109-12 (D.D.C.1976); Compania de Aguas de 
Aconquija SA v Argetina (Arb/97/3; Challenge Decision 3 October 2001)  
4.3. Current services for one of the parties
4.3.1 A firm in association or in alliance with the arbitrator’s law firm, but which 
does not share fees or other revenues with the arbitrator’s law firm, renders services 
to one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties in an unrelated matter.
4.4. Contacts with another arbitrator or with counsel for one of the parties
4.4.1 The arbitrator has a relationship with another arbitrator or with the counsel for 
one of the parties through membership in the same professional association or social 
organization.
Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(g); California CCP s.1297.121; NASD Code 
s.23(b)(3); Philipp Brothers [1990] Rev Arb 497; Hudault v Societe Generale de 
Surveillance SGS & Ors [2002] Rev Arb 208; SCC Arbitration 60/1999
4.4.2 The arbitrator and counsel for one of the parties or another arbitrator have 
previously served together as arbitrators or as co-counsel.
Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d); California CCP s.1297.121; Lucent Technologies
269 F.Supp.2d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y.2003); Cross-country Skiers (Tribunal Federal, 
27 May 2003)
4.5. Contacts between the arbitrator and one of the parties
4.5.1 The arbitrator has had an initial contact with the appointing party or an 
affiliate of the appointing party (or the respective counsels) prior to appointment, if 
this contact is limited to the arbitrator’s availability and qualifications to serve or to 
the names of possible candidates for a chairperson and did not address the merits or 
procedural aspects of the dispute.
4.5.2 The arbitrator holds an insignificant amount of shares in one of the parties or 
an affiliate of one of the parties, which is publicly listed.
Indonesian Arbitration Law (No.30/1999) Article 12(1)(c) Saudi Cable [2000] All 
ER (Comm)
4.5.3 The arbitrator and a manager, director or member of the supervisory board, or 
any person having a similar controlling influence, in one of the parties or an affiliate 231
of one of the parties, have worked together as joint experts or in another professional 
capacity, including as arbitrators in the same case.
Texas CPRC s.172.056(A)(1)(d); California CCP s.1297.121; Lucent Technologies 
269 F.Supp.2d 402, 405 (S.D.N.Y.2003); National Shipping 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
18725 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
7. Conclusions
It is clear therefore the IBA Guidelines are supported by municipal and jurisprudential 
sources. But the fact of use is what is most important when the existence of a custom is 
considered: it is increasingly common to see the IBA Guidelines referred to by the parties and 
decision makers (both arbitral tribunals and municipal courts) in challenge proceedings. The 
record is split fairly evenly between Common Law and Civil Law seats. Challenges in ISA 
and ICSID proceedings are often decided using the IBA standards. The IBA standards are 
also being passed into municipal law by direct enactment (like in the UAE) and indirectly by 
delegation of appointment and challenge functions to arbitral institutions. The net effect of 
these developments is to elevate the status of the IBA Guidelines and their Lists. To recap 
briefly, the items of the Non-Waivable Red List are universally actionable, either under 
specific provisions of municipal laws, nemo judex in sua causa or the Rule in Dimes. The 
waivable-Red list shows that the IBA favours Party Autonomy and supports the availability 
of waiver and collateral estoppel. The Orange List is where the ‘Protestantism’ of the IBA 
Guidelines is clearest: case law shows that the situations on the Orange List can go either 
way. Best practice is to observe the lex mercatoria rule of disclosure at all times. 
The previous chapters have shown that, where Orange List matters are pleaded the success of 
the challenge will largely depend upon the test for bias that is applied. Courts that apply 
Sussex Justices are much more likely to order disqualification in Orange List circumstances 
than courts which apply the Second Arm of Porter v Magill (or Gough).  The best example is 
probably IBA item 3.1 (‘Previous services for one of the parties or other involvement in the 
case’) – applying the Strasbourg/Sussex Justices test, in Celtic v UEFA the ICAS upheld a 
challenge based on previous service as counsel, as did the Paris court in Marteu v CIGP; 
using higher thresholds in similar facts American courts have dismissed challenges (see for 
example  Positive Software and  Lucent v Tatung). The very fact that these matters are 
identified as ‘Orange List’ proves that the IBA Guidelines display a higher tolerance for bias 
than state courts that follow both arms of  Sussex Justices. Whilst the Explanation to the 232
General Standard 2 shows that the IBA Guidelines recognise the first arm of Sussex Justices
(‘reasonable and informed third party’ vantage), a broader reading of the lists shows that the 
Second Arm of Porter v Magill (‘real possibility’) probably prevails. The writer has argued 
that the IBA Guidelines are lex mercatoria; if they are then so is Porter v Magill. 233
CHAPTER 7
Bias Challenges in Investor State Arbitration
No country in the world has ever won in international arbitration… Not the governments, not the 
nations, not the people. Only the companies win
- Bolivian President Evo Morales
1. Introduction
So far this thesis has focused on bias in private procedural settings. This is justified on the 
basis that, historically speaking, the majority of arbitrations have been conducted between 
private parties, usually in commercial contexts. The involvement of states in arbitral 
proceedings has, until relatively recently, mostly been limited to disputes with other states. 
There are exceptions, such as commercial arbitrations between private parties and state 
enterprises (such the ‘state trading entities’ of the Soviet era), in which states have appeared 
against companies. True inter-national arbitration – where tow or mote sovereign entities 
submit to the jurisdiction of an ad hoc or permanent tribunal to resolve a particular dispute -
is well settled in the law of nations. There are many examples of state-versus-state arbitration 
in the historical record: the Greek city states regularly used arbitration to avoid war within 
their confederacy; the arbitration of disputes between princes was a well settled practice by 
the medieval period: the Pope was regularly judged the grievances of Catholic princes; in 
1177 English King Henry II arbitrated the territorial dispute between the kings of Castile and 
Navarre.  But it was after the development of trans-Atlantic trade and investment in the 
seventeenth century that the model of sovereign dispute resolution began to change. 234
The 1794 ‘Jay Treaty’
1, settled between England and the newly formed United States of 
America in the wake of the War of Independence to decide the boundary with Canada, also 
contained detailed provisions in which the outstanding claims of the signatories and their 
nationals were to be brought before two special commissions of three and five arbitrators; 
these mixed commissions produced 565 awards, most of which related to the seizure of 
privately  owned  American-flagged  vessels by the British navy during the war
2. The Jay 
Treaty was the first of a number of treaties of ‘Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’ that, 
in varying degrees, required the signatories to respect the rights of alien property owned by 
nationals of the other State. The next step took place in 1871, when disputes over the alleged 
British violation of neutrality during the American Civil War led to the Alabama Claims
arbitration, in which an ad hoc panel of arbitrators (which included the King of Italy, the 
President of the Swiss Confederation and the Emperor of Brazil) sat in Geneva
3.  The 
successful arbitration of these disputes led to the establishment of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at The Hague in 1899
4. The PCA hosted its first investor-state dispute in 1935
5,
and remains active today
6. Unlike the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
7, and 
its successor institution the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
8, the PCA has jurisdiction to 
decide matters submitted to it that involve non-sovereign entities. The Secretary General of 
the PCA is appointing authority under the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules. 
In the second half of the twentieth century the role of private interests in public international 
arbitral proceedings increased dramatically. Indeed, the contemporary necessity to distinguish 
between ‘International Arbitration’ and ‘International Commercial Arbitration’ - the former 
connoting arbitral proceedings involving (or between) states and the latter between private 
parties  – illustrates the extent to which sovereign involvement has affected the modern 
   
1 The full title of the Jay Treaty, named after American Secretary of State John Jay, was the ‘General Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 1794’.  
2 Holtzmann, H.M., Kristjansdottir, E., (eds) International Mass Claims Processes: Legal and Practical 
Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2007), p.2
3 Alabama Claims Case, Decision and Award (14 September 1872), reprinted in Balch, T.W., The Alabama 
Arbitration 131 app. (1900). 
4 The PCA was established by the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
(1899). 
5 Radio Corporation of America v China (1941) 8 ILR 26
6 The case load of the PCA is rising again due to its role as designating authority under the UNCITRAL Rules 
and its increasing use as a venue for ad hoc investor-state arbitrations under Bilateral Investment Treaties. 
7 The PCIJ was set up as part of the peace process following World War One. It has non-compulsory jurisdiction 
over states. It was subsumed by the ICJ in 1945. 
8 Commonly referred to as the ‘World Court’, the ICJ was established as the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations in 1945. Like the PCA, the ICJ is based at the Peace Palace in The Hague. The ICJ has no 
jurisdiction to hear disputes involving private individuals. 235
practice of arbitration
9. Somewhere between these two procedural forms lies Investor-State 
Arbitration (ISA). ‘ISA’ is a blanket term for the binding resolution of disputes between 
foreign investors and host states. Much like International (or inter-state) Arbitration, ISA may 
be ad hoc or institutional. Institutional ISA usually results from the operation of a dispute 
resolution mechanism within an investment agreement between states. 
Most modern multilateral and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT’s) contain ISA provisions
which nominate an institutional venue or specify a procedure for the resolution of disputes. 
An example of a multilateral investment agreement is the Energy Charter Treaty (1994)
10. 
Today there are over three thousand BIT’s in force
11. In the 1960’s, the Organisation for 
Economic Development (OECD) sought to establish a ‘New International Economic Order’. 
This objective required the stabilisation of economic relations between developed, capital-
exporting countries and their capital importing counterparts in the developing post-colonial 
world. One of the outcomes of this program was a dramatic increase in the number of BIT’s, 
and a sharp rise in the per-instrument involvement of developing countries, especially Asian 
states
12. For example, the People’s Republic of China signed 117 BIT’s between 1982 and 
2006
13. Latin American states have also been active: Peru signed 400 BIT’s between 1993 
and 2004
14. Today there are between 2,500 and 3,000 BIT’s worldwide, and most of them are 
young. Indeed, the proliferation of BIT’s in the 1990’s is the reason for the growth of ISA 
and its contemporary significance within the field of international commercial law and 
practice.
It is beyond this scope of this chapter to examine the substantive aspects of BIT’s in any 
detail. Here, the writer is only concerned with how BIT’s structure processes for the 
settlement of disputes. Whilst it is risky to generalise in an area as divergent as international 
   
9 Significantly for the writer, the need to distinguish between international commercial arbitration and 
international arbitration is recognised at paragraph 5 of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest ion 
International Arbitration.
10 Done at The Hague on 17 December 1991, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was the Final Act of the 
European Energy Charter Conference. The content of the ECT is mostly substantive, relating to the protection of 
foreign investments in the domestic energy sectors of member states. Chapter 3, Part V of the ECT concerns 
dispute settlement. ICSID Arbitration is one of three dispute resolution methods available under Article 26(4), 
the others being ad hoc UNCITRAL Rules arbitration and arbitration at the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.  
11 UNCTAD, Trends in International Investment Agreements: An Overview (UNCTAD Series, UN New York), 
cited in Redfern, A., Hunter., M., Blackaby, N., Partasides, P., Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (Thompson 2004), p.565 at N13
12 Dolzer, R, and Schreuer, C, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford 2008), at 20
13 Chow, D, The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China in a Nutshell (2003) 374 ff, cited in Dolzer & 
Schreuer, above note 12 at 21 
14 Howell, D.J, International Investment Arbitration (Fulbright & Jaworski International LLP, March 2006), 
available at www.fulbright.com/images/publications/Howell032106.pdf236
trade law and relations, just as we can identify  ‘typical’ or ‘model’ arbitration clauses 
because there are fundamental elements to a private compromissum, so do the load-bearing 
walls of an ISA provision permit some generalisation on structure and form. As with purely 
private-party arbitration, consent is an essential precondition to ISA. The central pillar of any 
ISA provision is therefore the mechanism by which the state signatories submit to arbitration. 
It is this mechanism that allows foreign investors (being nationals of one of the signatories to 
the BIT) to commence arbitration against the state that hosts their investment if that state 
breaches their rights. The  extent to which ISA provisions cover truly procedural ground 
varies greatly. What a purely private ICA practitioner would identify as an ad hoc arbitration 
– really the ex nihil formation of a tribunal and the conduct of proceedings in accordance with 
bespoke rules, unassisted by any institution – is very rare in ISA. Most ISA provisions refer 
to an arbitral institution (be it ICSID, PCA, ICC, CIETAC or some other body) making the 
setting  in which an ISA is conducted predominantly institutional.  The  most important 
international  agreement for the procedural  law and practice of ISA is the Washington 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (1965)
15, because the Washington Convention established the premier ISA institution: 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). A typical BIT 
will give the parties a choice of two or three dispute resolution systems: UNICTRAL Rules 
arbitration is often the ad hoc option; arbitration at the SCC and ICC are common 
institutional alternatives. If the treaty gives the parties UNCITRAL Rules and ICC arbitration 
as its first two options, the third option will likely be ICSID arbitration. 
ICSID has special arrangements with the member states of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Canada, The United States and Mexico signed NAFTA on 17 
December 1992. Under NAFTA Chapter 11, an investor who alleges that a state party has 
breached its obligations under NAFTA may commence ICSID arbitration against that state 
under either the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Rules. The Additional 
Facility Rules expressly allow for NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations involving non-ICSID 
members
16. The Additional Facility has made ICSID even busier: as of 2007, over 50 claims 
had been brought to ICSID under NAFTA Chapter 11. Bias challenges have featured in a 
   
15 The Washington Convention was submitted for signature and ratification on 18 March 1965. The Convention 
entered into force on 14 October 1966.  
16 The United States is the only NAFTA bloc member that is also a party to the Washington Convention.
Mexico has not signed ICSID; Canada signed the Washington Convention in December 2006, but is yet to ratify 
it.237
number of these actions, including the Canfor Corporation v USA and Grand River v USA
matters examined below.
This chapter will consider the special case of ICSID. The writer is approaching ICSID 
proceedings as a ‘special case’ because when an ICSID tribunal is convened it does not take a 
municipal seat: in contrast to the New York Convention framework, the Washington 
Convention model is stateless. It is important to note that is not true of all ISA proceedings, 
which may or may not be seated at ICSID. ‘Seat Theory’ still applies to ad hoc ISA 
proceedings. For example, investor-state disputes submitted to the PCA are, as we saw in our 
discussion of the  Telekom Malaysia challenge in Chapter 3, subject to the  mandatory 
procedural laws of The Hague. ICSID is the only truly delocalised arbitral institution in the 
world
17. For the purposes of this study, the specific result of the exclusion of the procedural
law  of the seat is that, in contrast to the New York Convention model of ICA, the 
fundamental rules of procedural fairness that apply to ICSID proceedings are not derived 
from municipal law and public policy, but rather from the Washington Convention and the 
jurisprudence of ICSID. This difference requires that the writer commence this chapter with a 
brief overview of the Washington Convention system, and a short institutional summary of 
ICSID. ICSID appointment, challenge and appeal procedures will then be discussed. The 
writer will then examine a number of  ICSID challenge decisions, including Amco Asia v 
Indonesia
18,  Vivendi Universal v Argentina
19,  Suez v Argentina
20,  Generation Ukraine v 
Ukraine
21 and Zhinvali Development v Georgia
22. The extraordinary challenge to counsel in
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda dd v Slovenia will be discussed last. The problem of precedent and 
the new head of ‘Role/Issue Conflict’ will then be discussed, followed by an assessment of 
the policy pressures that flow from the institutional proximity of ICSID to the World Bank. 
The writer will conclude that, although the bespoke test prescribed by the Washington 
Convention sets a very  high bar for bias challenges, ICSID jurisprudence displays an 
   
17 Redfern, A., Hunter., M., Blackaby, N., Partasides, P., Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration (Thompson 2004), p.67 
18 Amco Asia Corp v Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case ARB/81/1 (Decision on Proposal to Disqualify an 
Arbitrator, 24 June 1982, unpublished). 
19 Compania de Aguas de Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/97/3 
(Decision on the Challenge to the President on the Committee, 3 October 2001) 17 ICSID Review – (2002) FILJ 
168
20 Suez Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/03/17 (Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of 
the Arbitral Tribunal, 22 October 2007) 
21 Generation Ukraine Inc v Ukraine, ICSID Case ARB/00/9
22 Zhinvali Development Ltd v Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case ARB/00/1 (Decision on Respondent’s Proposal 
to Disqualify Arbitrator, 19 January 2001, unpublished)238
increasing disregard for its black letters and preference for the tenets of the Sussex Justices
test. 
2. The Washington Convention 1965
The Washington Convention was drafted and settled by the executive officers of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)  – the World Bank. The 
World Bank was born out of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944
23. The Washington Convention addressed the 
perceived inadequacy of Diplomatic Protection
24 and confirmed the international legal status 
of the trend towards the recognition of the rights of private investors in foreign states. As Sir 
Elihu Luaterpacht observed 
For the first time a system was instituted under which non-state entities – corporations 
or individuals – could sue States directly; under which State immunity was much 
restricted; under which international law could be applied directly to the relationship 
between the investor and the host State; under which the operation of the  local 
remedies rules was excluded; under which the tribunal’s award would be directly 
enforceable within the territories of the State’s parties
25
Because  the  drafters of the  Washington Convention were principally concerned with the 
establishment of rules for the settlement of disputes, the content of the pact is  entirely 
procedural. Indeed, much of the substantive law that governs the rights of the parties to an
ISA was extant in custom well  before 1965. The protection of alien property was, for 
example, a well settled rule of international law when the Jay Treaty was negotiated
26. The 
   
23 The purpose of the Bretton Woods meeting was to negotiate the program of post-World War Two
reconstruction. It most notable products were the IBRD and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), both of which have contributed greatly to the development of the liberalised global economy in which 
ISA and ICA take place.  
24 The remedy of Diplomatic Protection is sought when an aggrieved foreign investor requests their home state 
to bring their claim against their host state on their behalf though diplomatic channels. The process is horizontal 
and more political than legal, with the outcome that the practical availability of Diplomatic Protection is subject 
to the willingness of the home state to take action against the offending host state. This effectively deprives all 
but the largest commercial actors of access to this remedy. See for example Brierly, J.L., The Law of Nations
(Oxford 1963) at p.277. Under Article 27, in the event a Washington Convention member state fails to enforce 
an ICSID award, the availability of Diplomatic Protection is revived. 
25 Sir Elihu Luaterpacht, in Schreuer, C, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge 2001), at pp.xi-xii 
26 John Adams, second President of the United States, said in 1796 that ‘there is no principle of the law of 
nations more firmly settled than that which entitles the property of strangers within the jurisdiction of another 
country in friendship with their own to the protection of its sovereign by all efforts in his power’. See Moore, 
J.B., A Digest of International Law (1906) 4:5, cited in Dolzer & Schreuer, above note 13 at 11239
procedural focus of the Washington Convention is the legacy of its designer, Aron Broches
27. 
During his tenure as General Counsel at the World Bank, Broches wisely concluded that the 
best way to maximise the security of international capital flows was not to attempt to reach an 
agreement on substantive standards for the rights of investors and their host states, but rather 
to  put  ‘procedure before substance’ and establish an  effective model for the impartial 
settlement of disputes
28. The guarantee of adjudicatory impartiality is, therefore, at the core of
the Washington Convention and the mandate of ICSID. 
3. ICSID
Article 1(1) of the Washington Convention establishes ICSID (‘the Centre’). The stated 
purpose of the Centre is to ‘provide facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of investment 
disputes between Contracting States and the nationals of other Contracting States’
29. The 
expression ‘Contracting State’ means  a member of the World Bank
30, but Article 67 is 
drafted to allow ICSID Administrative Council approved non-member states to sign the 
Convention
31. 
Article 2 of the Convention seats ICSID at the principal office of the World Bank, which is
Washington DC. The seat of an ICSID proceeding will be Washington unless the parties 
agree otherwise
32. Under Article 63(a) the parties may agree to conduct proceedings at the 
PCA or at the seat of another institution ‘with which the Centre has arrangements’. Although 
the Convention does use the word ‘seat’, the Centre is not by this designation subjected to 
municipal law in the same way a private arbitral tribunal (or ad hoc ISA tribunal) would be. 
In the sense of curial supervision,  ICSID is procedurally  stateless. This is due to the 
interaction of Articles 52 and 53 of the Washington Convention. Article 52 lists the grounds 
upon which annulment may be sought
33. These grounds are:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or 
   
27 Above note 13 at 20
28 Ibid
29 Washington Convention, Article 1(2)
30 Washington Convention, Article 67
31 In addition to Administrative Council approval, the applicant non-member state must be a party to the Statute 
of the ICJ. 
32 Washington Convention, Article 62
33 Washington Convention, Article 52(1)241
were last revised in 2006
40. Where the Convention and the Rules are silent on a matter of 
procedure, and the parties have not agreed on how to proceed, the Convention provides that 
the tribunal shall decide the question
41. Unless the parties select it, municipal procedural law 
has no role to play in ICSID arbitration. The lex arbitri of ICSID is therefore derived from 
non-national sources. In order of priority, these sources are: 
(1) The Washington Convention 
(2) The ICSID Arbitration Rules
(3) ICSID Jurisprudence 
These sources are examined below. It is beyond the scope of this Chapter to embark upon a 
full survey of the ICSID lex arbitri. The focus of this thesis is on bias challenges: how they 
are made and decided. As in ICA, in ICSID proceedings bias challenges can be made before, 
during or after the award is made. There is, however, one crucial difference to ICA – in
ICSID arbitration the parties do not have the right to plead bias at the enforcement stage. The 
Washington Convention has its own enforcement mechanism and does not rely upon the New 
York Convention for the enforcement of ICSID awards
42. The Washington Convention 
contains no equivalent to Article V (‘refusal to enforce’) of the New York Convention. The 
Article 54 ICSID enforcement mechanism is unidirectional:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention 
as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its 
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. 
It follows that domestic enforcement courts have no power to review ICSID awards
43; when a 
member state court is asked to enforce an ICSID award, all it is entitled to do is verify that 
the award is authentic
44. For the purposes of this study, the primary outcome of this limitation 
is that there is no public policy ground upon which to plead a denial of natural justice by ex 
post facto discovery of arbitrator bias. In an ICSID proceeding, the only post-award 
opportunity to plead bias is by motion for annulment under Article 52(1)(d). The sui generis
enforcement regime of the Washington Convention has the secondary outcome that ICSID 
   
40 The ICSID Arbitration Rules 2006 came into force on 10 April 2006
41 Washington Convention, Article 44
42 Above note 13 at p.288
43 Lew, J.D.M., Mistelis, L.A., Kroll, S.M., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer 2003), 
p.801
44 Above note 13 at p. 288242
tribunals are not de jure influenced by the enforcement practices of New York Convention 
member states or the doctrine of their courts. 
(1) The Washington Convention
A party to an ICSID proceeding may directly challenge an arbitrator at the appointment stage 
or during the arbitral proceedings. An indirect challenge may be made by application for 
annulment of the award under Article 52. The provisions of the Convention which regulate 
direct challenges are: 
Article 14 – Chapter 1 of the Convention sets out the process by which Contracting 
States may nominate arbitrators to the ICSID Panel. Under Article 13, each 
Contracting State may nominate four persons to the ICSID list. Article 14 states the 
qualities which a person must possess in order to be nominated as a Panel member or 
be appointed as an arbitrator in an ICSID proceeding. The requisite qualities are (1) 
high moral character, (2) technical expertise, and (3)  the capacity to exercise 
independent judgment. Regardless of whether they are party-appointed
45 or placed by 
the Chairman
46, where an arbitrator does not possess all three of these essential traits, 
that arbitrator can be directly challenged in accordance with Article 57. It is notable 
that the qualities of the arbitrator do not include impartiality
47.  
Article 38 – Chapter IV of the Convention governs the appointment of arbitrators by 
the Chairman of the Administrative Council
48.  Article 38 regulates default 
appointments by the Chairman. Article 38 creates a ‘Common Nationality 
Prohibition’, providing  that, in order to be eligible the appointees ‘shall not be 
nationals of the Contracting State party to the dispute or of the Contracting State 
whose national is a party to the dispute’. The purpose of the Common Nationality 
Prohibition is to avoid even the semblance of a lack of objectivity
49.
   
45 Above note 25 at p.515
46 Washington Convention, Article 40(2)
47 Notwithstanding the silence of Article 14, ICSID tribunals seem to interpret ‘independent judgement’ as 
including a requirement of impartiality. See for example para 42 of Suez v Argentina
48 The Chairman’s power to appoint is conditional upon (1) the lapse of ninety days since registration of the 
initial request for arbitration, and (2) request by a party to the arbitration. Once these conditions are met, the 
Chairman must consult the parties then make the appointment(s).
49 Above note 25 at p.495; the Prohibition applies to sole arbitrators (who it must be said are rare in ICSID 
proceedings), party-appointed arbitrators and ‘neutral’ chairs. An important limit upon the scope of the 
Common Nationality Prohibition is that it functions only in situations of default appointment by the Chairman 
pursuant to Article 38, and does not apply where the Chairman is designated as appointing authority under the 243
Article 57 – this article governs the process of challenging arbitrators. It allows for 
the challenge of any tribunal member on account of any fact indicating manifest lack 
of the qualities required of an arbitrator under Article 14(1) (ie. high moral character, 
expertise and independent judgment)
50. This  sets an ‘extremely high bar for 
challenging an arbitrator’
51. Significantly, vantage is not clarified: the black letters of 
Article 57 make no reference to any objective or ‘reasonable third person’ test. As 
will be observed, the first arm of Sussex Justices is, rather, a jurisprudential addition
to Article 57
52.    
Article 58 – decisions on challenges are taken by the unchallenged members of the 
tribunal itself. Where the challenge is made to a member of an annulment 
Commission, the same rule applies. Where the challenge is made to a sole arbitrator, 
or the tribunal or Commission is split on the challenge, the Chairman of ICSID shall 
decide finally. Generation Ukraine suggests that, in the rare event that the Chairman 
himself is conflicted out, the matter will be referred to the Secretary General of the 
PCA for final determination
53.    
Because the Washington Convention does not create a detailed enforcement objection 
mechanism, it is quiet on indirect (ie. post-award) bias challenges. There is really only one 
article on point: Article 52(1)(d) - ‘serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure’. 
This annulment sub-article has two compound elements: (1) the breach must be in respect of 
a rule of procedure that is fundamental, and (2) the breach of that rule must have been 
serious. A non-serious breach of a fundamental rule of procedure will not be enough; serious 
       
arbitration agreement. In such a situation the Chairman’s ad hoc appointment function is governed by Article 
37(2): see for example Mobil Oil Corporation and ors v New Zealand, ICSID Case ARB/87/2. In Mobil Oil v 
New Zealand the parties agreed in their contract that if the President of their three member ad hoc tribunal could 
not be appointed by agreement the Chairman of ICSID would appoint a New Zealand national. The matter went 
to the High Court of New Zealand. The High Court was required to consider inter alia whether this agreement 
was valid under Article 38. The question, therefore, was whether there was a conflict between Article 38 and 
Article 37(2) that caused the Common Nationality Prohibition to carry over into the ad hoc appointment 
process. The High Court held that the two articles do no conflict, and that the Article 38 Common Nationality 
Prohibition is live only in the context of Article 38 appointments: Attorney General v Mobil Oil NZ Ltd, New 
Zealand [1987] 2 NZLR 649 (High Court, Wellington, 1 July) 1987), 4 ICSID Reports 123
50 Article 57 also provides that a party may propose the disqualification of an arbitrator on the basis of offence 
to the Common Nationality Prohibition in Chapter IV. Under Article 40(2), arbitrators who are appointed from 
outside the ICSID Panel (which is the list of arbitrators) must also possess the mandatory qualities of an 
arbitrator under Article 14(1), with the effect that non-list arbitrators can also be challenged under Article 57. 
51 Reed, L., Paulsson, J., Blackaby, N., Guide to ICSID Arbitration (Kluwer 2004), p.81
52 See for example para 39-40 of the challenge decision in Suez v Argentina (Re Challenge to Arbitrator 
Kaufmann-Kohler), 
53 Generation Ukraine v Ukraine, ICSID Case ARB/00/9 (Award 16 September 2003)244
breach of a non-fundamental rule will be similarly excusable
54.  The  ‘fundamental rules’ 
referred to in Article 52 are different to the general procedural rules that bind an ICSID 
tribunal: ‘fundamental rules’ are restricted to principles of natural justice
55 which, it has been 
observed, are universally seen as including a rule against bias
56. The violation of the rule 
against bias would therefore need to be ‘serious’. The travaux preparatoires to the 
Convention make it clear that, in order to be ‘serious’, the breach must be ‘more than 
minimal’ and must have had the affect of depriving the applicant party of the benefit of the 
rule in question
57. The ad hoc annulment committee in Klockner I commented in obiter that a 
lack of impartiality would constitute a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure
58. To date, there are no published decisions on annulment applications founded on 
the ex post facto appearance of bias. 
(2) ICSID Arbitration Rules
In ICSID arbitration the parties are afforded considerable autonomy in the selection of 
procedural rules – the Washington Convention allows the parties to use rules other than the 
ICSID Rules (the most common alternative being the UNICTRAL Rules)
59. It is important to 
note, therefore, that  ICSID Rules do not necessarily apply to proceedings conducted at 
ICSID. The UNICITRAL Rules, for example, are often selected in ISA provisions within 
BIT’s, with the result that the Article 10(1) ‘justifiable doubts’ standard for challenge applies
in resulting  ICSID proceedings
60. Similarly, the ICSID Arbitration Rules do not apply to 
NAFTA Chapter 11 claims arbitrated at ICSID under the Additional Facility.  When the 
UNCITRAL Rules/Model Law standard is applicable, an ICSID tribunal may consider the 
doctrine and case law of Model Law states
61. ISA proceedings subject to the UNCITRAL 
Rules are sometimes consolidated with ICSID proceedings subject to the ICSID Rules. When 
   
54 MINE v Guinea, Decision on Annulment, 22 December 1989, 4 ICSID Reports 85, cited in Schreuer, above 
note 25, p.970
55 Above note 25 at p.969
56 Above note 43 at p.95
57 Above note 25 at p.971
58 Klockner v Cameroon at 130
59 Article 44 of the Washington Convention provides that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, any ICSID 
proceedings between the parties will be conducted in accordance with the ICSID Rules. 
60 Because Article 10(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules employs substantially the same wording as Model Law 
Article 12(2), the writer will not discuss the UNCITRAL Rules standard for challenge in this chapter.
61 Even where the ICSID Rules apply and no municipal jurisprudence is incorporated, ICSID tribunals 
sometimes still resort to the case law of leading seats for guidance on challenges. See for example Vivendi v 
Argentina at para 24, where the committee refers to the decision of the Paris Court of First Instance in Philipp 
Brothers v Drexel Burnham Lambert Ltd. 245
a challenge is made in mixed consolidated proceedings, it will be subject to separate tests 
applicable under each set of rules
62.
ICSID Rule 6 requires that arbitrators ‘judge fairly’. Much like the Article 7(2) of the ICC 
Rules,  ICSID  Rule  6(2)  requires that arbitrators sign a declaration of independence and 
provide a written statement of ‘past and present professional, business and other relationships 
(if any) with the parties’
63. The ICSID Rules were last amended in 2006
64. The changes 
included an addition to Rule 6(2) requiring that the arbitrator disclose ‘any other 
circumstances that might cause [his/her] reliability for independent judgment to be 
questioned by a party’ and, importantly, ‘assume a continuing obligation to promptly notify 
the Secretary General of the Centre of any such circumstance’
65. The first affect of the 2006 
amendments to Rule 6 is that the obligation to disclose extends beyond relationships (and, for 
example, into the realm of Pinochet-type sympathies and outcome preferences). The second 
affect is that, where before it was limited to past or present relationships, the Rule 6(2) 
obligation to disclose is now ongoing. And in Vivendi v Argentina (Re Challenge to President 
Fortier) the tribunal held that the Rule 6(2) disclosure obligation applies to members of ad 
hoc annulment committees as it does members of merits panels
66.  Another important 
jurisprudential extension of Rule 6(2) is that arbitrators have an ongoing (but limited) duty to 
investigate possible conflicts of interest
67.  
ICSID Rule 9 governs challenge procedure. Under Rule 9(1), the party ‘proposing 
disqualification’ must bring their challenge ‘promptly’. The ICSID Rules do not define what 
is ‘prompt’. Professor Schreuer has offered the opinion that ‘promptly’ means ‘as soon as the 
party concerned learns of the grounds for a possible disqualification’
68; in Suez v Argentina 
(Re Arbitrator Kaufmann-Kohler) the tribunal held 53 days was not prompt
69. Given their 
broad influence, it seems safe to say that something like the fifteen day limit imposed under 
the UNCITRAL Rules can be expected to apply. If the proposal to disqualify is not promptly 
made, the right to propose disqualification will be deemed to have been waived under Rule 
27.
   
62 See for example the second challenge to Professor Kaufmann-Kohler in Suez v Argentina
63 ICSID Arbitration Rule 6
64 The preceding amendments to the ICSID Rules took place in 1984 and 2003. 
65 The amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules came into force on 1 April 2006. Amendments were also 
made to the ICSID Financial Regulations. 
66 Vivendi Universal v Argentina (Re Challenge to President Fortier) at para 18
67 Suez v Argentina para 47
68 Above note 25 at p.1198
69 Suez v Argentina at para 26246
(3) ICSID Jurisprudence
As a preliminary matter, neither the Washington Convention nor the ICSID Rules adopt a 
doctrine of precedent. But due to the twin policy objectives of adjudicatory consistency and 
international rule-making, ICSID tribunals do tend to follow the decisions of other ICSID 
tribunals. We can safely say, therefore, that there is such a thing as ‘ICSID Jurisprudence’. 
Much like the jurisprudence of a court in a Civil Law state, ICSID jurisprudence consists of 
the decisions of ICSID tribunals and the doctrine of leading scholars of foreign investment 
law and dispute resolution. On questions of substantive law, ICSID tribunals increasingly 
refer to the decisions of ICSID and other ISA panels (a juridical practice which, the writer 
will demonstrate, is causing a rise in the number of Role/Issue Conflict challenges). On 
procedural matters, ICSID tribunals refer to the rules of arbitration established by other 
international bodies, and the general principles of international arbitration
70.  Challenge 
decisions often cite judgments of previous ICSID panels and the decisions of the courts of 
leading arbitral seats as persuasive authorities for the conclusions reached.  As has been 
observed in Chapter 6, ICSID tribunals often refer to and apply the IBA Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration when they decide challenge proposals.   
In preceding chapters, the writer has identified certain widely accepted principles which 
compliment  or inform the rule against arbitrator  bias, amongst which two are especially 
important: nemo judex and de minimis. Given the statelessness of the ICSID lex arbitri, the 
operation of these principles cannot be assumed. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish the 
place and function of these maxims in ICSID jurisprudence.  
(i) nemo judex in sua causa
As is to be expected, ICSID tribunals do recognise the rule that ‘no man may be a judge 
in his own cause’:  nemo judex informs the Article 14 requirement of independent 
judgement, and the ICSID Rule 6(2) disclosure obligation presupposes the operation of 
nemo judex. The force of this rule is also evident from the regularitywith which critics of 
ICSID cite the Centre’s institutional proximity to the World Bank: the ‘cause’ of the 
   
70 See for example the decision in Amco Asia Corp v Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case ARB/81/1 (Decision on 
Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator, 24 June 1982, unpublished), cited in Tupman, M, ‘Challenge and 
Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration’, Int & Comp L Q Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan., 
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Centre is identified as the cause of its parent, and the ICSID process is said to be 
illegitimate as a result
71. 
(ii) de minimis non curat lex
ICSID Tribunals have consistently confirmed that the challenge and disqualification 
articles of the Washington Convention are subject to de minimis. In pre-award challenges 
governed by Article 57, the circumstances which are said to deprive the arbitrator of his 
capacity to exercise independent judgment must be  ‘manifest’ and, it follows, 
significantly  more than trifling. Similarly, in an annulment application brought under 
Article 52(1)(d) the procedural breach must be ‘serious’. The record confirms that Article 
57 challenges are subject to de minimis: the tribunal in Amco Asia applied de minimis to 
dismiss a challenge to an arbitrator whose firm had a profit sharing arrangement with the 
lawyers for the claimant, and the annulment committee in Vivendi Universal v Argentina
confirmed the availability of the exception in obiter
72. In the context of Article 52, the use 
of the expression ‘more than minimal’ (to explain the meaning of the word ‘serious’) is a 
strong indication that de minimis functions in post-award settings as well. 
5. ICSID Challenge Decisions
The ICSID test is unique: the inter-operation of Articles 14(1) and 57 produces a rule that an 
ICSID arbitrator may only be challenged for bias where they manifestly lack the capacity to 
exercise independent judgment. No other arbitral institution or law uses this test. The key 
word is manifest. As a general rule, something will be ‘manifest’ when the court does not 
need the assistance of counsel to see it. The term is not uncommon in arbitration laws: some 
domestic arbitration statutes, for example, allow for judicial review of awards on the basis of 
‘manifest error of law’
73.  Internationally,  the notion of ‘manifest breach of procedural 
fairness’ is well developed in Anglo-American  foreign judgment enforcement contexts, 
where enforcement may be refused if the procedural public policy of the enforcing state is 
patently offended by the manner in which the foreign court reached its conclusion
74. 
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As has been observed, it was not until relatively recently that the ICSID case-load ‘took off’. 
Despite the comparative  paucity of reference,  ICSID tribunals have had a number of 
opportunities to consider the challenge and disqualification provisions of the Washington 
Convention. In fact, questions of independence arose in the very first ICSID case of Holiday 
Inns/Occidental Petroleum v Morocco
75.  In  Holiday Inns the Claimant’s arbitrator stood 
down after disclosing that he had become an outside director of Occidental Petroleum
76. 
Since then ICSID panels have varied in their approaches to the Article 57 term ‘manifest’. 
The  travaux preparatoires to the Washington Convention do not define or elucidate the 
expression. ‘Manifest’ has been interpreted to mean ‘obvious or evident’
77 and to ‘exclude 
reliance on speculative assumptions or arguments’
78, but not to bar challenges brought solely 
on the basis of appearances (ie. manifest does not mean actual)
79. And it certainly does not 
prevent the challenger from pleading matters unknown to, or undisclosed by, the arbitrator –
the appearance does not need to be manifest at the time the arbitrator sits, so long as the 
material facts of the challenge are proven later
80. Schreuer says the expression ‘manifest’ 
operates as an evidentiary condition which ‘imposes a relatively heavy burden of proof on the 
party making the proposal [to disqualify]’
81. The reader may recall that similar opinions were 
expressed by certain state courts in respect of the Gough ‘real danger’ test
82. This begs the 
question: which test for bias does the Article 14/57 most closely resemble: Sussex Justices, 
Porter v Magill or Gough? 
The writer is of the view that the test created by the Washington Convention is, in its black 
letters, closest to Gough. This opinion is based on the fact that (1) neither Article 14 nor 
Article 57 uses the word ‘reasonable’ or establishes a third person ‘objective observer’ 
vantage point, (2) the term ‘manifest’ is a usage of administrative law which implies court 
vantage and limited judicial review, and (3) the use of the word ‘manifest’ to preface the 
word ‘lack’ in Article 57 elevates the ICSID standard above that of a simple lack of capacity 
for independent judgment and, therefore, into the realm of evidentiary probability.  The 
writer’s opinion is, however, not unconditionally supported by the record – although early 
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81 Above note 22 at p.1200, cited in Vivendi v Argentina at para 24
82 See for example Webb v The Queen [1994] 181 CLR per Dean J at 71249
decisions (such as Amco v Indonesia) interpreted Article 57 as setting a strict test, in recent 
years ICSID tribunals have taken steps to lower the bar for bias challenges. The current trend 
is away from ‘real danger’ and towards the Sussex Justices test. In order to observe it, the 
pattern of challenges must be examined in chronological order. 
Amco Asia Corp & Ors v Indonesia; Re Arbitrator Rubins (1982)
This challenge arose out of ICSID proceedings on a claim brought by a group of three foreign 
investors against the Republic of Indonesia for the wrongful seizure of the Jakarta hotel 
Kartika Plaza on 1 April 1980. Indonesia challenged the Claimant’s appointee, Mr Seymour 
J. Rubin. The material facts of the challenge were that seven years earlier Mr Rubin had 
given tax advice to the individual who controlled the three corporate claimants. His firm also 
had an office and profit sharing arrangement with the lawyers for the Claimant, but neither 
Amco nor its controlling shareholder were clients of either firm
83. Although formally the 
arrangement ended before the arbitration started, for the first six months of proceedings the 
two firms still shared offices
84. Counsel for Indonesia argued that these facts deprived Mr 
Rubin of independence. The Claimant’s responded that Mr Rubin’s independence was not 
impaired, and that he was subject to a lower standard of independence (and thus a Sunkist-
type  higher threshold for challenge) because he was a party appointed  arbitrator.  In 
accordance with Article 58 of the Washington Convention, Indonesia’s challenge was 
decided by other members of the tribunal (Professors Goldman and Foighel). 
The challenge was dismissed: there was found to be no manifest risk of partiality because the 
services rendered by Mr Rubin to the Claimant’s principal shareholder were not in the nature 
of regular legal advice, their commercial significance was minimal (the fee for the advice 
being Canadian $450), and the links between the two law firms did not ‘create any
psychological risk of partiality’
85. In stressing the significance of the Article 57 expression
‘manifest’, the tribunal held that under the Washington Convention the challenger must prove 
not only the facts which indicate a lack of independence, but also that the lack is ‘highly 
probable’, not just ‘possible’ or ‘quasi-certain’
86. The tribunal reached conflicting 
conclusions on the Claimant’s argument that a separate standard of independence was 
   
83 The decision on the challenge to Arbitrator Rubins was not published. This summary of the materials facts 
draws on the discussion of the Amco Asia challenge in Tupman, above note 70 
84 Ibid at p.44
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appropriate for party appointed arbitrators, on the one hand stating that ‘no distinction can 
and should be made’, and on the other holding that a party arbitrator cannot be disqualified 
for relationship because the party appointing system presumes some acquaintance between 
the party and its appointed arbitrator
87.
The decision has been the subject of strong criticism by commentators. Writing in 1989, 
Tupman expressed the opinion that the tribunal in Amco Asia
imposed a standard that would tolerate virtually all prior business or professional 
relationship. Such a standard has no precedent in the municipal law of any country, 
and it is quite astonishing that it should have been applied in ICSID, with its unique 
and delicate balance of the rights of host states and foreign private investors
88
More recently the ad hoc annulment committee in Vivendi v Argentina commented in obiter:
The fact remains that [in Amco Asia] a lawyer-client relationship existed between the 
claimant and the arbitrator personally during the pendency ofthe arbitration; this must 
surely be a sufficient basis for a reasonable concern as to independence, unless the 
extent and content of the advice can really be regarded as minor and wholly discrete
[emphasis added]
89
Although this more recent criticism is conditional, it confirms the specific disapproval of the 
decision in Amco Asia and the general trend towards a softer Sussex Justices reading of 
Article 57. The  lasting value of Amco Asia lies  in its confirmation of the de minimis
exception to the rule of disqualification for prior services rather than its interpretation of the 
‘manifest lack of independent judgment’ standard (or its consideration of the  Sunkist 
distinction between party arbitrators and neutral chairs). The action taken by Indonesia in 
Amco Asia also sheds some light on the rather abstract, personal policy challenge brought by 
the Republic in the CalEnergy arbitration
90, a matter which has been said to provide ‘a virtual 
encyclopaedia of allegations of delay’
91.  
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Zhinvali Development v Georgia (2001)
Irish company Zhinvali commenced ICSID proceedings against Georgia for recovery of pre-
investment expenditures incurred in expectation of a contract for the rehabilitation of a power 
plant near Tbilisi
92. A proposal to disqualify was made by Georgia on the basis ofoccasional, 
purely social contacts between the arbitrator and an executive officer of the Zhinvali
93. 
Georgia’s challenge was decided by arbitrators Davis Robinson and Seymour Rubin (the 
arbitrator challenged in Amco Asia)
94. They dismissed the proposal, stressing the absence of 
any professional or commercial relationship between the arbitrator and the executive. In their 
unreported decision of 19 January 2001, the deciding members held that Georgia’s contention 
that ‘a merely occasional personal contact could manifestly affect the judgment of an 
arbitrator, in the absence of any further facts, was purely speculative’
95. The Zhinvali
challenge decision was cited with approval by the ICSID tribunal in the challenge to 
President Fortier in Vivendi v Argentina
96.
Vivendi Universal & Anor v Argentina; Re President Fortier (2001)
On 21 November 2000, an ICSID tribunal unanimously dismissed a claim brought by 
Argentine company Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and its parent (multinational 
water services company Vivendi Universal) against the Argentine Republic in relation to the 
regulation of utility  prices following the financial crisis of 1999
97.  In March 2001 the 
unsuccessful  Claimants applied for annulment of the award under Article 52 of the 
Washington Convention. In accordance with Article 52(3) the President of the ICSID 
Administrative Council appointed three list-arbitrators to the ad hoc annulment committee. 
The appointees included Canadian Yves Fortier QC, and the members agreed that Mr Fortier 
would be the President of the committee. When his fellows made their Rule 6 declarations of 
independence, Mr Fortier qualified his position. After reserving its rights at first, Argentina
challenged President Fortier. The material facts of the challenge were that one of the partners 
at Mr Fortier’s firm Ogilvy Renault had  given advice on Quebec tax law to Vivendi’s 
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corporate predecessor, Compagnie Generale des Eaux. Mr Fortier was not personally 
involved and the tax matter was unrelated to the claim against Argentina. 
An important threshold issue was whether ICSID Rule 9 (Disqualification of Arbitrators) 
applies to members of ad hoc annulment committees. This was raised and addressed by the 
committee  sua sponte. ICSID Rule 9 does not refer to annulment committees or their 
members, only ‘Tribunals’ and ‘arbitrators’. The committee held that the intention of the 
Administrative Council to apply ICSID Rule 9 to ad hoc committees could be inferred from 
the history of the Rules: the key event was the 1984 amendment of ICSID Rule 53 (which 
concerns the rules of procedure for annulment committees) to extend the application of 
Chapter 1 of the ICSID Rules (in which ICSID Rule 9 falls) to post-award panels
98. Prior to 
1984, only Chapters II to V of the ICSID Rules applied to post-award committees. Today, 
such a question would not arise because the 2003 amendments to the ICSID Rules removed 
the specific article and chapter references in Article 53, replacing them with the catch-all 
phrase ‘the provisions of these Rules’. 
The challenge was dismissed. Although they criticised the Amco Asia decision
99, the 
committee members agreed with the earlier tribunal that the effect of Article 57 was to 
preclude reliance on ‘mere speculation or inference’
100. Guided by this reading, the deciding 
members – Professor James Crawford SC and Professor Jose Carlos Fernandez Rozas – held 
that there was no reason to regard Mr Fortier’s independence as impaired by the facts 
disclosed
101. More generally, the committee held that an arbitrator’s professional relationship 
with a party is not an automatic basis for disqualification, and that ‘all the circumstances need 
to be considered in order to determine whether the relationship is significant enough to justify 
entertaining reasonable doubts as to the capacity of the arbitrator or member to render a 
decision freely and independently’. The test the deciding members applied was 
Whether a real risk of lack of impartiality based upon those facts (and not on any 
mere speculation or inference) could  reasonably be apprehended by  either party
[emphasis added]
102
   
98 Vivendi v Argentina at para 9
99 Vivendi v Argentina at para 22
100 Vivendi v Argentina at para 25
101 Vivendi v Argentina at para 27
102 Vivendi v Argentina at para 25253
This awkward formulation of the Article 14/57 test is a creole of the second arms of Gough
and Sussex Justices: it merges ‘real risk’ with ‘reasonable apprehension’. The footnote to it 
refers to the then-recent English decisions in Saudi Cable and Re Medicaments
103. The reader 
will recall that the court of Saudi Cable followed the ‘real danger’ test; the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Re Medicaments to apply a ‘real possibility’ reformulation of the Gough
test paved the way for Porter v Magill. As such, the committee in Vivendi was guided by a 
body of municipal jurisprudence that was in transition. This explains why the phrases ‘real 
risk’ and ‘reasonably be apprehended’- which the writer has identified as competing second 
arms of the test for apparent bias- are wedded in the Vivendi judgment
104. Because the two
expressions cannot co-exist, the Vivendi annulment committee’s interpretation of the Article 
14/57 test is of limited value as a statement of law.   
That is not to say, however, that the decision is without value as a precedent. Importantly, the 
deciding members held that where reasonable doubts as to the capacity for independent 
judgment are justified, the challenge will still be subject to the de minimis rule. Although the 
facts of the challenge did not require substantive consideration of the principle, the members 
did comment in obiter that the fee rendered by Mr Fortier’s firm in the ‘relevant period’ 
(which the members defined as being the period after the proceedings against Argentina 
commenced) was in their view a de minimis sum
105.
SGS v Pakistan; Re Arbitrator Thomas (2002)
SGS challenged Pakistan’s party arbitrator, Mr J Christopher Thomas, on the basis of his 
connections with counsel for Pakistan (Freshfields partner Jan Paulsson). The particulars of 
the Claimant’s challenge were that three years earlier Arbitrator Thomas had been counsel for 
the successful respondent in an ICSID arbitration (Azinian v Mexico
106) in which Mr Paulsson 
was an arbitrator, and that the partial manner in which the tribunal in Azinian decided in 
favour of Mr Paulsson’s client created a reasonable appearance that Arbitrator Thomas would 
‘return the favour’ in the instant matter. SGS said that the subsequent appointment of Mr 
Paulsson as president of a tribunal in an action in which Mr Thomas was advising a party 
supported the appearance of bias. 
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The deciding arbitrators dismissed the challenge. Reading Article 57 of the Convention, the 
members concluded that   
the party challenging an arbitrator must establish facts, of a kind or character as 
reasonably to give rise to the inference that the person challenged clearly may not be 
relied upon to exercise independent judgment in the particular case where the 
challenge is made
107
The tribunal held that the Claimant’s challenge was ‘bereft of any basis in the fact of this 
proceeding’, and characterised the proposal as ‘simply a supposition, a speculation 
merely’
108. Significantly, the word ‘manifest’ was taken as meaning ‘clearly and objectively’; 
the deciding members identified its function as a test for whether the inference that 
independence is lacking should be drawn
109. In its acceptance of inference as a basis for 
disqualification, the obiter in SGS conflicts with other ICSID challenge decisions. Inference 
was expressly rejected as a basis for challenge in Amco Asia and Vivendi v Argentina
110. In 
light of the broader pattern, the real contribution of the SGS decision was to open the door for 
the use of an objective ‘reasonable person’ test. 
Canfor Corporation v The United States of America (2003)
This challenge arose out of arbitral proceedings brought under NAFTA Chapter 11. In July 
2002, Canfor Corporation and Tembec Inc (both Canadian producers of softwood lumber) 
filed NAFTA claims concerning countervailing duty and anti-dumping measures adopted by 
the United States in relation to Canadian softwood lumber products
111. One year before his 
appointment, in a speech to a Canadian Government council, the Claimant’s arbitrator
described US government measures on softwood lumber ‘harassment’. The legitimacy and 
affect of US Government softwood lumber policy was live in the dispute. Upon learning of 
these comments, the US proposed disqualification. 
The challenge was referred to the Secretary General of ICSID under the Additional Facility. 
In March 2003 the Secretary General wrote to the challenged arbitrator informing him that if 
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he did not stand down a decision upholding the US challenge would be issued
112. The 
arbitrator resigned. Although no formal decision was made, the Secretary General still 
expressed a clear view in favour of the challenge: Uni-Inter Bias was made out. This decision 
provides an early glimpse of ICSID jurisprudence on ‘Issue Conflict’ in NAFTA 
proceedings.  
Generation Ukraine v Ukraine; Re Arbitrator Voss (2003)
The challenge in Generation Ukraine
113 raised the problem of Grundel Bias at ICSID. The 
challenged arbitrator - Dr Juergen Voss - was appointed by the Ukraine in ICSID proceedings 
commenced by Generation Ukraine. The Claimant challenged Dr Voss on the basis that he 
had, during his time as Deputy General Counsel of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency  (MIGA,  a  member of the World Bank Group) been involved in studies and 
investment policy reviews of Ukraine for the OECD. The Claimant’s concern was that Dr 
Voss had developed personal connections with Ukrainian political officials
114, and that these 
personal connections would deprive him of the capacity for independent judgment. The 
deciding arbitrators (Jan Paulsson and Eugene Salpius) were divided on the Claimant’s 
disqualification proposal, and in accordance with Article 58 the challenge went to the 
Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council for final determination
115. It was at this point 
that the matter took on the colour of Grundel: because Dr Voss was being challenged on the 
basis of his relationship with a World Bank Agency (MIGA), and the person being asked to 
judge his independence was the President of the World Bank, there was a potential breach of 
nemo judex in sua causa. 
In an ad hoc procedure that has been described as ‘original and unparalleled’
116, the President
of ICSID referred the challenge to the Secretary General of the PCA in The Hague. The 
Secretary General of the PCA considered the matter and made a recommendation that the 
proposal to disqualify Dr Voss be dismissed
117. This recommendation was accepted by the 
Chairman of ICSID, and the challenge was rejected. The arbitration resumed and the 
investor’s claim was ultimately rejected. Commentators have praised the approach taken by 
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ICSID in Generation Ukraine. According to Nigel Blackaby, the procedure adopted 
demonstrates that ‘the [ICSID] Chairman and the [World] Bank as a whole have perfectly 
understood that it was in the public interest to have an independent and impartial tribunal’ 
determine the challenge to Dr Voss
118. In the context of this Chapter, the sua sponte decision 
of the President to refer to the PCA must be seen as an expression of tacit approval for Lord 
Hewart’s dictum that ‘justice must be seen to be done’ and, therefore, a step towards the
jurisprudential implementation of a Sussex Justices test in ICSID proceedings.
Grand River Enterprises & Ors v The United States of America; Re Arbitrator Anaya
(2007)
Grand River Enterprises  commenced arbitration against the United States in response to
agreements reached by the US Government with certain tobacco companies. Like Canfor, the 
Grand River claim was brought under NAFTA Chapter 11
119. Grand River - a cigarette 
manufacturer owned by a Canadian First Nations group – appointed Professor James Anaya. 
The US challenged Professor Anaya on the basis that he was advocate for certain Native 
American groups in proceedings against the US before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the UN Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD). The US claimed that justifiable doubts arose as to Professor Anaya’s ability to 
impartially judge the NAFTA claim, because his participation in the Human Rights matters 
suggested he had predetermined the issue of US compliance with international obligations. 
The challenge went to the Secretary General of ICSID. The relevant standard was 
UNCITRAL Rule 11(1). On 23 October 2007 the Secretary General wrote to Professor 
Anaya’s informing him that his role as advocate before CERD was incompatible with his 
function as arbitrator in the NAFTA matter, and asked if he would continue to act as advocate 
in the CERD proceedings
120. Professor Anaya responded that he would not, but that he would 
continue to assist law students in relation to Human Rights advocacy work they were doing 
for the Western Shoshone people. Applying the ‘justifiable doubts’ standard posited by the 
UNCITRAL Rule 11(1) the Secretary General found that Professor Anaya’s advisory work 
was not inconsistent with his role as arbitrator, and was not on its own enough to cause 
justifiable doubts to arise. The US challenge was accordingly dismissed.   
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Suez & Ors v Argentina; Re Arbitrator Kaufmann-Kohler (No.1) (2007)
This challenge also arose out of the Latin American ‘Water Wars’
121.  There were three 
parallel ICSID proceedings: two were governed by the ICSID Rules and one by the 
UNCITRAL Rules. The parties to the UNCITRAL Rules proceedings (English company 
Anglian Water Group and the Republic of Argentina) agreed that ICSID would administer 
their action
122. The parties could not agree on the number of arbitrators or their method of 
appointment, and a three member tribunal was constituted in accordance with Article 37(2) of 
the Washington Convention. Argentina appointed Venezuelan Professor Pedro Nikken; the 
Claimants  (who included French water-services multinational Suez) appointed Swiss 
Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler.  ICSID  appointed  American  Professor Jeswald 
Salacuse as President of the tribunal. Rule 6 declarations of independence were made and the 
tribunal was constituted on 7 June 2004. On 12 October 2007, after only one of the three 
merits hearings had been conducted, Argentina filed an Article 57 challenge to Professor
Kaufmann-Kohler. It is worth noting that Professor Kaufmann-Kohler was a member of the 
Working Party that produced the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration.  
The basis of the challenge was that Professor Kaufmann-Kohler had been a member of the 
ICSID tribunal in the first Vivendi  claim  against Argentina  (from which the annulment 
proceedings and challenge to Yves Fortier QC arose). Argentina argued that the award of 
US$105 million in favour of Vivendi and its partner revealed
a  prima facie lack of impartiality...made evident through the most prominent 
inconsistencies of the award that result in the total lack of reliability towards Ms 
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler
123  
The alleged inconsistencies in the award were factual and evidentiary. The proposal turned on 
time limits: the tribunal was not notified of the challenge until 52 days after Argentina 
became aware of Professor Kaufmann-Kohler’s involvement in the Vivendi award. In respect 
of the UNCITRAL Rules proceeding, in which the fifteen day time limit imposed by Article 
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11(1) applied, the tribunal found that Argentina’s challenge was out of time
124. The tribunal 
reached the same result under the ICSID Rules, holding that the challenge to Professor 
Kaufmann-Kohler was not ‘prompt’ for the purposes of ICSID Rules 9(1)
125. Although it was 
strictly unnecessary, the deciding members did comment in obiter that the challenge was 
without merit: it relied on the inference that Professor Kaufmann-Kohler was biased against 
Argentina simply because she was a member of a tribunal that made a unanimous award 
against the Republic six years earlier. The tribunal concluded that the effect of Article 57 was 
to deprive parties of the right to challenge on inference and the  ‘mere  belief’ that 
independence is lacking
126.
The tribunal compared the Spanish and English versions of Article 14, noting that the 
difference in language raised a question of whether the Article 14/57 test implies an objective 
or subjective standard for apparent bias challenges
127. The deciding members held that the 
terms of Article 57 (in particular, the word ‘manifest’) implied a requirement that the 
challenger lead ‘evidence that a reasonable person would accept as establishing the absence 
of the qualities required by Article 14’
128. This is an approximation of the first arm of Sussex 
Justices, but an oversimplification of the objective test. As has been observed, there are two 
semantic options for an objective test: ‘reasonable  person’ and ‘reasonable  court’. The 
Gough test uses the latter, but it is no less objective. The writer’s view is that the Gough
approach  is required by the Washington Convention, and should have been taken in the 
challenge to Professor Kaufmann-Kohler.  In the writer’s submission,  the Article 57 
expression ‘manifest’ is an administrative legal device which is usually interpreted as 
requiring that a defect be apparent to the court without the assistance of counsel. Court 
vantage - rather than the view of the hypothetical third person- is more properly implied in 
the term ‘manifest’.   
Suez & Ors v Argentina; Re Arbitrator Kaufmann-Kohler (No.2) (2008)
Shortly after the dismissal of its first proposal, Argentina challenged Professor Kaufmann-
Kohler again. The second challenge was filed after Argentina discovered that in 2006 
Professor Kaufmann-Kohler had been elected to the supervisory board of Swiss bank UBS. 
The relationship between UBS and the claimants was that UBS held a 2.1% stake in Suez,
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and a 2.38% stake in Vivendi
129. Argentina’s second challenge extended to two other ICSID 
proceedings  against the Republic in which Professor Kaufmann-Kohler was also an 
arbitrator:  Electriciadad Argentina SA & EDF International SA v Argentina
130 and EDF 
International, SAUR International SA & Leon Participaciones Argentinas SA v Argentina
131. 
Argentina’s challenge also pleaded the Rule in Dimes: as a non-executive director of UBS
Professor Kaufmann-Kohler received a proportion of her remuneration in UBS stock, making 
her an indirect shareholder in the claimant companies
132. Argentina alleged that Professor 
Kaufmann-Kohler failed to disclose these facts in accordance with ICSID Rule 6(2) and 
UNCITRAL Rule 9.    
In their decision of  12 May 2008, Arbitrators Nikken and Salacuse dismissed the second 
challenge. The deciding members applied the different tests required under the Washington 
Convention and UNCITRAL Rules (the latter applying to the AWG claim due to the 
operation of Article 8(3) of the Argentina-UK BIT), effectively separating the 
disqualification proceedings. The challenge subject to the UNCITRAL Rules was quickly 
dismissed. Argentina’s argument that Professor Kaufmann-Kohler was under a duty to 
disclose that she was a director of UBS and that UBS had interests in the international water 
sector was without merit. UBS had no interest in Anglian Water Group, and common 
involvement in the water sector was ‘too remote and tenuous as to hardly be called a 
connection or relationship at all’
133. Accordingly, Professor  Kaufmann-Kohler had not 
breached UNCITRAL Rule 9 by failing to disclose her UBS directorship, and no ‘justifiable 
doubts’ arose under UNCITRAL Rule 10(1). 
In respect of the challenge subject to the Washington Convention, the deciding members 
cited Amco Asia as persuasive authority for the proposition that Article 57 imposes a ‘heavy 
‘burden’ on the challenger to prove that the lack of capacity for independent judgment is 
‘highly probable’, not just ‘possible’
134. The decisions in SGS v Pakistan and  Vivendi v 
Argentina (Re President Fortier) were also cited in support of this interpretation
135. On the 
question of whether the link between Professor Kaufmann-Kohler, UBS and the Claimants 
caused a manifest lack of independence, the deciding members held that ‘such connections 
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are increasingly easy to make as globalisation of modern life rapidly advances and countless 
institutions engage in activities that are global in scope’
136. The connection between an 
arbitrator and a party ‘must be evaluated qualitatively’ in order to determine whether the lack 
of independence is manifest
137. Noting that no ISCID tribunal had to date been confronted 
with the question of bias by portfolio, the deciding members saw fit to inclusively list four 
criteria for the qualitative evaluation of the connection: 
(1) Proximity: how closely connected is the arbitrator to the relevant party?
(2) Intensity:  how intense and frequent are the interactions between the challenged 
arbitrator and the relevant party? 
(3) Dependence: to what extent is the challenged arbitrator dependent upon the relevant 
party for benefits flowing from the connection?
(4) Materiality:  to what extent are the benefits that flow to the arbitrator from the 
connection with the relevant party significant and material?
138
Factor (3) draws on nemo judex and the Rule in Dimes; factor (4) is an incorporation of de 
minimis. The tribunal held that, despite Argentina’s contentions, the connection between UBS 
and the Claimants did not satisfy the four criteria: UBS were a ‘passive, portfolio investor’ 
rather than an ‘active’ and ‘strategic’ investor (as Argentina contended)
139. Given the scale 
and scope of its global operations, the share price of UBS did not depend upon the value or 
profitability of  its interests in Suez or Vivendi. Because a decision against the claimants 
would have had no significant effect on UBS
140, the compensation received by Professor 
Kaufmann-Kohler for performance of her duties as a director would be similarly unaffected
by the award
141. 
On the remaining question ofwhether her failure to disclose her UBS directorship constituted 
a manifest lack of capacity for independent judgment, the tribunal also ruled against 
Argentina. Before deciding on this ground of the challenge, the tribunal was required to 
determine whether the 2003 ICSID Rules obliged Professor Kaufmann-Kohler to disclose a 
matter that arose after the constitution of the tribunal. The deciding members held that
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although the 2003 form of ICSID Rule 6 did not expressly impose an ongoing (or post-
constitutional) disclosure obligation on arbitrators, the old rule did contain an implied 
ongoing obligation of disclosure
142. As to the particulars of the matter not disclosed, the 
tribunal found that  Professor  Kaufmann-Kohler was not involved in the day-to-day 
management of UBS and was unaware that UBS owned shares in Suez or Vivendi until 
reading Argentina’s second disqualification proposal
143. Professor Kaufmann-Kohler could 
not disclose a relationship of which she was unaware. The tribunal found that Rule 6 created 
no specific requirement to investigate possible conflicts of interest: the deciding members 
commented in obiter that the only basis for implying such a duty would be in a situation in 
which an arbitrator had ‘reasons to conjecture that a possible circumstance exists’
144. Given 
that Professor Kaufmann-Kohler was under such a limited obligation to inquire as to possible 
conflicts of interest, and considering that she did go through a conflict checking process with 
UBS (in which she gave confidential descriptions of her appointments as arbitrator), her 
failure to inquire into the possibility of a remote connection between UBS and the claimants
did not constitute a manifest lack on independent judgment. Argentina’s proposal was 
dismissed in full and orders terminating the suspension of the arbitration were made. 
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda dd v Slovenia; Re David Mildon QC (2008)
This challenge was unique: it involved  a rare form of  ASM Shipping Familiarity  - an 
objection to counsel, rather than to the arbitrator. The Claimant (the Croatian national 
electricity company) requested arbitration against the Republic of Slovenia on 4 November 
2005
145. After preliminary hearings in July 2006, the matter was booked for a two week 
hearing in Paris starting 5 May 2008
146. On 25 April 2008 the lawyers for the Respondent 
sent the tribunal their list of attendees. The list named David Mildon QC of Essex Court 
Chambers as counsel for the Respondent. The President of the ICSID tribunal (David A.R. 
Williams QC) was a door tenant at Essex Court. At no point prior had the Respondent 
advised the tribunal or the Claimant that Mr Mildon would be presenting part of its defence at 
the Paris hearing. The Claimant wrote to the Respondent seeking disclosure of the personal 
and professional relationship that existed between Mr Mildon and the President, clarification 
of the role Mr Mildon was to play in Paris, and the chronology of his engagement as 
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counsel
147 The Respondent’s lawyers replied that no relationship, professional or otherwise, 
existed between the President and Mr Mildon, but refused to disclose when Mr Mildon had 
been retained or the nature of the role he would play at the hearing
148. 
The correspondence continued: the lawyers for the Claimant contended that their client 
(Slovenia) was entirely foreign to the London Chambers system, and derived no comfort 
from the status of English barristers as separate, self-employed legal practitioners. It was put 
that Slovenia would not have consented to the appointment of Mr Williams as President had 
it known that he was a door tenant in the same chambers as counsel for the Respondent. The 
Claimant identified the failure to disclose the appointment of Mr Mildon as a breach of 
General Standards 3 and 7 of the IBA Guidelines, which require prompt disclosure by both 
arbitrators and parties of problematic circumstances. The lawyers for the Respondent replied 
that neither IBA General Standard 3 dealt with disclosure by arbitrators, and General 
Standard 7 disclosure by arties - neither dealt with disclosure by lawyers. After the 
Respondent again refused to give the chronology of Mr Mildon’s appointment, the Claimant 
gave notice that it would make an objection to his involvement at the outset of proceedings in 
Paris
149.
Slovenia objected to Mr Mildon on the first day of the hearing. The ICSID tribunal –whose 
members included the President – was required to determine two questions: (1) did it have 
the power to make an order disqualifying counsel, and (2) should such an order be made in 
the circumstances
150. With respect the first question, the Tribunal referred to ICSID Rule 6 
(judge fairly), Rule 18 (notice of counsel), Rule 19 (the tribunal shall make orders required 
for the conduct of the proceeding), and Rule 39 (power to make provisional measures for the 
preservation of a party’s rights)
151. Washington Convention Article 56(1) (the immutability of 
ICSID tribunals) played a pivotal role: under this principle a properly constituted tribunal 
cannot be changed once the proceedings have begun
152.  The IBA Guidelines and their 
Background Information (namely Paragraph 4.5
153) were also cited with approval by the 
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tribunal. Relying on Scheuer’s commentary the tribunal concluded that ‘as a judicial 
formation governed by public international law’
154 it did have the inherent power to make 
orders necessary to preserve the integrity of its proceedings, and that this inherent power 
included the power to disqualify counsel
155. With respect to the second question, the fact that 
Slovenia was foreign to the London Chambers system, coupled with the Respondent’s 
conscious decision not to inform the Claimant of its choice of counsel, had ‘created an 
atmosphere of apprehension and distrust which it is important to dispel’
156. The members 
decided that Mr Mildon’s continued participation in the proceedings could indeed lead a 
reasonable observer to form a justifiable doubt as to the impartiality or independence of the 
President of the tribunal
157. On these grounds the tribunal made orders that Mr Mildon could 
not participate any further in the proceedings.
At first glance, this unprecedented decision seems to turn on its own facts. Three points stand 
out. Firstly, the party challenging counsel (Slovenia) was not a Common Law state and had 
no familiarity with the customs of the English Bar (such as the Cab Rank Rule or the status of 
barristers as independent sole practitioners). Secondly, the party opposing the challenge had 
refused to give particulars of counsel’s engagement in its replies to the Claimant’s letters of 
inquiry and demand. Finally, if the tribunal did not disqualify counsel, then there would have 
been an appearance of partiality that required the President to stand down. As the proceedings 
were well advanced, the replacement of the President was not an option. As a matter of law, 
to do so would have gone against the principle of immutability enshrined in Washington 
Article 56(1). But one closer examination, the decision may have broader implications for 
ICSID and ICA. It is fundamental that parties have the right to counsel of their choice - this is 
ICSID Rule 9. But the accepted fundamentality of the right to counsel does not, it seems, 
render it an absolute procedural rule: where the choice of counsel imperils the integrity of the 
process, the right will be trumped. It remains to be seen whether this decision is a one-off -
the ‘Pinochet ofICSID jurisprudence’, if you like – or the first line of a new spell in the book 
of Black Arts. The writer suspects it is the latter. 
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6. Role/Issue Conflict and the Problem of Precedent
The jurisprudence of foreign investment law is in a phase of rapid development. As in ICA, 
party autonomy allows the parties to agree on the law applicable to the substance of their 
dispute. Failing express choice, the law governing the merits of a claim will be derived from 
the law of the state party, including relevant conflict of laws rules, and ‘such rules of 
international law as may be applicable’
158. The expression ‘rules of international law’ has the 
same meaning as under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ
159. ICJ Article 38(1) lists the 
sources of international law as being international conventions, international customs, general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations, judicial decisions and the doctrine of 
eminent scholars
160. As Schreuer notes, the Statute of the ICJ was drafted with state-state 
disputes in mind; the ‘neat categories’ contemplated by ICJ Article 38(1) do not necessarily 
‘conform to the complex realities of international practice’
161. ICSID tribunals are, therefore, 
engaged in a limited but constant process of bespoke rule-making. The development and 
recognition of the customary law of foreign investment is where this process is most visible. 
The record shows that ICSID tribunals most often apply customary law to questions of state 
responsibility, denial of justice, nationality and the legality of expropriation
162. As has been 
observed, ICSID tribunals regularly cite and follow earlier ICSID challenge decisions when
they determine proposals for disqualification. Similarly, the published awards of ICSID 
tribunals are the best source of the customary substantive law of foreign investment. 
Although the Washington Convention does not posit a doctrine of precedent, the practice of 
following earlier decisions is increasingly common in ICSID arbitration. The subject matter 
of ICSID arbitration is the chief reason for this practice: because the same issues arise over 
and over between investors and host states (such as the foreign investor’s entitlement to fair 
and equitable treatment), each award’s persuasive value as an expression of customary law is 
increased by a recurring congruency of facts. Leading ISA practitioners have confirmed the 
trend towards precedent: according to Philippe Fouchard, Emmanuel Gaillard and Berthold 
Goldman, ICSID awards ‘naturally serve as precedents’
163; Albert Jan van den Berg has 
observed that ‘there is a tendency to create a true arbitral case law’ in the field of investment 
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disputes
164; in 2005 Pierre Duprey noted the similarity between ISA awards and judicial case 
law
165. There are, naturally, strong arguments against these opinions. The claim that ISA 
awards enjoy some kind of de facto precedential status is weakened by the fact that that the 
law of foreign direct investment is in its infancy: it may be that we are bound to see some 
consistency in ISA awards at this stage of the game because the rules are still primary; the 
appearance of consistency may well vanish once secondary rules (or ‘the rules of the rules’) 
develop and the jurisprudence of ISA fragments. It is, of course, too early to tell.  
In the writer’s opinion, ICSID awards do appear to be, and are treated more and more like,
precedents. Whilst this has gone some way to achieving the policy objective of adjudicatory 
consistency, it has collided with the reversible personality of the arbitrator. The problem is 
that, unlike in a municipal setting - where case law is generated by individuals (judges) who 
serve only as rule-makers - in arbitration the rule-makers are also the rule-users; ‘counsel one 
day, arbitrator the next’. Significantly, it is from their role as rule users that most leading 
arbitrators make their money:  although there are some notable exceptions, for most 
practitioners  the function of arbitrator is not especially lucrative
166, at least not when 
compared to the money that can be made arguing the case. It follows that, as a precedent, an 
award may assume a commercial value when an arbitrator ‘changes hats’ to counsel: he may 
get the benefit of a rule he made. If an arbitral award has weight as a precedent, can the 
arbitrators who made it subsequently argue for its application when they appear before other 
tribunals as counsel? And would there be a risk that in deciding the earlier matter they were 
generating case law for their client’s benefit in the latter? These pressing questions are 
currently being debated in the context of ‘Issue Conflict’, one form of which the writer has 
termed Telekom Malaysia bias
167.
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ISA Issue Conflicts are to be distinguished from Issue Conflicts in ICA. In ICA, Issue 
Conflicts tend to focus on the arbitrator’s previous expressions of opinion in lectures (Uni-
Inter Bias
168) and their consecutive service in matters of similar or identical facts (which gave 
rise to the challenge in Qatar v Creighton
169). But in investment arbitration, Issue Conflicts 
can arise out of wholly separate (but concurrent or consecutive) arbitral proceedings. 
Although Qatar v Creighton situations do sometimes arise in ISA
170, because of the emerging 
doctrine of precedent the conflict is more between roles than issues – between the role of 
rule-maker and the role of rule-user. In this sense, ‘Role Conflict’ may be a better name for 
this type of challenge. The appeal in Eureko v Poland illustrates the new problem of 
Role/Issue Conflict in ISA. The first appeal in Eureko v Poland has been discussed in 
Chapter 3. Poland claimed that arbitrator Stephen Schwebel was related to the lawyers for the 
Claimant: they had offices in the same building. The Brussels Court of First Instance 
dismissed Poland’s challenge. On appeal, Poland raised Role/Issue Conflict. Schwebel was 
co-counsel with Sidley Austin in an unrelated concurrent ICSID arbitration (Vivendi v 
Argentina
171), and Shwebel and Messrs Sidley Austin cited the Eureko award as authority for 
certain propositions they were making on behalf of their clients against Argentina before the 
ICSID tribunal. The legal issue common to the both proceedings was the interpretation of the 
investment treaty obligation of fair and equitable treatment. 
The question for the court was whether Schwebel’s impartiality was cast into doubt by the 
fact that he participated as arbitrator in the making of an award in one arbitration (Eureko v 
Poland) that would be persuasive authorityfor his arguments as counsel in another (Vivendi v 
Argentina). The Belgian Court of Appeals declined to rule on Poland’s additional objection: 
Poland failed to notify the arbitrators in accordance with the Belgian procedural rules or 
make the Role/Issue Conflict argument before the Court of First Instance. Although the 
Brussels Court of Appeals did not rule on the merits of Poland’s challenge, there is no reason 
to suspect that the conclusion would have been any different to that reached by the District 
Court of The Hague in Telekom Malaysia. If anything, the evidence in Eureko v Poland was 
much stronger: Schwebel actually cited his award against Poland in the submissions he made 
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as counsel for Vivendi, proving the point that in the two matters Schwebel was playing the 
roles of rule-maker and rule-user consecutively. On the other side of the Atlantic, Argentina 
objected to Vivendi’s reliance on the Eureko award, making a formal request to the ICSID 
tribunal to have the record stricken of any reference to the decision. Although the merits of 
Argentina’s objection were not formally decided, commentators have inferred from the 
citation of the Eureko decision in the final award that the ICSID tribunal rejected Argentina’s 
position
172. This does not mean, however, that Role/Issue Conflict cannot found a challenge 
in an ICSID proceedings: the position taken by the Secretary General in Canfor Corporation
suggests that it is a valid basis for proposing disqualification in an ICSID proceeding; the 
decision in Grand River Enterprises suggests that even the broadest issues (such as a state’s 
compliance with ‘international commitments’) may be actionable. But neither Canfor nor 
Grand River was decided under the ‘manifest apparent bias’ test prescribed by Article 57 of 
the Washington Convention, and neither challenge raised the Eureko/Vivendi ‘problem of 
precedent’. Nevertheless, it can be surmised from the preference for Sussex Justices displayed 
by ICSID arbitrators that Role/Issue conflict of the Eureko/Vivendi type would amount to 
‘manifest lack of capacity for independent judgment’ under Article 57.  
7. Reasons for the trend towards Sussex Justices
It is clear from the record that, despite the fact that they are equipped with the high ‘black 
letter’ threshold for disqualification set by Article 57, ICSID panels are softening in their 
approach to bias challenges. Reliance on inference, as well as the use of the ‘reasonable fair 
minded observer’, is now permissible. These sua sponte doctrinal developments beg the 
question: why are ICSID tribunals moving away from the high bar of the ‘manifest apparent 
bias’ test towards the Sussex Justices model? In the writer’s view, the explanations can be 
found in the policy pressures flowing from the institutional proximity of ICSID to the World 
Bank and the cross-pollination of ICSID jurisprudence with the law and practice of ICA. 
7.1 ICSID and the World Bank: North v South
The  consistent  involvement of developing countries has required ICSID to increase the 
appearance of procedural fairness. The majority of ICSID claims are brought against 
developing countries (colloquially referred to as ‘the South’ or ‘the Southern economies’) by 
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foreign direct investors from developed, northern hemisphere  economies. International
arbitration first acquired a ‘North v South’ quality in the late 1970s, when a number of high 
value disputes arose out of large petrodollar construction projects in the Arab world
173. The 
process has retained much of this colour: one need only type the word ‘ICSID’ into a search 
engine to see that ICSID is identified by many as an institutional extension of the World 
Bank and a vehicle for ‘multinational corporate hegemony’. Recently, these objections have 
taken hold at the state level: in April 2007 Bolivia, Venezuela and Nicaragua declared their 
intentions to withdraw from the Washington Convention
174. Ecuador has made similar noises. 
To date, only Bolivia has actually pulled out
175. In a statement made after the withdrawal, the 
Bolivian Special Ambassador for Trade and Integration cited the ICSID claim of Aguas de 
Illimani (a subsidiary of Suez). The International Finance Corporation (a member of the 
World Bank Group) was a shareholder in the claimant company.  The  Bolivian  Special 
Ambassador alluded to nemo judex when he said ‘It is clear that the same institution should 
not be both arbitrator and a party to the dispute’
176.  
Allegations of ICSID bias are usually made on the basis that the institutional links between
the Centre and the World Bank make the two entities ‘one and the same’, or that the record of 
decisions against Southern host states betrays a deeper ‘philosophical link’ between ICSID 
purpose and World Bank policy. With respect to the first criticism, it is a matter of public 
record that ICSID is a creation of the World Bank. As such, it is uncontroversial that the 
origins of the Centre lie in the policy of the IBRD. The World Banks pays the running costs 
of ICSID; the Administrative Council of ICSID is composed largely of the representatives of 
World Bank member states;  the World Bank and the Administrative Council convene 
concurrently; the President of the World Bank is ex officio the Chairman of the 
Administrative Council. What is controversial is that the connection between the two 
institutions has not been severed as the rate of ICSID claims (and public awareness of the 
Centre) has increased in recent years. Other arbitral institutions have grappled with the task 
of reconciling success with  heritage. The reader may recall, for example, how  the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) reacted to the challenge in Grundel v International 
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Equestrian Federation
177 (in which concerns as to the independence of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport from the IOC were expressed in obiter by the Swiss Federal Court). The 
IOC divested itself of its responsibility for the CAS and transferred control of the court to a 
new organically and economically independent Council.
The World Bank has not undertaken any formal Grundel restructuring: the 2006 amendments 
to the ICSID Rules and Financial Regulations did not address the issue of ‘filioparental 
relations’ between ICSID and the World Bank
178. But as  Fouret observes, critics of the 
‘World Bank Tribunal’ ignore the fact that, when compared to the other institutions engaged 
in the day-to-day conduct of ISA, ICSID is transparent in its process and product. Awards in 
ad hoc ISA proceedings under the UNCITRAL Rules are hardly ever published; the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (prominent as a seat for East-West  ISA’s involving 
former Soviet host states and PRC enterprises) usually publishes awards without identifying 
the parties or the arbitrators; ICC proceedings are inherently confidential. Although party 
consent is still required, when an ICSID award is published it includes the names of the 
parties, the subject matter of the dispute (probably the most important component where the 
public interest is concerned) and the names of the arbitrators
179. The majority of ICSID 
awards are now published or otherwise disclosed
180, and some ICSID hearings are even open 
to the public
181. It is clear therefore that, as a target for criticism, ICSID is far easier than it is 
legitimate.    
As for the second basis, the writer is of the opinion that the Bolivian Water Wars damaged 
the reputation of ICSID at a critical time when its case load and profile were rising. The 
human right of access to water faced off against the Smithian economic right of the investor 
to the fruits of their labour, with ICSID as the stage. The ‘philosophical link’ between the 
policy of the  World Bank and the purpose of the Centre was raised by the host state. 
According to the Bolivian President
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No country in the world has ever won in international  arbitration…  Not the 
governments, not the nations, not the people. Only the companies win
182
This is plainly not true: as of late 2006, the numbers of final awards in favour of states and 
investors were about even
183. Despite empirical contradiction, the Bolivian President’s view 
is shared by some of the poorer Contracting States; similar sentiment is propagated by a
range of non-government  interest groups opposed to international trade liberalisation. As 
Rusty Park noted in 2006, ‘not all observers today accept Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantage, or share the assumption that cross-border trade and investment (the circulatory 
system of globalisation) bring the world a net benefit’
184. The Bolivian Water War provided 
rich pickings for leaders looking to evict foreign investors and establish (or re-establish) 
command economic models. In the last few years a group of states has formed up behind 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who has vowed to withdraw from the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund and replace them with a Latin American funded regional 
lending institution, the ‘Bank of the South’
185. 
ICSID proceedings take place in this increasingly complex policy setting. ICSID arbitrators 
have clearly felt the pressures of their heated geo-political context:  on North/South 
arbitrations, Algerian Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui has written of ‘the problems or arbitral 
“neutrality” of the harsh times we live in’
186. Bias challenges – where the allegation of 
conspiracy is most readily made – suffer the most in the North/South context; they become 
test cases for transparency in international arbitration. As former Secretary General of the 
ICC Anne Marie Whitesell observed in 2007, the desirability of encouraging states to 
participate in international arbitration is an important policy consideration in ISA 
proceedings
187; this realpolitik would appear to be colouring ICSID challenge jurisprudence.
It should not be forgotten that, in ISA, states are well positioned to make demands, and to 
some extent it seems that ICSID challenge panels are giving them the test they want when 
they challenge arbitrators. It is evident from the unique measures taken in the Generation 
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Ukraine challenge that ICSID is adapting its procedures where conflicts of interest. Whether 
they are doing so consciously or subconsciously, ICSID arbitrators seem to be reacting to the 
policy pressures around them by adding elements of Sussex Justices and lowering the Article 
14/57 test for bias. It has been said that the arbitrator’s need to adhere to a strict judicial 
standard of independence is part of a ‘broader trend towards the moralisation of international 
commercial law in general’
188; in this process the laws and practices of international 
arbitration respond to the global public interest. In ISA, the speed of this process of 
modification is increased by the tendency of ICSID arbitrators to refer to and follow earlier 
ICSID challenge decisions. It also has to do with the ICA pedigree of ICSID arbitrators. 
7.2 Cross-pollination with ICA jurisprudence
The increasing tendency of ICSID arbitrators to read the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test into 
Article 57 is partly due to the prevalence of that test in ICA. The writer has shown in earlier 
chapters that the majority of jurisdictions apply an approximation of the Sussex Justices test 
to challenges to arbitrators, and suggested in Chapter 7 that the test may have a place in the 
procedural lex mercatoria. Many of the people who serve as ICSID arbitrators also practice 
in the more diverse field of ICA with the result that, via the medium of the arbitrator, ISA and 
ICA are cross-pollinating. As Lew, Mistelis and Kroll observed in 2003, ‘the characteristics 
of investment arbitration are seen in commercial arbitrations and vice versa’
189. The law and 
practice of ICA clearly informs ICSID challenge jurisprudence. Evidence of this can be found 
in the judgment in Vivendi Universal v Argentina (Re Challenge to President Fortier), where 
the committee referred to the decision of the Paris Court of First Instance in Philipp Brothers
as well as the English rulings in Saudi Cable and  Re Medicaments. The more common 
approach, however, seems to be to invoke principles of municipal procedural law as self-
evident rule, or to rely on the General Standards of the IBA Guidelines as authority for broad 
interpretations of municipal laws such as the ‘reasonable third person’ vantage point. 
The problem with projecting ICA challenge and disqualification  standards onto ICSID 
procedures is that ICA standards have developed over a long duration, in a multiplicity of 
municipal regulatory contexts. ICSID, in contrast, is a self-contained  jurisdiction with no 
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municipal connection. Similarly, the Washington Convention requirement of ‘manifest lack 
of independence’ is a rule with no municipal equivalent. If there was a state which had such a 
rule, then its case law might be relevant. But there is not: the closest municipal equivalent of 
the Washington Article 14/57 rule is the Gough ‘real danger’ test. If anything, it should be 
Gough-era English jurisprudence that guides ICSID arbitrators in their approaches to 
disqualification proposals. Although there may be an argument that the increasing publicity 
of ICSID proceedings warrants recognition of Lord Hewart’s dictum (and thereby justifies 
the application of the first arm of Sussex Justices), there is no legal basis for the use of the 
second arm of Sussex Justices in ICSID challenges. The practice of employing elements of 
the Sussex Justices test is, it appears, either the result of ICSID arbitrators performing some 
kind of subconscious tronc commun of municipal law or an accident of the group’s exposure 
to ICA norms.  
8. Conclusion
ICSID has emerged as the leading venue for investor-state dispute resolution, and a crucial 
institutional component of the global trade complex. The posited law of the Washington 
Convention is now supplemented by a considerable body of jurisprudence. Since the 
challenge in SGS v Pakistan, elements of the Sussex Justices ‘reasonable apprehension’ test 
have been progressively tacked on to the black letters of Article 57 of the Convention by 
ICSID tribunals.  Reliance on inference, for example, is no longer off limits; the fiction of the 
‘reasonable fair minded observer’ has been introduced even though the ICSID Convention 
and Arbitration Rules make no mention of it. As ICSID proceedings take on more of the 
characteristics of a public adjudicatory process (eg. reporting of judgments, allowance of 
amicus curae submissions, open hearings, etc) the threshold for disqualification is getting 
lower. The availability of new grounds for challenge – including Uni-Inter Bias, Role/Issue 
conflict of the Eureko/Vivendi type, and Hrvatska Counsel Conflict – is either a cause or 
effect of this.  A  sure consequence of this process of jurisprudential modification is that 
disqualification proposals are increasingly common in ICSID proceedings: the ‘Black Art’ of 
bias challenge has caught on. Whilst the cure for this ailment is not simple, the writer is sure 
that Sussex Justices is not the answer. Earlier interpretations of the Washington Article 14/57 
‘manifest’ standard, such as that arrived at by the tribunal in Amco Asia, more closely 
correspond with the intent of the Convention and should be preferred today. If the preference 273
for Sussex Justices continues, a standing pool of ‘arbitrators only’ will need to be created and 
the function of the Secretary General of the PCA formalised.   274
CHAPTER 8
Causes and Cures
The age of innocence has come to an end…
- Jan Paulsson (1985)
1. Introduction
Pleading the appearance of bias is one of a raft of tactics deployed by parties who seek to 
delay and disrupt ICA proceedings, and deprive their opponent of the arbitrator of their 
choice. The writer calls these tactics ‘The Black Arts’. There are a number of ways to derail 
arbitral proceedings but crying bias is certainly one of the best. The reason is that the 
proceedings are usually suspended while the challenge and any subsequent appeals are heard
in supervising courts. Generally, the law does not always require suspension: Model Law 
Article 13(3) gives the tribunal discretion on whether to continue with the arbitration during 
the pendency of the challenge, for example. But given the prospect of reconstitution, most 
tribunals  adjourn  while the challenge is on foot. If the arbitration is institutional, the 
challenge might go up to a review committee or standing panel and even beyond into state
courts; if the tribunal is ad hoc the challenge may delay the proceedings for months or years 
while state courts deliberate on difficult questions (such as the interaction of the institutional 
rules chosen by the parties with the procedural law of the seat). Procedural public policy will 
complicate things further. The challenger’s best day out will be where the arbitrator simply 
stands down. But the delay caused is often just as good a result. As any commercial disputes 
lawyer knows, delays can be beneficial for the client: they might give them time to make (or 
free up) money  for the award, allow for creative book keeping, or even give the client a 
chance to shed assets.  Experience suggests that delays also tend to revive settlement 
negotiations, sometimes with positive results. But causing delay may also constitute an abuse 
of process and a breach of professional ethics. The fundamentality of the right to challenge 275
provides an essential shield against these risks; and the lower the threshold for 
disqualification, the thicker that shield is for the party holding it up. 
In the preceding national and regional surveys the writer has shown that there are three 
competing tests for apparent bias: (1) the ‘reasonable apprehension’ test (the ‘Sussex Justices
test’); (2) the ‘real possibility’ test (the ‘Porter v Magill’ test); and (3) the ‘real danger’ test 
(the ‘Gough test’). The preceding country studies have shown that English and American 
approaches to arbitrator bias have converged in recent years, favouring a higher threshold for 
impeachment
1. In Chapter 5 we saw that in the Common Law seats of the Asia Pacific (most 
of which are Model Law) all three tests for bias are represented: Hong Kong follows Porter v 
Magill, Malaysia follows Gough and Australia applies Sussex Justices. The European seats 
also vary in their approaches. The case law catalogued in Chapter 3 shows that Swiss and 
German courts are probably tougher on challengers – less likely to disqualify an arbitrator -
than French and Swedish courts. In Chapter 6 the writer put it that there is in the  lex 
mercatoria a rule equivalent to Model Law Article 12 and that, due to the increasing use and 
significance of the IBA Guidelines, the test for bias that informs it is Porter v Magill. In 
Chapter 7 the writer surveyed ICSID challenge jurisprudence and concluded that, although 
the ‘manifest lack of independence’ requirement imposed by Article 57 of the Washington 
Convention was interpreted strictly and in a manner consistent with the Gough test, ICSID 
panels are adopting Sussex Justices piece-by-piece. In short, although Sussex Justices has 
‘market share’, since the early 1990’s leading seats and arbitral  institutions have 
experimented with higher thresholds for arbitrator bias. 
Before we consider the merits of imposing  a higher test for apparent bias, one pressing 
question must be answered: why has the legal landscape changed so much over such a short 
time? The answer is complicated. First and foremost, law is alive: law answers society. There 
must, therefore, be some micro-societal reason for the jurisprudential shifts that have 
occurred in recent years. Although it is a cliché, there are good reasons to blame the lawyers:
there can be no denying that Magic Circle law firms have taken over arbitration in the last 
thirty years, or that their arrival changed the way things were done. The lawyers are the 
agents of change. The increased rate of challenge must, in the writer’s view, be seen as a by-
product of this market process. It seems safe to say that the arbitrators are not becoming less
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impartial – there might be some basis for saying that the recent development of a truly global 
market has increased the diversity of the individual’s interests, but the record shows that 
allegations of portfolio bias nearly always fail for de minimis. Similarly, the kinds of 
prejudices that were widespread and socially acceptable in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century are rightly taboo now. If anything, the professionalisation of the arbitrator’s function 
has increased the actual distance of the arbitrator from the parties. So it is not the arbitrators
who have changed; it is arbitration. The gentlemen’s club of arbitration is history: arbitration 
is now dominated by lawyers, rather than arbitrators. To understand why challenges have 
become common in this setting, we need to see a challenge proceeding for what it really is: a 
situation of expert hunters and easy targets. 
Expert Hunters – the arrival of the ICA technocrat
ICA began as an Old World cottage industry, a field of legal practice closer to a hobby than a 
profession. The pool of arbitrators was made up of ‘a handful of academic aficionados on the 
fringe of international law’
2. This group of ‘Grand Old Men’ was chiefly comprised of elite 
European (especially French and Swiss) academics, English silks and a few retired judges
(such as Lord Wilberforce)
3. The ICC was the clubhouse for this clique of learned patricians
4. 
But in the wake of the Oil Crises of the 1970s, a North/South reorientation of international 
trade occurred which brought international arbitration to the attention of North American 
capital exporters and, perhaps more importantly, their lawyers. Large, full service Anglo-
American law firms began to invest heavily in ICA. Dezalay and Garth carried out a study of 
this process in the mid-1990s, and their results are fascinating. They identify the arrival of the 
Anglo-American firms as the first stage in the process of ‘rationalisation’ (or banalisation, if 
you take a more romantic view) of ICA practice
5. Crucially for the writer, Dezalay and Garth 
observed that the big Anglo-American firms began to ‘introduce the legal techniques which 
are the basis of their preeminence’
6. 
The legitimacy of procedural ‘tactics’ is a distinctly Anglo-American notion; the same can 
probably be said for the idea of procedural law as a discrete skill. American lawyers have a 
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well deserved reputation for procedural creativity: the pop image of the attorney who has a 
‘motion for anything’ is certainly founded in truth. The vast majorityof the Anglo-American 
lawyers who became interested in ICA were, first and foremost, litigators. By the mid-1980s
the lieutenants of this first wave were branding themselves as international arbitration
specialists: the ICA technocrat was born, and market-driven generation warfare soon broke 
out. On the field, the procedural specialisation of this new technocracy faced off against the
more general skill-sets of the Grand Old Men. Dezalay and Garth describe the clash  as 
follows: 
the desire to promote their own technical competencies has led them [the technocrats] 
to a position that devalues the wisdom and generalist experience of their notable 
mentors, whom they characterise as dinosaurs. Since they [the technocrats] are for the 
most party too young to compete with the charisma of grand old men, they must 
emphasise their technical sophistication
7  
Where the Grand Old Men were more sophisticated in matters of substantive law (they had 
farmed the frontier in the Libyan Oil arbitrations and distilled the lex mercatoria), the ICA 
technocrats  knew more about procedure. The technocrats exploited party autonomy and 
pushed for the adoption of rules of procedure familiar to them, transforming relatively 
informal arbitration into ‘offshore litigation’
8. Indeed, it is from this process that typically 
American procedures have crept into ICA: cross examination, party-appointed experts and 
orders for full discovery are well known examples.  The  lawyers that introduced these 
practices came from an adversarial jurisdiction with an esteemed tradition of rights-driven 
constitutionalism - due process ranks highest amongst the raft of constitution rights familiar 
to the Anglo-American invaders. The right to an impartial and independent judge is a basic 
principle of due process in Common Law systems, and one in which American litigators are 
especially well versed in pleading. It is worth remembering that the American faction were 
raised in a ‘Vacatur Only’ setting – the ancient US Federal Arbitration Act does not allow for 
mid-proceeding challenge: the parties have to wait until an award is rendered, at which time 
they may run their bias challenge in the form of a motion for setting aside. The Americans 
were, therefore, used to ‘playing for keeps’ at the post-award stage. With this professional 
heritage in mind, it should perhaps be less surprising that the rate of bias challenges in ICA 
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increased once the Anglo-American technocrats were established: as hunters they were only 
doing what they knew best.  
Easy Targets – the Grand Old Men
The Grand Old Men were sitting when the technocrats arrived. The closed market of 
Continental ICA, with its polite dualist society of European academics and lawyers, made 
their seats all the more comfortable. At first, to the Anglo-American outsiders, it seemed as 
though everybody knew everybody except them. This European ‘salon society’ was a bit too 
cozy for the technocrats
9, trained as they were in the bare-knuckle adversarial tradition of 
Common Law litigation.  The key words of the new arrivals were ‘transparency, 
rationalization and competition’
10. By the late 1980s the technocrats were objecting to the 
professional familiarity and proximity of the senior actors. Consistent with their skills, the 
focus of their attack was procedural: the rules of arbitrator disclosure and independence. By 
1991 the technocrats had gained a good deal of influence at the ICC, so much so that
modifications to the ICC Rules were mooted. The proposal was to introduce an additional 
requirement that arbitrators disclose any significant prior or ongoing relationships with
counsel for the parties, rather than just the parties themselves. The Swiss faction objected on 
the basis that ‘the relationships that may exist between counsel and arbitrators are irrelevant, 
because they cannot possibly call into question the independence of the arbitrator, it’s only 
the relationships with the parties that arise’
11.  Many of the Grand Old Men and their 
apprentices  were against the creation of a rule for the disclosure of relationships with 
counsel
12. But the ICC opted to support greater transparency, and made efforts to expand the 
disclosure requirements of the ICC Rules
13. The ICC Court took the view that the Rule 7(2) 
‘Declaration of Independence’ should include a mention of any significant relationship 
between arbitrators proposed and counsel for the parties in the arbitration
14. The institutional 
push for transparency continues today, the 2004 IBA Guidelines being the most recent 
chapter. 
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It is no coincidence, in the writer’s opinion, that the arrival of the  Anglo  technocrats 
corresponded with the recognition of new grounds for challenge. In the preceding chapters 
the writer has observed that, since 1991, the technocrats have progressively added to the list 
of objectionable circumstances: the most recent addition is Telekom Malaysia Bias of the 
kind pleaded in the Eureko/Vivendi arbitrations. Although procedural specialisation is 
certainly one of the reasons for the success of the hunters, a more significant reason may be
that the Grand Old Men were easy targets. They were high profile, high visibility ‘divas’ with 
impeccable reputations
15. The fact that they knew everybody and everybody knew them was 
how they came to monopolise the ICA ‘game’ in the first place. But when the technocrats 
arrived, the virtue of familiarity started to be seen as a vice. 
It is important to note that the technocrats not only had the advantage of fact, they had the 
advantage of law: a test for bias geared toward appearances. The hunters also had the benefit 
of  a target group who placed a high premium on reputation. Right or wrong, bias and 
corruption are related conditions: one is technical misconduct, the other professional (even 
criminal) misconduct. The tar might be different but the brush is the same. When a challenge 
is made the threat to the arbitrator’s reputation is direct and serious - the fact that most 
institutional rules afford the arbitrator the right to respond to the allegation of bias proves 
this, as does the fact that arbitrators often feel shame when they are challenged. The emotive, 
often  indignant language used in the written responses filed by arbitrators betrays the 
psychological impact of the challenge upon them.  Sir William Norman Raeburn KC
apparently never recovered after he was removed for actual bias in ‘Catalina’ v ‘Norma’
16. 
As ‘moral entrepreneurs’
17 arbitrators have an eggshell skull for allegations of misconduct. 
As Loyola University Professor Margaret Moses has observed, many arbitrators simply 
withdraw when they are challenged
18. This is more than a reaction to the challenger’s loss of 
confidence – often what the arbitrator is doing is avoiding the risk of doing damage to their 
reputation by  responding to the challenge and ending up with public hearings of the 
allegation of bias in state courts. The younger generation of arbitrators appears to be more 
willing to resist the challenge – it may be that they have grown up with the Anglo 
technocrats, and have become acclimatized. Perhaps the best recent  example is Swiss 
Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, who refused to stand down in the face of repeated bias 
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challenges brought by Argentina in the ICSID proceedings against French company Suez
19. 
But it seems that only the thickest skinned of the Grand Old Men will resist, the rest often
prefer to walk away. There is resulting snowball effect: the challenge’s prospects of success 
are raised by the sensitivity of its target, and the observable success of challenges makes 
lawyers more willing to try challenge tactics in other proceedings.  The cycle contributes to 
what the writer calls the ‘Problem of Demand’. 
Competition as a cause
Trade in legal services is far from free. States usually exercise relatively high degrees of 
control over their legal professions. States do this for a variety of reasons, some of which are 
practical and some of which are policy-based. Generally speaking, the European states tend 
to control their professions more than the countries of the Common Law world. Although 
arbitration is a freer market that the market for litigation services (ie. you do not always have 
to be a lawyer in the state in which the arbitration is seated in order to appear before the 
arbitral tribunal), the constant threat of related proceedings in state courts (where the often 
strict local admission requirements do apply) gives the local legal profession a distinct in-
country advantage. Nationals of states that are most commonly chosen as seats – Switzerland, 
France,  Sweden  and  England  – therefore have a competitive advantage over foreign 
practitioners of ICA. Because of their higher rate of exposure to arbitral proceedings as 
counsel, lawyers from these leading seats develop skills (and professional profiles) faster than
their competitors from the New World. This is why Swiss, French, Swedish and English 
nationals are overrepresented in the ICA ‘mafia’ today. When the Common Law technocrats 
arrived, the market dominance of the Grand Old Men was at its peak.   
With this market reality in mind, it seems that challenges may have had a hidden function: to 
displace the old guard. Challenges allow the ‘upstart’ technocrats to assert their procedural 
expertise (and thereby demonstrating their competitive advantage) whilst at the same time
disrupting the cycle that has favoured the Continental professions. If the places of the Grand 
Old Men are not so safe, neither are those of their apprentices. Commenting on the 1991 
debate over the implementation of a requirement for arbitrator-counsel relationship disclosure 
in the ICC Rules, Dezalay and Garth remarked ‘it is partly a matter of introducing 
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competition into a market that was strongly cartelised’
20.  The writer agrees with this 
observation. There must be a correlation between the increased rate of bias challenges and the 
arrival of free-market ideology via the agent of the Anglo-American technocrat. 
The Problem of Demand
Any trade in services is subject to the laws of supply and demand. Legal services generally, 
and the Black Arts specifically, are no exception. The writer’s view is that the increased use
of bias challenges has created a client-driven demand for the tactic in high-value disputes.
Micro-economic forces are, therefore, partly responsible for the increased rate of bias 
challenge.  Some international commercial actors – including companies and states  –
demonstrate a clear willingness to resort to the Black Arts. The general privacy of 
commercial arbitral proceedings limits the extent to which these ‘repeat offenders’ can be 
identified, but in the investor-state field (where there is a public record) Argentina and Poland 
have repeatedly challenged arbitrators without good cause; looking at Amco Asia and 
CalEnergy we might add Indonesia to the list as well. As has been observed, the delay caused 
by a challenge means that the challenge can achieve its objectives even if it fails. As clients 
(including parties on the other side of the challenge) are exposed more and more to challenge 
tactics, they observe their effectiveness. This cycle creates the ‘Problem of Demand’: users of 
arbitration become more willing to resort to the Black Arts as their rate of exposure to them 
increases, and the more they instruct their lawyers to challenge arbitrators, the more skilled 
those lawyers become in running challenges. The challenge machinery (the law) becomes 
more efficient as its operators (the lawyers) become specialists; the product (the challenge
itself) naturally improves. In this thesis, the writer has sought to prove that this process is 
underway: the most compelling evidence of the Problem of Demand is that there are new 
ways of getting rid of arbitrators emerging every year. It is apparent that the IBA Guidelines 
will need to be updated soon – V.V. ‘Jonny’ Veeder foresaw this in 2005 when he described 
the Orange List of the IBA Guidelines as ‘a malignly imaginative check-list for tactical 
challenges by recalcitrant parties’
21. The Orange List will, for example, need to be extended 
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to include Eureko/Vivendi Role/Issue Conflict. The writer suspects that the Working Group 
will be required to make other additions in the near future. 
Whilst the writer is masquerading as an economist, it is worth crystal ball gazing for a 
moment longer: macro-economic forces may also contribute to the Problem of Demand. 
History proves that when times are tough, obligations become onerous, and the number of 
contract disputes increases. In modern cross-border settings, this means more arbitration
clauses are activated. The demand for arbitration lawyers skilled in the Black Arts increases 
as a result, because more parties are impecunious and demanding ‘total war’ from their 
lawyers.  The current Global Financial Crisis may, therefore, exacerbate the Problem of 
Demand and further increase the rate of bias challenge in ICA. 
Arguments for the cure
The arrival of the Anglo-American technocrats, and the resulting introduction of adversarial 
procedures  and liberal economic logic, caused a dramatic increase in the rate of bias 
challenges in ICA. The Problem of Demand has developed as a result. Since the early 80s,
the technocrats have progressively expanded the jurisprudence of bias, such that new grounds 
for challenge are now available. The writer has agreed with Dezalay and Garth that the desire 
to compete has informed this process. In earlier chapters, the writer foreshadowed an 
argument that the judicial use of the Sussex Justices test to interpret the expression ‘justifiable 
doubts’ under Article 12 of the UNCITRAL Model Law makes it too easy to challenge an 
arbitrator. This, in turn, offends the objectives of ICA: efficiency, flexibility and finality. The 
element of expertise is also at risk: as  Marc Henry mused in 2001, if the obligation of 
independence is too strict the arbitration world would be deprived of some of its most famous 
arbitrators
22. 
Kriegk has denounced the objective, absolutist approach to independence as a dogma, cult or 
tyranny of appearance
23. Out of agreement, the writer has suggested that the Gough ‘real 
danger’ test is more suitable for use in matters relating to ICA, and that if adopted in leading 
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seats it would reduce the rate at which bias challenges are made. To reiterate, the Arms of the 
Gough test are:
(1) assessment of the impugned conduct ‘in the eyes of the court’ (First Arm)
(2) a ‘real danger’ threshold (Second Arm)
Having come (back) to life in 1993, this test is now nearly extinct. England now uses the 
Porter v Magill test, and withthe exception of Malaysia, every state that followed Gough has 
now abandoned it in favour of the ‘real possibility’ test. It has been observed that the 
Doctrine of Party Autonomy is central to the law and practice of ICA. In Chapter 3 the writer 
invoked party autonomy and suggested the following clause as a means of achieving the ad 
hoc restoration of the Gough test in arbitration:
Challenges (‘Gough Clause’)
The Parties agree that any allegations that an arbitrator appears to lack impartiality 
or independence will, at whatever stage and in whatever jurisdiction they are made, 
be finally determined by the relevant authority asking itself whether there was (or is), 
in the relevant authority’s eyes, a real danger that the arbitrator was (or is) biased. 
In an ideal world, UNCITRAL would make a Gough option available under the Model Law. 
This is probably unrealistic: even if all of the states that had at one time or another applied a 
Gough test pushed for such an amendment, they would never have the numbers to carry the 
proposal. Indeed, their own records would go against them: the vast majority of Model Law 
states have experimented with the ‘real danger’ test have reverted to a Porter v Magill
compromise. Failing this, Model Law states might enact the ‘real danger’ test as a ‘Model 
Law Plus’ provision to Article 12. Although no state has done this, legislative additions to the 
Model Law’s ‘justifiable doubts’ test have been made. The new Federal Arbitration Law of 
the United Arab Emirates is an example: Articles 12(1)(c) and (d) of the UAE law are near 
perfect adoptions of the Explanation to General Standard 2 of the International Bar 
Association Guidelines. There is no reason why a Model Law state could not enact the Gough
test as an additional or explanatory provision to Article 12. The Gough test could also be 
taken up by leading arbitral institutions in amendments to their rules. Those institutions that 284
use standing panels to hear challenges to arbitrators (such as the ICC) could adopt the ‘real 
danger’ test in the challenge jurisprudence. 
In any event, statutory recognition of the Gough test is unnecessary: party autonomy dictates 
that substantially the same outcome can be achieved on an ad hoc basis by the parties 
themselves. If the parties wish to mitigate the risk of bias challenges disrupting their 
arbitration they can ask for the Gough test when they first meet; the arbitrator could even 
propose the standard after giving disclosure (but before entering onto the reference). In the 
writer’s opinion, there is no clear bar to the validity of a Gough Clause in an arbitration 
agreement or procedural order, especially in a Model Law seat. Under Model Law Article
13(1), party autonomy expressly extends to the challenge process, subject to the ‘within thirty 
days’ right of the parties to seek final review of the challenge decision by the court or other 
authority specified in Article 6. The parties can, for example, contract into and out of time 
limits for the challenge; agree who will decide the challenge (especially important in ad hoc
proceedings in Model Law states); and how the submissions will be made (oral, written, or 
both). It would seem open to the parties to agree to Gough as part of the challenge 
arrangements, although this would only happen if the agreement was made before any 
challenge had arisen (otherwise, why would a challenger make their life harder?). There may 
be an argument that the autonomy conferred by Article 13(1) extends only to truly procedural 
arrangements – and that the test for bias is a matter of substantive law – but this there is no 
authority on this question. The writer is of the opinion that the parties do have the power to 
choose a test for bias, because the question of impartiality and independence is inherently
procedural. Even if the question of bias is a merits matter, it would be open to the parties to 
choose the Gough test as an exercise of the general power to choose substantive law 
conferred on them by Model Law Article 28(1).  
The writer will now make a case for the validity of such a clause at the stage of judicial 
review by arguing that both arms of the Gough test are suited to arbitration and can be validly 
applied by arbitrators, arbitral institutions and state courts supervising arbitral proceedings.  285
2. The First Arm of Gough
Specific objections may be made with respect to the First Arm of Sussex Justices, and these 
objections aid the argument for Gough. In the writer’s view, the strongest submissions for the 
First Arm of the Gough test are: 
2.1 Specialist review 
Arbitration law is a species of the civil procedure genus. In the Civil Law world, the 
principles of arbitration come from Roman law. In the Common Law world, the statutory 
origins of arbitration lie in the Special Case Procedure that was available under the English 
Arbitration Act 1697
24. Arbitration remains a ‘special case’ of private law today. That it bears 
almost no relation to public law is a function of the Doctrine of Non-Arbitrability, under 
which disputes involving the determination of matters of public law are not capable of 
settlement by arbitration. Most challenges to arbitrators are heard either by the tribunals 
themselves (as panels of specialists at first instance), supervisory panels at arbitral institutions 
such as the ICC and SCC, or specialised courts like the English Commercial Court. Although 
appeal might take a challenge to a state court, the more likely scenario is one of specialists 
reviewing specialists in a ‘closed doors’ institutional setting. Disclosure, conflict of interest 
and bias are matters of professional conduct and, therefore, expert evidence. This thesis has 
shown that bias challenges turn on their own facts, the principal components of which are
usually the relationship of the parties to the arbitrator and the arbitrator to the dispute. 
In Common Law systems, and arguably Strasbourg jurisprudence, the ‘reasonable’ or ‘fair 
minded’ observer is intentionally constructed to lack expertise; he knows the material facts of 
the allegation of bias (‘the relationship that subsists between some members of the tribunal 
and one of the parties’
25) but nothing more. Whilst it is not the writer’s intention to appear 
elitist, this hypothetical ‘everyman’ has no idea that arbitration is contractual, party-made 
under an expanding Doctrine of Party Autonomy, or structured around expert determination. 
The  Sussex Justices ‘everyman’ is built to lack ‘inside knowledge’. Lord Justice Cross 
insisted on this in Lannon, and subsequent courts have agreed, defining this notional third 
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person (in terms reminiscent of Aquinas) as ‘a person who possesses the faculty of reason 
and engages in conduct in accordance with community standards’
26. 
The judgment of this fair minded observer might be good for assessing the fairness of general 
court procedure – of which he can be taken as having some baseline understanding by virtue 
of general social participation (and, today, from exposure to the forensic drama genre of 
American television)  – but it is no good for specialised dispute resolution procedures 
conducted in accordance with the standards of a closed professional community.  Inside 
knowledge is specialist knowledge, and in this regard the judgment of the fair minded lay 
observer is deliberately and hopelessly impaired. How can a person evaluate the conduct of a 
specialist when they are themselves a generalist? We would not ask a general medical 
practitioner to judge the professional conduct of a heart surgeon in a medical malpractice 
case, but we ask the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’
27 to judge the professional conduct and 
circumstances of some of the most highly specialised lawyers on earth every time we apply 
Sussex Justices to an arbitrator. In an ICA context, the application of the First Arm of Sussex 
Justices is misconceived and counterproductive. Instead, the First Arm of Gough should be 
used for arbitration because it allows for specialised (or at least truly judicial) review of 
specialised procedure. Whilst it may ‘personify the reasonable person’, the ‘reasonable court’ 
envisaged by Lord Goff must still be seen as having sufficient understanding of arbitration to 
rule on the propriety of the conduct of those that practice it. 
2.2 Confidentiality
This brings the writer to the issue of confidentiality. The Sussex Justices test is predicated 
upon an acceptance of Lord Hewart’s dictum that ‘justice must be seen to be done’; the words 
of the ghost that has drifted in and out of Common Law courts for the last fifteen years. 
When His Lordship uttered these hallowed words he was expressing a general community 
desire to maintain checks on public exercises of the judicial power. As Lord Woolf MR 
observed in Saudi Cable, Lord Hewart was talking about justice  in the courts
28. In 
considering the meaning of ‘serious irregularity’ (and ‘substantial injustice’) under s.60 of the 
English Arbitration Act (1996) in Groundshire, Bowsher J said
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The highest requirement that justice should manifestly be seen to be done may require 
that a judicial decision be overturned because of the manner in which it was reached, 
without it being demonstrated that the result produced injustice. But that is not the 
system applied to arbitrations by the 1996 Act
29
The system applied by the 1996 English Arbitration Act differs because ICA is private in 
both the theoretical and practical senses of the word: it is universally accepted that 
international arbitral hearings are private, and usually confidential
30. Arbitration is not an 
exercise of decision-making power that requires public confidence per se. ICA is, for the 
most part, invisible to those who are not direct participants in it. As has been observed in 
Chapter 7, ICSID and ad hoc investor-state proceedings might be an exception, because the 
interests of sovereign communities are being judged and the hearings are increasingly public. 
But in a confidential commercial arbitration, only the parties, their lawyers and the arbitrators 
can see the proceedings. Arbitration only takes on a public dimension (in both the above 
senses) when the assistance of a state court is required, and even in such circumstances the 
involvement of the state apparatus is non-substantive (ie. merits review is usually prohibited). 
Enforcement is the obvious example; assistance in taking evidence is another common reason 
for application to state courts. This thesis has shown that challenges can also go to state 
courts (particularly when they arise out of ad hoc arbitrations). It is important not to lose 
sight of the fact that these related public proceedings are procedural vignettes only; the 
broader image of ICA is private. Just because ICA touches the state judicial system at times 
does not make it a public adjudicatory process, or burden it with public adjudicatory 
imperatives.  ICA has very little, and often nothing, to do with the public. This is especially 
so when the procedure runs smoothly, and the award is made and paid. 
It is clear, therefore, that the circumstances of ICA are distinguishable from those before the 
House of Lords in Sussex Justices. In a Common Law setting, the Sussex Justices ratio is 
non-binding as a result. In other settings its persuasive value should be seen as limited. In the 
absence of Lord Hewart’s ‘public confidence’ policy premise there is no reason not to apply
   
29 Groundshire v VHQ [2001] 1 BLR 395 per Bowsher J at 40, emphasis added
30 Lew, J.D.M., Mistelis, L.A., Kroll, S.M., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer 2003), 
p.96; it is worth noting that municipal laws vary on whether there is a presumption of privacy, and often 
distinguish between privacy and confidentiality. See for example Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman
(1995) 183 CLR 10 where the High Court of Australia held 3-2 that arbitral proceedings were not inherently 
confidential.    288
Gough and make it harder to challenge arbitrators. This submission is strongest where the 
arbitral proceedings are private and  confidential – how can there be a publicly held 
perception of impartiality when there is no substantive public adjudicatory process to 
observe? The legal-fictional character of the notional ‘fair minded lay observer’ is 
deliberately locked out of the private arbitral proceedings, and they should be similarly 
excluded from the court. This is one of the main reasons the Gough test should be used for 
arbitrators: the First Arm of Gough uses a ‘reasonable court’ vantage point rather than a 
‘reasonable’ or ‘fair minded’ hypothetical observer. A court applying Sussex Justices in the 
context of a private arbitral proceeding is granting hypothetical admission to a hypothetical 
person. Needless to say, applying a ‘fiction to a fiction’ is unsatisfactory legal reasoning: it is 
two steps removed from the alignment of law and fact that is fundamental to the curial 
decision making process. Without the public perception imperative of Lord Hewart’s dictum 
there is no jurisprudential foundation upon which to object to Gough.   
2.3 Waiver
Sussex Justices was a criminal matter. The Sussex Justices test is a public adjudicatory 
standard; the low ‘reasonable apprehension’ threshold reflects a variety of public law and 
policy considerations which are alien to ICA, including the (1) presumption of innocence in 
criminal proceedings, (2)  the presence of the jury and (3)  the need to maintain public 
confidence in the administration of criminal justice. These are certainly within procedural 
public policy, but does that mean the Sussex Justices test is too? If it is a public adjudicatory 
standard, could the Sussex Justices test be waived?
The prevailing opinion amongst ICA practitioners and scholars is that the Equal Treatment 
provision of the Model Law is mandatory and cannot be waived or excluded by the parties
31. 
Redfern and Hunter identify the Doctrine of Party Autonomy as the ‘first principle’ of arbitral 
procedure, and equal treatment as the second
32. Equal treatment functions as a restriction on 
party autonomy in Model Law states. Impartiality and independence are preconditions for 
equal treatment, as actual party preference will cause an actionable ‘inequality of arms’ in the 
dispute. The availability is waiver is a precondition for access to party autonomy. Making the 
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initial agreement to arbitrate – the first autonomous act of the parties – is an act of waiver (ie. 
waiver of recourse to state court of jurisdiction). The process of arbitral rule-making (be it 
achieved in ‘one hit’ by the adoption of a lex arbitri or in stages by the ad hoc creation of 
procedural rules for the dispute) relies upon waiver. As a result, the concept of procedural 
waiver is well developed in arbitration law. It was expressly acknowledged by the US 
Supreme Court in Mitsubishi
33. Even where expansive readings of party autonomy prevail, 
not every right will be treated as waivable. There is significant divergence in academic and 
judicial opinions on this issue. Leading scholars of ICA express the opinion that only those 
parts of the Model Law that concern non-arbitrability or are expressive of public policy 
cannot be waived by the parties
34. 
Like merits access to the court, the absolute requirement of impartiality and independence 
applicable to state court judges should be treated as waived by parties who agree to arbitrate. 
The quid pro quo is clear enough: in return for waiving the benefit of this public adjudicatory 
principle the parties get to choose their judge, and they get a portable award. These are 
considerable benefits for the cross-border actor. Whilst the rule against bias is certainly 
expressive of procedural public policy
35, it only needs to be varied (rather than waived) in 
order for Gough to apply. In a Model Law state especially it would appear open to the parties 
to expressly agree that Gough will apply in the event an allegation of bias is made against 
their arbitrator. According to Petrochilos 
There should be no doubt that the parties to an arbitration may, at any reasonable 
point before an award is issued, make procedural arrangements to vary both 
mandatory provisions of the law of the arbitration and the rules of arbitration under 
which their proceedings are conducted 
36
The same author has expressed the opinion that it is open to the parties to agree as to higher 
or lower standards of independence as part of the qualifications of the arbitrator
37, and that 
lists of disqualifying circumstances (such as that under NCCP Article 342) are to be read as 
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subject to party agreement to the contrary
38. A court faced with such an agreement would not 
be asked to condone unequal treatment (which is a mandatory provision of the Model Law) 
because the parties are both subject to the same standard of procedural fairness. Even in the 
EU – the strictest jurisdiction in matters of procedural public policy – such arrangements 
seem possible from the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Osmo 
Suovaniemei
39.
3. The Second Arm of Gough
The ‘real danger’ threshold is better suited for use in ICA. This is a more general submission 
than the specific arguments advanced above in respect of the First Arm of  Gough. It is 
premised upon the following heads of argument:  
3.1 Arbitrators are not Judges  
Throughout this thesis the writer has observed that most municipal laws apply the same 
standard of impartiality and independence to judges as they do to arbitrators; the preceding 
chapters Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, 
Ecuador, Finland, France, Hungary, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Uruguay and the 
United Kingdom all fall into this category of states. Few states depart from this rule. The 
United States may be a possibility: in  Commonwealth Coatings some members of the 
Supreme Court entertained the notion of a higher standard for arbitrators, but in the leading 
judgment of Associate Justice White the same standard of judges was held applicable. 
Although the Court of Appeals discussed a lower standard of impartiality and independence 
for arbitrators  in  Pitta v Hotel Association of New York City (and more recently in the 
AIMCOR appeal) there is little authority for its application outside the Second Circuit 
(effectively New York). Guided by hidden dualism, certain Canadian courts have appeared 
willing to apply a lower standard to arbitrators in international matters, but, as in the United 
States, no binding judgment supports a different standard yet. The principal exception to the 
‘judge-arbitrator rule’ is Switzerland. In Swiss law there is authority for the proposition that 
arbitrators are subject to a lower standard of independence than cantonal and federal court
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judges: it seems that a ‘bare minimum of independence’ will suffice where arbitrators are 
concerned
40. Swiss courts take this view for the practical reason that, in contrast to judges, 
arbitrators regularly have contact with parties and their lawyers. Generally speaking, these 
kinds of professional contacts will not be enough to establish an objectionable lack of 
independence in a Swiss court
41. In the past, Swiss Courts took the Judicial Organisation Act 
rules for the disqualification of judges into account, but did not apply them telle quelle to 
arbitrators. The writer has forecast that this approach will be maintained under the equivalent 
articles of the new Swiss Federal Supreme Court Act.  
We all know what a judge is, and we all have an idea of what a judge does. Whilst the laws 
of judging vary state to state, the basics are universal. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct (2002) neatly mark out the imperatives: under the Bangalore Principles, a judge 
must possess (1) independence, (2) impartiality, (3) integrity, (4) propriety, (5) equality, and 
(6) competence and diligence.  Considering the Bangalore fundamentals, it is easy to see why 
the judge-arbitrator analogy has settled so comfortably in the law and practice of ICA. Whilst 
the procedural analogy between arbitrator and judge may have positive ethical results in that 
it encourages arbitrators to aspire to judicial neutrality, it has proven itself to be unworkable 
in practice. Although international arbitral proceedings are being ‘judicialised with 
aggressiveness’
42, arbitrators are not judges; the role and power of the arbitrator is ‘para-
judicial’ rather than formally (ie. constitutionally) judicial
43. It interesting that judges tend to 
accept this more than arbitrators.  Pierre Bellet, former President of the French Court of 
Cassation, wrote in 1993 that the office of arbitrator should not be equated to that of a judge 
because the independence of a party-appointed arbitrator will seldom be equivalent to that of 
a judge, and it is hypocritical to think otherwise
44.
The image of the judge as a kind of ‘gowned robot’, living in almost shamanistic isolation 
from the general population, does not project well onto the arbitrator. In fact, the opposite is 
accurate – Dezalay and Garth have shown that leading arbitrators are socio-professionally 
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hyperactive; anything but the monks we expect judges to be
45. Algerian Judge Mohammed 
Bedjaoui put it in strong terms:
Like all men, an arbitrator has a conscience which gives him a certain outlook on the 
world. He cannot detach himself from all the emotional ties which, consciously or 
unconsciously, may influence his thoughts. Whenever men are judged, including 
judgment by arbitration…a wager is laid on impartiality. An arbitrator is not a 
disembodied, floating being, without origins, or ethnic, cultural, religious, social and 
other attachments. I think it would be destructive to exaggerate these considerations, 
and naïve or suspicious to ignore their existence completely
46  
One of the most interesting features of the international arbitration community is the variation 
in the settings in which interaction amongst its members occurs. Besides arbitral proceedings 
themselves, there are all the other forms of dispute resolution proceedings – most conducted 
‘without prejudice’ and ripe for the formation of hostility and distrust - as well as related 
actions in courts, and educational appointments such as conferences. In 2007, Ahmed El-
Kosheri and Karim Youssef expressed the view that 
the world with which arbitrators have to deal is inevitably imperfect. It is therefore 
important at all stages – from initial selection to the rendering of the award – to set 
philosophical and idealistic conceptions of independence against the realities of 
arbitration and the practical problems that are commonly encountered
47
The tactical use of challenge to delay arbitral proceedings is made viable by the problematic
personality of the arbitrator, and the commercial-legal matrix in which they function. William 
Park has said recently ‘the consent on which private dispute resolution rests is qualitatively 
different from the implied submission to government courts that arguably results from living 
in society’
48.   As the Paris court noted in Bompard, arbitrators are not entrusted with a public 
function
49. They are not public officials in Hobbesian metaphorical ‘social contract’ with a 
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sovereign state like judges; arbitrators are mostly lawyers and ‘commercial men’, private 
citizens with private interests and lives who are placed on the bench by an actual triangular 
contract. Unlike judges, who as a fundamental rule cannot be chosen by the parties and are 
allocated cases by peer committee, arbitrators are appointed directly by the parties they are 
called upon to judge, usually because they have expertise in the relevant field.  At The 
Hague, Professor Fadlallah observed that ‘a system whereby each of the parties chooses an 
arbitrator is hardly likely to result in a court which is totally indifferent to the parties and their 
concerns’
50. According to Petrochilos ‘one does not expect the arbitrator to be innocent of the 
world around him. Indeed, one appoints an arbitrator because (rather than in spite) of his 
experience and the views that he has formed in the course of his experience’
51. The kind of 
‘intellectual virginity’
52 we expect from judges cannot be expected of arbitrators: frankly, to 
do so is absurd. Below the surface, the law seems to accept this; Dominique Hascher put it 
well:
The fiction of judicial independence as understood in judicial circles is maintained 
when it comes to choosing arbitrators, albeit superficially, giving way to greater 
realism when a solution has to be found
53  
In practice, higher tests are often used where arbitrators are challenged – in many states, the 
judge-arbitrator analogy is paid lip service only, largely as an exercise in Ostrich policy. 
Higher tests are used for arbitrators because courts know who international arbitrators are: 
senior barristers, partners of large international law firms, elite (mostly European) academics; 
all people likely to have long standing professional and commercial connections with the 
actors of the arbitral procedure. Petrochilos describes the ICA setting:
International arbitration takes place within an (expanding) milieu, in which 
practitioners share academic interests and meet in a number of fora. Arbitrators are 
most often practitioners who have earned their stripes by representing parties. An 
arbitrator may, thus, in the past have appeared for a company that has subsequently 
been absorbed by another company, which now proposes to appoint him in a dispute 
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with a third party. More commonly, an arbitrator is likely to have appeared against 
counsel for one of the parties, which party now appoints him
54  
If we contrast this high degree of Role  Reversibility and commercial immersion with the 
traditional role of a state court judge as a cloistered ‘oracle of a vague divinity’
55, then the 
judicial practice of holding arbitrators to the same standard as judges becomes harder to 
justify. The Sussex Justices elements reference a notion of absolute judicial independence 
that is wholly inappropriate for application to arbitrators: Bellet has gone so far as to call the 
appearance-based test for arbitrator bias ‘excessive and dangerous Puritanism’
56. In the 
writer’s view, the procedural fiction of the arbitrator as a judge has reached the end of its 
useful life. There is no good reason why a separate standard for apparent bias could not be 
adopted for arbitrators. In Saudi Cable, Justice Rix commented ‘it would be strange’ if the 
test was different for arbitrators
57. Well, the writer says it would be no stranger than fiction. 
3.2 The Presumption of Competence
Since Classical times the Presumption of Competence has been a fundamental principle of 
customary commercial law. In Chapter 6, the writer observed the renewed significance of 
customary commercial law in international markets. The new lex mercatoria is an important 
source of law today. The Presumption of Competence is essential to the efficient operation of 
any market and its legal system; when a party is not entitled to presume their contractual 
counterpart understands their bargain, the transaction will be delayed, and the parties will 
incur legal, administrative and opportunity costs. The nineteenth century Franco-Italian 
economist Vilfredo Pareto said that the sine qua non of an efficient market is that transactions 
are costless. In 1937, Ronald Coase conceived the theory of ‘Transaction Cost Economics’ in 
which the constructive possession of complete knowledge was identified as an essential 
means of minimising transaction costs. Neo-Classical theories of law have dominated ICA 
since the Anglo-American ‘invasion’ began in the early eighties
58. The current emphasis is on 
free, efficient markets, and the law that enables them. The customary Presumption of 
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Competence is central to the proper functioning of a free market – without it there is market 
failure. According to Berger 
There is a presumption for the professional competence of the parties to an 
international commercial contract. The parties may therefore not argue that they were 
not aware of the significance of the contractual obligations to which they have 
agreed
59
State courts are entitled to assume that parties that have signed an arbitration agreement have 
done so with full knowledge of the fact that they will get an arbitrator and not a judge. With 
this contractual backdrop it should be harder to challenge an arbitrator on the basis of 
apparent bias because when the parties agree to arbitration they are de jure aware that if a 
dispute arises they are not going to get a state appointed ‘neutral’ but rather an experienced 
‘commercial man’ (with a commercial past) as their umpire. 
3.3 Consistency with the Civil Standard of Proof
In Common Law counties a different standard of proof applies in civil proceedings to that 
which burdens the Prosecution in a criminal matter; civil claims require proof ‘on the balance 
of probabilities’ while the criminal standard is set much higher at ‘proof beyond reasonable 
doubt’. The civil standard of proof requires the occurrence of something to be more likely 
than not before it will be taken as proven; it is often said that the civil standard of proof sets a 
threshold of ‘51% probability’. Although Civil Law states vary in their laws of evidence, it 
can be said with confidence that no distinction between civil and criminal standards of proof 
is recognized in the Civil Law world. 
In the 1990’s there was a widely held belief amongst Continental ICA practitioners that 
‘Common Law lawyers, particularly the Americans…were responsible for embellishing 
arbitral procedure’
60. This view survives in some circles. Although as a matter of law 
arbitrators are usually not bound to follow strict rules of evidence, market forces (including 
the global expansion of  the Anglo-American ‘Magic Circle’ firms) have forced some 
Common Law rules of evidence into ICA. Despite the Civil Law footprint in leading 
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institutional rules (including the evidence provisions of the UNCITRAL, ICC and LCIA 
Rules
61), and the generally inquisitorial role of arbitrators (eg. direct questioning of experts 
and lay witnesses as opposed to the passive adjudicatory method used by Common Law 
judges), Anglo-American rules of evidence are slightly ahead of Civil Law principles in ICA 
today. The following Anglo-American rules of evidence have been appropriated by modern 
laws and practitioners of ICA:
(1) Adversarial procedures:  the active role of Counsel in the extraction and 
presentation of evidence, as opposed to the active role of the decision maker 
(which is a feature of Civil Law inquisitorial procedure), is a Common Law effect. 
Adversarial procedures in ICA include the vigorous cross examination of 
witnesses. Although there is allowance for adversarial procedure in some Civil 
Law systems (namely under the law of France, where the principe de la 
contradiction  functions as a right to confront and contradict in an adversarial 
fashion
62), the adversarial procedures prevalent in ICA owe more to Anglo-
American law than Continental rules of evidence. 
(2) Party appointed experts: Common Law rules of evidence allow the parties to 
appoint their own expert witnesses. Civil Law systems give this power to the 
Court, not the parties. Due to the centrality of efficiency and expertise, the use of 
party appointed experts is common in ICA. New trends in the use of experts –
including ‘Hot Tubbing’ (or expert conclave) – suggest that the place of this 
aspect of the Anglo-American law of evidence will strengthen in future. 
(3) Discovery: Except to the extent that a party must indicate the evidence upon 
which they intend to rely, there is no duty of discovery in a Civil Law system
63. A 
common complaint amongst Civil Law practitioners of ICA is that American 
parties (or rather their lawyers) demand full discovery: exhaustive production of 
documents, filing of depositions and expert reports, and inspection of subject 
matter
64. The ‘scatter-gun tactic’
65 of US-style discovery is especially common in 
   
61 Above note 31, p.356
62 Above note 42, p.195
63 Gunter, P, Transnational Rules on the Taking of Evidence, in in Schlaepfer, A, Pinsolle, P, Degos (eds),
Towards a Uniform International Arbitration Law? (Juris 2005), p.132
64 Above note 31, p.355297
large construction project disputes
66, where detailed expert reports and 
voluminous technical documents are often exchanged in pre-hearing skirmishes.  
If Common Law principles of evidence are now prevalent in ICA, then related primary rules 
of evidence (such as the Anglo-American distinction between civil and criminal standards of 
proof) also have a place in ICA. Even at its most liberal, the Doctrine of Non-Arbitrability 
guarantees that arbitral proceedings are civil; crime is non-arbitrable. With these realities in 
mind there are good grounds for arguing that the standard of proof applicable in ICA is the 
Common Law ‘balance of probabilities’. Redfern and Hunter confirm this:
The degree of proof that must be achieved in practice before an international arbitral 
tribunal is not capable of precise definition, but it may be safely assumed that it is 
close to the “balance of probability”
67
In Chapter 2, the writer compared the Second Arms of Sussex Justices, Gough and Porter v 
Magill, and gave the opinion that a ‘real possibility’ is quite different from a ‘reasonable 
apprehension’: whilst a suspicion (or apprehension) may be reasonably founded in so far as it 
has been formed in the mind of a person as a result of their exercise of the faculty of reason, 
the material facts upon which the suspicion is based may not necessarily interact to produce 
the result that the apprehended outcome is a real possibility. Under all three tests for apparent 
bias, the challenger must prove the material facts that support the appearance. The success of 
a challenge will, therefore, depend upon evidence. 
The reader may recall, for example, the Gough-era decision of the Hong Kong Court of 
Appeal in Logy Enterprises
68. In Logy Enterprises the challenge was unsuccessful because 
the Appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving that the composition of the tribunal 
was against PRC law or that there was a real danger of bias on the part of the arbitrator
69. The 
material facts of the challenge (the arbitrator was an official of the same Chinese export 
bureau as that which issued a commodity inspection certificate that was put into evidence) 
did not pass the civil standard of proof. 
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The Second Arms of Gough and Porter v Magill require that the ‘danger’ or ‘possibility’ of 
bias be real. The Second Arm of  Sussex Justices, in contrast, requires only that the 
apprehension be ‘reasonable’. Because they require challengers to show a real and definite 
possibility, the Second Arms of Porter v Magill and Gough are consistent with the 51% 
threshold of probability that is the civil standard of proof. The Second Arm of Sussex Justices
must be seen as falling well below 51% probability in so far as it allows the material facts of 
remote but reasonable possibilities to pass the test for proof. In this sense, the Second Arm of 
Sussex Justices conflicts with the Anglo-American civil standard of proof in use in ICA 
today. 
3.4 A Sunkist compromise?
The key can be found in a proper balance: est modus in rebus. In certain United States appeal 
circuits (principally the Second and Eleventh), courts distinguish between the level of 
impartiality required of party-appointed arbitrators and ‘neutral’ Chairmen – the writer calls 
this the ‘Sunkist Distinction’. An alternative to the flat imposition of a ‘real danger’ or ‘real 
possibility’ test may be to observe a Sunkist Distinction, and use the Second Arm of Sussex 
Justices for Chairmen and the Second Arm of Gough (or Porter v Magill) for party-appointed 
arbitrators. It was observed in Chapter 4 that this is the approach taken in domestic arbitration 
in the United States, and the writer has shown that there is also authority for it in 
Switzerland
70. In the writer’s opinion, the Sunkist distinction simply acknowledges what is 
already accepted in practice: there is a difference between positive bias and general sympathy 
for the party that appointed you
71.  Of course,  the rule in Sunkist  has its critics. Of the 
distinction between party appointing arbitrators and chairpersons drawn by the ICSID 
tribunal in Amco Asia
72, Tupman has said
unquestionably all members of the tribunal in international arbitration should be held 
to the same standard of independence, whether appointed by a party or not. The 
concept of a non-neutral arbitrator as it exists in some Common Law systems simply 
   
70 See for example BG decision 9 February 1998[1998] Bull ASA 634; BG decision 30 June 1994 [1997] Bull 
ASA 99 
71 Hunter, M., Paulsson, J., ‘A Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration?’(1985) 
13 Arbitration 153
72 Amco Asia v Indonesia, ICSID Case ARB/81/1, Decision on Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator (24 June 
1982)(unreported)299
has no place where the parties are of different nationalities and might lose faith in the 
process if a foreign, apparently lesser, standard were applied 
73
Whilst the writer respectfully agrees that a single body of rules for bias is  desirable in 
international commercial arbitration, the writer also submits that the recognition of a Sunkist-
type split standard is not inconsistent with such uniformity. Principles of waiver and 
collateral estoppel support the Sunkist distinction: a party who has participated in proceedings 
before a tribunal of two party-appointed arbitrators and a ‘neutral’ chair should not be able to 
complain about the purported eventuation of a risk to which they consented when the tribunal 
was formed: violenti non fit injuria. Both parties should be estopped from denying that they 
accepted the foreseeable sympathies of the other’s appointee when the tribunal was formed. 
The writer is of the view that a collateral estoppel (or implied waiver argument) arises out of 
the very act of accepting a ‘two and one’ tribunal in the arbitration agreement – why have an 
‘umpire’ if deadlock between the party-appointed arbitrators was not a live prospect to the 
parties when they negotiated their dispute resolution clause? If some level of  latent 
preference or familiarity amongst the party-appointed arbitrators was not tacitly  mutually 
acceptable then the parties should have chosen a sole arbitrator or agreed to an entirely
institution-appointed tribunal. The international customary Presumption of Competence
dictates that the parties were aware of this option and chose not to take it. At the very least, 
where party-arbitrators are provided for, previous appointments should not be valid grounds 
for challenging the other party’s arbitrator. Holding the parties to their bargain requires 
imposition of a more rigorous standard of impartiality on the Chairman than the party-
appointed  arbitrators. It should, therefore, be more difficult to challenge another party’s 
arbitrator on the basis of apparent bias than it should be to run the same case against the 
chairman. This outcome would be achieved by reserving the Second Arm of Sussex Justices
for Chairmen and leaving the others to Gough.
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4. General Arguments for a Higher Threshold
At this stage it is possible to make submissions in favour of a higher threshold for 
disqualification which take in both arms of the Gough test. These arguments take in a range 
of concerns, including policy considerations, commercial necessity, and outcomes derived 
from formalist reasoning and comparative law. 
4.1 In Favor Contractus and the ‘Mitsubishi Doctrine’
It has been said that ‘There is no way to put the parties in an identical procedural situation 
and no need to do it, either.’
74 The writer has argued that a standard that addresses this reality 
is necessary for the proper functioning of the system of international arbitration. Arbitration 
is a creature of contract and ‘should be understood primarily though the lenses of contract 
rather than adjudication’
75. The agreement to arbitrate is a contract. Eminent scholars agree 
that ‘arbitration agreements are in general submitted to the same type of rules of 
interpretation as all other contracts’
76. It is trite law that contractual terms are to be read in a 
manner that favours their effectiveness. This rule of interpretation is codified at Article 4.5 of 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 1994; Articles 5.103 and 
5.106 of the Principles of European Contract Law 1998. Favor contractus is lex mercatoria
77, 
as are the related rules of effet utile and in favorem validatatis
78. 
There is a well developed specific body of authority for the proposition that an agreement to 
arbitrate must be read in favor contractus. One view is that Article II(3) of the New York 
Convention, which requires the courts of member states to enforce an arbitration agreement 
unless it is ‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’, demands this 
approach. This is supported by the fact that Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (1969)
79, to which many New York Convention signatories are also party, 
requires that the words of Article II(3) of the New York Convention be given their ordinary 
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meaning, and be read in good faith and in a manner consistent with the objectives of the state 
parties in signing the Convention
80; the same can be said of the words ‘public policy’ at New 
York Article V(2)(b). Since  Mitsubishi  US Courts have consistently held that arbitration 
agreements must be interpreted in favour of arbitration
81, and most states with pro-arbitration 
policies have subsequently agreed with this policy
82. Beneath the treaty superstructure, at the 
level of the contract, the Mitsubishi Doctrine equates to in favor contractus. The decision of 
the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Comandate Marine is a recent example of 
a state court following the Mitsubishi Doctrine to an in favorum contractus construction of 
the arbitration clause
83. 
The courts of New York Convention member states can today be expected to interpret an 
arbitration clause positively  in favor contractus. Where arbitral awards are concerned 
contract law must be taken into account at all times, including the enforcement stage. The 
agreement to arbitrate is a bargain the parties must be held to pacta sunt servanda. The 
rendering of an award is merely a stage in the arbitration contract; the enforcement of the 
award is the final stage. As a quasi-contractual document the award should be read in favour 
contractus with the effect that de minimis breaches of the contract (such as non-serious 
departures from procedural fairness) should not frustrate its performance. This contractual 
approach is complimented by the Gough test for bias. A corollary of it is that an arbitration 
agreement – the undertaking that enables the award - should be read as excluding those 
procedural rules that frustrate its operation. The writer would place Sussex Justices in this 
category of rules: this thesis has shown that the Second Arm of Sussex Justices sets the bar 
too low, with the effect that parties to arbitrations in Sussex Justices seats are better placed to 
frustrate proceedings by tactical challenge than they would be in a Porter v Magill or Gough
jurisdiction (where the prospect of success would be much lower). 
4.2 Manifest breach of procedural public policy
The New York Convention Article V(2)(b) ‘public policy’ bar is set high deliberately. State 
courts show an increasing awareness of this. The reader will recall that observations to this 
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effect were made by the Court of Appeal of British Columbia in Quintette Coal. In Chapter 3
we saw that Swiss, German and even French courts have acted similarly, all showing a 
willingness to use a higher threshold  for bias challenges post-award. In Chapter 4 it was 
observed that US courts will only refuse to enforce awards that offend the ‘most basic notions 
of morality and justice’ of the forum state
’84. In Fertilizer Corp of India this understanding of 
procedural public policy caused the ‘actual bias’ defence to enforcement to fail. Many other 
states  recognise that, in the public policy clash between finality and fairness at the 
enforcement stage, finality should win unless the breach of procedural fairness is found to 
have been egregious. 
Professor Georgios Petrochilos says procedural public policy will only be offended – and the 
award exposed - when the breach is ‘patent’ or ‘manifest’
85, and the writer agrees. A breach 
will be manifest when the court does not need the assistance of counsel to see it. This 
translates to a preference for a higher test for bias, possibly even a requirement that actual
bias be shown for enforcement to be defeated. In the United States, Germany and Switzerland 
there is certainly a de facto higher threshold for bias challenges in foreign award contexts. 
There is no good reason to apply this standard to the product and not to the process. A similar 
approach should be taken with pre-award challenges, and it is submitted that application of 
the Gough test would achieve this.
4.3 ‘Narrow’ international public policy
State courts are usually careful not to impose their forum standards on foreign courts
86, and 
generally apply a looser public policy standard (which takes the narrower form of 
‘international public policy’ or ‘ordre public attenue’) to foreign judgments than that which 
they apply in purely domestic legal relations between their own citizens
87. They do so to take 
account of the facts that 
(a) the legal situation created by the foreign judgment is not closely, or at any rate not 
exclusively, connected with the forum; and 
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(b) the foreign judgment has been pronounced by an authority of a foreign state, 
thereby purporting to create legal rights and obligations under its own legal system
88.
If arbitral awards are just an especially portable kind of foreign judgment, then it would seem 
reasonable to take the same approach and construe procedural public policy narrowly at the 
enforcement stage. When the procedural breach is a lack of impartiality or independence, 
applying Gough would be consistent with the traditional, looser procedural standard applied 
to foreign court judgments. This submission is especially strong where the award has been 
rendered in a double-exequatur state, and has been confirmed by a municipal court before 
being exported by the award creditor. 
4.4 Finality
A recurring theme of this  thesis is that public policy has substantive and procedural 
dimensions
89. There is an undisputed procedural public policy in favour of procedural 
fairness and equal treatment of parties in legal proceedings. But there is also a substantive
public policy in favour of arbitration as a means of settling international commercial 
disputes
90. Finality serves the purpose of efficiency in terms of an expeditious and 
economical settlement of disputes; Dolzer and Schreuer observe that ‘in international 
arbitration, the principle of finality is typically given more weight than the principle of 
correctness’
91. When they decide appeals against challenges, the courts of leading Common 
Law seats often preface their determinations with approximations of this policy rule: in the 
Positive Software case of 2007, for example, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
noted the risk that post-award bias challenges pose to the finality of arbitration
92. Efficiency 
and finality are pillars of any pro-arbitration  public  policy, US or not: challenges to 
arbitrators undermine both. The writer has shown that the practice of challenging arbitrators 
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is on the increase, especially in Europe. Leading practitioners Redfern, Hunter and Blackaby 
observed
Challenges to arbitrators were at one time a rare event. If a vacancy occurred it was 
usually because of the death or resignation of an arbitrator. However, modern 
commercial arbitrations often involve vast sums of money, and the parties have 
become more inclined to engage specialist lawyers, who are expert in maneuvers 
designed to obtain tactical advantage, or at least to minimise a potential 
disadvantage
93  
We know from costly experience that frivolous  bias  challenges  – ‘the machinations of 
mischievous men’
94- cause delay and create enforcement risks; these are the objectives of 
those who practice the Black Arts. We can summarise the basic needs of those who use ICA 
in one sentence: when an award is made it must be final. The finality of the arbitral process 
requires that measures be adopted which limit the right of challenge to situations where there 
is a real danger of injustice. In the writer’s view, this is what the Gough test does: it makes 
the Black Art of bias challenge less effective. 
4.5 Adopting Gough has no effect on the Rule in Dimes
In Chapters 2 and 3 the writer traced the evolution of the rule against bias, noting that nemo 
judex is now absolute in most states. Naturally, the writer takes no issue with this: it is and 
must always be the case that no man may be a judge in his own cause. In the Common Law 
world this fundamental rule of procedure is known as the Rule in Dimes; it is a rule of 
automatic disqualification which properly applies to judges and arbitrators alike. The Rule in 
Dimes is subject only to de minimis: a judge (or arbitrator) will not be disqualified for a mere 
trifling interest in the cause before them. An interest does not need to be pecuniary to trigger 
the operation ofthe Rule in Dimes. Where there is actual bias the Rule in Dimes will function 
to automatically disqualify a decision maker or, where they have already made a decision, 
render their judgment or award null and void. Despite Pinochet (No.2), the rule of 
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disqualification for the appearance of bias – be it as expressed in Sussex Justices, Porter v 
Magill or Gough - is entirely separate from the Rule in Dimes; it can be modified without 
affecting the fundamental procedural rule of automatic disqualification for non de minimis
interest in the cause. This means that the arbitral process will always enjoy the protection of 
nemo judex. Whatever risk Gough poses to the procedural public policy of a state (or the 
integrityofthe arbitral process) must therefore be seen as offset by the continued operation of 
the Rule in Dimes. 
5. Adopting the Gough test would reduce the rate of challenge
One question remains: if the Gough test were adopted, either by the parties or the leading 
seats of ICA as the writer has suggested, would there actually be a downstream reduction in 
the number of bias challenges made in international arbitral proceedings?  It has been 
observed that, even though a challenge may not ultimately result in disqualification of its 
target arbitrator, it might still serve its purpose in the delay it causes to the proceedings. On 
one reading, this might mean that no amount of bar-raising would reduce the rate at which 
bias challenges are made because their capacityto cause delay would be unaffected
95. But for 
this to be so, delay alone would need to be the objective of the challenge, rather than delay 
and disqualification. In the writer’s view there are two main reasons why delay alone would 
not be sufficient as a tactical incentive for bias challenge. 
Firstly,  whilst the arrival of the Anglo-American technocrats caused  an increase in both 
demand and respect for challenge tactics, it should not be forgotten that the New World 
‘barbarians’ were Romanised shortly after the walls of  ICA were breached in the 1980’s. The 
customs of the predominantly European ICA community - which the new arrivals willingly 
subjected themselves to - worked against the legitimisation of the Black Arts. As Lord Steyn 
observed ‘The idea that arbitration is an honourable profession has long ago disappeared 
under commercial pressures. But the observance of good faith is still an enduring value’
96. 
There is still a widely held (albeit declining) view that frivolous challenges are bad faith, bad 
for arbitration:  it is ‘just not cricket’ to challenge arbitrators without good grounds. This 
view, which reflects a custom, has been born out of recent experience. The rate of challenge 
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has made it much more difficult to appoint an arbitrator than it was twenty years ago. Today, 
ICA practitioners often say things like ‘well, Professor Smith was the best man for the job, 
and we wanted to appoint him, but he would have been too easily conflicted out’. This is said 
most often in relation to the European arbitrators; the ‘divas’ of ICA. Whilst some practice 
areas are worse than others (investor-state disputes, for example, as especially exposed), this 
experience is shared by many arbitration practitioners. Because arbitration is a ‘game’ – or 
what Hayek would have called a cosmos, rather than taxis - the self-interested actions of the 
participants are limited. As a matter of professional ethics, the lawyer’s interests are de jure 
the same as the interests of their client. But arbitration lawyers will not make challenges they 
know are doomed to fail under a higher test because they know that they will suffer the moral 
and social consequences of their actions at later stages of the ICA ‘game’. The delay pay-off
is simply not enough incentive to breach the customary rule against frivolous bias challenge, 
especially when delay  can be achieved by other means (such as demands for further 
discovery) which are not subject to the same customary and moral proscriptions as 
challenges. 
Secondly, rules of black letter law reduce the legitimacy of delay alone as an incentive. Logic 
dictates that if a higher threshold for disqualification is used parties will be less likely to win 
when they challenge an arbitrator. Today, because the arbitral process is in the hands of the 
lawyers – who we can assume to be aware of changes in law such as the adoption of a stricter 
test for challenge and the consequences of such shifts – a higher rate of failure will make 
these operators of the system less likely to advise clients to challenge arbitrators. If an action 
will clearly fail, or will be unjustifiably oppressive or vexatious, or will give rise to 
unfairness, it will be open to the court to stay it on the basis that it constitutes an abuse of 
process
97. A party (and their lawyer) who takes a challenge to a municipal court where the 
Gough test is in force may, therefore, be abusing the processes of that court. In a Common 
Law seat the same party might be exposed to suit in tort (on the basis that they have taken the 
challenge to court for an ulterior or improper purpose)
98. Arbitration agreements contain an 
implied, general obligation to act in good faith
99: frivolous challenges may constitute 
breaches of this implied term, with the result that the challenger is liable to the other party. In 
addition, the lawyers running the challenge may even find themselves in contempt of the 
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municipal court. None of these outcomes are certain, but they do not need to be: an even 
remote risk of abuse of process, cross-claim in tort, a claim under good faith or a finding of 
contempt should be enough to turn parties and their lawyers away from  making baseless 
challenges. If delay is so important, the lawyers will simply find another way. 
In so far as it has the result of making delay alone the only probable result of a bias 
challenge, adopting the Gough test should cause a reduction in the number of bias challenges 
because the risks of challenge outweigh the reward of delay. There will, in the writer’s 
opinion, be a downstream reduction in the number of tenuous (and certainly frivolous) bias 
challenges if a stricter test is adopted. This conclusion is supported by Lord Steyn, who said 
‘it may well be that the emphasis in Porter on justice being seen to be done may lead to an 
unwarranted increase in challenges to arbitrators’
100. It is worth noting, however, that even if 
the Gough test were adopted, this forecast downward trend would be difficult to observe 
because of the general confidentiality of international arbitral proceedings. 
6. Conclusion
In this thesis the writer has shown that ICA is essential to the preservation of the rule of law 
in international markets. The New York Convention is the only international civil judgments 
enforcement pact that can claim anything like the coverage needed to inspire business 
confidence. Trans-national commerce must use arbitration to get the benefit of the New York 
Convention enforcement framework. The law and practice of ICA have developed as a result. 
Trading states have responded by harmonising their municipal arbitration laws, around forty 
five by outright adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law and many others by selective 
enactment of its provisions (eg. England). One Model Law provision that has enjoyed wide 
ranging legislative approval is Article 12, under which an arbitrator ‘may be challenged only 
if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or 
independence’. The writer has argued that this wording is so well represented in municipal 
laws and institutional rules as to make it lex mercatoria. But despite its virtual universality, 
this expression is read in different ways, and with different results. This is because municipal 
laws of apparent bias guide state courts in their interpretation of the expression ‘justifiable 
doubts’. In seats with lower thresholds for the appearance of bias – including France, The 
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Netherlands, Sweden, and Singapore - the Black Art of tactical challenge is clearly on the 
rise. The writer has given many examples of unsuccessful, often frivolous challenges run in 
courts in these states, and argued that the trans-national objectives of arbitration are offended 
by municipal laws that allow (or even invite) attempts to disqualify or remove arbitrators for 
trivial interests, associations and events. 
This thesis has identified three competing tests for apparent bias: Sussex Justices, Porter v 
Magill and Gough. These are the ‘sub-tests’ of Model Law Article 12. England experimented 
with Gough in the 1990’s, but reverted to a Porter v Magill ‘compromise’ (incorporating the 
First Arm of Sussex Justices and the Second Arm of Gough) in 2002. Apart from Malaysia, 
all of the Common Law seats that followed Gough now apply the test in Porter v Magill. 
Since the judgment in Commonwealth Coatings, American superior courts have imposed a 
high threshold for bias disqualification, but the current assault on the Federal Arbitration Act 
suggests that the days of this rule may be numbered. ICSID jurisprudence is, it appears, 
sliding in the same direction. The courts of the leading European seats – as well as the body 
of Strasbourg jurisprudence that floats above most of them – apply tests which, although 
varied in their curial expression, draw on both arms of Sussex Justices. For reasons outlined 
in this thesis, the writer is of the opinion that the Gough test, with its court-vantage and high 
Second Arm, is better suited to arbitration and arbitrators. But very few states agree. Rather 
than argue for amendment of the Model Law or a program of domestic statutory 
incorporation of the  Gough ‘real danger’ test, the writer has invoked principles of trans-
national commercial law, including the Doctrine of Party Autonomy and waiver, to argue that 
it is open to the parties to ‘take matters into their own hands’ and limit access to the Black 
Art of bias challenge by including a ‘Gough Clause’ in their arbitration agreement. 
There are a number of reasons why the Black Arts generally, and bias challenges specifically, 
have become more common as a feature of international arbitration. The actors and the 
context of ICA have changed dramatically since the New York Convention was settled in 
1958. The petrodollar arbitrations of the 1970’s attracted new participants, including 
institutions and multinational law firms. The arrival of the Anglo-American technocrats in the 
1980’s ushered in a new era of procedural specialisation in which international arbitration 
took on many of the distinctly adversarial, competitive qualities of Common Law litigation. 
These ‘New World upstarts’ projected their free market ideologies onto the Continental cartel 
of ICA practitioners, and sought to interrupt the cycle of experience and appointment that 309
favoured the European legal establishment. Bias challenges ranked high amongst the new 
competitive procedures, and they were used to good effect. By the late 1980’s the body of 
challenge jurisprudence was growing quickly. The observable success of challenge tactics 
caused the wider arbitration community to take notice, and their tactical and ethical 
legitimacy was quickly settled. Market approval led to the Problem of Demand as clients 
began to shop for lawyers skilled in the emerging Black Art of bias challenge, and, as the 
decisions discussed in this thesis demonstrate, bias challenges are now a common occurrence 
in ICA today. But the case law catalogued in this thesis is by no means exhaustive: many 
challenges have been run and decided in circumstances of the strictest confidentiality, and it 
is simply the case that we will never know for sure how regularly arbitrators are challenged. 
All that can be said for certain is that the immutable laws of supply and demand guarantee the 
future of the Black Art of challenge in international arbitration. The point has been made in 
this thesis that it is largely a matter for the parties whether they fall victim to the spell or not.310
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